

THE CIA AND THE MEDIA

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
OF THE
PERMANENT
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS
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DECEMBER 27, 28, 29, 1977, JANUARY 4, 5, AND APRIL 20, 1978



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THE CIA AND THE MEDIA

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 27, 1977

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF THE
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:15 a.m., in room 2322 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Les Aspin (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Aspin (presiding) Boland (chairman of the full committee), Mineta, and Wilson.

Also present: Thomas K. Latimer, staff director; Jeannie McNally, clerk of the committee; and Loch Johnson, Richard Giza, James Bush, and William Funk, professional staff members.

OPENING STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE EDWARD P. BOLAND

Mr. BOLAND. I have a brief opening statement. As the press knows and those who have been before this Intelligence Committee, this committee is structured into four subcommittees, and the Subcommittee on Oversight is chaired by the distinguished gentleman from Wisconsin, Les Aspin.

I believe that it is appropriate and fitting that the first hearings conducted by this committee's Subcommittee on Oversight are public hearings.

I feel that the topic which is the subject of these hearings, the relationships between the CIA and the press, is a very crucial one.

We are a nation that values a free press above many other highly prized rights. Our long-standing conviction and our constitutional framework rely heavily on the unfettered exercise of free speech.

So we ought to consider the opinions which members of the press have on any relationship with the intelligence services, and we do so in an appropriate forum, in open session and on the public record.

At the same time, it is also appropriate to mention that our national interest, our position as a world power, and indeed, our very survival in this nuclear age, make it imperative that our Government and our policymakers have the necessary intelligence to enable them to act in an informed fashion and for the common good.

Thus, our need for an effective and reasonably unfettered intelligence capability is also very strong. I say reasonably unfettered. This committee was created to insure effective congressional oversight of intelligence activities. It will not become the unquestioning

ratifier of all that the intelligence community proposes. But its duty to insure a strong and dedicated intelligence service is just as strong as its obligation to prevent abuse.

Much has been made in recent years of the ill that the CIA and other Federal intelligence agencies have begot. Unfortunately, but correctly, theirs is a profession where the successes and the triumphs cannot be trumpeted.

The press has been the tool by which not only the CIA but congressional oversight of the CIA has been reshaped in the recent past.

The service that our news media have played has all in all been a very useful one and a very necessary one, perhaps one which only the press could provide.

We meet today, however, to explore the press's relationship with the CIA in another context.

Simply stated, we know that in the past the CIA has had contractual relationships, paid and unpaid, with individual journalists in both American and foreign news organizations.

In some cases, officials of these organizations were witting of these relationships; in others not.

Some of the journalists did positive intelligence gathering for the CIA; others merely exchanged information or offered information on their own.

Some journalists went further; they published stories both true and false for the CIA or they helped recruit agents. Sometimes the journalists weren't really journalists at all, but rather CIA agents under cover.

No doubt the motives behind the relationships were varied. There are a number of questions which arise from what we know of these CIA-press relations. They reach the very heart of a free press, its impartiality and credibility, and they raise the possibility that Americans at home can be victims of disinformation sown by their own Government. Sometimes the likelihood of such a result is small, but we are here to explore even remote possibilities.

We are also here today, as we will be in the succeeding hearings, to explore whether the CIA should be involved with the press at all, and if so, to what degree and under what restraints.

The CIA, under its new Director, Admiral Stansfield Turner, whom we will hear toward the end of these hearings, has recently issued newly revised regulations on just what sorts of relationships it will allow itself when dealing with individual members of the press and their employer organizations.

We will consider the guidelines in light of what we hear from representatives of the intelligence community and the press.

We will try to explore each possible relationship as well as the larger ramifications each may present.

Lastly, we will seek the opinions of our witnesses about what, if anything, ought to be done about CIA-press entanglements, and if some remedy is called for, whether it is the Congress, the press or somebody else who ought to pursue it.

Let me close with this observation.

This subject matter is undoubtedly one where black and white give over only too quickly to great areas of grey. That is why this

subcommittee has scheduled as exhaustive a series of hearings as possible.

And that is why we have asked this distinguished group of witnesses to appear before us.

We are not interested in drawing attention to past excesses of intelligence activities. We are aware that access to and knowledge of past excesses are essential to shaping a better future in this field. The important thing to remember as we plunge into what follows is that we want to emerge, if possible, with workable suggestions for a stronger press and a healthy, efficient CIA.

That might be a tough order, but our system of government deserves no less.

I want to express my appreciation to all the witnesses who have agreed voluntarily and on their own to come before this subcommittee, and I am delighted that the subcommittee is chaired by the distinguished Member of Congress from Wisconsin, Les Aspin and that the ranking minority member is Congressman Bob Wilson of California.

And so Mr. Aspin, as I have indicated, chairman of the Oversight Subcommittee, will handle these hearings.

May I thank you very much, Mr. Colby, for your appearance here this morning.

Mr. COLBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

OPENING STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE LES ASPIN

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Chairman, today we open a series of hearings on the relationship between the intelligence community and the media. This is only part of a very much larger subject of the relationship between the intelligence community and other American institutions, the academic community, the publishing houses, and others. Eventually, we hope to hold hearings on all of them, but today we begin with the media.

To begin with the CIA-media relationship is the most important, perhaps the most difficult, and certainly potentially the most sensational relationship of all; important because of the first amendment to the Constitution; difficult because the CIA has issued a number of directives on the subject over the years, the latest being Admiral Turner's earlier this month; and potentially sensational as witness the number of stories and articles done on the subject. The latest in the New York Times is being published right now.

It is important to say at the outset that these hearings were not set up to learn the names of journalists who may have been working for the CIA in the past nor were they set up to try and uncover more abuses from the past. The hearings have been designed to try to determine what, if any, is the proper relationship between the media and the CIA, or in other words, in what way is the CIA like other Government agencies and should be treated as such by the press, and in what way is it different from other Government agencies?

To answer such questions, we need to have experienced intelligence officers to tell us what kinds of relations with the press they consider useful and ethical, and why; and we want the media to tell us what kinds of relations they consider harmful and unethical and why.

To begin the hearings, and hopefully shed some light on the first of these questions, we have our first witness today, Mr. William Colby, a former Director of the CIA.

Mr. Colby, it is a pleasure to welcome you here this morning.

Mr. COLBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I'm delighted to be here.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Wilson, do you have anything?

Mr. WILSON. No, I just want to welcome Mr. Colby, and let's play ball.

Mr. ASPIN. It's your floor.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM COLBY, FORMER DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. COLBY. Mr. Chairman, I have a prepared statement which I have made a few minor changes in, but if I may I will just read that to you.

Thank you for this opportunity to contribute to what I hope will be a clarification of past relationships between CIA and the press, and the identification of appropriate guidelines for the future.

I speak as one who swore to support and defend the Constitution, including its first amendment protecting our free press, through the contribution which an effective foreign intelligence service can provide.

First, I think that a number of concepts and distinctions need to be clarified, as some of the basic elements of the subject have unfortunately been confused and jumbled in the diffuse debates on this topic. Fundamental to any discussion must be an understanding of the nature of modern intelligence as the gathering and analysis of all relevant information on the international problems affecting our country. The central features of this process are the most advanced disciplines of scholarship and technology, not merely the old techniques of the clandestine trade.

Thus, it is essential to recognize the important CIA responsibility to collect what is known as overt information. This includes such noncontroversial activities as subscribing to journals and news services, gathering technical publications and encyclopedias, and recording and analyzing the public radio broadcasts and statements of the other nations in the world. It also includes CIA offices in some 40 cities of the United States to request our fellow citizens to share with their government information they may have about foreign matters.

In this overt information capacity, the CIA is merely a subscriber to the product of our journalists and the recipient of whatever information the citizen wishes to give his Government. To the extent that newsmen have contact with CIA in informal exchanges with CIA station chiefs abroad or analysts at home, no interference with the independence of our press takes place, and both sides benefit from the exchange of knowledge.

Of course, some relationships have in the past gone beyond these, and have included CIA employees on intelligence missions abroad who served as real or pretended journalists. I myself have handled such individuals in my service abroad. But here again, some distinctions need to be drawn. For example, my agents and I had a clear understanding that they did their intelligence work for me, but that the news reports they wrote were a matter between them-

selves and their editors and were not given prior clearance or direction by me.

The reason for such an understanding is simple. The function of the CIA is to work abroad, not to determine the content of American media. The many discussions on the subject of CIA's relationships with the press have not brought forth cases of CIA operating covertly to control what should appear in the American press. While this may have been only an understanding in the past, not a clearly articulated regulation, and while this may not have been followed in some isolated instances, a serious examination should recognize the existence of this restraint to put to rest any myth that CIA dominated our media output in America.

Indeed, the recent New York Times review of this subject essentially confirms that CIA's efforts to affect public opinion were aimed abroad, conforming to its mission assigned by a series of American Presidents and supported by a series of American Congresses.

A third important distinction is between CIA's connections with the press, American and foreign, to collect intelligence, and the more aggressive mission which CIA had in the past, and parenthetically has in far less degree today, of influencing political developments in foreign nations. Obvious means for exerting such influence have been foreign journals and other media affecting political opinion, attitudes and actions in those countries. For many years, clear doctrinal differences have governed such work, differentiating between so-called white propaganda, acknowledged openly by its source, that is, the U.S. Government, in which case it would not be a CIA task; gray propaganda, unattributed to some ostensible third source; and so-called black propaganda which pretended to be the output or even an internal document of the target group. For example, this last category was a particular favorite of the Soviet intelligence services with their department of disinformation, such as the bogus American documents distributed in Africa and described in Congressional hearings in 1961.¹

While some black propaganda was indeed produced by CIA and circulated abroad, by far the largest part of its effort fell in the so-called gray area. This included the support of journalists and other media circulating material beneficial to the United States, and such larger operations as Radio Free Europe, which was formed under ostensibly private sponsorship to avoid the diplomatic constraints applicable to governmental emanations.

It is fashionable today to denounce these efforts as products of the cold war and to condemn individual instances which were failures or even reckless. But a larger view of the cultural and intellectual battle which raged in Europe and the less developed world in the 1950's and 1960's would recognize that CIA's support of the voices of freedom in the face of the massive propaganda campaigns of the Communist world contributed effectively to the cohesion of free men during that period.

And I say that the recent New York Times disclosures of the tactical maneuvers and stratagems of that conflict should not

¹Hearing before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate entitled "Communist Forgeries," June 2, 1961.

dismay us today, but should rather give us pride that our Nation met those challenges with the weapons of ideas, and in fact won that ideological battle without recourse to bloodier weapons.

It has been suggested by some critics, especially some members of the press, that CIA should have absolutely no contact with any element of the news media, that CIA be treated as some sort of pariah which would contaminate by its shadow. Since the journalists' product with the United States has been and remains free of influence by CIA, the major reason advanced for such prohibition is that the revelation of one American journalist as an intelligence agent or contact would cast suspicion on all other American journalists and adversely affect their ability to perform their true functions.

With all due deference to this thesis, the facts do not bear it out. Foreign nations, and especially hostile foreign nations, are not apt to believe protestations that our journalists have no intelligence relationships, however firmly we declare them. Indeed, false charges of being intelligence agents are periodically made against American journalists, either because another nation does not believe our claims of restraint, or more often, because it opposes unwelcome inquiries by anyone, including journalists. The close relationships between journalists and intelligence services in almost all other nations, including some impeccably democratic ones, will continue to be regarded as the norm and will not be changed by our forbearance.

Even in those cases in which we have absolutely set a bar against intelligence connections with American programs, such as the Peace Corps, we regularly see individuals of those services expelled from other nations for pressing their inquiries or their work too far. The fact that they have no contact whatever with CIA has not protected them, nor would a similar prohibition protect our journalists in the future. Indeed, this ostrich-like tendency to pretend that journalism can be purified by a total separation from CIA bears a strong similarity to Secretary of State Stimson's closing of a code-breaking unit in the Department of State in the 1920's with the comment that "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail." Secretary Stimson presumably believed that he lived in a world of gentlemen. But when he became Secretary of War a few years later, Mr. Stimson was reading as much Japanese mail as he could obtain, having learned that the real world is not populated solely by gentlemen.

I believe certain principles should and can be identified to insure both that the independence of our press under the Constitution is respected and that our intelligence service can accomplish its mission to help preserve that independence. This should include a regulation reaffirming the long understanding that our intelligence services in no way control the content of information or opinion in American media. To enforce this rule, the House and Senate have established these permanent committees on intelligence, and they can insure that our intelligence services adhere to such a regulation and carry out only those activities directed by the President and acceptable to these committees.

Given such arrangements, I strongly recommend that we not establish any blanket prohibition against any relationship whatso-

ever between American journalists and intelligence services. I would particularly hope that we would not be so foolish as to forbid any relationship between American intelligence services and the journalists of foreign and even hostile powers. We do not need, for example, the self-inflicted wound of being barred from intelligence operations targeted against TASS.¹

But I recognize the concern of our press over its independence, and thus I agree fully with some restrictions on the CIA's relationships with the American press. Some of those in existence date from the early 1960's; I instituted others in 1973; Mr. George Bush established more stringent ones in 1976,² and Adm. Stansfield Turner further clarified and limited this relationship earlier this month.³ I believe the subject fully covered at this point and suggest no further steps are needed beyond adopting Admiral Turner's directive as a formal regulation.

But having said this, I call upon this committee to discharge the other side of its responsibilities. You must control our intelligence services and insure that they follow the policies of our country. But you are equally obliged to insure that our intelligence services can function so as to protect our country. One of the greatest areas of frustration and difficulty in our clandestine intelligence work abroad is the subject of cover. Intelligence officers cannot be effective in hostile areas of the world if they wear the initials CIA on their hatbands. It is essential that we give these officers other explanations for their presence, and for their contacts with the secret intelligence sources that they must meet in other nations. They must be allowed to live and work without exposure to hostile counterintelligence services, to disaffected ex-employees, or to vicious terrorists. If you accept that intelligence work is important to the protection of our country, and both our laws and Presidential Executive orders say that it is, as does the very existence of this committee and its Senate counterpart, then you must also give CIA the essential tools with which to do its work.

The last 10 years have seen a critical erosion of the cover under which American intelligence officers must work. The Peace Corps, the Fulbright scholars, the U.S. Information Agency, the U.S. Agency for International Development and now journalists are off limits, and additional groups clamor to be included in this charmed circle. But if one examines the resident American community in many countries, it is obvious that the remaining areas of cover are few and that many CIA officers are all too easy to identify. And earnest investigators and even hostile groups are today busily engaged in programs to expose them.

Thus, I ask this Committee to compensate for barring our intelligence from the use of American journalist credentials by reversing the tide of prohibition with respect to official cover. This committee should insist that the agencies of the U.S. Government incorporate in their ranks small numbers of intelligence officers under proper administrative arrangements so that they are not revealed. This will no more discredit the work of those agencies than the proper performance of intelligence work under the firm guidelines and

¹The official Soviet News Agency.

²See appendix A, p. 331.

³See appendix B, p. 333.

supervision now established will discredit the United States as a whole.

With this change, our journalists can be kept immune, and intelligence can be improved. The melting ice floe of adequate cover has already led to the tragic death of one of our officers and the frustration of the work of a number of others. We must halt this trend and decide sensibly and seriously which parts of the American scene should indeed be kept free of connection with intelligence, and which can help discover the dangers and problems abroad about which our country needs to know in the years ahead.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you, Mr. Colby, for a very good and useful statement.

We want to welcome another member of the committee here. He is not a member of the subcommittee, but we are happy to have him and hope that he will be able to participate, the gentleman from California, Mr. Mineta.

What I would propose to the members of the committee is that we question the witnesses rather informally. I think rather than have any specific time limit, if we could just ask questions, and then when you come to the end of a subject, yield the time. I think we have enough time and not too many members; I think we would all be able to ask all the questions we have in mind.

Let me just start, if I might, with just a couple of factual questions, Mr. Colby.

One is the question in your opening statement where it states that "the melting ice floe of adequate cover has already led to the tragic death of one of our officers * * *".

Was that Richard Welch?

Mr. COLBY. Mr. Welch, yes.

Mr. ASPIN. OK.

My second question concerns where you talk about the disinformation programs such as the bogus American documents distributed in Africa and described in congressional hearings in 1961. I am not familiar with that.

Could you describe that, please?

Mr. COLBY. Well, they developed—there were various fake embassy dispatches, American State Department cables and things like that handed around to various leaders of African countries at that time to show that somehow the American government and CIA were involved in plots to overthrow them, and so forth.

The State Department sent a truth squad around to those countries to demonstrate by internal examination of the actual documents, compared with the format of real documents, that indeed these were bogus and were fake and were distributed with the idea of leading them astray.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you.

Let me just ask one question to start the hearings, and then I will yield the floor. Perhaps you could put it in as succinct a manner as you can: Why is it necessary for the CIA to have involvement with journalists at all? Why not say, OK, journalists are off limits?

You have mentioned, for example, the diminishing cover and that is a good point, but why journalists? What is it about journal-

ists that is so useful to the CIA? Why do you need them particularly?

Mr. COLBY. Well, I think you have to start back one point which is why do you have to have anybody other than an official representative of the United States abroad? Why do you have to have a fellow outside of the embassy official community?

Because he can get to people that officials cannot get to. Because he can circulate in areas without bringing with him the official presence of the United States. He can speak to people who would not speak to a representative of the American Embassy.

Now, obviously he is not going to be what is in our parlance a real spy, because a spy is almost by definition a foreigner who is within the other society, within the target group that you are after. But you do need to maintain contact with such an individual, and it is extremely difficult for a middle grade or junior officer in the American embassy to be meeting on a street corner with a member of a foreign politburo or the central committee of the Communist Party in some neutral country where that group is a real threat to what happens in that country. Therefore, you need somebody outside.

Now, if you look around as to who can do that best, the journalist can circulate perhaps the best. The local businessman has almost as difficult a time explaining why he is in contact with some local trade union member as an official of the United States, and, therefore, it is a matter of which possible contacts you could use as against how many there are and then what you are willing to do. As I say, I surrender on the journalist, but I think this is the reason why many countries have used journalists. They do have the ability to circulate much more broadly than many other intelligence representatives abroad.

Mr. ASPIN. So basically they can go and talk to a lot of people and ask a lot of questions without—

Mr. COLBY. Without arousing that degree of suspicion.

Mr. ASPIN. The other side of the question is what dangers do you see in the relationship between the CIA and the journalists? I mean, what is it that we are really trying to protect from your point of view?

Mr. COLBY. To me the key element is that our Government not determine what the opinion of our citizens should be. That is what our free press is all about, that the press make up its own mind independently as to what it puts in its media. And that I think is the critical element of the constitutional relationship. As I say, the problem of discrediting journalists by using them as intelligence agents, I don't think that is a substantial one, although naturally it is a matter of concern to everybody and that is a matter of the wisdom with which you use this, I mean, how careful you are to protect that cover.

But from a constitutional point of view, I think the fundamental thing is to prevent our Government from determining what our people should read in their free press.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you, Mr. Colby.

Mr. Boland.

Mr. BOLAND. I take it, Mr. Colby, that your position is and has been for some time that the CIA should not pay the journalists.

They should not be employees of the CIA, and additionally, journalists should not be under contract to the CIA; but the CIA, whenever it can, may obtain information from journalists on a voluntary basis.

Mr. COLBY. Well, I think I would extend the first part of your equation to a larger one, whether it is paid or unpaid, employed or not. I think this has been a moving regulation. I set up a regulation that the full time staff members of regular journals not be CIA contacts and active relationships. Mr. Bush cut that—reduced that by saying anyone accredited by an American journal, that is, even a foreigner.

Mr. BOLAND. How do you describe the word "accredited"?

Mr. COLBY. "Accredited" in that context I think means some indication from that particular journal or news media outlet that that person represents him in any way, either as a stringer, a freelancer, whatever, if he has a document, any kind of indication of sponsorship by that journal. There are many journals which had stringers around the world who presented themselves as representatives of particular American journals, although they were not regular staff employees.

Now, Admiral Turner's restriction goes further than that. It accepts the idea that no accreditation, no one foreign or American accredited by any journal, but then he adds a different element to Mr. Bush's. Mr. Bush has said no paid or contractual relationship. Admiral Turner's statement is no relationship, any relationship is off limits, and then he makes an exception for the independent exchange of views with the representative abroad, which I think is accurate, and I think that Admiral Turner's restriction, as I indicate, is probably the one that should stick right now.

Mr. BOLAND. Of course, no one would object to the independent exchange of views between the Agency and the journalist.

Mr. COLBY. Some would. Some would.

Mr. BOLAND. Some might?

Mr. COLBY. Some do.

Mr. BOLAND. Some do.

I would think that would be very few, though, because I would think most journalists and newsmen would recognize the fact that a great source of their information is the CIA, and they have to have the ability and judgment to really balance it and determine whether or not that which is said to them is really valid—whether it is white or whether it is grey or whether it is black.

Mr. COLBY. Surely.

Mr. BOLAND. And I would think the good judgment of those in the field, provided they have no connections with CIA, would give them the opportunity to determine whether or not the information which they seek and which they obtain ought to be used by them.

Mr. COLBY. I agree with you, Mr. Chairman. I think that more and more of CIA's product should be made available publicly as well as on background to journalists, and still protect the source.

Mr. BOLAND. Reporters, I think, and I am talking about accredited reporters, those who are not under contract and those who are not paid, would be perhaps the best source for information for the Agency in foreign nations. They have great lines of communications themselves to some people whom the CIA has no contact

with, and usually their personality is the kind that oftentimes will unearth stories the CIA could not unearth.

Mr. COLBY. Well, I think more it lies in the area of judgment and experience in that area. In some areas, the resident American journalist has been there for a number of years. He circulates around our Government and the local government and various other places, and then makes his own judgments as to what he writes for his journal, and is perfectly proper. The CIA officer is one of his sources. He checks in with him occasionally, the CIA chief of station. I think there is no problem with that.

Obviously most journalists will tell you that you don't just ask questions. You engage in a conversation in which there is an exchange and a discussion of information. Out of this exchange, some of the judgments rather than the simple information—the judgments of the journalist are of advantage to the local American CIA officer in getting a better understanding of the background of politics, the general culture of that atmosphere, and so there is a net benefit from it, but it is not a specific item of information reported to him.

Mr. BOLAND. Journalists use that tack pretty well, I think; instead of asking specific and direct questions, they are conversational and they are engaging.

Mr. COLBY. An exchange of views.

Mr. BOLAND. Unfortunately, at times they are not forgetful of those conversations.

Thank you very much.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Colby, many years ago Allen Dulles established a policy which said that we can neither affirm nor deny any charges made against CIA because to do so would be giving additional—would be giving information away and either denying or affirming in effect would be broadcasting the charges.

I think you probably made the major change in that policy when you came in, and I think I was somewhat doubtful about the validity of it or the wisdom in doing it, but I must say that with the cloud that CIA has been operating under as a result of Watergate and other such things, this policy that you adopted I think has proved to be correct.

Are you familiar with the new statement of CIA relationships, regulations on relationships with the U.S. news media that Admiral Turner—

Mr. COLBY. I have a copy of it, yes.

Mr. WILSON. Do you pretty fully subscribe to the new regulations?

Mr. COLBY. Yes, I think so.

Mr. WILSON. I think it might be well, Mr. Chairman, to put this in the record, the Central Intelligence Agency memorandum for the media because it should be a subject of discussion before this committee anyway.

Mr. ASPIN. Without objection.

[The information referred to appears as appendix B, p. 333.]

Mr. WILSON. Are there any specific points in this two-page statement, Mr. Colby, that you might differ with Admiral Turner?

Mr. COLBY. I think the phrasing of the paragraph 1(a), "enter into any relationships", that is very broad. That would presumably include the informal exchange, but then he gets out of that on the next page by saying that there are certain limitations on the policy that he stated, so that I think he solves that difficulty.

Mr. WILSON. But he does say in that "enter into any relationships" "for the purpose of conducting any intelligence activities."

That more or less, to me anyway, implies a contractual relationship for—

Mr. COLBY. I think, no, that would include a conversation with a local journalist discussing what is going on in the local government, because the obvious CIA purpose is to find out what is going on, and as I say, in modern intelligence, what is openly known is just as much intelligence as what is secret.

Mr. WILSON. Do you think that these policies will be unduly restrictive on the obtaining of information?

Mr. COLBY. Well, as I say, Mr. Wilson, I am concerned that this process of erosion continue, that I think I would agree with the chairman that the importance of the press in America gives it a very special status, but if we begin to running through large portions of the American scene and say each of those has a special status, we end up with nothing in the way of cover, and that I think would be dangerous, and therefore that is why I have dragged my feet on some of these things even though there has been self-restraint by CIA. I hate to see these restraints established because then other groups clamor to be included within the group.

Mr. WILSON. In other words, you are saying that we have gone about as far as we can go in this.

Mr. COLBY. We have. I think that there are a lot of other groups that would like to be included in this category of not having any relationship with CIA, and if this keeps on going, it will include some very broad groups indeed.

Mr. WILSON. Well, that brings up one of the points in your remarks, your statement about other agencies of the Government being allowed to participate on a regulated basis in helping the CIA.

Mr. COLBY. Yes.

Mr. WILSON. Is that—

Mr. COLBY. Well, that—you see, the strange thing is that it was really within the Government itself that this process of pushing CIA out of the way started, with the Peace Corps, the USIA, AID, all the other groups, the Fulbrights and so forth, and my point is that if there are private groups in America that we want to keep immune, fine, but one who works for the U.S. Government I think must accept the fact that he is a part of a large government and part of his obligations are to help the other aspects of the U.S. Government do their job. I don't think you could properly set up a rule that said that no Foreign Service officer will have any contact with any military officer. It would be flatly absurd, in other words, that he would try to keep himself totally apart from anything to do with force or violence or military affairs. That would be absurd.

Similarly, I think it is wrong for any part of the American Government to say they will have nothing to do with any intelligence work, if we conduct intelligence work under the guidelines and under the supervision that we now have.

Now, that doesn't mean that there won't be some mistakes, some exposures, some errors. That occurs in all elements of the government. I think the Congress does a very good job in pointing those out from time to time, and it will undoubtedly occur in intelligence in the future. But I think that we also have to recognize that intelligence needs cover in order to operate.

Mr. WILSON. Do you know of any similar restrictions on foreign governments' intelligence activities operating in this country? Of course, that was not your jurisdiction, but you must have been aware of some Russian intelligence operations.

Do they put restrictions like this on their—

Mr. COLBY. They do not. The Soviet ones, I know, are very broad in their relationships with their intelligence people.

Certain other countries do restrain themselves in this country just as we in certain other countries restrain ourselves.

Mr. WILSON. You mean we have to assume that anybody who works for a Communist government in this country—

Mr. COLBY. Might be.

Mr. WILSON [continuing]. Is a possible agent.

Mr. COLBY. Is a possible, and I don't think that makes very much difference. You know he is a possible and you pay attention to him as a possible. It doesn't affect his ability to operate as a representative of his government.

Mr. WILSON. That's all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BOLAND. Will the gentleman yield for one question?

As a followup to Mr. Wilson's question on whether or not other governments impose restrictions on the activities of reporters or the connections of those governments with newsmen, I wonder whether or not any of the departments of our Government impose these restrictions on our newsmen. I am talking about the State Department and other departments of the Government which, of course, have offices in many areas of the world.

Mr. COLBY. Well, certainly some of the our Government agencies have given instructions to their own personnel as to how to handle newsmen who come to the door, that they should be sent to the press office and things of this nature, and I think this is true in the military and other elements of the U.S. Government. It is what can only be called a defensive approach, trying to keep the access of the newsmen within some channels that the management of the agency can control.

I think that is different, though, from your question as to whether they are using them aggressively rather than defensively.

Mr. BOLAND. And whether or not any of those departments or agencies of the government might have had paid journalists on their staffs.

Mr. COLBY. Well, there are a certain number of journalists who have moved into press officer positions in the military, in the National Security Council and various other places and then returned to private life, and a few of them have written rather extensive discussions of what they learned while they were in the Government. I think there is some doubt in the press as to whether this is good practice. I know there is doubt in my mind as to whether it is a good practice. I think some of the articles we have read have been the kind of information exchange within the Gov-

ernment, and then to find it in the pages of the press a couple of years later in an expose I think is kind of a surprise.

Mr. BOLAND. Thank you.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Mineta.

Mr. MINETA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am just wondering with the recent directive put out by Admiral Turner, would you interpret it as saying that contact—at least for information gathering purposes—ought not to take place?

Mr. COLBY. I think what it says is that if you go—if you are a station chief in a foreign country, you would be proscribed from going to the local AP—American AP representative and saying will you go do this for me, whether you pay him or not. I think it would be proscribed. However, if he comes into the office or if you meet him at a party or have lunch with him and you discuss that is happening in the country as a general, well what do you think is happening and what do I think is happening, and there is a kind of an exchange of views, that would be all right.

It is the difference between leaving you with a mission or just exchange of views, and no funds involved in the exchange of views either.

Mr. MINETA. It seems to me one of the elements that distinguishes a democratic society from other forms of government is the fact that it is a two-way street. Information flow, and the public's right to know about what is going on, is a very great one and I am just wondering whether or not that flow of information, whether or not it is really "intelligence", isn't an important kind of facility that ought to be available to the press as well?

Mr. COLBY. I think it should in much higher degree than we have had it in the past and even than I was able to bring about. Quite frankly, I think that a great amount of CIA's intelligence—and by that I mean the modern intelligence, which is the accumulation of all kinds of information and then judgments about them, should be put out in unclassified form.

Now, there are many things that are unclassified today. We can discuss here in great detail the numbers and characteristics of Soviet missiles which we have learned from very sensitive and delicate sources, but we can talk about the substance. We don't talk about the sources.

I would like to apply the same principle that our press has, which is putting the substance of the information out but their insistence on protecting the source.

Now, I think that will require some changes in the normal procedures of intelligence, which has been to incorporate the source in the report. Therefore, if the report leaks the source leaks, and I think that we have to experiment with ways in which we can put the material out in unclassified form but without reference to the specific source so that you do protect the source.

Nobody knows who Deep Throat is, but we all have benefited by his information. Now, I think that is the standard I would like to apply to intelligence as well.

Mr. MINETA. And yet national security is usually the reason given for nondisclosure of even something that is already available in various media.

How do you distinguish that fine line between the public's right to know and that?

Mr. COLBY. Well, I would use the source as the distinction, the intelligence source, I think, though, that there is another area, however. There are certain things that you want to keep secret because they are a particular technological weapons system, say, that our country has. It has nothing to do with intelligence, but a particular secret that gives us a net advantage in the world for a certain length of time, you want to keep it secret. Some of our diplomatic relationships have to be kept secret.

To some degree in diplomatic exchanges, there are some situations that the other country can be well aware of but they don't want us to admit because then they are forced to react if we officially state it, and I think this is the category that frequently is thought of as a violation of any reason in national security to prevent the Government speaking. There are certain operations which have become exposed that other countries, that the press knows about, and yet that our Government has not spoken officially on. And it is deliberate. That not speaking officially is deliberately set in order to avoid pushing the other country into a corner and making him react.

In Khrushchev's memoirs, he very clearly points out that the thing that upset him about the U-2 downing in 1960 was not so much the U-2 flying over his country, or even the false cover story that CIA put out at the time about a weather plane off course. He says in his memoirs that the thing that really sent him up the wall and made him cancel the Paris summit conference was when President Eisenhower felt that he had to state that he personally had approved that mission. That made it a challenge. Up to that time he was dealing with a kind of an ambiguous thing as to who was responsible, but then it became a challenge by a chief of state that he had a right to fly over the other chief of state's country, and Mr. Khrushchev felt that he had to react to that particular challenge.

Mr. MINETA. You say you are concerned about the growing ring of exempt agencies for use of cover, and you don't feel that Government employees as such should be exempted.

Would you make a distinction between the public and private sector then?

Mr. COLBY. Oh, well—yes, I would say that if we could get a reasonable relationship with the members of the U.S. Government, whoever they may be—and there may be one or two that you would like to except there, just so long as it doesn't get too broad—then you could be more restrictive with respect to outsiders, with the private sector.

I would not bar anybody in the private sector because again that would mean that all intelligence officers were sitting in an embassy.

But nonetheless, I would think you could be a little more restrictive in the nongovernmental area if you are a little less restrictive in the governmental area.

Mr. MINETA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you.

Mr. Colby, let me just follow up on some of the questions that people have been asking about the Turner directive, because I

think your interpretation of it is very, very interesting and one that I wondered about myself. I guess eventually we are going to have to ask Admiral Turner when he comes up just what his interpretation of that memorandum is; but your understanding is that any relationships with full or part time journalists would mean voluntary things. That paragraph, coupled with the paragraph on the back, which says "does not deny any person an opportunity to furnish information," implies: What page 1 taketh away, page 2 giveth back—only in part, though, right?

Mr. COLBY. Only in part.

Mr. ASPIN. Because there certainly are voluntary relationships which a journalist might in good conscience undertake with the CIA, for example, allowing the CIA to prior task him, suggesting areas that he might look at. It has been suggested that members of the press have been asked and have in fact hosted parties to provide the chance for members of the intelligence community to meet some contacts, acted as couriers for information or money being passed, or conducted agents spotting, some of the things that are involved with identifying agents as potential spies—saying to this gentleman, here is a likely suspect, here is a good person, this kind of thing.

But it is your understanding that all of those things, even voluntarily, are barred by the Turner directive.

Mr. COLBY. It would bar anything other than the giving of information.

Mr. ASPIN. Of information, which is——

Mr. COLBY. Anything other than the giving of information.

Mr. ASPIN. And that has to be initiated on behalf of the——

Mr. COLBY. Of the newsman.

Mr. ASPIN. So really this would even bar calling up a journalist coming back and asking him if he would be interested in debriefing? Would that be barred by this, do you think?

Mr. COLBY. Asking him if he wants to, overtly, I think it mentions in there, would be all right, I think.

Mr. ASPIN. So you could ask him if he wanted to come out to the Agency and be debriefed and tell us what you learned.

Mr. COLBY. I think the point being the essential characteristic of the open relationship, that it would be an openly admitted relationship.

Now, that isn't necessarily true among other American citizens.

In other words, CIA frequently can assure to an American citizen who tells us something that we will not reveal our source, but I think in this situation we are saying that in the journalist area, we are not going to have even that kind of a quiet, confidential relationship. I think any relationship, the change from any paid or contractual to any is a very, very broad.

Mr. ASPIN. It seems to me when I read it I thought that was important.

Would it also, in your view, eliminate, for example, calling up and asking if they wanted to be prebriefed? That may not happen very often. I guess mostly the prebriefing is instituted on behalf of the journalist. But would the directive preclude prebriefing?

Mr. COLBY. Well, I think the prebriefing, again I would say yes, an aggressive chasing of a journalist would be excluded under this because there is a tasking involved.

I mean, if you tell him to look at what the factory smokestack looks like, you know——

Mr. ASPIN. It gets very close to the tasking.

Mr. COLBY [continuing]. Why, you are really giving him a chore.

Mr. ASPIN. Yes, I know, the dividing line between prebriefing and tasking is sometimes very, very difficult because the journalist will ask, well, what should I look at and what should I be looking for.

Mr. COLBY. Well, if he asks, then——

Mr. ASPIN. You can suggest.

Mr. COLBY. I would say sure, the questions we have about this country are what are the state of the health of the leaders, you know, what are the factions. These are the questions that we in the intelligence business don't know. There is no commitment that he is going to come back and tell us what he learned.

Mr. ASPIN. I think your interpretation is very interesting because I think that was my interpretation of reading the directive; and I think it is much bigger and much broader than anybody thought when Admiral Turner put it out.

Mr. COLBY. And again, I accept that, you know, the press is concerned about its independence, and let's recognize it.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me ask you about people in connection with the Turner directive because I think that is another aspect of the question.

We have got a chart that lists the people who are usually talked about in this connection with the direction.¹

First, is the full and part time accredited journalists, second, then, the stringers. Third, is nonjournalist staff employees. Fourth, is editors and media policymakers. And then, fifth, there is freelancers, and then, of course, the whole area of the foreign media; but the Bush directive of February 1976² really dealt with the first item: full and part time accredited journalists. The Turner directive——

Mr. COLBY. Stringers would probably be included in that, too, because normally the stringer is dealing with a particular journal.

Mr. ASPIN. All right.

Mr. COLBY. There would be some way——

Mr. ASPIN. Because there was some question as to whether stringers applied under the Bush directive.

Mr. COLBY. If you were a total freelancer, then I think it would be open, dealing with half a dozen different journals.

Mr. ASPIN. But anyway, the Turner directive does include stringers specifically. It mentions them.

Mr. COLBY. Yes.

Mr. ASPIN. So now we have full and part time accredited journalists and stringers specifically mentioned.

In the Turner directive, nonjournalist staff employees are fair game if management knows.

¹See appendix C, p. 335.

²See appendix A, p. 331.

Mr. COLBY. If management—yes.

Mr. ASPIN. So there is some question raised by some people whether that is proper or that is not proper; but there are two other areas that people have very often suggested ought to be included in a directive such as the one of Admiral Turner's. One is the editors and media policymakers, and the other is freelancers, particularly freelancers who write often for a U.S. news outlet. Those two are perhaps the ones that I think people say, well, the Turner directive or the CIA directive, really ought to be broadened to include those two categories if you are really concerned about the content of American media. Some freelancers who write frequently for the American press are certainly as important as full time accredited journalists or stringers, and others, editors and media policymakers, in other words, the people back in the home office who shape and help determine what gets in the paper or how the things is rewritten, or how it comes out, or editorial content, are equally important.

What would be your views about those two groups of people being included in a directive?

Mr. COLBY. Well, I would start from the point of view that a freelancer is selling his copy to whoever is going to buy it, both foreign and domestic, foreign and American, but he—I don't find any particular moral issue involved in the use of a freelancer in that respect because the editor to whom he submits his material knows that he is dealing with a total outsider, and so the editor is going to make an editorial judgment about whether this material should be used or not.

Mr. BOLAND. And they are going to be much more careful.

Mr. COLBY. He's going to be more careful, exactly, than about one that he has on some kind of a firm relationship.

Therefore, I would say that the broad phrasing here might exclude some freelancers, but that if a freelancer began to get an association with a particular journal and became known around the town as writing frequently for the XYZ Gazette, then, he would probably fall into the prohibited category. If he was just some fellow that sent home letters to the editors once in a while and maybe got a couple of dollars for one or two of them, then I don't think he is so set as an American journalist, in that sense, that he would have to be included.

Mr. ASPIN. How about the editors and media policymaker?

Mr. COLBY. The editors and media—in a way, they are journalists, let's face it.

Mr. ASPIN. I see.

Mr. COLBY. And in that sense I think they are included as journalists because they are an important part of the journalist function.

Mr. ASPIN. So your interpretation of the Turner directive would be actually to include those people already.

Mr. COLBY. Oh yes.

Mr. ASPIN. OK.

Mr. COLBY. I mean, I couldn't imagine anything you would want less than to have the editor of the something or other Times as a CIA paid intelligence officer. No, I think he fits clearly into the journalist category there.

Mr. ASPIN. When you say that the important thing is not to get something into the American media that shouldn't be, your position is very, very clear.

I am wondering about the question of credibility which is another thing that other people are worried about, to make sure that the American press remains credible. I think there are a number of people who would say that what we really ought to do is sever these relationships so that I as a reader of the press can believe what I read, and I think that some of those people might want to broaden that, and I am thinking particularly about freelancers.

Mr. COLBY. Well, I think the answer to that is that you as a member of the American public pick up a journal and you are reading information that comes from all sorts of sources—

Mr. ASPIN. Yes.

Mr. COLBY. Foreign, domestic, interested types, noninterested types, objective, very prejudiced, all the rest of it, filtered through the staff journalists and staff editors who decide what should be presented to the public, that you are putting your judgment, your faith in that editorial process rather than in the origin of the particular information.

Mr. MINETA. Would the Chairman yield?

Mr. ASPIN. Surely.

Mr. MINETA. I am wondering if we can make a distinction between the people and their work product because to a certain extent we are concentrating on the written media here; but what about the work product of, let's say television cameramen? Is that something that CIA should have access to or look at, say, a smoke-stack or a construction project that has some kind of a tube there, or an underground shelter program going on.

Is that something of importance?

Mr. COLBY. Well, some of the journalists take the position that anything that doesn't occur in the published—and that includes the TV media—on the project should be totally held away from government.

Now, I think many of us will accept that the government should not be able to subpoena it, that there are certain implications in the editorial process that are involved in that, but if the journal and the station openly and voluntarily, and openly I think is important there, without any secrecy involved, lets the official look at something which is not made public generally, as a voluntary act, without pay, without any kind of a relationship, I don't see any great problem with it, any any more than I see a problem with the American who travels abroad who comes back and tells his American Government that, gee, I noticed something very significant over there. I don't think that affects his independence. It would affect his independence if he were sent over there and paid to come back with the right information, but it wouldn't affect his independence if he just comes home and lets the Government know.

Similarly, I don't think it would affect the independence of one of our news channels to let the Government look at the full take on some particular set of scenes that were in an area of great importance to us, provided this was not any secret arrangement, just made available anything you want to see on this that would be very useful, go ahead.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. In other words, in a conversation over lunch or a martini, a newsman working for AP in some foreign city said I had an opportunity to visit some military base and I surreptitiously took some pictures.

Mr. COLBY. We probably would not want to take those, quite frankly, because we would be afraid that he would be arrested with that and with that evidence of passing it over to us, that that kind of thing would be very dubious.

But if he took his pictures and then he used half a dozen of them in his show, that he had 50 others, yes, we might like to look through the others.

Mr. WILSON. Well, that's sort of like it was covered in what Life and Time used to do. They always took 1,000 pictures for every 1 printed, and the Agency was interested in pictures they took of the May Day parade in Moscow, and so they weren't working for CIA if they showed these other pictures that were never——

Mr. COLBY. Sometimes if you get one picture of a weapon, it leaves you very dubious as to what the real measurements are. If you get another picture, you can tell them very precisely.

Mr. WILSON. Do you think that Admiral Turner's regulations would proscribe that?

Mr. COLBY. No; that's the voluntary furnishing of information. That's perfectly all right, I think.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Colby, talk for a little while about foreign media because I think that is clearly where the debate is now.

There's a number of people who have said that we ought to apply the same standards to foreign media that we apply to our own. I know that Senator Inouye has in his end of the year report¹ suggested that the foreign media be off limits to the CIA. The American Society of Newspaper Editors has made that suggestion.² A number of people writing, including Charles Seib, who writes for the Washington Post upon this subject, has said that foreign media should not be part of the CIA's assets and part of their apparatus.³

Why is it important to have the foreign media?

Mr. COLBY. I don't believe in unilateral disarmament, Mr. Chairman. I don't believe we ought to dispose of our Army and our Navy in the hopes that the other countries will do the same.

The fact is that there is an international ideological contest going on, a very significant one to people like Mr. Lenin, even recently Mr. Brezhnev who made a particular point of saying yes, co-existence, but no, that does not mean the end of the contest of ideologies. The ideology is a contest in terms of ideas. How are those presented? Through the media to the mass of the people, and consequently, I believe that we should not disarm ourselves in this contest in the hopes that the rest of the world will be gentlemen.

Mr. ASPIN. First of all, I guess the foreign media is used differently or is useful to the Agency in a different context from the domestic media. Really the thing that you want out of American journalists is usually intelligence. You are not anxiously using——

¹Senator Daniel K. Inouye, chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, report to the Senate, Dec. 1, 1977, p. 9.

²See testimony of Eugene Patterson, p. 242.

³See appendix F, p. 238.

Mr. COLBY. You try to stay away from them.

Mr. ASPIN. For propaganda or for agent handling or for anything else; but I take it in the foreign media those other things tend to be more important, and particularly with the propaganda aspect tends to be a lot more important.

Mr. COLBY. Yes, certainly, although I would say that you I am sure are well aware that the political and paramilitary work of CIA in the 1950's was something like 40 odd, 50 percent of its budget.

Mr. ASPIN. Yes.

Mr. COLBY. Very active programs of all sorts, everything from the war in Laos to the newspaper articles in various countries around the world. It was part of this context. Today that percentage has dropped to something less than 2 percent, I don't know the figures anymore, but I gather it is somewhere down in there, that is, there is very little of this going on because of the change in the nature of the world today.

But I look ahead to the next 10 and 20 years and some of the ideological contests that may come upon us, and I think that we are going to need a way of putting out information, views, opinions, ideas important to our country in foreign media, in foreign areas, and not just hope that they are going to cover them.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you. I think that is very good.

Let me tell you what the people who have made objections to using foreign media say, just to catch your reaction if I might.

One is kind of a moral, ethical position that what this country stands for—as opposed to our principal rivals in the world, totalitarian regimes, the Soviet Union particularly—is freedom of the press. I think one of the things that distinguishes our two forms of government is freedom of the press, and that freedom of the press is one of our big selling points and one of the things we use when we are in ideological dispute, arguing not so much with them but with Third World countries. Why is the United States better than the Soviet Union? We have a free press.

Isn't that undermined by a situation which allows the CIA to use the foreign media? By permitting us to treat foreign media differently from our own media, aren't we in a sense undermining our position in the world that way?

Mr. COLBY. Well, I think that the alternative—in the first place; no, I don't think so, because what we are talking about is life in the United States, and life in the United States does have a free press. Life in the United States has a lot of other qualities that attract people to us, free enterprise, our social security system, our prosperity, all the other things, the free workings of the Congress, all these—the free workings of the judiciary, all these attract to the United States. This doesn't mean that we have to impose them elsewhere, that we have to avoid dealing with anything other than free enterprise abroad, that we won't deal with a state economy someplace. It doesn't mean that at all. Of course we have to deal with them.

The other side of the point, however, is that if we abstain totally from any influence through this means, then we give it to the other groups who use this vehicle very assiduously. The best example of that, of course, was in western Europe in the 1950's, the

amount of covert assistance that was going into, say, the Italian Communist Party and its mass of fronts at that time was conservatively estimated as in the \$50-million-a-year category.

Now, we can abandon the field, say no, we won't have anything to do with anything else, and the situation will be dominated by those hostile views and hostile voices.

There are many hostile voices today saying what kind of society we have. I think you will find that in an examination of our use of this particular tool of foreign policy, the use of foreign press, that in general we have tried to put forward true stories. There have been a few that have been lopsided, but most of it is an attempt to get our story, which is a true story, and the truth of the opposing stories, the truth rather than the facade presented to the peoples of the world through their own press, and that, therefore, it is a matter of getting the information to them, and that if we don't try, if we don't get it through that vehicle, they won't learn it.

Mr. BOLAND. That is a pretty important weapon, in the arsenal of democracy, isn't it to get our word across?

Mr. COLBY. It is a very important weapon.

Mr. BOLAND. Which probably would prevent the more serious undertakings down the road.

Mr. COLBY. The intellectual communities in the early 1950's were heavily, heavily dominated by the press, the organizations of various cultural groups mounted and supported from the Soviet Union. We know that. Yes; CIA did involved itself in a lot of activities to meet that kind of a challenge, to support the people who believed in freedom, free thought. We supported journals, we supported organizations. I think we won that war because of the quality of life in this country, that freedom was put over as really existing here. But if we had not spoken, then the demagoguery of the other side might well have won in a number of countries.

Mr. MINETA. Mr. Chairman, is the measure whether or not something is a corrupting influence or not?

Mr. COLBY. That is a very difficult word to handle because obviously there are occasions on which somebody who has less than totally pure motives may think that he can get support to run some kind of an effort from the United States, and we have been involved in supporting things that really didn't work out very well because of the quality of the individual.

Generally, you try to look for an effective, good leader, speaker, whatever it is, and support him, but sometimes you make a mistake I think, the corruption thing would be hard to put as a guideline. I think that the problem is it is very hard to make guidelines, public guidelines of this nature, and that I think is why we have this committee and the corresponding committee in the Senate, so that you don't have to make these flat rules, that you can supervise and check each individual case, and in sort of a case system of determining policy by looking at each individual case and then gradually letting the policy grow out of the distinctions you have made.

Mr. MINETA. So far, our experience is the after-the-fact. We are closing the barn door after something has happened. I think what we are trying to do is figure out in advance what the dangers are we ought to stay away from.

Mr. COLBY. Well, I think that today—well, as I say, this 2-percent figure that I mentioned indicates that we are not dealing with a very large problem right at the moment. I think that there is an opportunity here to get some principles settled by looking at individual situations and finding some that are on the far side of the line and some that are clearly on the near side of the line and gradually determining from that where the line actually is rather than artificially drawing a line, finding it later to be in the wrong place, and then being unable to change it. I think that—

Mr. BOLAND. I wonder, Mr. Chairman, can you weight the value of the overt propaganda, that is, stimulated by the USIA, and the covert propaganda that is disseminated through paid foreign media.

Mr. COLBY. Well, I think the biggest propaganda that goes out of this country is carried by our normal news services. That is the thing that has the greatest impact abroad, obviously. The American news services, journals, TV, all the rest of the print and radio. Government is a very small portion of that total quantity of news and quantity of opinion going abroad. The USIA and the VOA, of course, have a certain amount of that.

We still do have the Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty which we took away from CIA a few years ago, but they are still continuing to take those voices back into areas that otherwise would not be supported in that way.

The additional aspect of the covert contribution, as I say, at this moment is very small, less than 2 percent of CIA's activities budget at the moment, but in that period of the cold war, it was very substantial and I think it had a major impact on the development of the policies of Western Europe in the 1950's, no question about that. It had a very substantial impact, and I think an even bigger impact than the official governmental machinery in some of those areas.

Mr. BOLAND. Is the USIA an important source of propaganda we are selling to the people who are listening?

Mr. COLBY. I think their charter is to put out accurate information about the United States.

Mr. BOLAND. Does it get through, and is it effective?

Mr. COLBY. I think it is in great part; yes. I think they do a very good job. I have known a lot of the USIA people and they have had a lot of contacts with foreign press and outlets around the world. Their libraries are very effective. They also are bombed once in a while to show their effectiveness.

Mr. BOLAND. Is it, or can it be, as effective as the foreign media that are using propaganda in describing our way of life and its benefits and blessings?

Mr. COLBY. Well, I think there are some situations in which an individual in a foreign country is going to accept what USIA says as the official view of the American Government about what it is doing, but if it reads what a local journalist-columnist writes as his opinion, then he is going to say well, that man speaks or thinks as I do. He is a conational of mine, and that is his view, and that seems to make sense.

Mr. BOLAND. Because a listener of the USIA certainly knows that it is an official outlet.

Mr. COLBY. An official outlet, yes.

Mr. BOLAND. This is propaganda or an official respresenting this Nation; while it would seem to me that the story in the foreign press would be more believable by people who read it.

Mr. COLBY. If it is a reasonable story, of course.

Mr. BOLAND. And the ability to circulate that would be more effective, too, in certain areas.

Mr. COLBY. In certain areas, yes.

Mr. WILSON. Mr. Chairman?

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Getting back to Admiral Turner's new directive and your interpretation of it, which I think is important because you have got enough background to know what he means——

Mr. COLBY. I haven't spoken to him about it.

Mr. WILSON. Well, I would be interested.

Assuming our case officers are so cleverly covert that a newspaperman, an American stringer in a foreign country, establishes a friendship with him and the case officer under cover as an agricultural attaché is not suspected of being a CIA employee—would you consider that relationship proscribed if he was pumping him for information or was feeding him information that could be useful?

Mr. COLBY. Yes; in other words, if the CIA officer were pretending to be the agricultural attaché, he obviously would have to deal with respresentatives of the agricultural press, he would have to talk to them and respond to their questions, and so forth, but if he then began to say, well, look, why don't you do this, you do that for his intelligence, total intelligence knowledge, and you can't distinguish covert from overt at this point, began to task him and use him, then I think he would clearly be getting over the line here. If he were just exchanging views on what it looks like in the agricultural areas, then that would be free.

Mr. WILSON. But supposing it is a foreign correspondent of TASS or whatever it is, and he is the agricultural attaché, and he wants to give the foreign guy misinformation about our crops or whatever it is, for some reason he wants to give some misinformation, this would not be proscribed.

Mr. COLBY. No; technically it would not.

Mr. WILSON. Because he is dealing as an intelligence agent, getting away with it in a covert manner, dealing with the foreign press, and the foreign press not being aware ostensibly of what he is doing.

Mr. COLBY. Right.

Mr. WILSON. So that is not a restriction.

Mr. COLBY. That would not be a restriction, nor would it be a restriction to go ahead and recruit that foreign newsman as a regular agent.

Mr. WILSON. In other words, he could actually, there is no proscription on his actually making arrangements with any foreign press person or editor or whatever.

Mr. COLBY. No, foreign press is not included.

Mr. WILSON. To feed him misinformation or elicit information from him.

Mr. COLBY. No, nor to help him run his journal. If his journal was one that put out a favorable look about the United States, he

would not have a restriction against recruiting the individual, providing him support in order that that word extended and went further in that country.

Mr. WILSON. Wouldn't any covert operators have to be very careful that they did not in fact give out false information that would find its way back into the U.S. press.

Mr. COLBY. Well, in the first place, false information, as I indicated, is really fairly rare that CIA is involved because it is checkable, and if it turns out to be false.

Mr. WILSON. Well, let's say military.

Mr. COLBY. The false information, he would certainly, giving it to a foreign newsman, I think that he would say that that is going to the foreigner. If he gave it to an American newsman, he would be giving false information to the American newsman, to send to the American media, that would be wrong, but if he gave it to a foreign newsman to run in the local paper——

Mr. WILSON. Well, Aviation Week would pick it up the next day, so we would have it back here.

Mr. COLBY. Well, I think Aviation Week would already have it.

Mr. WILSON. All right, thank you.

Mr. COLBY. But that is a problem, what is called the feedback problem, of being printed abroad and then being used here. It has happened very rarely, I gather, but there have been a few minor occasions on which it has.

Mr. WILSON. But I am with you in not wanting to have any more proscriptions. That is why I am trying to bring out cases where in your opinion——

Mr. COLBY. It would still work.

Mr. WILSON. It would still work despite these restrictions.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Mineta?

Mr. MINETA. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Very quickly, Mr. Colby, in your statement on page 7 you say:

I believe the subject fully covered at this point and suggest no steps are needed beyond adopting Admiral Turner's directive as a formal regulation.

Is it not already a formal form?

Mr. COLBY. Oh, it may be. I just—it says at the top that it is—"ordered implementation of the following regulations." I really am not in touch with Admiral Turner on this, and so I don't know, but just so that it isn't just a statement by one Director, that it is a part of the formal regulations of the Agency, affecting the behavior of the people in the Agency.

That may already have been done. I don't know.

Mr. MINETA. Let me go one step further.

Do we need legislation in this area, or should we rely on the ability of the media to protect themselves from being manipulated by the CIA?

Mr. COLBY. Well, I think that you may well have some legislative limits here, but I would suggest that they be very carefully phrased and not go into massive detail, but rather be more of a statutory principle, leaving it to be implemented by regulations which this committee can then review to see whether it is keeping in touch with the proper policies.

But I think it would be a mistake to pass every phrase of this into a law because of the difficulty of changing it. You might get in

a situation 10 years from now where you would like to change it, but if it is in a law, you couldn't, whereas if it were in a regulation you could with the approval of the committee at the time.

Mr. MINETA. Thank you.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Colby, let me go back again to the foreign media and let me press you a little further because you give very good answers; but I want to make sure that you have a chance to respond to the points that others will make when they say that by using the foreign media we succeeded and we won the propaganda war and it was important to get our point of view across. That implies that the CIA was unable to get its point of view across on its own.

— Is it your view, really, that the foreign media—and I don't mean TASS, which is obviously different—but is the foreign media, even in Western democratic countries, different than it is in this country?

Mr. COLBY. It is a bit different in their concept of their responsibilities. They don't have the firm constitutional distinction that we do between the press and the Government. There is much more of a symbiotic relationship in many countries, not all but many. I think many countries are tending toward our approach. I think that is what some of the international associations of journalists are moving toward, is more of a general recognition of a separate role of press from government, but you know, it runs everywhere from—and I don't mean just in the authoritarian countries—that the press is thought of as much more of an educational tool than independent.

Mr. ASPIN. An arm of the government or of a political party.

Mr. COLBY. Many countries view the idea of having their broadcasts and their TV as totally independent of government as really quite a shock.

Mr. ASPIN. Yes.

Mr. COLBY. Because in most of the countries of the world those services are run by government.

Mr. ASPIN. To be sure foreign journalists come with a lot of ideological baggage that is not part of our scene. I mean, they write for party publications, or the government controls the outlet.

Is that in part what you think is a justification or a rationale for why we should also make sure that our point of view gets in there and why it is necessary to have these kinds of contacts?

Mr. COLBY. No; I never justified what we did by what they do.

Mr. ASPIN. I see.

Mr. COLBY. I don't think that is a proper standard. I think we have to justify what we do by the necessity of defending our country in this era of independent states, and appropriate limits to what we will do, supervised by the Congress so that we stay within the borders.

Now, we haven't done this in all cases. Don't get me wrong. There have been all sorts of failures. But I think your ideal situation is to make an American judgment about what is proper and what is not proper, and then enforce it, and it really has nothing to do with what the KGB or the XYZ does in other countries. That is a total separate problem. "I don't do it, they do it and therefore we do it," is absolutely wrong.

Mr. ASPIN. OK. Thank you.

Let me ask the second big problem of using the foreign media. One is this kind of ethical question, the other is the feedback question.

You say that feedback is relatively rare; but how do you handle it? I mean, what do you do when you have got a story, we want to put it out in a foreign media, and you have got a number of chances for this to come back through "replay" or feedback?

The Church committee, I know, listed two major concerns that they had of feedback.¹ One was in an area of the world where there was not much coverage. If something had occurred and there were very few media in that particular part of the world at the time, whatever the propaganda was put out in that place tended to get picked up and relayed as being the most relevant news.

The second problem was for area specialists, people who were really specialists in the country, in universities and other things, who really follow an area of the world very closely. If we put out a story which is totally false propaganda, how do you protect those people against the domestic feedback of the planted story?

Mr. COLBY. It is a tough problem. I think I first have to say that. Second, there are certain things you can do. For example, we have had a relationship for many years that if a false story is put out by the CIA, that the Ambassador, somebody of this nature will be told of it so that he is not misled into believing that it is totally true. To some extent there have been cases that I have read indicating that Mr. Dulles or Mr. McCone or somebody went to a couple of the journals and told them not to use the material coming from a certain press agency that was being supported by us abroad. Now, that doesn't catch every individual citizen, but it does catch the major journals, the major people.

To a limited extent you could do that then. I am not sure you could do it now. Today you would probably generate a story by doing it, and, therefore, you can't do that now, but I think that let's accept that there may be a de minimis area here where if it is just a little story at the bottom of page 14, it really doesn't matter that much. If we report the fact that some political group is rising in strength and becoming better in a country, and if that is just a little item over here, it is not going to affect American opinion in the broad sense at all.

If it does become a major story in that country, then, maybe it is becoming a major fact as well. Maybe it started as just an idea and maybe as just a story, but if it becomes a major fact thanks to the kinds of support it got, then, it is a real fact even though it originated, and I think that was true of some of the cultural groups and political groups that we did support and assist in the 1950's and 1960's, that they became real facts, even though they were initiated deliberately as an effort to get another voice into the forum.

Again I go back to the basic point that most of these must have some basis in truth. Otherwise they won't fly, that the image of the totally false story suddenly dominating American media is just not

¹See final report of the Select Committee to Study Government Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, Report No. 94-755, book I, p. 197 ff.

going to happen, because in the first place, if it is that big of a story, if it is beyond the de minimis area, American media will start to focus on it and show there is nothing there. If it does become a big story, it becomes a real big story, even though it may have originated—

Mr. ASPIN. I think you put your finger on a more difficult part of the problem; these things are not just black and white. There is not a totally false story and there is a totally true story. What you really have, I would guess, in 85 percent of the cases, or maybe that is too high, is some kind of a story which has some aspect of fact to it, but then it is given a little bit of a twist or given some kind of an interpretation or a certain slant to try and get that part across.

How, then, can you protect against the feedback of that kind of slant? I mean, that is what seems so awfully difficult.

Mr. COLBY. Well, I think you there have to make the distinction between whether it is a big story, and if it really became a big story with no foundation at all, then you would have a problem. I think the post mortems of some of the coups that have occurred around the world have indicated that the propaganda quotient of it was very high as distinct from the actual force used, and that in at least two countries, the political situation in that country was changed by the degree of propaganda put out exaggerating the truth of a very small resistance group which then won thanks to that propaganda. Now, you can argue about whether we should have done it or not in each case, but the fact is that in that case you did produce a result and once the result was there, it was a result, even though it started with an exaggeration of the size of resistance that was actually there.

Mr. ASPIN. In other words, if you do the job well, the story becomes true.

Mr. COLBY. Yes, sure, if you support the XYZ party and it wins the election, it is true.

Mr. ASPIN. No; that is certainly the case. I am not sure that is what we want, but—

Mr. COLBY. You may want the XYZ party to win instead of the ABC party in that country which would be very hostile to the United States.

Mr. ASPIN. One of the cases where we do have some example of feedback on the record is the propaganda assessment that followed the efforts against Allende in Chile.

Now here is a case where the Church committee came up with the document that showed under the CIA's auspices there were stories planted and they were relayed throughout all of Latin America, and it did note that there was some kind of assessment and these did come back into American press in some of the major publications. I think what we really are concerned about is asking the question about when you have got a whole campaign like that, how do you do it? I mean it is not just a story where you can phone up people and say, hey, don't pay attention to this. It is a whole kind of campaign, a whole point of view which is being put out in many, many ways.

Mr. COLBY. Well, I think in that situation there was a legitimate difference as to what the true story really was. Now, in that

situation the one story was being put out, that the situation looked, we'll say, pink, and it was a question of whether enough attention could be gotten to the story that it was, let's say, green, so that the latter became at least competitive, or whether the government-supported story was going to dominate totally, and I mean the foreign government-supported story.

Now, the CIA program was to try to get the other story generally circulated and develop the amount of opinion that gave it credibility and gave it some attention, and in that case it was accepted that that was effective and the program centered around it, and some of the American press did pick it up.

I think that was another one in which the question was not whether the raw facts were true—they probably were true on both stories. The basic facts were probably true. The question was whether this selective group of facts was going to dominate public consciousness, or another group of facts would also be in public consciousness, and CIA's effort was to make sure that this set got a full run, and in that case it did, and in that case I think you got into another situation where with a reasonable amount of success in doing it, it became a real fact, that it really did become an appropriate interpretation of what was going on.

Mr. ASPIN. I am beginning to understand why there are so few black propaganda campaigns.

Mr. COLBY. Really, black is almost impossible to handle.

Mr. ASPIN. Is there a formal mechanism in the Government for alerting people on the black propaganda?

Mr. COLBY. Well, I can't say right now, but I know that there was one at various times. If there was a pure black story, then there were certain arrangements, we had to inform certain people—and I have forgotten who there were right now—but second, of course, you had the various committees which went under various numbers 40 and 303 and all those, and there is the present one, where the general program has to be submitted for overall approval, and today, of course, any such program would have to be brought here to this committee right away after the President has approved it.

Mr. ASPIN. But it really is mostly, I suppose, limited to fairly high officials in the Government, in the executive branch, the 40 committee and now——

Mr. COLBY. Yes; although there are staff members, some of whom have written books.

Mr. ASPIN. I don't know, it is a tough area because it probably doesn't go down very far and you have people who, of course, are probably very important in funneling or in making policy at lower levels who may be misinformed by what is going on.

You have got area specialists who are writing and who may eventually come into the Government and become high officials who didn't know at the time what it was, and when they come back in there is no attempt to brief them and say, hey, all of these stories were false. So, sure, the current Secretary of State knows but somebody who is out of Government, say, a lawyer in New York who is going to be the Secretary of State in the next administration, may get the wrong impression. It is just a very difficult situation.

Mr. COLBY. They are generally briefed on anything that is important to him. In other words, if he has to deal with the Prime Minister of country X, then I think he will probably be told that 10 years ago that CIA had something to do with his arrival in power through some assistance or whatever so that he will be able to handle the conversation. There have been one of two exceptions to that, too, but generally I think——

Mr. ASPIN. Do you think it is practical to try and notify media?

Mr. COLBY. These days it is practically impossible, unfortunately. As I say, I think either Mr. Dulles or Mr. McCone did this on a few occasions but today I would say absolutely impossible. You would generate a story right away, and you know, that is the relationship and that is accepted as fact, but let's not deprive ourselves of this necessary weapon.

Mr. ASPIN. Does anybody have any questions?

All right, let me go to another subject if I could, and let me ask about one area that you talked about in particular, made reference in your opening statement to an area of Agency-media relations that the important thing is that the Agency not be in a position to influence the content of the American media. Now, there is, or course, one area where you might be interested in influencing the content, and that would be to try and dissuade the media from using a story which you considered to be——

Mr. COLBY. I was rather heavily involved in at least one of those.

Mr. ASPIN. That's right, so the question is——

Mr. COLBY. I don't think that falls in this category at all.

Mr. ASPIN. No; this is a separate category, but it led into the question and I would like to ask you a couple of questions about that kind of area, the Bay of Pigs, the *Glomar*, events where you really do believe that the national security is important in this issue, and that what we are really trying to do is to prevent the story from getting out or maybe to delay the story. I guess my question is how should this kind of thing be handled? How do you handle a story when this happens?

Thanks to the Freedom of Information suit, we saw how you tried on one case. Is there a better method than that?

Mr. COLBY. That wasn't very effective.

Mr. ASPIN. No.

Let me tell you, I guess what worries me about it. First of all, I was a little uneasy about the methods that were being used. I mean, for example, the telephone conversations being recorded and investigating people, and a lot of stuff in the files about newspapermen and their motives. That is one aspect. But there is the second aspect of the thing that I think is almost bound to fail. When you start out with a story, you don't know who all has got it, you don't know who is writing it. First of all, it seemed to take an inordinate amount of your time, or the DCI's time, whoever happens to be in charge at the time.

Mr. COLBY. Mine.

Mr. ASPIN. Yours, in this case. It takes a lot of time. You are calling and telling a lot of people who didn't know the story on the off chance that they did and were about to go with it, becomes kind of a topic of conversation because newspaper X wants to make sure that newspaper Y isn't going with it, so they start communicating

to make sure that they don't break the agreement. It becomes the kind of discussion going on around the bar at the Press Club, more magazines start stomping the ground and looks like they are going to write an article, people ask, why is the press suppressing, not writing this story? Eventually it is bound to go because there are so many people involved, and indeed, it is almost bound to be a story bigger than it would have been before because of all of the kind of hype it has been given by the attempt to suppress it.

I read that whole episode. I think that in the case of the *Glomar*, a very good case for security existed. I was rather sympathetic that that was really a national security secret and a genuine one.

How do you handle that kind of thing?

Mr. COLBY. Well, I think you have to first realize that there was a difference in the time between the successful suppression of the Bay of Pigs invasion and the *Glomar* exposure, and that came out of the different relationship between intelligence and the press in America today from what it was then. Then the press did lay off, sometimes they think to their regret now, but nonetheless, up to the point of not running it, they did.

Obviously there is a provision in the New York Times case, in the Pentagon Papers case, that in the event of grave and irreparable damage to the Nation you could get an injunction. I think that would be almost impossible to establish unless you saw that the Capitol was about to explode tomorrow morning or something, that you would get that, and in fact, the Supreme Court has made it very clear, that prior restraint will be just about the last thing that they will ever consider, and I think that is appropriate. I agree with that, that approach.

There have been a number—I have been engaged in other efforts to get people to change, preferably change slightly a story so that it doesn't pinpoint a certain item, and I have had individuals in the press who have agreed to do that, and I have written at least one of them a letter of thanks for that, that he had a story, he had it dead right, he thought the operation was all over—in which case I would not have argued with him—but it was still going on and I asked him to refer to the Continent rather than the individual country. He did. It caused no flap. I don't think anybody was any the worse off for it. He agreed to it. I don't think there was any improper—I explained to him only one fact, that we still needed this. This was very good and it was still going on, and he understood it and bought it immediately, and it was true.

But I did think I had to explain to people the need for—the need to prevent this thing from going out.

The *Glomar* thing, I think President Ford made the best remark one time when he said that he really wouldn't have minded if 214 million Americans knew about it so long as the foreigners didn't. Well, that is the approach that is right. It really didn't matter to me how many Americans knew about it so long as it didn't get to the foreigners.

Now, that became impossible in that case, but I think it was a part of the whole CIA investigations and everybody was all stirred around, and in that case also, it got out, and was printed in one paper which believed that the operation was over, and as soon as

we explained that it wasn't over, they cooperated and tried to clamp it down. By that time it was too late.

But in that, even though it had appeared in that one, I thought that it might be reasonable that the foreign country wouldn't necessarily take it as serious. They had read an awful lot of other stuff about the CIA at the time and they might have just discounted it, and I thought they might not take it seriously at that point. They didn't react until much later until it became a more general story.

I think that the standard has to be that you go, you have to have a serious matter of great importance, great interest, and great interest in a positive sense, and you have to go to the editor, the publisher or somebody and say here is why it is in our national interest for you not to run this story. The choice is his, and I made that very clear to all the different individuals I spoke to. I said, I have no authority to tell you not to run this, but I say it is terribly important that we not run it, at least until we get another chance, and many of them accepted it.

And as you said, then it ran around the Press Club bar too much and somebody finally blew it. But I think that on a somewhat less sensational story, we may have been successful, and that one we held for about 6 weeks. I didn't get through the following summer, but we did hold it for about 6 weeks, and one very effective investigative reporter was onto it a year before, and he held it for that whole year after I had gone specifically to him and said look, please, this one is important. And I have had my troubles with him since, but he is an honest American and he responded I think very responsibly.

Mr. ASPIN. So basically maybe I have painted too pessimistic a picture of this informal arrangement. I can't think of any structural way to do it.

Mr. COLBY. No, I don't think you can solve it structurally. I don't think—you just have to go to the newsman, who is going to be very suspicious, and he should be, that you are giving him some flim-flam, and you are going to have to convince him that what you are saying is true, and that it is important, and he has to then agree with you that it is worth saving, and then you might succeed, you might succeed.

Mr. ASPIN. You know, I guess one of the amazing things about the *Glomar* example was the lack of suspicion, I thought. I mean, maybe it is a credit to you that, in spite of Watergate, in spite of Vietnam, the people you talked to seemed to be very ready to accept your word for it.

Mr. COLBY. I think we were talking of technology, and it is easier to convince of the facts of the technological things of that nature. If you had had a thing like the Bay of Pigs, I think you would have had much different reaction. If you had had a political program or something like that, then I don't think I would have succeeded in convincing them at all.

Mr. ASPIN. Because I would have thought it was the other way around.

Mr. COLBY. The technology of this was so obvious.

Mr. ASPIN. Is that right? Because I would have thought it would have been easier to make people understand on the Bay of Pigs. I

mean, then you run into the ideological problem of is this a good idea or isn't it, but it is immediately obvious to anybody, if you lay out the story of the Bay of Pigs, that obviously if it is published the whole operation has to be scrubbed. And then you run into the question of whether people want it to be scrubbed or not scrubbed, but I would have thought the *Glomar* thing would have been much much more difficult because it is technical. In a sense, I mean, the issue with the *Glomar* was whether the CIA had in fact blown a lot of money here, whether it was money that was stupidly spent.

Mr. COLBY. Well, that would come up sooner or later, though. That would come up a little later, maybe, rather than a little sooner, and the money thing wasn't a major problem at that stage, that you weren't dealing in enormous threats and damages and so forth. Some of the newsmen disagree with this, you know. They say that it should have gone right away because not so much for the money as the potential political embarrassment, the potential difficulties, diplomatic difficulties, but I think that that was one well worth trying, and I am sorry we couldn't hold it for 6 more months because I am convinced we would have succeeded.

Mr. ASPIN. What do you think should be the reaction of a manager of a newspaper or television network when you call them with something like this? I mean, would you expect them to say to you, thank you, I am glad to have your points of view, but I would like to check it out.

What should be the proper response from people?

Mr. COLBY. Well, I think they would listen to you and probably not give you an answer right then, as most of these did not give me an answer right then, that I will think about it and I will obviously consult with the people that they wanted to, and then I will decide what I will do, and I think that is the proper relationship, unless it is the grave and irreparable damage in which I could get an injunction, and that I doubt.

Mr. ASPIN. Do you generally find more cooperation with management than reporters in this business?

Mr. COLBY. No, I had the same reaction on both sides. You know, it is all—it is a profession and you deal with it, and I think an honorable profession. I have no—I think they contributed enormously to the kind of society we have, even though they put the bureaucrats under a little difficulty every once in a while. That is good.

Mr. ASPIN. Is there anybody else who would like to ask questions? I have some more but I would like to have anybody else try.

All right, let me go to the part of your testimony, Mr. Colby, where you said that we are losing our cover with other people and particularly the U.S. Information Service,¹ AID (Agency for International Development), and others.

I wasn't really aware until I read your testimony that in fact there was a prohibition on the U.S. Information Service and AID.

Could you tell us, how did this prohibition come about? I guess it is following on a question that Congressman Wilson asked a little

¹This is the term used overseas to describe the United States Information Agency, USIA, which has a new name as of 1978: the International Communications Agency (or ICA).

earlier, but could you go into how these prohibitions come about and why don't we know about them?

Mr. COLBY. Well, I think it basically started with the Peace Corps which was public. Each of these has been in some public forum. I mean I am not——

Mr. ASPIN. No, I mean, I went back and looked at the record and discovered that in fact it was. But go ahead.

Mr. COLBY. I believe it started with the Peace Corps and the idea that it is such an obvious danger to some countries that an individual American be way out in the back country if he is an intelligence agent, that when the Peace Corps was set up, that restraint was set in immediately. That would be one that I think I would be inclined to agree with still.

Then the question became about the Fulbright scholars, and then the question came about USIA and I don't know which one came first, but how can a USIA officer do his job of convincing people abroad if people are suspicious of him, and in the late 1960's the idea of pushing CIA out of AID became the particular—I know one Senator was particularly active in pushing that, in the appropriations hearings of the AID Agency, and it was accepted by AID and we lost all our cover, and that, you know, when you wipe out all those agencies, when you combine it with the difficult administrative aspects of dealing even in the agencies that are remaining, you end up with very few people in any country who can possibly be working for CIA.

The other countries don't necessarily believe this, but it can be a real thing from CIA's point of view.

Mr. ASPIN. But I went back and looked at some of the hearings. In fact it is said in these hearings that in the case of U.S. Information Service there is some testimony in public to the effect they are not being used; but it is never in the open record that there is a blanket prohibition forever. What they are talking about is at the current time, you know. For instance, in 1973, when those hearings went on the head of AID said I have been assured by the CIA Director that there is nobody under AID cover; but it was never made public in the form of a directive, and I am wondering what good does it do not to make it public? I mean, the whole purpose of protection would be to make it public. It seems to me extraordinary that we have got two things. First of all, you can't recruit in AID and USIS, and yet AID and USIS are not getting the benefit because the prohibition is not being made public.

Mr. COLBY. Well, I think the benefit was in dealing with Congress.

Mr. ASPIN. I see.

Mr. COLBY. And that the testimony was the part that made the impact, that Congress itself was insisting on this prohibition.

Mr. ASPIN. The what?

Mr. COLBY. The Congress was largely——

Mr. ASPIN. It was really instituted by the Congress in these cases, was it?

Mr. COLBY. I know it was instituted by the Congress on the AID thing. I am not quite sure some of the—I am pretty sure it was on the Fulbright, for obvious reasons.

Mr. ASPIN. Probably Senator Fulbright's own concern.

Mr. COLBY. And about USIA, I am not sure, frankly. The Peace Corps—

Mr. ASPIN. And the rationale was that these things were not—

Mr. COLBY. Would adversely affect their receptivity in the foreign country if they were thought to be possibly CIA.

Mr. ASPIN. But again, why not make it public? It seems to me it would be crazy to say it would affect their receptivity and then ban it, but not announce it so that the foreign countries would know.

Mr. COLBY. Well, I think—I do not know the answer to that question. It was made public but it was not put out as a—

Mr. ASPIN. Is there anywhere on the public record a list of people who are banned from CIA?

Mr. COLBY. I hope not.

Now, the reason I say I hope not is why make it easier for the foreign country. If he does actually believe our protestations, then it just makes his whole chore of identifying who the CIA people are much easier, and, therefore, why give him a list? I mean we succeeded at one point in having one list withdrawn that was too easy to decipher, and I think wisely that we have. Its main function was to help send Christmas cards, I think. I think we could get along without that.

Mr. ASPIN. But I see. The point you are making is that if you issue a list of people that are prohibited, then that tells the world where the rest of them are, but at the same time, if you don't issue the list of who is prohibited, I don't know what good it does to the people who have been prohibited?

Mr. COLBY. Well, as I say, I am totally opposed to the prohibition among official Government agencies, with maybe one or two exceptions.

Mr. ASPIN. You have a good point, and I think it is really worth going into by the committee as you suggest.

Mr. COLBY. Well, I would really welcome it because I think if we did, and if we didn't have to announce one way or the other that suddenly all our other agencies will be full of clandestine officers, but if we just quietly withdrew from this restriction and then gradually used it—you know, we can't overuse it because it will stick out, and, therefore, a discreet amount of it would I think not affect the effectiveness of those agencies—it and would enormously help the Agency in its work.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you.

Mr. COLBY. The problem is that this cover thing, it has a double impact. It not only is difficult to work in but it discourages the people in CIA to even attempt to maintain a good cover, and some of the CIA's own sloppiness in cover has come from the feeling of futility, that it really doesn't do any good anyway, that there is no sense in moving your house every 2 years as each new officer appears because all you have to do is read the embassy list and you can tell who is in CIA. So what is the difference? You are not hiding anything.

And then the administrative aspects of not going through the expenses, and all the rest of it, of the enormous amount of effort it takes to maintain good cover comes into effect, and people really don't maintain good cover, whereas if they think they really have a chance of doing it, then they will.

Mr. MINETA. Mr. Chairman, I am wondering, is there a distinction here between the intelligence gathering aspect of the CIA and the operational aspects? Perhaps there is not sufficient control or coordination between the intelligence gathering duties and the operational aspects?

Mr. COLBY. No; that is not one of the problems. They've got some problems, but that is not one of the problems. After General Smith took a look at it and decided you could not run, in 1952, I think it was, could not run two separate clandestine networks abroad because you would end up chasing the same people. Therefore, he said we must merge them into one clandestine service abroad, and there's one chief of station in a country and he controls both the intelligence gathering and any operational activities that may be involved.

Now, that was not true in the late 1940's.

Mr. MINETA. It is not so compartmentalized that the left hand does not know what the right hand is doing?

Mr. COLBY. There have been cases of that where individuals have been sent out from Washington to do a separated, compartmented job in the country and the officer in the place not know about it. I have run onto a couple of those and managed to protest rather vigorously when I would run into it, but it is not a common thing. It is very rare, and today, I doubt that it exists today. I just don't know.

Mr. MINETA. Is that done even to check on the operations?

Mr. COLBY. No; it is because of some very high security relationship that you want to keep totally secret, and you want to reduce the number of people who know anything about it whatsoever, and, therefore, you send an individual out to go do it and come back.

But today you tell his chief of station certainly.

Mr. MINETA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me, Mr. Colby, go to another subject, if I might, and that is the question of cover, especially the Richard Welch case.

You say for example, that Welch lost his life because of this diminishing cover.

I guess I don't understand the relationship between the Welch case and diminishing cover.

Mr. COLBY. Well, I have essentially four reasons why he was killed. One was the fact that he had bad cover. He had—the administrative arrangements indicated who was in CIA and who wasn't.

Second, the second reason was that the station there, this aspect I had gotten into earlier, had accepted this bad cover in that he lived openly and his predecessor had lived openly, and they lived in the same house, and they didn't really make any big effort to remain hidden.

And the third reason, of course, was that the amount of hysteria about CIA during 1975 stimulated a lot of activity around the world—anti-CIA activity and so forth.

The fourth reason—and you need all four to add up—was that there were groups who had gone around deliberately identifying individual members of CIA.

Now, his name came up in something, but it was while he was in Lima or something that his name came up. It is not so much that he was named right there and fingered there, although an Athens paper did carry his name shortly before his death, but the main thing was that this concept of driving the individuals of CIA out of these places began to personalize the antagonism that some people had with respect to CIA. If you combine all four factors, then the terrorist group which moved against him found it fairly easy to find him. They were stimulated to move against a CIA officer, and stimulated to move against CIA, and, I think, therefore, the four factors add up.

Now, one of those factors is the bad cover that affected not only Mr. Welch but lots of other people, and there were families elsewhere in the world whose children were told at school that their daddy was something reprehensible, a spy, this sort of focusing on individuals, chatter among some of the communities abroad, the American communities as to who is in CIA and who isn't. These lists that are today being put out in various countries are not entirely accurate but they are to some degree accurate, they to some extent include people who are not members of CIA. To some extent they leave people out who are members of the CIA. But their batting average is not all that bad, and this again is this matter of putting pressure on not only the individuals but the families of these officers who are serving abroad in difficult jobs, and I think they need—they deserve much more than what we have given them in terms of cover. We are not going to be able to solve all the problems, I am not saying that, but we can certainly improve this one.

Mr. ASPIN. So the point is just cover generally?

Mr. COLBY. Cover generally.

Mr. ASPIN. Because certainly the station chief in any country is not going to be operating under a cover other than an official cover, would he?

Mr. COLBY. There have been, there have been.

Mr. ASPIN. There have been. So you might actually be wanting private cover for somebody as important as a station chief.

Mr. COLBY. You might.

Mr. ASPIN. Might. OK.

But it leads to another whole issue here which I think we ought to talk about before we finish this morning, and that is the Welch case as an example of a kind of a relationship with the CIA. Namely, that the Agency or the Government agency, whatever it is, tries to sell its side of the story, and maybe you and I have talked about this, I think, on occasions, but I was always convinced that you did a great job on that Welch assassination in the way you sold your side of the story. I mean, you say today that there were four reasons, but the phone calls that were going out to the media by the CIA information officer mentioned only one at that time, and that was——

Mr. COLBY. That was for the first day, in a high degree of emotion, and I cut that off, I remember.

Mr. ASPIN. It did, because I know the story going out at that time was that Welch was fingered in Counterspy Magazine and that——

Mr. COLBY. The statement I made was that, in response to a statement made by one of these groups that said that the reason Mr. Welch was killed was because of CIA's interference in Greece, that I thought that was absolutely outrageous to try to bring that, to try to drag that whole thing into his death, when that wasn't what his death was all about. I got a little upset about that, and I think some of my associates were a little upset at the moment, but within about a day I think we had calmed down and we said, now look, let's be dignified about the way we do this. Let's not make charges. Let's give him the kind of burial that he deserves as an officer killed in the service of his country.

Mr. ASPIN. Because certainly I think that the general impression in the country, if you were to take a poll of those who remember it, I am sure their impression is that the reason Welch was killed was because he was mentioned in a magazine, mentioned publicly by a—

Mr. COLBY. I rather specifically have avoided saying that, and you may be right about the first few phone calls. I just don't know. But as I say, as soon as I did get a hold of it I think—and the field was pretty emotional.

Mr. ASPIN. In fact, it wasn't until the middle of January that anybody began to write things about the station chief, the light cover, the fact that he had always lived in the same house, that he had always had the same title, Assistant to the Ambassador, that people in fact knew pretty freely who he—

Mr. COLBY. Yes; but I think if you go the root cause, the root cause I think was the hysteria and sensationalism about the CIA. Now, we have not discovered who killed him, but if you go the root cause, I think that is the root cause, and that is what upset me because the way we conducted ourselves during most of 1975, and the hysteria about CIA I think was endangering the physical lives of our officers abroad. Greece was not the only country with terrorists.

Mr. ASPIN. But you had us on the run at that time on the Pike Committee, you know. It was on the downhill side of the slope by then. I mean, if I am remembering through that year, the hysteria reached its peak in the spring and the summer. By the fall of that year—1975—it was already on the down side.

Mr. COLBY. No; September was the Senate's first open hearing. That was one of the low points.

Mr. ASPIN. But the crazy attempts on Jerry Ford's life, you remember. I think that was the turning point, and then, of course—

Mr. COLBY. We didn't have anything to do with that at all.

Mr. ASPIN. No.

Mr. COLBY. Let's stop that one before it gets going.

Mr. ASPIN. I wasn't accusing you—

Mr. COLBY. I know.

Mr. ASPIN. But I think the public was turning; but leave the issue aside. We will never agree on that one; but the general point being, when the CIA has a story that they are trying to sell, is this different from other agencies of the Government? There's been the recent allegations about trying to sell stories. Mr. Stanley Karnow as an example, and I can use his name because he used it himself.

In 1959 he said somebody from the Agency approached him and wanted him to write a story saying that the Chinese were about to explode a nuclear bomb, and he said something about how do I know that and what happens if they don't, and they said, well, just—just write it and say that they tried and failed. And Mr. Karnow never did write it.¹ But he writes about this as an example that you have to be careful about the Agency, and his point is essentially that the CIA is not unlike Defense or State. They are trying to sell the Trident submarine or the B-1 bomber, and somebody has always got an axe to grind. It is a town full of people trying to peddle one line or another, and it is not unlike that. Is that your view?

Mr. COLBY. Well, I would say you have got to distinguish two different things. I think we have covered any idea of putting out a story about the bomb, which is a false story or a propaganda move.

Mr. ASPIN. Right.

Mr. COLBY. That you can't go to an American newsman with, bang, that's out.

Second item, however, is suppose it is a real assessment, even wrong, but a real assessment, then I am—I believe that we should make more of these assessments available to the press. The press is going to look at them, be suspicious of them, but that's all right, that's fair enough, but you know, all this information that is in the public, you know, about the weapon systems of foreign countries and so forth I think is properly in the public domain. I think that it would be wrong to keep it totally secret. I think the more that we can make available to our citizens to help them make the right judgment, the better. This does mean separating the sources and putting the substance down.

But the third category of what you are talking about is CIA's attempt to explain its role in some contentious situation. Now, that is not the bomb story either, but it is perhaps the Welch story, I mean, an attempt to explain the CIA institutional interest in a certain appreciation which it believes in, that is, that intelligence is a good thing, that we should be able to use foreign media, that the war in Laos was a success. I don't see anything improper with that. That is given to the press. They can look at it, see whether they like it, check it, disagree with it. There's nothing wrong with that.

Mr. ASPIN. One thing makes me question it: I wonder if it isn't true that the stories put out by the CIA or the line put out by CIA is harder to check for journalists than others. I mean, for example, clearly if the Department of Agriculture tells you it is putting out the line that the Agriculture Department's programs this year are a booming success, you can phone 15 farmers and get 15 different opinions on that issue. Even with Defense and State, it seems to me that it is easier to check a story if the Navy is saying the Trident submarine is the greatest thing since sliced bread. You can find other people around who know something about it, who are willing to talk, who will give another point of view.

But so much of the Agency's information is hard to check. How does Stanley Karnow check the story that the Chinese are about to

¹See appendix G, p. 339.

explode a nuclear device? He could call somebody else in the Agency, but that person might not be in on the story because of compartmentalization or something.

Or Mr. Frank Snepp has said, for example, that the Agency was putting out the "bloodbath story" in Vietnam, that if North Vietnam took over South Vietnam, there would be a bloodbath.² I don't know how you check those stories out if you are a journalist, and if some contact in the Agency gives you some kind of a leak. The only question I pose about the suggestion the Agency is just like any other agency of Government is that it seems to be so much harder to check CIA stories.

Mr. COLBY. Well, I think it is true that an individual item of information may be harder to check, although it is not entirely impossible there. I think it is easier to check an assessment. If our assessment is that the Chinese are going to blow a bomb, it is easier to check that as an assessment with other agencies of the Government, with other experts in sort of general Chinese politics and science, things of that nature, you can do some checking.

The third level, though, I think that is important is again the responsibilities of these committees, of the Senate and of this one here in the House, that—and I suggested in past times that an annual accounting or something of that nature without revealing anything that shouldn't be revealed, can give a general assessment. I think it is—the various committees have put out their version of things that they felt went wrong. The Senate the other day on the oil estimate. The CIA conducts post mortems, I know, about things, whether they are right or wrong. I think it is important that these committees not build up a solid case of showing only the bad things, even though that has a function in the congressional approach to the bureaucracy, but I think in intelligence it is dangerous because nobody really does know the other side of it very well. Therefore, I would think a balanced assessment of the effectiveness of our intelligence on an annual basis by the committees would be a useful thing, would keep the heat on the agency to get a good mark, and you would be able to make a real assessment and know the facts as to whether they are accurate or not.

I think that is a way around this inherent problem that you very appropriately raised.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just one additional area that we haven't covered.

Are you familiar with what the Senate has been talking about for additional restraints on intelligence agencies dealing where you cannot hire or have on your payroll or deal with anybody in a religious profession?

Mr. COLBY [nods in the affirmative]. And academics. Those were in the Senate report.

Mr. WILSON. And also anybody who travels on a subsidized trip sponsored by the Federal Government.

Mr. COLBY. That was an extension of the Fulbright concept, the cultural things.

²60 Minutes, Volume X, Number 11 as broadcast over the CBS Television Network, Sunday, November 20, 1977. "Coverup?" Produced by Barry Landa.

Mr. WILSON. Do you feel that these are unnecessary additional restraints, more of the iceberg?

Mr. COLBY. Well, again, I am resistant, quite frankly, to the idea of incorporating more and more and more of these because I think it will generate a request by more and more and more groups, and my original reaction to the question on the missionaries was that I think we shouldn't be barred from it. It really took several months later for either Mr. Bush or Admiral Turner to realize that we weren't using any anyway, and you know, my defense was kind of useless, but I didn't really get to that question. I just hated to see another group set up as a bar because somebody else will be along, you know, somebody will talk about students, American students abroad. Somebody will talk about businessmen. I mean, I don't know why businessmen would be so reluctant to be included in that group, you know, and then you end up with everybody.

And, therefore, I say—I hate to see these become hard and fast rules, and even though in good discretion, good sense we are not going to use certain of them as we have, as we haven't the missionaries. But in World War II there were a lot of missionaries that were very helpful to our intelligence in various far parts of the world that we didn't know much about, and I would hate to see us write into law that we couldn't ask some missionaries what the situation in central China in 1941 and 1942 was.

Mr. WILSON. Well, I can see that if you keep chopping off a little more, the further you go down the pike, for example, if we have already denied the use of any intelligence activity by AID, and AID deals with a lot of U.S. businessmen, I mean, we could extend that further and say anybody that is doing business with AID would be included in that proscription.

Mr. COLBY. That's my problem.

In other words, I would like to hold this one to the press and then if necessary fight each one of these other ones later, but at the same time go in the other direction with respect to official officers of the U.S. Government as I really don't see that they need to be protected to the degree they are.

Mr. WILSON. OK, that's all I have.

Mr. ASPIN. Just one final question to follow up on the subject we were discussing before, which is the danger with journalists dealing with the CIA's version of a story. One of the things which concerns me, to go back to the foreign media, is that I would think under the current guidelines, and even without the current guidelines, maybe the best way to get a CIA slant to a story in the domestic press would be through the foreign media. Let's say, for example, you were trying to peddle a story and you went to a Stanley Karnow with a story back in 1959 that the Chinese are about to blow a nuclear device. So Stanley Karnow says, "Why, what proof have you got?" and then wants to check it out.

I don't know how he checks it out, but he asks for proof. But let's say that story has already appeared in the foreign press somewhere and, with the competitive nature of the business, once it has appeared, it has a tendency to go and the wires are particularly competitive. I would guess if you put that story into someplace that was fairly creditable, I think it might have been easily picked up. In other words, it might be almost easier to get something into the

U.S. press past the skepticism of the reporter if you do it and make it a fast breaking story that the wires have to pick up and that everybody has to jump on.

Mr. COLBY. I think you are right, that—you see, I think you have to distinguish—and I don't know the background of this, if the story was a true assessment, that they are probably going to blow a bomb, then I think you ought to make it available to all the press.

Mr. ASPIN. I see.

Mr. COLBY. Without necessarily showing where it came from, not to pick out Mr. Karnow or anybody else but just make it available as a release as we have done with the Soviet oil estimate, things like that, and I think that is a good thing, to release that kind of thing, and let the argument occur as to whether it is right or wrong. The discipline of being proved right or wrong will make the assessments better, and I think consequently that is not much of a problem.

If it is a false story, then I suspect if it is a terribly important false story, and it appears in the Squeedunk Gazette of Lower Slobbovia, it really won't get much attention. If it appears in the London Times, it will, but I guarantee you the London Times isn't going to print it unless it thinks it is right, or some other comparable paper.

So I think there is an inherent protection against being grossly misled there, although there are cases on the margins, if you get a story in some country's important newspaper through an agent that you have working for him, it could be picked up, and if it is a shading of the full story or even the additional aspects of a story that hasn't been given coverage before, it may get some coverage, but it is going to be—if it is going to go, it is probably going to have a high degree of truth to it, and then it is a question of whether you accept the fact that that additional information comes—even though it was started from CIA, and if it comes through a foreign source and is totally impractical and did not get knocked down, if it became a big story in this country and we suddenly realized that CIA had started it, not thinking that I was going to become such a big story, I guarantee you the President would do something about it because he really would move.

And then this committee, of course, and the corresponding Senate one are going to want to know about this general activity, and you know, the degree to which you want to know, and certainly any major campaign you can insist on knowing right away, and if you don't agree with it, tell them to stop.

Mr. WILSON. Misinformation purposely leaked to the foreign press about, say, let's talk about military strength for example, a new weapons system, either false or misleading, either too much or too little of what our strength is, isn't that or wouldn't that be considered a pretty valuable tool for this country to use in such things as SALT negotiations?

Mr. COLBY. Well, you know, the greatest danger around the world is, in my view, is a total misreading of the American potential. We do put out an awful lot of criticism about ourselves which is part of our society, but there have been a whole series of very prominent state leaders in this century who have misinterpreted American criticism and American free discussion into a belief that

America is weak, and one was named Wilhelm and one was named Togo and one was named Stalin and various others, and each of them felt that they could just push us away, and it is just—they made terrible misassessments. Therefore, I think the degree to which we get an honest picture, a picture of America's strength and determination in the rest of the world is important, even though there may be a cacophony of noise here complaining about how weak we are.

Mr. WILSON. I have been impressed in recent trips to foreign countries in hearing over and over again how much more superior our weapons are than the Soviet weapons, and yet we are told here about the Soviet weapons superiority over most of ours, and I think you are right, that this kind of misinformation could be a dangerous—

Mr. COLBY. And again, I think the answer there is not false information about American strength, but an attempt to put out true information about American strength which otherwise wouldn't get put out, and I don't mean just military strength. I mean moral strength and all of that stuff, because if you read some of the more critical journals abroad about America, you get a very different impression of what kind of a country this is by reading them.

And it would be unfortunate if that impression really was the only one that existed.

Mr. WILSON. OK, just one final question, Mr. Chairman.

What areas, getting back to Admiral Turner's new regulations, what areas do you think in that two-page document, offer the biggest problem, I mean, where it is really the shoe is starting to pinch and it is getting pretty tight.

Mr. COLBY. Well, the "enter into any relationships" you know, that broad proscription way down that list is a very extensive restraint, although as I indicated, I accept it. It is a fact of political life in America today and the role of the media.

Mr. WILSON. Well, it is possible that this—

Mr. COLBY. I would like to have a situation—

Mr. WILSON [continuing]. This committee and the Congress will be adopting resolutions that would in effect become the regulations. If this is an unworkable regulation that has been determined by the DCI, then, I think we need to know more, where the restraints, and the possible restraints are so that we don't unduly restrict operations in the future.

Mr. COLBY. Well, I would say that with respect to the media, I do accept this. Two things I ask: That we not go headlong into large other areas of American life and proscribe them, and second, I think we ought to reverse this absolutely absurd situation we have among the official representatives of the U.S. Government. I think that is just plain dead wrong, and that needs to be changed.

Mr. WILSON. I said that was the last thing, but let me ask another big question.

Do you feel we need something comparable to the British Official Secrets Act?

Mr. COLBY. Well, I think we need a better way of keeping the secrets that our intelligence people learn in the course of their business. I would not agree with the British Official Secrets Act. It

is much too sweeping for our society, and I think it is unconstitutional, frankly. But I believe that we should have an improved espionage statute, secrecy statute. The present statutes are really very poor, and I would say that we need a very specific statute that says that anyone who undertakes to learn and keep the secrets of intelligence sources and methods—by that I mean signs the agreement as an employee—should be subject to criminal penalties if he leaves the service and then decides to violate that agreement.

Now, I think those criminal penalties——

Mr. WILSON. You could put Congressmen under that, too.

Mr. COLBY. Well, no, Congressmen, you are protected by the Constitution, on the floor. Outside the floor, that is another question, but I think that I would have two restraints: One, that it only apply to the individuals who undertake the obligation and not to whoever they give the information to—that protects the newsman or whoever it is. Second, that before a prosecution, I would insist that you would have to go before an independent judge and convince him that it really was a secret. Now, there is some language you can fool around with on this, but so that you not get the whistle blower trying to demonstrate corruption, mismanagement, whatever, clamped down.

With those two restraints, I would have the punishment, and I frankly would give up on the idea of prior restraints and the idea of requiring all employees to send every publication to the Agency. I would merely say that the Agency ought to offer its services to review and assure the person that there were no intelligence sources and methods included, and that, therefore, he could go ahead and print, but they not be under the obligation. I think this recent Snapp thing shows that that particular vehicle is not going to work. It worked in the one *Marchetti* case and was supported by the courts under the idea of an employee agreement, but it really didn't work very well there either, and I think if you just have a criminal penalty for people who undertake the obligation and a protection that the case be reviewed by a judge to make sure that it really is an intelligence source and method, then you would have, I think the kind of secrecy arrangements that would reduce the degree of leakage.

I think you have to turn that around, with greater exposure of the substance of our information, while we protect our sources better, and as I say, I would apply, the one thing I have learned from the journalists is that they believe in putting out their information. They also insist on protecting their sources.

I think we in this country need to protect our sources of our Nation as well.

Mr. WILSON. OK, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ASPIN. One final area before we leave the whole foreign media. The purpose of the foreign media operation in terms of whatever propaganda we do is always said to be to influence the opinion of foreigners, that we are trying to avoid the feedback, we don't want to misinform or even to really bias the opinions of Americans, that what we are really trying to do with the propaganda effort is to win the battle in the foreign country.

In connection with that, it has always seemed to be most puzzling as to why it is that one of the things the CIA seems to be

most involved with, as far as proprietaries or subsidies go, is English language newspapers in foreign capitals. I mean, if you are really after the foreigner, why use the English language paper? The people who are most likely to read an English language newspaper, I would guess, are first of all, the U.S. correspondents who are there, particularly those who don't speak the language very well, and second, any American tourists in the area. And it seems to me if we are really after the foreigners, we should not be involved in English language newspapers.

Mr. COLBY. Your thought process is right, and I think we—at least I know I in general follow that thought process. One particular English language newspaper I was not very happy about seeing us get involved with, but nonetheless, we did, but I think also that in many countries of the world the English language newspaper is a general circulation newspaper, in certain areas where there are different dialects spoken in the country, then the English language, say in ex-English colonies—places of that nature, has an impact, a local impact and not merely a foreign one.

I didn't really like getting into supporting a newspaper anyway. I mean, it is a terrible burden, it is expensive, it is a nuisance to try to manage, and everybody wants to manage it from Washington, and it is just the way you get a story into a foreign opinion. The best way is, as you say, through foreign journals. Their local journals, through preferably a relationship with somebody who contributes to that journal, and that is both cheaper and more effective, and I couldn't agree more with your basic point.

Mr. ASPIN. But do you ever think that perhaps the CIA was being had by a couple of these guys who once set up—

Mr. COLBY. Oh, well, I have had lots of local news people come up to me with this great—

Mr. ASPIN. Scheme for setting up a paper.

Mr. COLBY. Well, setting up, they hardly got in the door, but this paper is going under and it is going to be taken over by terrible people who are hostile and will use it against our interests and so forth, and all it needs for you to do is to put a certain amount of subsidy into it.

No thank you. I have said no lots of times, because you start, then you are never free of it.

Mr. ASPIN. You wouldn't have basically—

Mr. COLBY. That's not to say it hasn't been done. Don't get me wrong. That is my own personal attitude.

Mr. ASPIN. Going back to the foreign media, and I am trying to think of some remedies now, one possibly would be to say: OK, no more English language newspapers.

Mr. COLBY. English language wouldn't be good. But let's say no restraints on dealing with media whose principal, you know, effectively all—you would have to leave off a few extra copies that come to the Library of Congress maybe—but no restriction on a journal or other outlet whose major target is in a foreign area, in the foreign country in question or a series of foreign countries, so that you don't just use the language as a test. There are a lot of areas of the world where you would otherwise scratch yourself out of some pretty important areas.

Mr. ASPIN. All right. I know, for example, there is the English language paper in Athens, and there's one in Rome and Tehran and all these other kinds of places. They have got to be——

Mr. COLBY. Yes; I always found them kind of useless.

Mr. ASPIN. Yes; they have got to be dealing mainly with the English-speaking community there.

Mr. COLBY. But I am thinking more of some of the—and I don't know that any of these are active now but some of the ex-English colonies and things of that nature.

Mr. ASPIN. OK.

So the English language newspaper is not the way to go.

Mr. COLBY. I don't think that is the way.

Mr. WILSON. Well, you would have a little difficulty with London.

Mr. COLBY. Well, that is a whole separate problem. We have got a whole separate arrangement.

Mr. ASPIN. That's a whole separate arrangement.

That's one possible area to look at, and the other possible area to look at is to make a little bit more formal and rigorous this business of trying trying to prevent the feedback. I take it that is a little bit haphazard and it is not very formal.

Mr. COLBY. An example could be, I mean that if anything develops to have any substantial impact or feedback, that the Agency would be under an obligation to come up and tell you all about it, tell the Congress about it right away.

Then you would put pressure on them to do something about it, and you don't know what it is right now. You might have to ask the President just to say don't accept this in a public statement, or there might be other ways you could solve it.

Mr. ASPIN. But basically, short of prohibiting everything, which is what you don't want to do—others may, but you don't want to do that—but you would not be adverse to some kind of tightening up or some kind of restructuring these programs and information systems to prevent the feedback from hitting certain people.

Mr. COLBY. And bringing the Congress into the system.

Mr. ASPIN. And for bringing the Congress into the system. You don't think it is possible to bring the press in without blowing the story.

Mr. COLBY. At this point I am afraid not; 20 years ago yes; but not today.

Mr. ASPIN. And basically if we were to go into and have a look at some of these subsidized operations and proprietaries, you would think that we might find some things that we have been involved with in the past which are really not aimed directly at the local public.

Mr. COLBY. Oh, I am sure if you look around far enough in the past, you will find all sorts, you know, individual things. But I think you will find the major thrust has been foreign opinion, a concern about the feedback, and an effort to reduce it if not eliminate it.

So I think that, just as the New York Times reviews here in the last few days indicate that pretty generally an effort was made to keep CIA from dominating what appeared in the American press, even while it had a major chore abroad. I think that came through with the stories there.

Now, they had some stories that certain things did come back; yes, there were some exceptions, but I think the general rule is pretty clear.

Mr. ASPIN. And just for the record, you do not think that by prohibiting the use of journalists a la the Turner directive we are going to help much in preventing our journalists abroad from possible physical harm and increase their access?

From the journalist standpoint, their concern about a CIA-media relationship is first of all objectivity; second, credibility of the press; but third there really are a number of them who are worried about physical danger from association with the CIA.

Mr. COLBY. I don't think they are going to be saved by that.

Mr. ASPIN. And that's not going to help, you don't think?

Mr. COLBY. That's not going to help.

Mr. ASPIN. The fourth problem is really access. They are concerned that, when the Agency has ties with journalists, people in various parts of the world are not going to want to let the journalists come in and talk. If a fellow comes in and is ostensibly to be interviewing the leader for a story, but they are afraid that what he is really doing is checking to see how many machineguns they have got, they don't let him in.

Mr. COLBY. I think that there are a lot of countries that would consider it a lot less of a threat to deal with a CIA agent reporting to the American Government in classified form what they thought, what their ideas were, than by dealing with an American newsman who is going to make a front page story out of it. I think that is what scares a lot of other countries. The intelligence thing is kind of incidental.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you.

Loch, do you have any questions?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes; I have three quick points which I would like to clarify, if I may, and I will try not to be redundant.

The first one has to do with the Turner directive. I am afraid that when the Bush directive come out there was some confusion as to how far that net reached, and I am afraid there may be similar confusion with the Turner directive.

If I may refer you to the first page, paragraph (a), do you think it would clarify this paragraph if it read this way:

Enter into any relationships with full time or part time journalists—including editors, media policymakers and so-called stringers—accredited by a U.S. news service, newspaper, periodical, radio or television network or station as well as any accredited or unaccredited freelance writer who writes on a regular basis in the area of public affairs.

What I am introducing first, of course, is the phrase "editors, media policymakers."

Mr. COLBY. Yes. I don't mind that one. I do have trouble with the freelancers.

Mr. JOHNSON. Why is that?

Mr. COLBY. Well, I just hate to give up any more than I can help, quite frankly, but you say "write regularly in the area of public affairs." I don't think that is the test. The test is whether he is known as a particular contributor to an American journal, you know, that freelancer who writes in the area of public affairs

would include the Azerbaijanian who writes in the local Azerbaijanian News.

Mr. JOHNSON. What if the reference were clearly to public affairs related to the United States.

Mr. COLBY. Related to is hard. I mean, I don't think we can really draft it very well right here, but in other words, if you wanted to include freelancers I would put freelancers up in there in the earlier stage, including the so-called whatever it is, accredited by or with a regular relationship with, you know, something of that nature.

Mr. JOHNSON. The second point I wanted to ask you about once again is this notion of "prior tasking". It wasn't clear in your testimony about what kind of relationship a journalist who is an American ought to enter into with the CIA, on just a voluntary basis. Let me suggest, for example, that a reporter may go out to the Agency on his own volition for a briefing before he goes overseas, and what if in that briefing he asks the CIA briefer what kinds of things he ought to look at in a certain country and the briefer, seeing this opening, begins to suggest a number of items of information that might be of interest to the CIA as well?

Mr. COLBY. Sure.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, does this imply giving the journalist a mission?

Mr. COLBY. No; I don't think so. In that case, the question is whether the journalist is still independent or whether he is doing something for the CIA. In other words, if the CIA, in the background briefing, before he goes to a country, he says, well, what questions do you all really have about the country and he says, well, we don't know who is going to be the successor to the Prime Minister, we don't know what the groups are around the military leadership, who they really are and how they relate to each other, those are some of the problems, and by the way, we haven't the faintest idea what that factory is over in Lower Slobbovia. They are doing something there, but we really don't know what it is, period.

Now, he is not doing anything for CIA. He has learned that there are some open questions. He is going to go——

Mr. JOHNSON. But doesn't that imply the CIA would like to know about that factory and would want him to come back and tell the Agency about it?

Mr. COLBY. Sure. He can come back and put it in his newspaper.

Mr. JOHNSON. And what if it doesn't go in the newspaper?

Mr. COLBY. Then my point would be that sure, we could go to the newspaper and say, I don't know what your reaction is, but would you be willing to share it with us? We are not going to make any spooky arrangement out of this, but if you will give it to us, we certainly would appreciate it, but you don't have to, and I don't think that's a violation.

In other words, he is still independent. He is making his own decisions about what he does, what he writes, what he covers, what he shows us, and that is the key to it it seems to me.

If you then go—if you went to the journalist and said, now, you have got to find this one out and you have got to tell me, and don't

cover it in the paper because we don't want them to know that we know it, then you are tasking him and then I think that is bad.

Mr. JOHNSON. OK.

And the final point I wanted to talk to you about is this subject of the use of foreign media. It seems to me generally one might use the foreign media for intelligence gathering, on the one hand, or for propaganda purposes, on the other hand.

Let's set aside intelligence gathering for a moment and just look at the propaganda aspects.

That is a covert action, isn't it?

Mr. COLBY. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. It occurs to me that covert actions are taken very seriously these days in this country, and they have to go through many approval processes.

Mr. COLBY. They sure are.

Mr. JOHNSON. I know Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, appearing last year before the Church committee, said that covert action should be used only in the most dire circumstances, when it was really necessary for the country.¹

Given all that, shouldn't these black propaganda programs follow the same criteria, and be used only when it is really of considerable importance to the country?

Mr. COLBY. Well, I think the present Hughes-Ryan amendment says that before CIA can do anything other than intelligence gathering, that it must get the President's certification that it is important to the national security, which puts up a certain number of hurdles, and it must be immediately reported, in a timely fashion or whatever it is, to the committee.

So that gives the committee a chance, I guarantee you, to stop it if they think it is wrong.

Mr. JOHNSON. So do you think that when the CIA infrastructure places an editorial in some far-flung country this is reported through Hughes-Ryan?

Mr. COLBY. Not every one, but I think that—I don't know what they do now, but I know when we did it, I took that law very seriously and what we did was summarize a whole series of relationships and said this is the kind of thing that is going on every day, and if you want to know more about it, ask, we will tell you, but this kind of activity is going on.

Now, that then left it up to the Congress to say well what is going on in one country or another? And we would tell them.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MINETA. Mr. Chairman, just following up on that. Usually the operation has already gone into effect, and the question of timely reporting is something that could be 1 day or 1 week later.

Mr. COLBY. Not really. Quite frankly, I think the timely fashion is adequate, unless you want to get in a situation of prior approval, and I really don't think you do.

And I think if the President signs it, then my practice was to call up the committee that afternoon and say, you know, I have

¹Hearings before the Select Committee to study Government Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities, U.S. Senate, Volume 7, p. 54ff.

something to report and I am available any time you want me, tomorrow morning.

Mr. MINETA. Before it becomes operational?

Mr. COLBY. No; but in the real world it is going to take you that long to do something, and if there is a great explosion in the committee when you get up there the next day or even a week later, and the committee says this is the stupidest thing I have ever heard of, absolutely not, and we think you had better stop this, and right now, then I think in most cases you have got a chance to do it. Most of these are continuing operations. We are talking about a relationship with a newsman, a line of propaganda with various countries. We can turn those off with a cable.

Mr. MINETA. Mr. Colby, in this Turner regulation, we have got first the policy, second the limitations, and third the exceptions. I am wondering whether or not the exceptions become the boiler-plate language to allow just about anything to occur on the basis of prior approval by the DCI.

What kind of mechanism for oversight would you suggest there?

Mr. COLBY. Well, obviously, if the Director issues this directive, he can change this directive any day. I mean if he is the authority that issues it. If, as the Chairman suggested, you have some general legislation, then you put additional requirements on him, as the Hughes-Ryan amendment is an additional requirement on him beyond his restrictions, beyond even the President's restrictions. But here supervision seems very simple. The committee just has to tell him, I want to know every one of those specific approvals, just every one, you come up and tell us about.

Mr. MINETA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you.

Any more?

Thank you very much, Mr. Colby. We are going to meet this afternoon at 2 o'clock with some people from the CIA, and we hope to go into some more of the media relations in greater detail. We appreciate very much your coming.

Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 12:04 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m. the same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 2:08 p.m., in room 2322, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Les Aspin (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Aspin (presiding), Boland (chairman of the full committee), Mineta, and Wilson.

Also present: Thomas K. Latimer, staff director; and Loch Johnson, professional staff member.

Mr. ASPIN. We resume the hearings this afternoon on the CIA and the media with three more witnesses with extensive CIA experience. Mr. John Maury served as the CIA Chief, Soviet Operations, Station Chief in Athens, Greece, and several other posts in a career as an intelligence officer that stretched over two decades. He capped his public service with 2 years as an Assistant Secretary of Defense from 1974 to 1976.

Dr. Ray Cline also spent two decades with the CIA, and served in the Office of Strategic Services before that. While with the Agency, Dr. Cline served in Asia and Europe, and was Deputy Director for Intelligence for 4 years. After leaving the CIA in 1969 he also served as Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the Department of State. Today Dr. Cline is director of studies, Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies here in Washington, and the author of a recent book called "Secrets, Spies and Scholars."

Mr. David Atlee Phillips has been both a journalist and an intelligence officer. He was once editor and publisher of the "South Pacific Mail," an English-language newspaper in Chile, and then an intelligence officer for over two decades with broad experience throughout Latin America. Mr. Phillips retired from the Agency in 1975 to form the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers, and has recently authored a book on intelligence entitled "The Night Watch: 25 Years of Peculiar Service."

Welcome, Gentlemen.

Mr. Maury, may we begin with your opening statement, sir?

STATEMENT OF JOHN MAURY, FORMER EMPLOYEE, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. MAURY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to be here to discuss something that I think concerns us all. Never before, it seems to me, has our country been in greater need of reliable information about what is going on in the world. Without such information, we are, for all our military might, a blind giant stumbling around an uncharted minefield. I recall a colleague who worked in the White House some years ago remarking that perhaps the greatest danger to peace in our time is an ill-informed American President. I think the same could be said about our American political leaders and our American press and our American people, and for the information we need in these days, I think we have to rely both on our intelligence services and on our media.

I regret to say that I think the credibility and effectiveness of both have been badly damaged recently. The credibility of the intelligence community, I think, and its effectiveness, have been damaged by irresponsible and false allegations in the media, and I think the same irresponsibility has damaged the credibility of the media.

Now, I see nothing sinister in the basic hostility of the media toward any Government agency that conducts its affairs in secret. I think that is inherent in our system. On the other hand, I think Lord Acton, when he said, "Power corrupts," would today certainly have included the media among those whom he feels it has corrupted.

The media has been instrumental in destroying two presidents in recent years and in influencing the outcome and the conduct of a major war, and it seems to me that when they complain about how they have been corrupted and discredited by the CIA, they are being shortsighted, because it seems to me only they can suffer by these agitations and allegations about how CIA has somehow seduced them. It seems to me the media has taken aim at a nonexis-

tent target and then shot themselves in the foot because in truth I find very little evidence that any news destined for American consumption has been significantly influenced in any way by CIA involvement. Furthermore, I find no evidence in my experience and in that of colleagues with whom I have discussed the matter, that the cooperation of the media with the Agency has had a corrupting effect on either the Agency or the media.

The great bulk of what CIA has done through the media in the way of disseminating information has been, as Mr. Colby said this morning, the dissemination of truth to combat falsehood rather than the distortion of the truth, and I think, Mr. Chairman, that regarding journalists cooperating in the collection of intelligence, I have known many such cases, but I have yet to know of any case where these individuals who cooperated with intelligence services willingly and served them well in any way did so at the expense of their obligation to either their employers or their readers.

So much for what CIA has done to the integrity of the press. Now I believe we are all concerned about the integrity of CIA. I remember a Soviet intelligence officer, a defector, said some years ago that members of the KGB were always taught that their first priority was to put out the eyes of their adversary by degrading and disrupting his intelligence service. If this is true, then I think Moscow must be very pleased with some of the things that have appeared in the American press, and let me hasten to say that I am not talking about all of the press. I am not talking about the wire services and I am not talking about the news magazines. I am talking about some of our leading dailies and some of our more fashionable periodicals.

But let me give you some examples. We have all seen in various news stories repeated references to CIA involvement in Watergate. The truth is that there was never any such involvement.

Second, we have seen references to CIA as a rogue elephant operating without any direction. The truth is that both the Church and Pike Committees have confirmed that in all important respects, CIA operations were under the direction of the White House.

We have seen many allegations of CIA involvement in illicit drug traffic. The truth, as Mr. John Ingersoll, the Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs has said, in response to a congressional inquiry, is that the CIA has been "this Bureau's strongest partner" in running down illegal drug traffic.

I could name a number of such examples, Mr. Chairman, and let me just take two or three others here.

We have seen a story by Jack Anderson headlined "CIA Teaches Terrorism to Its Friends." You have to read the story to realize that the only content of the story is that CIA teaches counterterrorism to certain allied security service. I don't know who wrote that headline.

We have seen evidence here of falsely labeled photographs used to support a false charge, shades of Joe McCarthy. I have read in a leading daily that the CIA Station Chief in Athens tried to kindle a war in Lebanon. I have read another leading journalist echoing the allegations of the Soviet propaganda that the so-called Penkovsky papers were precisely the coarse straw which Soviet authorities

claimed, and I have seen allegations recently that CIA was recruiting mercenaries in Zaire and introducing swine virus into Cuba.

These stories I mention, Mr. Chairman, because while I recognize that anyone can make a mistake in the press and CIA and elsewhere, many of these and a number of other stories I have not mentioned, I have called to the attention of leading journal and asked if any of my allegations were unfounded or unfair, and if not, suggested that the record be set straight, mentioning that I could prove that these stories were false, and the answer came back that my allegations were not impressive. But there was never any suggestion that they were not well documented.

Another one of the disservices, Mr. Chairman, which I feel the press has done to the intelligence community has been to provide a small handful of disgruntled former intelligence officers like Marchetti and Agee and Stockwell and Snepp and John Marks free media coverage, making of them instant celebrities, and in the course of it, doing grave damage not only to the effectiveness of certain intelligence operations, but as we have seen in the case of Dick Welch, even jeopardized their personal safety and their lives.

Some discussion about Mr. Welch earlier this morning brings to mind the fact that I was staying with Mr. Welch just after front headlined stories appeared in the Athens press identifying the CIA. We talked about this at the time. I had preceded him by several years as Station Chief in Athens, and he was staying in the same home that I had lived in and my predecessors had lived in for some years. He said that it had been suggested by headquarters that he might move to another address, but he realized that this would be quite absurd under the circumstances. He said, of course I am a marked man now, but not because people have found out who I am. They could have found that out any time. But, as he pointed out quite accurately I think at the time, the terrorism which we see so much of today is not interested in who they get unless it is somebody that makes headlines. Mr. Welch would have been just another dead spy if his name had not been featured on the front pages of the Athens press.

Now, there, I think, is the key to it. They could find other CIA station chiefs, or they don't have to be station chiefs. All they have to be is somebody who will make headlines. I mean, why Olympic athletes, for example, in Munich? Because there is good press coverage of Olympic athletes. They had nothing to do with CIA.

So the point is, I think, in the Welch case that this was indeed the result of publicity, an irresponsible publicity of the press. The Athens press having picked it up from some of the extremist American media, not the responsible press, but Mr. Chairman, let me mention another example of what I think is troublesome, not only what the press prints but what it doesn't print.

Not long ago Messrs. Evans and Novak had a column—last spring it was, actually—identifying Philip Agee as CIA's first defector. A number of newspapers, over 100, ran that column. Some of them killed it. One of those that killed it just 3 weeks earlier had defended its record in providing public information about CIA's secret support to King Hussein of Jordan, and in that editorial defending its revelation of that sensitive information appeared these words: "The real point is that

newspapers cannot be true to their trust if they allow themselves to get in the position of managing the news, or picking and choosing, or publishing or withholding."

That is the kind of hypocrisy in the press that I want to point to, Mr. Chairman, but I do so not out of malice—

Mr. WILSON. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman.

What newspaper was that, Mr. Maury?

Mr. MAURY. The Washington Post.

I have a number of examples from the Washington Post. I have others from the New York Times I also have certain other material, that I can put into the record if the committee is interested.

[The subcommittee approved the insertion of the information referred to. See appendix H, p. 340.]

Mr. MAURY. I might explain though, that since I have mentioned the Washington Post, I think maybe I should be quite precise in what I have said because I had in my prepared testimony, as you may have noticed, said that I was not anxious to name names because I merely wanted to make the point and make sure that I got evidence into the record that would support the point, but since I have mentioned the Washington Post, perhaps I should take just a moment and explain just what I am talking about.

I had called these misstatements, to the attention of the Washington Post in a letter on April 7 to Mrs. Graham in which I said—and I quote:

My purpose in writing this letter is not to embarrass the Post or make headlines or bylines for myself. But I feel that in its treatment of this subject the Post has been less than candid with its readers and has damaged the credibility, and hence the effectiveness, of an important national asset.

I had hoped, and still hope, that the Post might permit this issue to be raised in its own pages, perhaps as a "taking exception" piece, and this was my purpose in submitting the enclosed "credibility" item. If it contains any factual inaccuracies or unfair allegations, I would appreciate having them called to my attention. Otherwise, unless the Post is prepared to reconsider running it, I hope to have it published elsewhere.

The reply I received was a note from Mrs. Graham of April 15 enclosing a memo to her of Mr. Charles Seib of the Post Staff, which contains the following passage:

The fourth item (which was actually the first chronologically) is the most sensitive because it amounts to a direct attack on the Post in support of Maury's thesis that the paper is biased and unfair in its handling of CIA matters.

I don't think his bill of particulars in the article is impressive.

I will submit for the record, if you wish, Mr. Chairman, more material on this precise point, but let me explain that in raising this I am not trying to settle a personal score with the Post or anybody else, but I am trying to make the following point. I feel that the irresponsible handling of stories regarding CIA by the American media has created a dangerous misconception about the Agency's activities which, if unchallenged, will generate pressures for excessive restrictions and revelations, thereby crippling the effectiveness of the Agency. It is for this reason that I think it is important that this record be brought to the attention of the committee, which is properly examining restrictions on Agency operations and activities, and I feel that if these false allegations that are so widespread and widely accepted are not challenged, that we may end up with a cure worse than the disease.

Also, to go back to a matter that I touched on earlier, I feel strongly that when it gets to the matter of CIA and the press, with the oversight of a diligent committee such as this committee I certainly think is, and as the Senate committee has proved itself to be in its existence so far, the abuses that we have been concerned about can be brought under satisfactory control without putting our intelligence services in a legislative straitjacket which we may regret in some of the crises that may be waiting for us around the corner.

But Mr. Chairman, I do feel strongly that the issue of CIA corrupting the press is relatively minor—after all, attempts are being made by a lot of people other than CIA to influence what goes into the press, the reporters that file and the editors that publish material have their own biases. There are many people in the lucrative profession of public relations in this town that are trying to get their story in the press and calculated leaks from the White House, the Pentagon, and various other elements of the Government I think are a time honored institution, and so I personally feel from my experience that the CIA role in manipulating the American press is minimal compared to a lot of other people that are engaged in this kind of activity.

But I am not suggesting, Mr. Chairman, that the issue of intelligence manipulation of the press is negligible. I happen to be aware of a document, a manual entitled "The Practice of Recruiting Americans in the USA and Third Countries," published by the First Chief Directorate of the KGB. It lists a dozen top priority targets for Soviet recruitment; first, government officials with classified clearances; second, members of the American press.

Now, I think it is only logical that the press would be a top priority. After all, the intelligence agent operating under press cover has a unique advantage. He can openly pry into the most sensitive secrets of the White House, the Pentagon and CIA. After all, that is what all Washington correspondents seem to be doing most of the time. Even if he attracts suspicion he can invoke the first amendment and probably avoid investigation, and in addition, our espionage laws, as I will mention in a moment, are I think woefully inadequate, even if he does attract suspicion. And finally, an agent under press cover is in fact two agents. He is an espionage agent with excellent mobility and access, but he is also what the KGB calls an agent of influence, well suited to disseminate misinformation abroad which is one of the priority preoccupations of the KGB as you know.

Now, it has been some years since I had details regarding live operational cases in this regard, but I do know that in the past the Soviets have been quite successful in some of these respects, and I can only assume that they haven't given up.

Now, let me explain the vulnerability of our system to this kind of operation because I think it does bear on the viability of our intelligence operations.

We have a number of laws in this country that protect Government secrets of various kinds. Several statutes provide clearcut criminal penalties for revealing insecticide formulas, agricultural marketing agreements, the names of persons on relief, bank loan applications, income tax data, export controls, and so on. But as to

the secrets of intelligence sources and methods, as Mr. Colby mentioned this morning, we have far from adequate statutory protection; 18 U.S.C. 793 makes it a crime to reveal classified information relating to the national security only if it can be proved that it was done "with intent or reason to believe that the information is to be used to the injury of the United States or the advantage of a foreign nation."

Now, as we all know, intent is almost impossible to prove in court, and so these Marchettis and Agees and so on, unless you catch them dealing with a foreign agent, can spill everything they know with virtual impunity, as we have seen.

And I am not suggesting, Mr. Chairman—and I will close with this point—anything as stringent as the British Official Secrets Act, but I am suggesting that we need some kind of legislation which will protect intelligence sources and methods similar to that applying to restricted data under the Atomic Energy Act. It would cover only information specifically designated as involving sensitive sources and methods by the Directors of the various Intelligence Agencies, and would only bind individuals who had, as a condition of their employment, made a sworn commitment to observe the restriction.

I do think that the lives of our personnel and the effectiveness of our intelligence operations are at least as worthy of protection as soybean crop statistics, and I would respectfully suggest that at an appropriate time the committee might want to look into that possibility.

And in closing, let me just quote from a letter of George Washington some 200 years ago when he wrote to Colonel Elias Dayton:

The necessity for procuring good intelligence is apparent and need not be further urged. All that remains for me to add is that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon secrecy, success depends in most enterprises of the kind, and for want of it, they are generally defeated however well planned.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you, Mr. Maury.

[The prepared statement of John M. Maury follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN M. MAURY

My name is John M. Maury. My background includes law practice in Charlottesville, Va.; service in World War II as a Marine officer assigned to Naval Intelligence and commanding the U.S. Military Mission to North Russia in Murmansk; 27 years in CIA, including assignments in Berlin, on the NSC staff, on a Presidential Task Force to review U.S. foreign policy, on a disarmament delegation in Geneva, eight years as chief of Soviet operations, six years as Chief of Station in Athens and five years in charge of CIA liaison with the Congress. After retirement from CIA I served two years, 1974-1976, as Assistant Secretary of Defense. In appearing here today I speak for myself alone.

Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to appear before your Subcommittee on a matter which I believe concerns us all. Never before has this country been in greater need of reliable information about what is going on in the tense and fragile world beyond our borders. Without such information we are, for all our military might, a blind giant stumbling through an uncharted minefield. For this information we must rely on both our intelligence services and our press. But to serve our purposes this information must be not only reliable, it must be credible.

I fear the credibility of both our chief intelligence service—the CIA—and our press has been badly damaged in recent years. I believe the credibility, and the effectiveness, of CIA has suffered because of a series of false allegations and irresponsible revelations by the press. I believe the credibility of the press, at least among those familiar with the facts, has equally suffered. Not all of the press has

been a party to this irresponsible campaign to discredit the CIA. The wire services and the news weeklies have, in general, been more responsible. And I find nothing sinister in the basic hostility of the press toward any government agency which operates in secret. In our free society this is inevitable. But the record of some of the nation's leading dailies, and that of some of the fashionable periodicals, has been a shabby one. Their performance brings to mind the words of Mr. Jefferson when, in 1807, he wrote to his friend John Norvell that "nothing can now be believed which is seen in a newspaper. Truth itself becomes suspicious by being put into that polluted vessel".

A favorite theme of those who seek to discredit the CIA is that the Agency attempts to manipulate the news, and thus is a threat to the integrity of the American press. On the basis of the record, which I shall cite in a moment, one may ask, "What integrity?" One may also ask just how a press so jealous of its integrity could think its interest would be served by proclaiming to the world that it has been seduced and subverted by a sinister CIA. But in fact, Mr. Chairman, to the best of my knowledge there is no case where significant news destined for American consumption has been falsified or corrupted due to CIA involvement.

Last year Mr. Carl Bernstein, a diligent investigative reporter who was working on this question, told me he had reached the same conclusion. Mr. Stuart Loory attacked this issue in the *Columbia Journalism Review* of September/October 1974, but the best he could come up with were two cases: One, where an unidentified informant told him of a hypothetical case in which the "United States Government, for example, might decide to float a story discrediting the Soviet Union as an irresponsible nuclear power"; and another where a scientist "while consulting for CIA, developed a scheme for misleading Soviet Scientists by publishing articles containing false research results in American scientific journals"—a scheme which was ultimately vetoed by CIA Director Allen Dulles.

The Church Committee of the Senate, which investigated CIA media and other activities last year, registered considerable concern about the possibility of CIA supported "black" propaganda abroad producing "fallout" which might be picked up and unwittingly played back to American audiences by US media. The Committee report mentioned books and articles, the Publication of which was supported by CIA, usually without the knowledge of the author (who thus was hardly a CIA mouthpiece), but which sometimes were available in English and obtainable in the US. The Committee cited no cases where these had had a mischievous or misleading effect on American readers. The examples mentioned included a book about a student in a communist country. Interestingly enough this book happened to have been reviewed by Eric Severeid who, with no knowledge of the CIA role, commented that "our propaganda services could do worse than flood (foreign) university towns with this volume". Other examples cited by the committee were CIA-supported translations of Machiavelli's "Prince" into Swahili and T.S. Eliot into Russian. The Committee apparently found no evidence that these projects had produced any sinister results in the U.S.

I can appreciate the concern to protect the American reader from false information disseminated abroad. But the great bulk of CIA media operations has been aimed at disseminating the truth to areas where it is not otherwise available, as in the case of Radio Free Europe broadcasts to the truth-starved populations of Eastern Europe. If I may say so, it seems to me that by agitating this issue the press has taken aim at a non-existent target and succeeded only in shooting itself in the foot. News manipulation no doubt is a problem for a free press. Indeed news is manipulated every day by the reporters who file it and the editors who present it. News manipulation is both a common practice and a lucrative profession. Calculated news leaks, both true and otherwise, are a favored device of statemen, bureaucrats, politicians, defense contractors, public relations experts and innumerable pressure groups. If our concern is really about manipulating the media, the CIA aspect of the problem seems to me hardly significant.

As to the related issue of the role of journalists in the collection of intelligence, I know of some who have served their country in this capacity willingly and well. I know of none where this service was at the expense of their obligation either to their employers or to their readers.

So much for what CIA has done to the integrity of the press. Now, since I believe we are all concerned about the integrity of CIA, let me explain why I believe the press has caused serious mischief in this regard. I recall hearing a former Soviet intelligence officer quoted as saying, "We were taught that our first task was to put out the eyes of our enemy by disrupting and discrediting his intelligence service". If so, Moscow must be pleased with some of the material appearing in the American press in recent years. For example:

Numerous stories have implied CIA involvement in Watergate. In fact there was no such involvement. When Helms learned that the White House was seeking CIA assistance for some unknown but suspicious purpose he ordered it stopped, and he later refused CIA assistance in the post-Watergate coverup.

Press stories have described CIA as an uncontrolled "rogue elephant", defying even Presidential direction. The fact as confirmed by both Church and Pike committee of the Congress, is that CIA in all significant respects has acted at White House direction.

Various stories have linded CIA to illegal drug traffic. The fact is that, as BNDD Director Ingersoll has certified, "CIA has for some time been this Bureau's strongest partner" in running down foreign illegal drug sources.

A few years ago there were stories about CIA's "illegal" and "unauthorized" war in Laos, conducted without Congressional knowledge. In fact, various Congressional committees and subcommittees were briefed on this operation on 359 occasions between 1959 and 1972.

One familiar trick has been misleading headlines, as where a leading daily headlined a Jack Anderson column "CIA Teaches Terrorism To Friends." In fact, the story said only that the teaching in question was how to counter terrorism. Another leading paper headlined a story "CIA Goal: Drug, Not Kill, Anderson." In fact the story said only that the White House had consulted a doctor who had formerly worked for CIA about such a possibility. Another headline proclaims "Benefits From CIA Rated Low." The story merely quoted a speaker as saying, "very little good" had come out of congressional investigations of CIA.

One major daily has used falsely labelled photographs of CIA buildings to support the false charge that CIA is much larger now than it was in 1960.

Other outright falsehoods printed in the most influential dailies in the country include allegations that the CIA Station chief in Athens tried to "Kindle a war" in Lebanon; That the so-called Penkovskiy Papers, (material from a senior Soviet intelligence officer working for CIA) were "precisely the coarse fraud soviet authorities claimed" (in fact, virtually every word in the papers attributed to Penkovskiy was his own); that the CIA was recruiting U.S. mercenaries for Zaire; and that CIA had introduced swine virus into Cuba.

One of the disservices of the media has been to reward and encourage that small handful of disgruntled former intelligence employees Victor Marchetti, John Marks, John Stockwell, Frank Snepp and CIA's first defector to the Communists, Philip Agee who, in violation of their secrecy agreements (which the courts have ruled are binding contracts) have betrayed their public trust by "telling all". Some of these media-created instant celebrities may have irreparably damaged the careers, and even endangered the lives, of former colleagues whom they have publicly identified. Just two years ago I was visiting my old friend Dick Welch, the CIA Station Chief in Athens—a position which I had once occupied. Welch's name had just prominently appeared in the Greek press, replaying revelations appearing in American publications. Welch commented to me that he was now a marked man. A few days later, back in the States, I learned that Welch had been assassinated in front of his athens home as he returned from an Embassy Christmas party.

Agee, by the way, was reported in a column by Evans and Novak some months ago to be suspected of collaboration with the DGI, the Cuban intelligence service which is intimately associated with the KGB. (Indeed, Agee has admitted as much.) This column appeared in a number of papers, but not in a leading national daily that regularly carries the Evans and Novak column. Just three weeks before killing the Evans and Novak column this paper defended its disclosure of the highly sensitive covert support CIA was providing King Hussein of Jordan in an editorial which concluded with the following words: " * * * The real point is that newspapers cannot be true to their trust if they allow themselves to get in the position of managing the news, of picking and choosing—publishing or withholding—on the basis of anybody's hopes or fears of real (or fancied) consequences"

Mr. Chairman, I do not claim that the squalid record I have cited is typical of most of the American press. It is based mainly on material I have noted appearing in the two or three dailies I see regularly. I have had an exchange of correspondence with top officials of one of them in which I have pointed out several serious distortions and falsehoods and proposed an article setting the record straight. I also asked that if any of my allegations were inaccurate or unfair I be so advised. The response did not address that point, but merely stated that my case was not "impressive". The reason I have not named names in this connection is that I do not feel this is the proper forum to pursue personal differences. If the committee so desires I will of course document the above points in detail. But I have felt it necessary to cite at least enough specific facts to demonstrate that some of the media have, through a series of distortions, created an image of a dangerous and

irresponsible CIA which has little relation to reality. Unless these distortions are challenged, I fear widespread misconceptions will generate pressure for cures far worse than the disease for legislative restrictions and public exposures which will damage the effectiveness of the Agency even more than it has been damaged by false allegations, public disclosures and clumsy personnel management to date. I see no harm in confidential collaboration in the interest of national security between consenting adults even a journalist and an intelligence officer so long as neither violates his professional obligations.

However, Mr. Chairman, I do not wish to leave the impression that intelligence penetration of our media is not a problem. A manual entitled, "The Practice Of Recruiting Americans In The USA And Third Countries," published by The First Chief Directorate of the KGB, lists some dozen priority recruitment targets. First on the list are government employees with secret clearance. second are members of the press. And what could be more logical? The Soviet intelligence agent operating under press cover in the United States has unique advantage. He can openly pry into the most sensitive secrets of the White House, the Pentagon and CIA without attracting suspicion. after all, that's what the other Washington correspondence apparently spend their time doing. Even if he does attract suspicion, he can rely on the currently fashionable interpretations of the First Amendment to block investigation. Moreover, an agent under press cover is, in fact, two agents. He is a well placed espionage agent, but he is also an ideally situated "agent of influence", available to disseminate through journalistic, political and academic channels information, and misinformation, in the service of his Soviet masters. In fact, one of the major departments of the KGB is department A, whose sole mission is the dissemination of subversive and deception information abroad.

It has been some years since I have been privy to details regarding the involvement of members of the American media with foreign intelligence services, so I am in no position to cite currently active cases. I can say that such involvements in the past were of significance, and, based on both logic and experience, I must assume that this is true today. Let me explain the vulnerability of our national security to espionage conducted through media channels. Our basic espionage law (18 USC 793) makes it a crime to reveal classified information only if it is done "with intent, or reason to believe, that the information is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation". As any lawyer knows, intent is often quite impossible to prove. Thus if an American official passes secrets to a known foreign intelligence agent, he may be in trouble. But if he passes them to a member of the media, who then publishes them or passes them on to whomever he pleases, he is safe; he merely has to claim that his intent was only to let the American people know what their government is doing behind their backs.

The irony is that our Federal statutes provide clear-cut criminal penalties for the revelation of a wide variety of government information. For example: the unauthorized revelation of insecticide formulas, \$1,000 and 1 year; Department of Agriculture information, \$1,000 and 1 year; agriculture marketing agreement information, \$1,000 and 1 year; Department of Commerce information, \$5,000 and 5 years; names of persons on relief, for political purposes, \$1,000 and 1 year; crop information, \$10,000 and 10 years; confidential business information, \$1,000 and 1 year; bank loan information by a bank examiner, \$5,000 and 1 year; names of borrowers from land bank by examiners, \$5,000 and 1 year; names of borrowers from National Agricultural Credit Corporation by examiner, \$5,000 and 1 year; income tax information, \$5,000 and 5 years; patent information, \$10,000 and 2 years; tax return information by an employee of HEW; shipping information by an employee of a common carrier, \$1,000; selective service records, \$10,000 and 5 years; confidential information on export controls, \$10,000 and 1 year; information for commodity speculation, \$10,000 and 1 year. But the employees and former employees of our intelligence services, whether acting from spite or greed or secretly in the interest of a foreign power, apparently can reveal sensitive secrets with impunity unless we can prove their intent.

Mr. Chairman, if we are to have the reliable and timely intelligence which our executive and legislative leaders need to face the issues before them our intelligence services must be provided with the security protection without which no intelligence service can hope to operate effectively. It is a demonstrated fact that foreign agents and foreign intelligence services will not cooperate with an intelligence service that can't keep a secret, and today's fabulous and costly technical collection systems can survive and function only under tight security protection.

This is not to suggest anything as drastic as the British Official Secrets Act, or the security laws of most of the European democracies, under which any disclosure of classified material could bring severe criminal penalties. But under our present laws only communications intelligence appears to enjoy protection. In passing the

National Security Act of 1947 the Congress recognized the unique sensitivity of information on intelligence sources and methods by specifically charging the Director of Central Intelligence with responsibility for protecting such information. However, the law did not provide him with the means to carry out this responsibility.

May I respectfully suggest, Mr. Chairman, that this Committee might render the nation a great service by examining the possibility of a law similar to that applying to "Restricted Data" under the Atomic Energy Act. It would cover only information specifically designated by the Director of Central Intelligence and the heads of the other intelligence agencies as relating to intelligence "sources and methods"—the identities of agents or the details of technical collection systems. It would have no application to other categories of classified material. And it would be binding only on those individuals who, by virtue of employment or a contractual relationship with an intelligence agency, voluntarily assumed, by sworn commitment, the obligation to protect source and method information.

In considering such information, it may be appropriate to recall the comment of Gen. Washington who, precisely 200 years ago, wrote in a letter to Col. Elias Dayton; "The necessity for procuring good intelligence is apparent and need not be further urged—all that remains for me to add is that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon secrecy, success depends in most enterprises of the kind and for want of it, they are generally defeated however well planned."

Mr. Chairman, to newspaper articles relevant to this subject have recently appeared in the New York Times. One, by Mr. C. L. Sulzberger entitled, "Memories: Media Shifts" was in the issue of December 17. The other, by Mr. Stanley Karnow entitled, "When a Newsmen Consults the CIA" appeared December 18. So far as I know neither of these articles was written by or for CIA. With your permission I should like to place them in the record.

Dr. Cline.

STATEMENT OF DR. RAY S. CLINE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF STUDIES, THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

Mr. CLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen. My old friend and colleague Jack Maury has come out swinging on the issue of abuse of the press by CIA or of CIA by the press, according to which way you look at it. I must say I find that rather heartwarming, but I would like to move back a step or two to talk about the kinds of relationships between the press and the CIA that do come into question before we decide whether they are damaging or not damaging. After all, since feelings are strong on these issues, it strikes me that we tend to use language and adjectives about a whole range of relationships while we really are taking exception only to some narrow field. So it occurs to me that it might help this committee in its work if we were a little systematic about what we are talking about, if that is not too irregular.

Mr. ASPIN. No, no, please.

Mr. CLINE. I think we all probably can agree that this country very much needs an effective intelligence system, and it very much needs a free press; so our problem is what the appropriate relationships between the two can be in an open society, and I am not sure that we have very good answers in some cases.

Now, to start off with a cliché, some of my best friends are journalists, and I think that is natural because if you really stop to think about it, there is a very close parallel between the work of a newspaperman, a news gatherer, and an intelligence officer who also spends most of his time collecting information. There are a few other activities, and I think those are the ones that we will come to shortly as the nub of the problem between CIA and the press. But as far as information gathering is concerned, there is a close correspondence between news gatherers, whether they work

for CIA, the Washington Post, the New York Times or a TV network, assuming that we are talking about simply discovering the truth about a very messy outside world. And that, after all, is the main mission and the main task of the CIA. I think sometimes we forget this because we get very interested in the more exotic activities of propaganda and covert action.

But, as news gatherers, there is a great similarity of interest, and I think it is entirely natural that there should be close relations. I believe a man from Mars would be surprised if newspapermen, the media, newsgatherers, and intelligence officers didn't compare notes and have something in common.

In my 30 years of intelligence work, I exchanged views and information with literally hundreds and hundreds of American journalists as well as many foreign ones; and, as far as I can see, all of those relationships and exchanges were mutually beneficial and entirely honorable on both sides, and that is why I want to raise the issue here that the objections which are often made probably relate to a rather narrow field of activity.

Let me explain what kinds of relationships there have been over the years, most of them, as I say, benign. I don't intend to reveal any names or identities. I leave that to Phillip Agee and some of the others because, while I don't expect any newspapermen to be assassinated for their relationships with CIA, I think their characters might be. Further, I think we are talking about an issue of political and social responsibility, not personalities.

The recent wave of sanctimony which has swept over the press implying that all journalistic contacts are in some way sinister and immoral is, in my view, misguided. Perhaps it is based on the assumption that at this time in history the first amendment of the Constitution is the main principle around which all of our governmental responsibilities should be organized. I must say, I find that a little difficult to swallow. I got out the Constitution this morning just to take a look and while I am sure the committee doesn't need to be reminded, perhaps occasionally the press does—that first amendment is an amendment. The Constitution starts off by providing a system of establishing justice, insuring domestic tranquility, providing for the common defense and promoting the general welfare, and it established a Congress and an executive office to take care of that.

Then finally, as the first and very important article of the Bill of Rights, it did say that the Congress, under this Constitution, shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press, and it went on to some other provisions.

Now, I find it very hard to turn all of this around and say that there is an absolute principle that the Government will be conducted in this country in a way which has as its primary objective the protection of a free press. I think a free press with very mixed responsibilities and powers, is part of our society, and that we should try to balance off the benefits which we gain from it with the responsibility of all American citizens, and of the Congress and the President to protect the general welfare. Excuse me for being a little professorial about that, but I think the first amendment is

not the central purpose of our Constitution—it is an important provision of it.

Now, in the field of passing information back and forth between newspapermen and intelligence officers, there are a number of kinds of relationships; your staff has kindly indicated the main relationships on a placard large enough for the people here to see.¹ I will not follow those boards exactly, but let me give you a thumbnail sketch of the kind of relationships which do develop almost automatically between these two types of news gatherers.

A journalist very commonly comes to an intelligence officer to provide unsolicited information, usually something unsuitable for dissemination in the journalistic media—it doesn't make a good story. He is not paid for this information. All he wants really is a well-informed CIA person to talk to him concerning his experiences, to confirm or deny those experiences, to give him some reaction. Now, in the intelligence business that is what we call debriefing. In other words, he wants to debrief himself—to use an English-language barbarism which is very common in this Government—to debrief himself to an intelligence officer so as to get some idea of whether or not he has valuable information. It is often true that information which is not valuable to the newspaperman or his media—the media to which he might submit it—is valuable to the Government; it might be a detail that would be important in some respect in filling out a picture relating to our security which the intelligence officer is deeply concerned with.

I think examples of this could easily suggest themselves. A relationship between two officials in a Communist country, a rather hostile country, which had not been noted publicly and did not appear in their press since it is not free, might be observed by a Western newspaperman. It wouldn't make much of a story in our press, but it would be a matter of note for U.S. intelligence officers.

Now, the next step beyond confirming stories and swapping information is asking for a prebriefing. Many newspapermen have come to me, and I am sure to all my colleagues, saying:

We are going to do a story on so and so. Perhaps we will be making a trip somewhere or interviewing some important personalities. What should we ask or what should we look for? Is there anything important we might not think of about this situation which you are aware of because you have been studying the problem for the U.S. Government for a long time?

I see no reason why they shouldn't ask those questions and be given good information. In that case they are being prebriefed on the intelligence elements of a story. Again, no money is passed, no obligation is made; it is a voluntary relationship, mutually beneficial as far as I can see.

Let me say right here that I think by far the great preponderance of contacts between CIA and journalists have been the debriefings and prebriefings, and that they have been unpaid, voluntary, and mutually beneficial. I think that is an important distinction to keep in mind as we go on into these problems.

Then, of course, it is true that occasionally—and I have had this experience—an American newspaperman has said to me that he thought he was onto a good story but his own newspaper or other

¹See appendixes C, D, and E.

news medium was unwilling to pay his expenses to pursue the story. He has said:

They don't think it is sexy, but I think I am onto something useful, and I think the U.S. Government would really like to know what I will find out. How about your coughing up a little dough for an air trip to Prague, say, in return for which I won't tell you anything that I wouldn't tell anybody; but still, I may get some information that you would like to have.

On occasion that kind of financial assistance has been given; and as far as I can see, it has probably been a fairly good bargain because in view of the restrictions on all travelers in most totalitarian countries, the casual observations of U.S. newspapermen on matters about which they are unlikely to print a story are sometimes useful as nuggets of information—political information and economic information—valuable to the CIA and to the U.S. Government.

Now, the last possible category of relationship is when the newspaperman has accepted such an assignment for pay, beyond accepting money as expenses or even an honorarium of some sort to enable him to make a trip. He will be tasked, he will be told exactly what would be very nice to know, and he will systematically debrief himself again after the trip. At that point there is a relationship which begins to be I think in the eyes of the press suspect, and I know that some of my journalist friends feel that the passage of money somehow is what corrupts. I don't know what they do about taking pay from their own newspapers. I assume that that is pure somehow. I am not sure that the passage of money is the right dividing line between correct and incorrect behavior; but in any case, I am sure that there has been very little money passed between CIA and newspapermen, and that on the whole, it has been passed for exactly the kind of information which in my view would not in any way affect the duties of a newspaperman in connection with his own employment.

Now, let me move on to say that it seems to me that there is one area of CIA activity which occasionally involves newspapermen which causes most of the difficulty in the relationships; that is when CIA, entirely abroad and mostly with foreign journalists, provides slanted or even fabricated stories in the interests of deceiving foreign people—mostly adversary people, officials in adversary countries—about U.S. intentions or the intentions of our allies.

This doesn't happen very often. It mostly is associated with war-time or quasi-war-time situations. Nevertheless, there is a propaganda element in a very limited sector of CIA's work—its political action programs overseas—but since this fascinates people so much, I think many journalists, like many American citizens, tend to believe that CIA's work is about 95 percent political propaganda and 5 percent information gathering, whereas in fact it is the other way around. The main job of CIA is information gathering, and I would say considerably less than 5 percent of CIA work has anything to do with political propaganda or action.

Nevertheless, clearly here is a different field. I must say I cannot get terribly concerned about the charge that this occasional planting of a probably not totally untrue but perhaps slanted story about a foreign government in a totalitarian society and its con-

tacts in a conflict zone in international affairs, is a matter likely to contaminate the American press. I think the advantages on occasion of such provision of stories to foreign newspapers are clear enough from the U.S. Government's point of view so that I am not sure it is a serious encroachment on the time and intellectual efforts of the American news media to sift out those stories and deal with them just as they would any other dubious story—dubious because of its source or its internal character, or because of the lack of confirming information.

I think it is a responsibility of all editors and newspaper reporters to check their sources, to beware of being taken in by slightly slanted statements. As Mr. Maury said, they come from all over the world. They even come from all over this town, and I think it would be awfully naive of the media to suggest they only encounter the danger of picking up false information from the stories that CIA might have spread.

At any rate, I would suggest that the byword for editors and newspapermen in the free marketplace, the free news, is caveat emptor, let the buyer beware. Intelligence officers have the same problem. After all, there are a lot of agents in the world, intelligence agents who are trying to sell dubious information to CIA; and it is simply a professional matter of skill to determine the valid from the invalid story. Why journalists should feel they are particularly susceptible to being traduced in this way I don't know. Considering the amount of dubious garbage that is printed in the U.S. press from a variety of sources, I feel that the charge of a chance of contamination by a source in contact with CIA is exaggerated at best and probably not a very serious one. The media, after all, don't have to run any story they are dubious about.

Therefore, it seems to me the real anguish comes down to the feeling that perhaps some single major story, whether planted by an American journalist or foreign journalist, would creep into the U.S. press and mislead our Government, our public, our information network. I have been concerned about that in my career in Government. As a matter of fact, I used to serve on some committees which were anxious to be sure that no CIA politically slanted propaganda story did mislead our own State Department or any other part of our Government. There have been a few instances where there was a chance that that would happen and I consulted Foreign Service officers and State Department officers to be sure that it was not the case. I cannot recall a single instance where such fabrications or slanted stories really fed through in an important matter, or in dealing with an important matter in the U.S. news media. I can't think of a single case that I could build where the U.S. public might have been confused or disturbed by false or distorted information of this kind.

I am sure if it has happened, it must have been quite rare and on subjects of relatively limited interest to most of our people. There has been only small amount of such material disseminated in the past by CIA. I suspect there isn't much of any these days, judging by news stories about changes in emphasis at the Agency, and I am sure that little of it has any danger of contaminating legitimate news.

Therefore, I would like to conclude by saying most CIA relationships with journalists are with foreign nationals and are harmless, a point that should be stressed because it is the access of foreign journalists which is most useful to CIA; that these contacts, and contacts with U.S. journalists by CIA are mostly unpaid; that nearly all are simply debriefing sessions with an exchange of information and a mutually beneficial session of confirming or pointing out lack of confirmation of information. And last, the danger of contamination is exaggerated. Good political propaganda actually involves spreading the truth, not falsehood. The relatively small number of instances of CIA's planting deceptive news stories has been usually local, that is, designed for a specific target audience in a specific foreign country, and rather limited or technical in its news impact. Most misleading of the U.S. press is done by agents of foreign governments operating in closed societies or by U.S. policy level officials simply putting out their own version of the news.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you, Mr. Cline.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Ray Cline follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RAY S. CLINE

To start off with a resounding cliché, some of my best friends are journalists. I believe that is natural and entirely appropriate. There is an inevitable professional parallelism, even a certain degree of symbiosis, between American information gatherers of all kinds working in the foreign field, whether they work for The New York Times, The Washington Post, a TV network, or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Collectors of news and intelligence—they mean the same thing—all are searching for nuggets of truth about the outside world. They all try to acquire reliable sources, whose identity they often feel it necessary to protect, and in every case their credibility depends on a record for objectivity and accuracy.

At this historical moment, the American news media, which have so successfully wrapped themselves in the First Amendment as if there were no other Constitutional obligations, constitute the only relatively unfettered espionage organizations in this country. Reporters investigate all leads to good stories, pay sources whose secrecy they preserve, and receive—and print—stolen documents from inside our own government. That is exactly what U.S. intelligence agencies do except that they concentrate exclusively on penetrating foreign governments and institutions, not our own.

In my thirty years of intelligence work I exchanged views and information with hundreds of American journalists, as well as many foreign ones. All of these relationships were, in my view, mutually beneficial and entirely honorable. Let me explain what kinds of relationships CIA developed over the years with journalists. Nearly all of them were entirely benign in my opinion. For that reason I do not intend to reveal any identities. Instead I want to list the many types of contacts between journalists and CIA that can exist—very few of them objectionable. I believe the recent wave of sanctimony implying that and all journalists' contacts with CIA are in some way sinister and immoral is misguided—a kind of presumed guilt by association which in other areas of society our free press would be the first to protest.

These relationships have ranged over the following spectrum:

A. In the field of providing information to CIA in anticipation that it will benefit the U.S. Government—

1. A Journalist provides unsolicited information, usually unsuitable for dissemination in journalistic media; he is not paid; all he wants is a well-informed CIA person to debrief him on experiences he has had and observations he has made.

2. A journalist asks for prebriefing before making a trip or interviewing a source so he will not miss the opportunity to ask good questions and turn up unique or especially significant data.

3. A journalist receives CIA expense money to enable him to make a trip or entertain a source likely to yield data of interest to the U.S. Government when his own news agency will not pay for the story.

4. A journalist accepts an assignment for pay from CIA, being prebriefed and debriefed in the process of providing data of intelligence value to the U.S. Government. In some cases the news media management may be aware of this moonlighting and consider it acceptable; in others they are unwitting.

B. In the field of receiving information from CIA in anticipation that it will enhance newsgathering skill or the reputation of journalists—

1. CIA gives reaction to journalist's information, perhaps confirming or denying.

2. CIA passes true information to journalist in belief it generally serves public interest to have the facts known; in Washington this is a "leak."

3. CIA gives interpretive analysis of situations and trends—often cribbed by news-analytical reporters and editorial writers.

4. CIA provides slanted or fabricated stories in interests of deception.

Unfortunately most comments on CIA contacts with journalists fail to make any of these key distinctions. My own philosophy on these different relationships follows, with special attention being paid to whether the journalist is a foreign national or a U.S. citizen:

A. With respect to information gathering—

1. All foreign journalists are fair game as information sources; they often have or can get information valuable to military safety and foreign policy objectives of the United States, and I can see no injury to the American free press in secret exploitation of these sources. Many of them pass their information along to American journalists, too, and it is really only a question of which channel gets the data first that determines whether an item of information is a news story or an intelligence report.

2. Moonlighting American employees of American media who provide information to CIA—like foreign journalists do not damage the U.S. press in any way unless they undertake so much special work for CIA that it handicaps them in carrying out their normal duties. Naturally CIA would prefer this not to happen, since reporters overseas have good cover for access to many sources of information that are not easy to acquire except in the capacity of reporter, stringer, or free-lance writer. Obviously, if serious encroachment on journalistic time and performance does occur, the media outfit involved should fire the journalist for not doing his job—and the problem is solved. It should not matter that his difficulty was moonlighting for CIA anymore than if it was excessive time spent on wine, women, gambling, or even stamp collecting.

3. Prebriefed journalists, whether foreign or U.S. nationals, accepting payment for expenses or an occasional stipend for getting information of value to CIA, do no injury to the U.S. free press provided the moonlighting does not impinge on regular newsgathering duties. If it does, as in the case of voluntary provision of information without prebriefing, the situation is corrected automatically because the journalists sooner or later lose their jobs.

4. All voluntary, unpaid provision of information by journalists to CIA is mutually beneficial. CIA will be anxious to protect its source and will keep the relationship confidential if the journalists so desire. No harm to the reputation of the U.S. free press will be done if the journalists themselves do not gossip about their contacts with CIA. This relationship between journalists and CIA should be encouraged in the same way that citizens are encouraged to report suspicious persons or actions to the police or the FBI.

5. While it is, always has been, and in the future should be limited to a small number of special cases, a regular, contractual relationship with U.S. nationals who are journalists in an information providing mode seems to me to be acceptable and to do no harm to the U.S. free press if the CIA relationship is known to the management of the news media involved. If the media management can live with the potential conflict of interest in the assignment of tasks—which it may without damage to its own interests if CIA is flexible in its prebriefings and tasking—there seems to be no injury to the U.S. free press. Any feedback of information into the press as a result of the CIA contact is valid news data—some of it gathered because CIA subsidized the effort but nonetheless true.

6. In other words, it is hard to see why journalists should not provide information to CIA. The argument that some cannot do so without casting suspicion on others is spurious. Nowhere abroad does any government assume that the news media have an independent sovereignty that prevents journalists from passing national-security information to their own government's intelligence agency. In fact, they assume that all journalists, including Americans, do so. There is simply nowhere, except in the United States, an "immaculate conception" of journalism which needs protection from intelligence contacts of every kind. I think American journalists will be better served if they accept this real international world and live it. Most of them did for many years without any injury to our free press. It is only the extravagant

post-Watergate pretension to purity and morality that suggests to some journalists that they should preserve a reputation for "cloistered and fugitive virtue" at the expense of a healthy relationship with the parallel profession of newsgatherers in CIA.

B. With respect to the dissemination of news at CIA's suggestion—

1. A few journalists are still willing to slant or plant news stories in foreign publications because CIA sees a benefit to U.S. security or foreign policy. In the past there were quite a few, nearly all foreign nationals, working for foreign news media. This presents U.S. media considering disseminating the stories with problems of assessing their reliability and seeking confirmation from other sources. These are no different from editorial decision responsibilities for assessing thousands of stories daily which have not the remotest connection with CIA. In the marketplace of free news, the editors' byword has to be caveat emptor: let the buyer of news beware! Intelligence officers have to assess the reliability of reports reaching them on the basis of sophisticated examination of the internal details of the item of information, the record for reliability of its source, and the existence of confirmatory or contradictory evidence. Why editors should complain about their need to exercise this judgment on all news stories is not clear to me. Considering the amount of dubious garbage that is printed in the U.S. press from a variety of sources, I cannot understand the alleged fear of contamination by a source in contact with CIA. The media do not have to run any story they are dubious about.

2. If a foreign journalist is paid or persuaded by CIA to slant or plant news stories, CIA should be alert to prevent U.S. embassies, other U.S. government agencies, and news agencies from being deceived by the story. In an important instance, the State Department, with which major deception stories ought to be coordinated, should alert central news media that the story cannot be relied on.

3. Except in time of war or some extremely grave international crisis, U.S. journalists and news media should not be used to place slanted or fabricated stories; and, even then, care should be taken as suggested above to alert U.S. agencies and central news media that a story is unreliable. In fact, I do not recall a single instance where fabrications were planted in U.S. news media. I am sure if it happened, it must have been quite rare.

4. Only a small amount of untrue or deceptive material is disseminated by CIA, and little of that is of such a character as to constitute any danger of "contaminating" the legitimate news.

From all of this I conclude:

A. Most CIA-paid, protracted relationships with journalists are with foreign nationals and harmless.

B. Most contacts with U.S. journalists by CIA are unpaid and nearly all are simply debriefing sessions—with the journalists and the CIA officer simply exchanging information and views in a mutually beneficial way.

C. The danger of "contamination" of the U.S. press by false information is grossly exaggerated. Good political propaganda involves spreading the truth, not fabrication. The relatively small number of instances of CIA's planting deliberately deceptive news stories has been usually local (i.e., in specific foreign countries) and rather limited or technical in its news impact. I am not aware of any instances of CIA misleading the U.S. press on a matter of policy consequence in the past thirty years. Most misleading of the U.S. press is done by agents of foreign governments operating in closed societies or by U.S. policy-level officials simply putting out their own version of the news.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Phillips.

STATEMENT OF DAVID A. PHILLIPS, ASSOCIATION OF FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS

Mr. PHILLIPS. Mr. Chairman, for the record, I would like to point out that the members of the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers recently met in solemn conclave and changed their name to the Association of Former Intelligence Officers. They didn't like the geriatric ring of that first title.

Mr. BOLAND. You will have a lot more in a couple of months. [General laughter.]

Mr. PHILLIPS. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to participate in your deliberations on the role of the CIA and the

press. Perhaps I can contribute to a discussion of the complexities of the issue because of my background.

From 1954 until 1975 I was a professional intelligence officer. Prior to that, for several years, I was an independent journalist overseas, the editor and proprietor of an English-language newspaper, and at the same time, an intelligence operative.

In 1950 a man I had known only as a diplomat in the American Embassy in Santiago invited me to lunch. I wondered why he took me to such a remote restaurant on the outskirts of town, and he explained over coffee by revealing that he was the chief of the CIA in Chile, and wanted me to help him on a part-time basis.

The cold war was hot. Joseph Stalin was still alive. It never occurred to me to say no.

Not only did I agree to cooperate with American intelligence, but I accepted a salary, \$50 a month and license to spend \$12.50 a month for my expenses, and I signed a secrecy agreement. I did not feel any less a citizen for having done so.

When I asked the CIA chief why he had selected me to work with him he cited my situation and mobility. As a newsman I had cover, and explanation of why I was in the country, and access, I could move about and ask questions.

Some say that there should be no contact of any kind between the CIA and the media abroad, a suggestion I find to be frivolous, and even question the propriety of all such relationships in the past.

There is a natural affinity between American journalists and American intelligence officers abroad. They perform tasks which are similar, except that one reports to the public and the other to his Government. An American journalist overseas might be described as a person sent to a foreign city by his employer to establish contacts and develop sources so that he can ferret out information to send to the home office. While much of his work may be tedious, the journalist is expected to be alert for the impending event which might change history, predicting it when possible and describing it without prejudice when it occurs.

Precisely the same definition applies, I believe, to an American intelligence officer abroad. The analogy is even more apt in the case of intelligence officers and investigative reporters: Both frequently seek out anonymous sources who must be convinced that their identities will remain inviolate; and both search for that all-important second, confirming source. If the newsman or the intelligence officer allows his final product, his report to the home office, to become contaminated in any way, for any reason, the question of impropriety, even legality, looms large.

In the American communities I have lived in overseas, some nine foreign capitals, it was my experience to find that there was a clique of Americans who were especially knowledgeable about local political, economic and social developments. The group was generally comprised of the American Ambassador and his political officers, the resident American bankers, American journalists, and the CIA station chief. In the past, symbiotic relationships between members of this coterie were perfectly natural. I see no reason that under certain guidelines such relationships should not be continued.

I have reviewed the new regulations concerning CIA relations with U.S. news media recently implemented. It is obvious that American journalists will be asked to contribute in the future to intelligence efforts rarely, if at all. This committee and other oversight entities will be exploring whether future relationships shall be even more restricted.

I am concerned because it appears intelligence officers abroad have fewer and fewer opportunities to find cover and meet well informed sources. A junior intelligence officer posed the problem to me in a crude but thought-provoking manner. "If the restrictions continue," he asked, "will we soon be allowed only to collect intelligence from pimps and prostitutes?"

The kind of information our policymakers need today cannot be obtained in the streets and back alleys of the world.

The subject of whether we should conduct secret operations in our free and open society, especially after Vietnam and Watergate, has been a valid subject for debate, but that issue now seems to have been resolved.

It is my hope that this committee can, by exploring the tricky, grey areas involved in any intelligence endeavor, help us find the answer to the question which remains. Can we conduct secret operations?

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you, Mr. Phillips, and thank you all very much for very interesting questions that you raised and points that you raised.

Let me, if I might, just start out, and I want to ask each of you different questions; but I think I would like to start with the very important issues raised by Dr. Cline. All of you, to some extent, raised the issue that of course journalists are very much like intelligence officers in what they do and how they operate and the kind of questions they ask, the people they see, which of course is the point Mr. Colby was making this morning about why it is so important that we not sever all relationships between the journalists and the Agency, and I think it is true. I mean, in certain respects, a CIA officer and a journalist are operating exactly the same; but then, of course, the CIA does things other than what a journalist does, covert operations being one of them. So it is both a great parallel, but also a great danger. And I would like to explore that issue of to what extent is the CIA the same and to what extent is the CIA a little different from the journalism profession.

In particular, I think that what Dr. Cline was saying is very important, which is to illuminate the various activities that were possible relationships, because journalists have had relations with the CIA. It depends upon what you are talking about with the relationship, I guess, is really what you are saying. I suppose if you included everything on that activities chart, from story confirmation, information swapping, prebriefing, debriefing, access to files, outtakes, prior tasking, intelligence collection—that whole lot—you are talking about several thousands of people, and where the cutoff point is depends upon what people believe is ethical and proper. It is somewhat a judgement call.

But let me go to the question of the kinds of bonds of association for just a minute, before we turn to that question. Dr. Cline, you

mentioned that, for example, you could anticipate a member of the press conducting an intelligence gathering operation for the CIA, for expenses, say, and leaving aside the Turner directive what we are really trying to ask is not what is the law now. We are asking what ought to be the law.

You see no danger, I take it, in that kind of a relationship, no danger to the media from having a part-time contractual relationship?

Mr. CLINE. That's right, Mr. Chairman. I think that the technical fact of having some expenses paid for by the U.S. Government rather than by a newspaper or television network does not in any way affect the character of the relationship. Therefore, the provision of expense money seems to me to be almost irrelevant.

Now, I think other people may disagree with me. Somehow money seems to be very crucial in personal relations and perhaps it is the root of all evil. I thought it was the love of money that was the root of all evil. I don't think the kind of money that was passed out to Dave Phillips, for instance, \$50 a month and \$12.50 for expenses, was going to corrupt him very much one way or another; and the sums of money which I am aware of ever having been provided to U.S. newspapermen for expenses have been picayune and insignificant. Therefore I do not think they have had any effect on their behavior.

The only way in which I can see that a relationship of this kind, particularly if it was repeated frequently, might do damage to the news media would be when it would eat up too much of the time of the newsman. Because he found it more fascinating, he would spend more time—wasted from the point of view of his own news media because he wouldn't get a story—in pursuing leads and ideas suggested to him by a CIA officer.

But it seems to me that itself is not a dangerous situation. It is in itself correcting. If he wastes a lot of time gambling, chasing women or drinking, he will get fired by his news agency. If he spends too much time pursuing CIA leads which don't develop news stories, I expect he will have to quit his news job and see if he can wangle a job with the CIA. I don't know if that ever happened. But I don't see how that corrupts the press in any way. It seems to me to be a problem that might affect it only administratively.

Mr. ASPIN. OK, that would be reimbursement for expenses, and I guess you put in the same category, occasional payment on a contract basis for particular services.

Mr. CLINE. Right.

Mr. ASPIN. What would you say than about regular financial payment, having somebody either on a retainer or a regular salary?

Mr. CLINE. Well, there you are getting into a longer term relationship and one for which certainly, if you are an intelligence officer, you would expect a substantial contribution of time and services. My own feeling is that if a newspaperman had such special access to valuable information, that is, information sources valuable to the U.S. Government, he ought to be permitted to contribute that kind of help to our government as a matter of our national welfare, and that probably he should not do so without

some sort of administrative clearance with the employing organization.

I say that not so much because I think it is going to corrupt the press if he does it, but because it is probably going to cause some kind of a snafu at some point between the CIA and the news agency concerned, and because it would be almost creating a cover situation in a newspaper which I think ought to be cleared with the top management.

Mr. ASPIN. Do I understand you then to say that if the journalist is taking on reimbursement for expenses and occasional payment on a contract basis, you do not think it would be necessary to clear that with the management?

Mr. CLINE. No; I don't see that an occasional use of that sort is going to interfere with his regular duties very much, and I don't see any moral issue involved. I don't see any real conflict of interest. It is simply serving two users of information, interested in slightly different information. But clearly if he is going to spend a lot of the hours of his day concerned with Government purposes rather than private news purposes, I feel there is a conflict of interest, not of a moral kind but of a practical kind, and I think if I were running such an agent, I would probably want to clear it in some way with one of the responsible officials.

But this is a matter of administrative judgment, and I don't really argue that there is any great philosophical basis for such a position.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me put the counterargument because I don't know how to ask questions to get at what I am trying to say. So let me argue with you and let you come back.

What I would say, or what somebody probably on the other side would say, to that line of reasoning about even reimbursement for expenses is that what we are talking about with the media is a number of problems: how much his time is and his objectivity, those are only two. But there is one other thing that we are talking about, namely, the credibility of the media, and the credibility of the media with the leadership. And reimbursement for expenses is something of value. A person can't take the trip to Prague unless you pay for it, so that is something worth having.

Let's take some examples where I think this thing might run into problems. You have got a reporter named Joe Smith, and the CIA has him under contract, reimbursing for expenses or occasional payment on a contract basis. It is supplementing his income, allowing him to travel to certain parts of the world where he couldn't otherwise.

Now comes a number of chances for Joe Smith to write a story. Let's suppose that, for example, in country X there is an overthrow of the government, and the old government goes into exile. The new government takes over, and the old government in exile makes the charge that the CIA was involved in the coup which overthrew him.

Joe Smith now writes a story which says in effect that there is nothing to that charge, that he has checked it all out. He files the story saying there is nothing to the charge. Who is going to believe Joe Smith?

And let me give you another example. Country X invades country Y. Questions are raised in Congress about the possibility that the CIA was caught flatfooted by this happening, that in fact the CIA didn't know anything about it.

Joe Smith writes a story that says, in fact, no, that the CIA knew all about it, that they were right on top of it, that they had informed their superiors, and so forth.

Who is going to believe Joe Smith if you have to him on expenses and on contract?

A third example—this could go on forever, but let me give you a third example.

One Monday morning Evans and Novak write a column which says that Air Force intelligence has just discovered the Soviet Union has made a brand new antisubmarine warfare breakthrough, and the whole submarine ballistic missile fleet of the United States is going to be obsolete in 1985. Evans and Novak further go on to say that the arms control-niks in the Carter administration are putting the kybosh on this story because it is going to hurt SALT II, and they are getting help from the CIA who has been pooh-poohing the Air Force story.

Now, Joe Smith writes a story about this bureaucratic clash and comes to the conclusion that in fact the CIA is right, that General Keegan's proteges in the Air Force have been exaggerating the threat again and in fact the CIA is right.

Who is going to believe Joe Smith?

What I am saying is that when you have a relationship between a journalist, a reporter, even for expenses, you are giving him something of value and you are calling into question his credibility when he writes stories, and he inevitably writes stories about what the CIA is doing: Are they involved in a coup, did they know about this invasion, are they right in this interpretation of the Soviet strategic posture, all of these examples, and I can name 100 more. I can give you another example about Panama, Middle East, you name it, you can go on for a million examples. But the point is that once you pay people like that, you damage their credibility and you can't have a credible press if the CIA is paying them even expenses.

What would you say to that?

Mr. CLINE. Well, I think that you are mixing up two propositions a little bit, if I may.

Mr. ASPIN. Sure, go ahead.

Mr. CLINE. All right, I will treat the scenarios generally rather than specifically one by one. In the first place, you have to decide whether you think the relationship is widely known or not known. Now, as far as CIA is concerned, if it provides expense money to a journalist, it damned well doesn't want anybody to know about it because he obviously won't get the story if this is known. They are not protecting themselves from the U.S. press. They are protecting themselves and the journalist from the security officers in any country he visits. So if the journalist who feels that it is alright to take such a voluntary assignment and to be reimbursed for his expenses, keeps his mouth shut, I don't think anybody is going to know about it. So that fact will not add to the discrediting of himself or his colleagues.

So, I think what you are reduced to is saying, well, if it is not denied by any newspaper, and if it is not said that no newspaperman ever takes any money or has any serious dealings with the CIA, then they will all be suspect. That I find obviously true, but I can't find it a terribly disturbing thing because I can assure you from my 11 or so years overseas, all foreign governments, all foreign journalists, and all foreign security officers believe that all newspapermen are intelligence agents. There is no "immaculate conception" of the U.S. press in the areas we are talking about; what is much more likely is that there will be so many charges of newspapermen working for CIA when it is not true, that this will tend to protect the few occasions when one is legitimately doing a task of use to the Government.

So I feel that is a spurious challenge. I think that journalists, including American journalists, have to accept the fact that when they are operating in their newsgathering capacity overseas, many people will suspect them of being intelligence officers, and they either better not be or they better be able to disguise, as any other covert operator does, what they are doing. That would be exactly what CIA would want them to do.

We are not talking about thousands of cases. As I said, the thousands of cases apply simply to exchanging views over the bar. We are talking about a small number of cases where something valuable to our Government is to be procured. I think in those cases they ought to take their chances and try to preserve their security and let the general reputation of everyone abroad being corrupted by CIA, which is a great cliché, be laughed off like water off a duck's back.

Mr. ASPIN. I guess it is just a difference of perception. Basically, of course, I am talking about the American's perceptions of their own media. I know that abroad people think that everybody is working for the CIA, and perhaps there is nothing that is going to be said or done around here that is going to change that; but I am really talking about the American's perception of the media. I guess I believe that if we don't have these kind of statements, and even if we do there is perhaps some suspicion, but if we don't have these kind of statements then the suspicion is: Gee, we can't really believe any pro-CIA stories because, of course, they might be the ones that are involved in paying them.

Mr. CLINE. Well, I guess the conclusion to what I was trying to say is that there are going to be those attitudes about journalists and journalistic stories and all favorable stories about CIA, and whether it is true or not doesn't really make very much difference. May I ask you a question? How would you guarantee to the public and convince them that CIA never had anything to do with newspapermen if in fact they didn't? What would you say?

Mr. ASPIN. Well, I would say that if you had the Turner directive or whatever directive, and it is public and it is in operation, there isn't any guarantee other than, of course, there would be an enormous brouhaha if it were discovered that they were ignoring the Turner directive, and at some point it just becomes to the CIA not worth the effort.

I mean, one or two journalists or even three or four journalists on the payroll, whatever they are doing is not worth the potential damage to the CIA that would come out if that were exposed.

So I would say to anybody who asked me if I were sure that the Turner directive or the Bush directive is being followed: No, I can't guarantee you that. All that I can say is it is unlikely just because of the enormous risk that they would be running and the enormous outcry that would insure if they were doing it. That is the only guarantee.

Mr. CLINE. Well, I hope you have better luck with that in this cynical town than I do. I tell people it really wasn't CIA that did it, but I am sure you are familiar with the old New Yorker cartoon showing two native residents, obviously of an African country, watching a volcano explode and one of them saying to the other, "Pass it on, CIA did it." This is the general attitude of stories about CIA, and I am not sure we can disembody the real facts.

Mr. BOLAND. Let's look at the examples that Les Aspin gave about the deposed leader in some foreign nation and the CIA being responsible for it, and the military structure or posture of the Soviet Union. When a reporter who is reimbursed for expenses and slants stories and says that the CIA is not involved and that the story with respect to the posture is or is not correct; that really goes to the credibility of the press itself, or the reporter. I think it does harm. It does immeasurable harm, I think, to the press generally.

The further question is: Who are you going to believe? That is a matter for the policymakers. I don't think the policymakers ought to believe some particular story of some reporter in a foreign nation that says CIA was not involved in this. I would think they ought to know; certainly the CIA would know. I would think the CIA's responsibility is to indicate to those in positions of responsibility that this is not so; that CIA was not involved. Then whatever intelligence could be picked up in foreign nations with respect to the military posture of the Soviet Union this is important, terribly important; but I think that they would have some concern about where does it come from. I mean, would they believe the reporter who writes the story about whether or not the Soviet Union has expanded its submarines or whether our ability to defend ourselves against them is now obsolete? Who are they going to believe? And I think Les Aspin asked the question, and I think it is probably a good question; but it would occur to me that perhaps we ought to believe those whom we can depend upon with a great degree of accuracy and credibility.

Mr. CLINE. Well, Mr. Boland, I agree with you. And, of course, if you are speaking of responsible officials, you ought to ask the Director of CIA about the facts, and this committee can do that. We are talking about less privileged people, where in fact their mind is made up on the basis of the newspaperman who is so foolish as to slant a story about these matters simply because he is getting a \$100-airplane trip. I wouldn't think that that had much to do with his working for CIA or anything else; I think he is not a very good newspaperman.

I assure you the CIA officers concerned would not ever urge him to slant a story in the U.S. press for those reasons. They are

interested in him for another purpose. That is really where my difficulty with this problem is. If he did it, it would be a gratuitous act which would be stupid. It would probably discredit him with his own newspaper editor fairly soon.

Mr. WILSON. Well, Mr. Chairman, to the question that Dr. Cline brings up about whether or not it would be moral for a reporter to surreptitiously and covertly accept money. The situation you mention couldn't prevail because obviously he wouldn't be a good spy, he wouldn't be a good covert operator if it was generally known that he was receiving reimbursement from CIA. I think the question that Dr. Cline raised of whether it is moral or immoral can only be answered in the person's own mind. A lot of people think espionage itself is immoral, it is ungentlemanly, it's a dirty business, and I don't want to compare that at all with you distinguished gentlemen, but garbage collection is a dirty business—it is necessary in the system that we have, and in some ways it is inconceivable that some people would ever take a job such as you are doing, and yet I look upon them as men who are risking their lives, just as servicemen or policemen or others who are looking after our security. So I don't think we need to be concerned about the morality of it.

We are faced with this fact, the Director of CIA has put out some very stringent guidelines, not guidelines but regulations that may later be put into law by the Congress and thus make them actual statutory considerations that say you are not going to be able to hire anybody associated with the American press. If this is the case, do you think the intelligence service—and I would like any one of you to answer, or all of you, if you want to—do you think this is going to be a restriction that hampers the capability of the CIA to operate effectively in the future?

Mr. CLINE. I would like to say I think it would limit CIA. I think each category of well informed persons with access to information abroad that is ruled out of bounds for CIA limits its effectiveness.

Now, it is a price you may be willing to pay, but I personally will try to give you the benefit of my views based on my own experience. My personal view is that the limited occasional use of American newspapermen as sources of information does not cause them to slant their stories. It has nothing to do with putting deceptive or slanted material in the U.S. press; and if it is conducted in a professional and reasonable way, it is not going to injure either the media or the CIA. So I think it is a self-denying ordinance which is a little bit damaging.

Now, if that were all to the story, perhaps you would say:

Oh, well, OK, but if that is true, I feel confident that next year you will be hearing from some other profession which says: "A lot of people think we are CIA officers, too, and while we don't have the first amendment to worry about, we are moral and righteous citizens, and we don't want to be suspected of working for the CIA."

So, as Dave Phillips says, you will end up not being able to talk to anybody who knows anything about events overseas. That is the danger.

Mr. WILSON. Mr. Maury, what is your attitude?

Mr. MAURY. Yes, sir. I am an old-fashioned liberal and I don't object to any relationships between consenting adults, whether

public or private, as long as neither one violates the law or his obligations to his society or his company or his Government agency. As far as I am concerned, this is something I don't think we can legislate or regulate about, sir. It seems to me that there is an affinity between members of the media and members of the intelligence community. There are certainly scoundrels on both sides, and hopefully the good will displace the bad. Hopefully those members of the media who neglect or violate their responsibilities to their publishers or to their public as a result of any CIA involvement will be caught up with and hopefully the CIA or other Government intelligence agencies will not misuse the media.

I think that as a result of the oversight of this committee, in which I have great confidence, CIA involvement with the press will be kept within the proper bounds. As far as the press maintaining its own integrity is concerned, I think that is up to the press to set and maintain its own standards.

The media has always taken the position, when I have complained to members of the media about publishing leaks, damaging leaks from the intelligence or defense communities, that this is not their problem. They say you guys police your own leakers. Don't bother us with your problems. Well, I say the same to them. Let them police their business and we will police ours.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you.

Mr. Phillips?

Mr. PHILLIPS. In one category of American journalists overseas, the American journalist who is sending his product news back to the United States, I would like to borrow your phrase, Mr. Aspin, and say this conversation is not worth the effort. Because the possibility that this committee, I believe, and the Senate committee, are going to go back to Admiral Turner and say no, that is much too strong a statement in that field, is just inconceivable to me; that we are going to say that there should be a regulation now that says yes, you can pay a salary to working journalists who are providing information.

My concern is I sort of see that in a sense as a lost cause, with a background as an intelligence officer, and having been brought up in the tradition of the British intelligence service. I suspect that there are a lot of people who think that maybe some of the most prominent newsmen and writers in Britain may have had some connection with intelligence: Somerset Maugham, Ian Fleming, Kim Philby; so that was the past.

In the present situation I don't see this committee, or anyone else, saying sure, it is all right to give salaries or money to working American newsmen.

My concern then goes on to this present new directive, the regulation which has just been implemented, in what it will do in a second category which you are going to be talking more about later, and that is the support category. And I can—I was trying to imagine my own reaction to that regulation if I were still working at the CIA, and this was the basis for my statement that there will be only rare instances where the press contributes to American intelligence, because as I read that regulation now it starts out and says the Agency won't have any contact at all with American newsmen. Then it backs off on the second page and it says there

that yes, you can talk to an American newsman and tell him if you think he has a clinker in his story, and he can do the same to you about the reports you are about to send back. But I also see that phrase on the first page cutting out some absolutely essential business that can be performed by Americans working in journalism overseas without prejudicing either.

I am trying to think of two instances in my own past. One, for instance: I was in a country and I was a very close friend of an American newsman. We had been neighbors here in Bethesda before he went to this country. I saw him regularly overseas. He knew where I worked. We had lunch; I bought lunch one time; he bought lunch the next time, and then one day he said to me; a man is in town and I am having lunch with him tomorrow. I am going to get a good story. The man he was meeting was a high official of a closed society, a man I had previously known, but only slightly. I had also heard stories that this high official was disaffected, so I said to my American newspaperman friend: Do you mind if tomorrow when you are having lunch with this fellow if I stop by your table and renew my acquaintance with this man so I will have an excuse to call him later and talk to him? And the newsmen said, no, by all means.

So that is what I did. According to this regulation I shouldn't do that. I would feel I was proscribed from doing it.

Also, the business of definition of the people we are talking about. I recall a case which in essence went like this: An American in Latin America was a stringer for an American publication which had to do with mining. He had that job as a stringer simply because he was in the mining business and lived around mines and miners traveled all the time.

I recall someone saying to him: Would you mind keeping a spare radio communications set up in the mountains in case our embassy is ever overtaken by a mob, so that we can be sure that we can communicate with the United States? Under the present guidelines, I can't see that I could ask him to participate, even voluntarily, in that kind of intelligence work.

So the points I am trying to make are that I believe that the way things are now, that there is no way that anyone is going to decide that American newsmen could be on the CIA payroll if they are sending information back to this country.

The present regulation, it seems to me, proscribes even the most innocuous type of meeting with American newsmen, other than these conversations over lunch.

Mr. WILSON. Well, if I could comment on that, as this regulation is drafted, the very last paragraph, No. 3: exceptions. "No exceptions to the policies, prohibitions stated above may be made except with the specific approval of the DCI."

Now in the second case you spoke of, as long as that exception is allowable, it is conceivable that an exception could be made. So I don't think that would be quite as strong as the first point you made about how far you could go under these regulations in maintaining your contact with a friendly newsman.

Mr. ASPIN. But I think you are right, Mr. Phillips, to raise these issues because clearly by the time Admiral Turner comes we are going to have a whole list of these questions to ask him. You know,

does this really mean this or that, or does it mean something else. But I think that any relationship which substituted for the "paid and contractual relationship" (which was the wording of the Bush directive) has got to be considered significant. And I think it is clearly something we have to talk to Admiral Turner about.

Let me go on. I don't guess we will ever agree on whether we can pay expenses, so let's go on to another issue.

Mr. CLINE. Is the committee paying our expenses today?

Mr. ASPIN. Oh, yes, sir, yes, sir.

Mr. CLINE. Fine.

Mr. ASPIN. On the understanding, of course, that you don't have to say anything that makes us happy. Say anything you want.

Mr. WILSON. Transportation on the subway from downtown.

Mr. CLINE. 40 cents.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me go on to another issue because I think Dr. Cline did us a great service by raising this issue in these hearings.

What we are really talking about is a whole range of different activities that media might undertake with the Agency, and the whole question, of course, of the numbers is wrapped up with this. The question of how many, whether it is 400, whether it is 1,000, whatever the number is of people having a relationship with the CIA depends, of course, upon what activities you are talking about. And if you are talking about that whole range of activities, everything on that "Activities Chart", we are talking about, I am sure, thousands of people. The question is: What is the line that ought to be drawn?

What we listed on the chart, Dr. Cline, are things we picked up in preparation for this hearing that we had heard about in other places, and lined up in terms of from the most innocuous up, starting out with story confirmation which is probably the most innocuous kind of relationship in which somebody calls the CIA to check out a story. We also have information swapping, meeting casually with a member of the Agency somewhere and just bantering stuff back and forth. The next one being prebriefing, or going out to the Agency and talking to somebody before going on a trip; and debriefing when one comes back, which involves imparting some information presumably which probably did not appear in the story. Access to files and outtakes would be another area; that would mean you let a CIA official see files and outtakes that never appeared in print. And then, finally, the prior tasking of intelligence collection. That is when you go out for your briefing and allow the Agency to say OK, here is what we want you to look at when you go overseas.

That information is, of course, only one aspect of the activities that journalists might undertake for the CIA. Another is support. The most innocuous would be a friend in the Agency asks a journalist to host a party so the CIA can make contact with people; second would be to provide some kind of safe houses or post office boxes for the Agency; and third, then, and more involved with the Agency, would be to act as a courier, either for information or money that is, run information to an asset or money to an asset.

Agent work is another thing that journalists might be very, very useful for, helping to spot agents for the Agency, saying so and so looks like a good bet, he seems like a reliable fellow, you know,

spotting and assessing agents, similar things, including actually recruiting the agent; and then actually handling the agents. I guess actually handling the agents is a pretty unlikely thing to be asking a journalist to do.

And then of course the whole area of propaganda which of course we discussed this morning and probably will discuss a little bit more.

Let me ask unanimous consent to put the chart, into the record if we might.

[The charts referred to are printed as appendix C, D, and E. See pp. 335, 336, and 337.]

Mr. ASPIN. A lot of journalists say, for example, that they will do journalistic things but they don't want to be involved with espionage. In other words, they are journalists, and then in connection with their life as journalists, sure, they will cooperate with the Agency the way they would cooperate with any source or the way they would develop any source; but they don't want to be involved with espionage.

Where in that line of activities does espionage come? Maybe, Dr. Cline, you could tell me where in your judgment on each of those activities you think the line is where a journalist still could maintain his integrity as a journalist? What could he do and what couldn't he do?

Mr. CLINE. Well, by my somewhat academic definition, all of the functions under the heading "Activities" are intelligence work or espionage, if you want to use that term, if they are conducted by an intelligence officer. I would say that all of the activities on that chart under the heading of "Information" would also be legitimate activity of a newspaperman, a journalist doing his media work.

Now, the places where you might make some distinctions follow: except for hosting parties, I very much doubt that I would ask a U.S. newspaperman to do any of those other things; but I suppose if he did so for compensation, he would then properly be called participating in espionage. Propaganda is a separate case. That is something else, and we have already discussed that.

That would be my usage of the terms, just trying to be consistent. There is no magic to it.

Mr. WILSON. Excuse me. You put the condition for compensation on it. What if he did almost any of those things under the first three, voluntary proposal, under bonds of association, either through patriotism, friendship ties or for his own benefit, realizing that if he worked with you, you don't have to pay him, but that he is going to do a better job for his newspaper.

Now, under this regulation, clearly you could not do it.

Mr. CLINE. That's right.

Mr. WILSON. Because it says enter into any relationship with full-time or part-time journalists for the purpose of conducting any intelligence activity.

Now, it is conceivable to me that you might be able to stretch this regulation enough to say the first three or four, story confirmation, information swapping, prebriefing and debriefing, on the basis of the first three, bonds of association, and get away with it, but wouldn't it be a lot better if you put the condition monetary—

you can't enter into any contractual arrangement with any newspaper. In other words, to go on the payroll?

Mr. CLINE. Well, it would certainly make things simpler. Maybe that is the object of the exercise. On the other hand, as I argued earlier, the passage of money does not really determine the character of the function. The function, just as you said, may well be the same, whether it is done for patriotism or for money. As a matter of fact, a lot of professional espionage is done by foreign citizens who do it out of idealistic reasons and don't take any money.

Mr. WILSON. I think if I went to somebody and I were an agent, and I went to a press man or to confirm a story, a report that I had gotten, and I did it strictly because of friendship or I thought it was good for the country, I think I would not be violating this rule.

Mr. CLINE. I think that's right. I hope that's right, but I am not sure. The rule is a little murky.

Mr. ASPIN. You wouldn't draw the line at prior tasking, I take it, from what you are saying.

If the CIA told the journalist, "Gee, while you are there, why don't you see how many machine guns they have got, or whether you see any enemy tanks," that doesn't bother you?

Mr. CLINE. That doesn't commit the newspaperman to look for them, or to tell you about them even if he saw them. What it says is: It just happens that we would be very interested if you discovered this piece of information. So I don't see that it compromises the newspaperman in any way.

I have prebriefed a lot of travelers to foreign countries, who were not newspapermen, telling them, at their request, what to look for and what not to look for, mainly in the interest of their own safety. It's not always true, but in the past, in particular, it used to be true that American businessmen who had gone to the Soviet Union, and showed an interest in certain areas, regions, or types of people, were very likely to get socked in the clink. We always tried to warn them what not to show an interest in. This prebriefing is a very general thing.

Mr. ASPIN. Well, there is a lot of grey area between prebriefing and prior tasking. Where does it really become a request?

But if you really asked a person, say, to go out and look at that and report back, you think that is not going over the bounds?

Mr. CLINE. Well, I tend to agree with Jack Maury. It is still a voluntary association. If the guy doesn't want to do it, he doesn't do it, and he says, "No, I won't do this anymore."

Mr. ASPIN. Let me ask Mr. Phillips, because he is the one that has had some experience in both areas.

How do you look at the issue of activities, and where do you stop as a journalist and become an employee of the CIA?

Mr. PHILLIPS. First of all, of course, espionage, no matter who conducts it, is illegal in every country in the world, whether it is a newspaperman or anyone else, and those grey areas sometimes are very grey indeed.

It only occurred to me a couple of years ago that I had been violating U.S. law over a period of years without the least thought of causing any harm, but when I went overseas as an undercover CIA agent in deep cover I used to go down to K Street and fill out

an application for a passport. When they asked what is your occupation, I did not write down spy. I lied on that application.

So this is the kind of problem you have in almost everything on that board.

Now, in the middle bracket—host parties, provide safe house and act as a courier—I would guess that in 80 percent of the countries of the world that the host government would consider “provide safe house” and “act as a courier” as a crime for which they would send someone to jail. Or shoot you; sometimes they even shoot spies today.

So the point I—I am going to answer your question about where I will cut it off—but again, in each case, assess it. If I have a friend overseas who is a newsman, and there is someone in that government who I really feel it is vital to get to, and I want to recruit him, I would say to myself, is it really wrong to say to that man, I understand you did a long story on him 2 weeks ago. What do you think his psychological makeup is? What are his vulnerabilities?

Would that be improper? Would it be improper for him to tell me?

I don't think so on the one shot basis. I don't think so as a human relationship between an intelligence officer and a newsman.

The difference, of course, no matter where you are on that map, is the institutionalization of the role of a newsman. Here is a newsman overseas reporting back to the United States, and he spends a good portion of his time, maybe 20 hours a week, doing these chores for me. That is, it seems to me: where it comes down.

So generally speaking, I would say that the activities under “Information” are pretty much ethical for both persons concerned, including the newsman. In the second one, I think the newspaperman would be foolish indeed to do anything other than host the parties or he might be in jail, and that the intelligence officer would be unwise to ask him to do it.

In the third one, except on the occasional basis, any one of those things is involving the newsman in intelligence operations.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Maury, any comments on this question?

Mr. MAURY. Sir, we are discussing the Director's regulations. It strikes me, knowing something about how things work up there, or used to work up there, that these regulations are based on the idea that if we in CIA don't put out something to quiet the media down a little bit, they will turn the screws on this committee, and this committee might come up with something even worse. So I think that is what we have got right here in front of us to worry about.

I agree with my colleagues here, Mr. Chairman. I think that we have to go back to what I said earlier, and that is that there are opportunities for abuses under every one of these headings, but I do not see how we can legislate or regulate in any sensible way that will plug all of the ratholes. I think we have to rely on this committee and the SCC, the Special Coordinating Committee of the NSC, that has the oversight role of the intelligence community on the executive side, and the leadership of the CIA, and the sister committee on the Senate side to keep the CIA honest and hopefully the press can do something to keep itself honest.

Mr. BOLAND. Let me ask whether or not either one or all of you believe that these regulations ought to be imbedded in legislative concrete, or would you prefer to see them as directives?

Mr. MAURY. If I may comment on that sir, I am deeply concerned about legislative concrete as you say, for two reasons. First of all, I think the world is perhaps more fragile and unstable than it has ever been. I think the United States is more susceptible and vulnerable to events abroad than it has ever been. I think the conditions that lie ahead, the pitfalls that lie ahead in the conduct of our foreign policy are many and varied and impossible to predict with precision. I would hate to think that the effectiveness of our intelligence agencies was circumscribed in advance in the present climate so that when a crisis strikes, we would not have the flexibility to respond effectively to whatever challenge we may face.

The reason I am concerned, in all honesty, about legislative solutions to this admittedly difficult problem, Mr. Chairman, is that once we start down that road we have inevitably a wide variety of amendments, suggestions, pressures for additional restrictions. Once we open up that bucket of worms we're going to be, as somebody has pointed out earlier today, deluged with proposals for restrictions against the use of this and that and the other group, and I don't know where it's apt to end.

I would hope that we have a responsible executive branch that can lay down reasonable regulations acceptable to the appropriate oversight committees of the Congress, but also subject to change where vital national interests require.

Mr. CLINE. I'd like to agree with that and say in addition that even the promulgation of this kind of publicly announced regulation tends to inhibit activities more than the words themselves clearly suggest. We're having difficulty this afternoon. We haven't really, I think, defined any of these terms with crystal clarity. I assure you that the general drift of this new regulation will be that any sensible intelligence officer is going to stay away from all of this business of the press just as much as he can, unless he has what he considers to be an opportunity so golden that he couldn't live with himself unless he brought it out. I think this will be a very strong self-denying ordinance, and only those exceptions which Mr. Wilson mentioned—where you can go right to the Director, which isn't very easy to do—will be the cases in which use of the contacts of the press which I would consider legitimate will be undertaken.

So the more informal, the more a matter of working definitions and the more a matter of consultations with members of this committee and with the intelligence supervisory people in the executive branch so that you can help define these things in a pragmatic way which would enable us, as I said earlier, to have a free press and to have a good intelligence system, both of which I think you ought to aim for. No words in legislation or in directives are going to feed down with 100-percent clarity.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Phillips.

Mr. PHILLIPS. Sir, it seems to me that perhaps the answer to—I am a little torn on this issue because there have been so many instances in my past where I have been involved in operations, where I thought it was what everyone wanted, including the Presi-

dent and the Secretary of State, and later people talked about its being improper and illegal. What it turned out to be was one of those bad zigs in American foreign policy that we have gone through from year to year on many occasions.

So I am sort of tempted to say, yes, let's have the law so that intelligence people know what they should do. What we have had before was the charter of the CIA which said you fellows can collect intelligence and perform "such other functions and duties." Well, that banana peel, of course, has caused all the problems.

So I almost welcome the idea of some laws so that intelligence officers can understand them. They are bright enough to understand them. There are some loonies, but they go off, they leave the Agency, they go into other professions: insurance salesmen, plumbers, so forth.

Mr. WILSON. Journalism.

Mr. PHILLIPS. But my point is this. Right now, for instance, I would see no problem at all in a U.S. statute or law which made it a punishable offense for any intelligence officer to become involved in an attempt to influence American public opinion. It seems to me that would be a very good law to have to prevent any sort of institutional effort to participate in a program, the primary objective of which was to change our views in this country. I think there should be such a law and people should go to jail, including intelligence officers, if they violate that law.

But then we come down to the business of how is that going to be interpreted, under what circumstances? How will the young people who are now supposed to conduct intelligence do so—and intelligence is a profession which requires, once the decision is made, to be pursued with vigor or it won't work. So the laws that are necessary, yes. It is almost like covert action. I believe that we should undertake covert action rarely, only in situations where it is absolutely vital, and I think we need some laws in those areas where it is vital, but in doing that, it seems to me we must avoid the situation that we have been in before where at the beginning of World War II we found ourselves making public requests to people who had been tourists over the years saying would you please send us any photographs you took while you were traveling abroad, and where our understanding of the new enemy was so shallow that we allowed in our own country really incredibly bad things to happen. Our understanding of Japanese intentions was so poor that we allowed ourselves to move all of those Japanese citizens in California into concentration camps.

So somewhere between the law and the flexibility necessary for vital intelligence operations we have to find that answer, and it is not easy.

Mr. WILSON. May I ask, I asked Mr. Colby this morning and I would like to ask you gentlemen, I know we don't need a British Official Secrets Act, but do you feel we need legislation that would prohibit the sort of thing that we have seen recently where revelations by former intelligence officers, where they break an oath that they have taken to not make their activities public, could be subject to very severe fine and imprisonment? Would this be too much of a penalty for us to pay from the standpoint as libertarians, to

require that anyone who takes an oath and breaks it has broken a law that is punishable by jail?

What do you think about that, Mr. Phillips?

Mr. PHILLIPS. Well, my feeling is one, that no matter how much intelligence officers might yearn for a British secrecy act, it is not worth the effort; we are not going to have one.

I do feel that people who have worked in intelligence have the same obligation that any businessman has when he signs a business contract; that in civil court he can be prosecuted if he breaks that contract under certain conditions. There is an argument made that without the whistleblowers; our society is not as healthy as it should be, and in many instances that is certainly true. But if we institutionalize the art of whistleblowing by intelligence officers, then we are going to get into the situation where it will seriously damage the ability of or intelligence agencies to work.

So it seems to me that a reasonable aspiration is some sort of statute or law that says intelligence officers who have signed an agreement are not allowed to violate that agreement.

Now, there are all sorts of areas there. I recently wrote a book and I had to take it for clearance, and there were some bloody sessions because I thought there were some things that were sort of silly that I was being asked not to have in that book, and so forth. However, there were always a lot of avenues to me. If I had just written a book on Vietnam, for instance, and I were to show up at this committee, I don't believe you would turn me away from your doors if I said that I was really, really being shackled in trying to get across my viewpoint, and this and that and the other. So once again it is a tricky, grey business. But in that one area, people who have worked in intelligence, I think we are going to have to have it or the institution won't survive.

Mr. WILSON. Dr. Cline?

Mr. CLINE. Well, this is one of the most troubling problems in our intelligence profession today, and I don't know what the answer is. I don't believe that legislation on the subject will solve the problem. My feeling is that the leaks—and I think unfortunate behavior of some former intelligence officers in this respect—have come more from the public attitude toward revelations and the welcoming of whistle blowing than from deficiencies in the regulations.

I thought when I was in charge of a lot of intelligence officers, that the regulations were pretty good—I could fire the guy, I could bring civil suit against him, and I might even, in an extreme case, get an Espionage Act indictment. But it turns out that because of the state of public opinion that has been created in this city in the last few years, no sensible official would ever take any of these actions because he would lose the case. He would lose it publicly, simply because public opinion is against secrecy in the intelligence agencies. There is no real confidence in the integrity of this system.

So I don't think a law would help us very much. I am inclined to take my chances with the integrity of the intelligence officers if this committee will do what it can and other responsible people will do what they can to give clear guidelines to CIA, as to what its responsibilities are and the way it should conduct its duties, and

then concentrate on making this profession and this kind of work again a respectable form of public service in which you will get good quality people who will have every career reason to want to protect the secrecy of their activities.

So I would be inclined to say legislation probably wouldn't help. It is the public mood which we ought to try to correct.

Mr. WILSON. Before I call on Mr. Maury, I would just like to say that we had an experience recently where a Congressman, according to the rules of the Armed Services Committee was required to sign a statement to be allowed to read a top secret document taken in executive session. He signed the statement to the effect that he recognized that it was top secret, could not reveal it to our staff or any members of the press, and so forth. He signed it and then immediately went out and gave the story and admitted it in a hearing that we had, and Congress was unable to——

Mr. CLINE. Didn't know what to do about it.

Mr. WILSON. And it just didn't know what to do about it, couldn't police it, and I wouldn't leave it up to the responsibility of an intelligence officer, but any citizen who knowingly violates a top secret confidence and disseminates it is guilty of a crime, and that is treason or whatever you want to call it.

But I really feel strongly enough that if it is a newspaperman that does it, he ought to be subject to it, too.

Mr. CLINE. I am very sympathetic to that point of view. I am just saying that it is just like the Congress; I find it very hard to say how it could be policed.

Mr. WILSON. I don't think anybody has to hold their breath until that becomes law. I really feel that that is going to be about the only way we can get around to it.

Jack, what do you think?

Mr. MAURY. Mr. Wilson, first of all, let me say that I think in reviewing this problem, it is remarkable that perhaps over the last 30 years, there have been 70,000, 80,000, 90,000 people who at one time or another worked for CIA, some of whom worked there very briefly. Of that number, there are only a half a dozen that have violated their oath. In the case of the Congress, this one individual that you speak of is the only one that I know of recently that has done the same thing, but it doesn't take but one bad apple to spoil the barrel, and it does seem to me that where you have the Victor Marchettis and John Marks and John Stockwells and Frank Snepps and Phillips Agees, any one of whom can do and some of whom have done irreparable damage to highly sensitive and important intelligence operations, and jeopardized the careers and even the lives of some of their former colleagues, I think that we owe it to the rest of the intelligence personnel to try to find some legislation that will give some protection against this. Every civilized country has it. In some of the Scandinavian countries you can go to jail for even mentioning the existence of the official intelligence service. There are guys in jail right now in Norway for revealing information that they got, who have no government connection at all, but who have published information of a classified nature.

And in this country it is ironic that we have two gentlemen who are doing life in prison now, one named Lee and one named Boyce who were in the TRW involvement, getting information out of

TRW involving sensitive intelligence operations and passing it to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. Now, if they had gone to the Los Angeles Times or San Francisco Chronicle or Aerospace Daily and passed out the same information, they would be free and the Russians would probably have the information even sooner.

So we have that irony, and it seems to me that again I say, we owe it to ourselves and to the members of the intelligence community to do what we can to fill this gap because it is an invitation to anybody who is disgruntled or doesn't like the way his supervisor treated him or didn't get a promotion when he wanted one, to go to some member of the media and become an instant celebrity, and get a lot of money for betraying the secrets that he had sworn to protect.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Mineta.

Mr. MINETA. Something sort of bothers me about what is going on here.

First of all, let me just comment. Mr. Phillips, when you said Japanese citizens were moved into the camps, I think you mean American citizens of Japanese ancestry, did you not?

Mr. PHILLIPS. Of course I did.

Mr. MINETA. Because I was one of those 111,000 at the time, and I think your analysis of that time is correct. But one of the things, Dr. Cline, you said was about the public mood which we ought to correct; and Mr. Maury, you just mentioned the Scandinavian example of disclosure. You are not suggesting that the CIA ought to be free of rules by which the game is played or by which the conduct of their business in an open society such as ours ought to be set, are you?

Are you saying that CIA ought to be able to "do their thing" without being shackled, so to speak, by rules and regulations?

Mr. CLINE. I certainly didn't mean to say that, sir. What I was trying to say was that I was not sure the wisdom of man, even the wisdom of Congress, could make a law which would clearly indicate when it is appropriate to release certain information and when it is criminal to do so. I was saying that you have to create a climate of opinion, through the conduct of your business, which will give guidelines to intelligence officers so they will know what is expected of them.

My impression is that most of them are trying to follow what they think is public interest in these matters, and that there is some genuine confusion now because of the notoriety that some of the publicists have received.

So I would urge the committee to try to define what they think is right and wrong and to impress it on the intelligence profession, which you have every opportunity to do; and between the House and Senate, I think you can set a climate of opinion which will make it clearer what honorable conduct is.

I am a little dubious about reducing that kind of wisdom to criminal legislation. That was the only point I was trying to make.

Mr. MINETA. Criminal legislation.

Mr. CLINE. Yes.

Mr. MINETA. Now, as far as the public mood goes, doesn't that get formed by some of the information that does surface as to some of the transgressions?

Mr. CLINE. Yes; I think it has been created by—what is it now—3 full years of investigations and disclosures of abuses and misdemeanors of various kinds; and I think that what has not happened, is that it has not been made sufficiently clear that the intelligence agencies themselves were trying to discontinue and clean up these abuses before they were revealed publicly. I think it is true that most of the information came from internal investigations by CIA itself, and it has not been made clear that the many instances that can be fairly criticized really represent a very tiny percentage of the total activity of CIA and the other intelligence agencies, and that most of their functions and tasks have been performed creditably in the interests of the public and the security of this country. I would like to see that balance righted a little more; people should talk about the achievements of the intelligence profession as well as certain abuses.

Mr. MINETA. I think there is great support for having a good intelligence network. I personally was in military intelligence in Korea and Japan and I think that, as far as an intelligence-gathering arm, there is a great need for them. And I think people want that; but I think they get troubled when policy directives of the CIA or others go beyond policy directives of the Government; and I think that does more harm to the credibility. And there is no sense of accountability on the part of those who are in intelligence agencies, either; I think that is what becomes the problem.

I think basically there is a support for a good intelligence network; but the transgressions get us into trouble

Mr. CLINE. Well, I simply repeat, I think the transgressions have been limited in comparison to achievements. I think they are all at least 4 years old. I am not aware of any new transgressions since the investigations started.

Mr. MINETA. Maybe we get smarter as we get older.

Mr. CLINE. Exactly, and I think the creation of this committee and the Senate committee has done a good bit for accountability in these matters.

Mr. MINETA. Is it better policy, then, maybe more than regulations that we need?

Mr. CLINE. I think we need some new positive policy. I like to hear people like you say what you just said—that we want a good intelligence system, we know we need it, and we are trying to find ways to make it completely compatible with a free society, which we also want.

Mr. MINETA. Some in the intelligence community dispute whether we do need a new charter within the intelligence community. Would you dispute that?

Mr. CLINE. Well, it depends on what you mean by new. I think the charter that President Ford issued is pretty good. I assume that is what they are operating on. I have seen drafts of new legislation, I believe from the Senate side, which is very similar and makes a few more moves which I think pins down some of the questionable points a little better.

I think that legislation concerning these matters is appropriate. I would like to see a charter approved by both Houses of the Congress, but I say that not so much because I think the law will then be crystal clear as to what you should do and shouldn't do, but

because there will be the beginning of a climate of understanding between the Congress, the executive branch, and the professionals as to what is in the common interest; and so, it is the educational effect that I would welcome more than any possibility of using a law for criminal procedures. That is where I demurred a bit because I think it is difficult to legislate these gray areas.

Mr. MINETA. Mr. Maury.

Mr. MAURY. Mr. Mineta, I want to be clear. I certainly do not object to regulation and control, and furthermore, I never intended to suggest that the Agency should operate without responsible controls. My concern was that legislative measures to say who you could recruit and who you could buy lunch for and so on, who you could exchange information with and when and how, I think is an unnecessary solution to a not very serious problem. I think the problems of the past have resulted in the fact that first, nearly all of the major improprieties that I know of with which the intelligence community has been charged originated outside of the intelligence community. I think that was confirmed by both the Church and the Pike committees. At least as far as the CIA was concerned, I recall the conclusion of the Church committee report was that CIA in all important respects had acted in accordance with Presidential or White House direction.

I think also that most of the things that we have been concerned about were well known to the Congress or certain Members of the Congress, but my experience was that in many cases they didn't want to know any more than they had to, and I welcome the fact that here we have new committees that obviously are going to dig deep and keep a close watch on the intelligence community. But I also want to support what my friend Ray Cline has said, and that is that most of these improprieties were uncovered by in-house investigations within the intelligence community, and the results of those investigations leaked, and then the press had its fun with them. But I would hope that this committee and the Senate committee could get together with the executive branch and agree upon guidelines that would not require detailed legislative do's and don't's because then I am afraid we might pass something in the present political climate that might prove quite unrealistic in some of the unforeseen circumstances that we might confront in the years ahead.

Mr. MINETA. Thank you.

Mr. ASPIN. There is one other area that I would like to go into a little bit, and that is the propaganda area. I know Dr. Cline has said something about that and would like to explore it a little bit.

Before we do that, I was sitting here worrying about the fact that I cannot make Dr. Cline, who I consider a very bright and able fellow, understand my concern about CIA paying the expenses of a journalist, and why that is damaging to the credibility and why that worries me.

Let me try it from one other angle, and then I will give up. It is your view that if a person works for a newspaper and moonlights for the CIA, that—as long as it doesn't interfere with his job, in other words, doesn't take up too much time, basically he can serve two masters because one is a moonlighting job and the other is a daytime job.

Let me ask you, how about if it were for the reverse? How about if your station chief in Cairo were moonlighting as a stringer for the Washington Post. What would you think of that?

Mr. CLINE. If it were a cover relationship which I knew about, that would be perfectly OK; that would be fine.

Mr. ASPIN. How about if you didn't know about it because, under your definition of expenses, it wasn't necessary to tell the newspaper management that you covered these expenses. So suppose your man——

Mr. CLINE. If my man did anything that I did not know about—in the intelligence world you monitor all of his activities because you have to protect him against being exploited by counterintelligence services and so on—of course, I would stop him immediately.

Mr. ASPIN. Because in one sense, of course, if your man in Cairo is stringing for the Post, you at least know what he says and you pick up the Washington Post in the morning and read about it. The Post, in contrast, is never sure what he is doing.

Mr. CLINE. Doesn't know what he is doing.

Mr. ASPIN. And so you could understand that the Post—I say the Post, but any newspaper—might be very unhappy with that relationship.

Mr. CLINE. Sure, and I think I said—I may not have made it very clear in my statement—I would take no offense if one of the newspapers or news agencies fired the guy for cooperating with CIA. All I was saying is that if he entered into a voluntary arrangement that did not interfere with his doing his own duties, I see that as a problem between the newspaper and the employee, and not a corruption of him by CIA. I predicated that position not so much on some metaphysical decision——

Mr. ASPIN. Yes.

Mr. CLINE. But on my observation that I don't know of any cases where newspapermen did anything that damaged their performance as newspapermen as a result of these voluntary associations. So it is really as a historian rather than a metaphysician that I say that.

Mr. ASPIN. OK, then we are back to the credibility issue which is a different issue on which we disagree.

Let me go on. We shouldn't keep you much longer. We have kept you here a long time, but let's talk about black propaganda for a little while and the whole propaganda effort.

We talked to Mr. Colby about it this morning and I would like to get Dr. Cline's views because he specifically mentioned it in his opening statement, but also the views of the other two gentlemen. I take it basically your position is that any slanted story the CIA may be interested in peddling to the media is the media's problem because there are all kinds of things going on and lots of people out peddling stories. This town is full of people peddling stories, and so it is just a question that journalists have to watch out for and they can't take anything without checking it. That is true of CIA stories, that is true of Defense Department stories, Agriculture stories and every agency.

Let's go back to the feedback of stories planted abroad, not planted through the U.S. media but planted essentially through the foreign media by people who are perhaps paid assets. I know you

don't think it is a very serious problem, but what procedures can we set up to make sure that if we do do this in the future, we make sure it doesn't play back in the U.S. press?

Mr. CLINE. My opinion is that in the rare circumstance in which such a story, floated for a legitimate Government purpose but obviously not in the public interest to be spread around in this country, was getting a lot of play. I would authorize someone in the position that I held once in CIA, the senior analyst, the guy who is supposed to decide whether information is reliable enough to go to the White House—such a person normally having lots of contacts with the press, legitimate contacts, swapping stories and confirming and denying stories—to simply go to the managerial element in the media concerned and say, "Look, I wouldn't go with that story. I think we have reason to doubt very much whether it is valid." I think that happens from time to time, and I see no harm in it. I think it would be a good thing to do.

It used to worry me a lot because at various points, a long time ago, I had a little contact with some black propaganda mainly intended to try to get the Chinese Communist regime out of Korea and keep them out of Southeast Asia; on one or two occasions stories started which I knew were not valid stories, but which I thought were serving a useful purpose as deterrents to conduct by the authorities in Peking. We really wanted to deter them, and my recollection was that we mostly were concerned lest the Foreign Service and the State Department itself see these as valid activities, valid situations which would be reported and then spread around the Government; and we had arrangements to try to spike those stories and not let them get credibility.

I don't remember whether anyone ever went to one of the news media and suggested that they be careful about this story, but I see no reason why one of the overt officials in the intelligence apparatus couldn't keep that in mind as a responsibility.

Mr. ASPIN. I think that is an important addition to whatever does go on now.

Mr. CLINE. I am not sure there is anything going on.

Mr. ASPIN. All right, but whatever the guidelines are now for dealing with this, I take it that they are informal and there is no set relationship or set list of people who are informed, except if black propaganda operations are considered covert actions, and then have to go through a process before they get approved.

Anyway, one of the questions, then, is, of course, with that kind of procedure of notifying, whatever it is, of notifying senior officials in the U.S. Government, it has left out the press, which then of course leaves out a lot of people who have impact on U.S. Government policy in the future or currently, and it was of some concern.

Now, when we asked Mr. Colby this morning, his views were that you couldn't inform the press without prompting a story. That if you call up the newspapers and say "Look, there is a story that is coming in from Zaire, but we planted it and it is a false story, that you are going to get a story on the fact that the CIA planted a false story." In other words, you end up creating more problems.

Mr. CLINE. Yes. That may be right. I may be reflecting my experience, which is now a number of years ago, when I felt I could do that with a lot of newspaper people. Maybe Admiral Turner's

guidelines would make it impractical for me to try to do it today, but I still think it is the way reasonable people can handle it.

Mr. ASPIN. You could, of course, call them up and say look, it is my view that that story is incorrect. It is our view over here it is incorrect without saying that—

Mr. CLINE. Well, I wouldn't in any circumstance say "Hey, we planted a particular story, don't run it." That is sort of stupid, I think.

But you do often have an opportunity to comment on the reliability of stories, and I see no reason not to say, "Just in case you are running this one," or "I notice that you gave this a play. I think you are off base on it: I have good reason to believe you are off base." Now, they might well make a story out of it, but I hope they wouldn't.

Mr. ASPIN. Everybody that I have talked to about this whole issue seems to me a little vague on how it would be done if we had a propaganda effort, a black propaganda effort, which leaves me with the impression that in fact there is very little in the way of established procedures.

Am I incorrect in drawing that assumption?

Mr. CLINE. I think you are right. I think there is very little in the way of black propaganda, so it is a little hard for people even to worry about the problem. As a result, of course, there isn't much in the way of procedure.

Mr. ASPIN. And the problem, again, goes back to the real question of black propaganda. When we were working with Mr. Colby this morning, it seemed there was almost nothing that was really black propaganda because black propaganda meant there was absolutely no grain of truth in it anywhere, whereas almost any story has got some kernel of truth, and so it is a mixture.

Mr. CLINE. The best propaganda is the truth. That is part of the problem.

Mr. ASPIN. The best propaganda has got to be that kernel of factual truth with a little bit of CIA slant, though, hasn't it? That's the really best propaganda.

Mr. CLINE. Well, no, I would say a little bit of solid interpretive knowledge.

Mr. ASPIN. That's very nice.

Now, would either of the other witnesses like to comment on the whole black propaganda effort and what we do on it?

Mr. MAURY. Well, let me say this. You spoke of a little CIA slant, but actually in my experience, almost without exception, the slant, such as it was, or the emphasis, let us say, because it really wasn't so much slant as emphasis, it was what factual stories to push, and was based not on any priorities assigned within CIA, but was in accordance with guidance from the State Department and the NSC. We in CIA got the same guidance when I was in Athens, for example, that my USIA friends got. For example, I remember a period during the Cyprus negotiations when Secretary Vance, at that time recalled from his law practice, came over as a special arbitrator on the Cyprus issue, and we were able to manipulate some of our press assets there and make sure that the American side of the story got fair play because if you left it up to the Greek press, all of our efforts in connection with resolution of the Cyprus

issue were described as simply a sell out to the Turks, and I am sure the Turkish media were telling the same story to their people. So what CIA was trying to do was to make sure that a balanced story got to the Greek people.

That is really typical of the kind of things that we were doing with our press assets. As far as planting falsehoods, I can't think of a case where any black propaganda was actually a fabrication that was disseminated in the free world. Now, there may have been some, but the only cases I know of were aimed at specific, limited objectives behind the Iron Curtain.

Mr. PHILLIPS. Sir, there is no question that if you are going to approach this from the angle of what is absolutely moral and the question of ethics, the best thing to do is to say, in order to avoid fallout, there shall be none of these operations, propaganda operations overseas. If you decide that in some cases we need this adjunct to our foreign policy, something that happens along with USIA and so on, it is inevitable that you must suffer sometimes the consequences in the form of fallout in this country.

And so it seems to me that the answer to the problem must be in an intelligence service which is so geared that it does not embark upon that course. Certainly it can and has taken care of the problem within the Government on many occasions. There has not been a formal structure for that sort of thing. But these days I agree with Mr. Colby 100 percent. If word came in to CIA headquarters that it was just noted that such and such a publication was going to repeat one of our stories overseas and someone picked up the phone and called that publication it would probably result in a newspaper story about the telephone call rather than what we said in the black propaganda, and that is that is just the way things are.

So as a practical matter we are going to have to decide if we are going to conduct such operations, that you are just going to have to take your chances, as long as you are satisfied that you don't have a bunch of spooks conspiring to influence American opinion.

An example of that: You mentioned earlier an example of the propaganda during the 1970 period in Chile, and of course, the entire Chilean episode was one of the ones which was the subject of perhaps more controversy than any other political action thing. But the intent of the propaganda at that time was to repeat for the public record what Salvador Allende had been saying for 32 years in speeches, things that he did not—he began to downplay a little bit at that time. If you make the decision to do it, then the inevitable consequence will be that there will be some fallout. The only way to avoid it, I think, is to say that you shouldn't have such operations overseas.

Mr. WILSON. You referred to spook, are you—is a spook a kook in a black cloak or what?

Mr. PHILLIPS. Sir, "spook" is a term that is applied to intelligence officers, sometimes in a perjorative sense, sometimes affectionately, by the people who work with them overseas. Over the years we have even gotten to the point that we refer to ourselves as spooks.

Mr. WILSON. I didn't know whether you were being critical or not when—

Mr. PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Mr. WILSON. What you are saying is it is all right to tell our story, and obviously it is biased, but it is essentially the truth, it is just the truth from our point of view. It is like the history books they used to have in the southern schools after the Civil War, an unbiased account of the recent unhappiness between the States from the Southern point of view, and there are various versions of the truth, and obviously the CIA would be responsible for disseminating it with as much truth as possible.

Mr. ASPIN. Any others?

Loch, do you have some questions?

Mr. JOHNSON. If I may, for just a minute.

Dr. Cline, if I may refer to your prepared statement. I personally think we have the best free press in the world; but I wonder if it is the only free press. You say all foreign journalists are fair game. Later on you say you can see no injury to the American free press; but I wonder if there aren't some other countries that also value their free press and wouldn't be upset at what they might view as our efforts to corrupt their free press?

Mr. CLINE. Well, I was speaking from the point of view of the protection of our own free press. When I say it is fair game to recruit foreign journalists, I am sure that other governments would object, but the point I was trying to make is that I think that in most foreign countries, the journalists are subject to pressures to enter into relationships with their own governments which cause them to give any information their governments want directly to the governments. That is the distinction I was really trying to make. So I think they should be treated, in thinking of these various activities, in a different category from U.S. journalists who do have this very unique and special protection of the first amendment, which obviously is a constitutional obligation for us to protect.

Mr. JOHNSON. Also in your prepared statement you talk about "moonlighting," and I really wonder, is it possible—I am being somewhat redundant here, I suppose—but is it really possible for a human being, as opposed to an angel, to have loyalties to two masters without being in some way biased?

For instance, if you had a journalist who was collecting intelligence for the CIA but also writing critical articles about the CIA on the side, would you continue to pay that journalist to gather information for you; or would you say to yourself, well, since this fellow is being so critical of the Agency, why should we continue to associate with him?

Mr. CLINE. Well, actually, Loch, it is a very hypothetical case, but if I had a journalist who was in effect moonlighting a lot and getting me very good information from hard-to-get clandestine sources—I couldn't get any other way—I would prefer him to write stories against the CIA because then his cover would be good. I guess this is just a perverted operational mind, but I really think what you are worrying about doesn't exist.

But the CIA intelligence officer overseas who is trying to find out something about East Germany really couldn't care less what it says in the American press about this and that. He is trying to get that negative information, and I don't see that the journalist would

make any money, win any brownie points, do anything to his benefit by slanting his stories in the American press.

This is a very practical matter.

Mr. JOHNSON. You don't think it is possible that a journalist may become an addict who is hooked on either information from the CIA or some other kind of payment, and therefore, to continue the analogy, in order to keep "mainlining" from the CIA, he will write things favorable to the CIA?

Mr. CLINE. Well, he may—human beings are very corruptible, we all know that—but, as I said, it would not be the objective of the CIA case officer concerned; and in fact, if he discovered that the particular journalist was hooked and became an irresponsible journalist, he wouldn't be a very good source. You would want to drop him, you see.

All the cases I know about, where journalists have given useful information to CIA, were occasional activities by quite responsible journalists who simply felt it was their duty to pass along information in the same way that someone might pass along criminal data to the police or the FBI. I don't know if they felt any differently about it, but they were not in any sense hooked.

Now, they might like to swap stories and boast about accomplishments privately with their friends in CIA, but that comes under category one or two, certainly, and I think is harmless.

Mr. JOHNSON. In your prepared statement you used the phrase "flexible" * * * "if CIA is flexible in its prebriefings and tasking * * *"—what do you mean by that?

Mr. CLINE. Oh, yes. Well, what I mean is I think in such a relationship as we are hypothesizing here of having a regular contractual relationship, it would be very important for CIA to be flexible in the way it handled the journalist so as not to compromise his status, not to endanger his safety would be the primary concern; so you would have to be flexible in the way you briefed him. You wouldn't give him all of the tasks that you could think of. You would say, "Oh, no, this guy is in a very special category. We will task him with just one mission that he might accomplish that nobody else could accomplish." I mean CIA must be very sensitive in handling the man in his own interests so as not to interfere with his status in his own profession.

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Phillips, I was wondering if you, based on your experience in the Western Hemisphere, would tell us a little about the procedure of having a journalist sign a secrecy oath before becoming affiliated with the CIA.

Was that standard procedure for American and foreign journalists back in those days?

Mr. PHILLIPS. No, it is not standard procedure. As a matter of fact, recalling Latin America over a period of 25 years, I can think of only, and I mean it literally, a handful of cases where journalists signed secrecy agreements. In your usual relationship with a journalist it would seem to me the worst thing in the world you could say at the bar where you are talking to him; by the way, you have to sign a secrecy agreement. I could see him getting up and leaving.

It depends to some degree, however, on what he is tasked to do. Now, I was in the position where I had a small, foreign language

newspaper in Chile. I was not reporting to the American press. I was not a stringer for any American organization, and during the 4 years that I was part time and during the almost 7 or 8 years after that when I was a full time intelligence officer outside of Chile and still owned that newspaper, I was never asked on a single occasion to place anything in that paper, or replay, or write an editorial on political things. I was asked to perform other things, such as handling agents, recruiting, assessing, spotting and that sort of thing. So it didn't seem to me to be improper to sign a contract on my understanding of what I was going to do. It is not a common practice by any means.

I have been quoted in one magazine as saying that I confirmed the fact that I knew of over 200 cases where journalists signed secrecy agreements. That was a misunderstanding of what I said. I know in my experience of a handful, and it is not a usual basis.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you.

Mr. ASPIN. All right, anybody else?

I want to thank you all very, very much for coming. It was very informative and I really appreciate it.

Thank you very much.

Tomorrow morning we will meet at 9 o'clock and we will have some testimony from some correspondents, a panel of foreign correspondents.

Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 4:36 o'clock, the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 9 o'clock, Wednesday, December 28, 1977.]

THE CIA AND THE MEDIA

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 28, 1977

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF THE
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:14 a.m., in room 2322, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Les Aspin (chairman of the subcommittee), presiding.

Present: Representatives Aspin (presiding), Boland (chairman of the full committee), Mineta, and Wilson.

Also present: Thomas K. Latimer, staff director; and Loch Johnson, William Funk and James Bush, professional staff members.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you all very much. We will open the hearing this morning. Yesterday we had testimony from former employees of the CIA, and today we have some very distinguished foreign correspondents with us.

Mr. Joseph Fromm has been the foreign correspondent for U.S. News and World Report for 28 years, working in Asia, the Middle East, and for the last 18 years out of London.

Mr. Tad Szulc has reported for the Associated Press from Brazil, for the United Press from the U.N. and for the New York Times from Latin America, Spain, Portugal, and Eastern Europe, and is now a freelance writer specializing in foreign policy and living in Washington.

Mr. Herman Nickel also has had a rich background as a foreign correspondent. For two decades he was a Time-Life reporter in London, Johannesburg, Bonn, and Tokyo, and is presently on the board of editors for Fortune magazine.

And Mr. Ward Just has reported for Newsweek and the Washington Post from around the world, including London, Cyprus, the Dominican Republic and Vietnam. He is now a freelance writer living in Vermont, and a fiction writer. Let's open the hearing this morning perhaps with some opening statements from some of the witnesses. I know Joe Fromm has one, and Herman Nickel has one, and Ward has something to say.

Why don't we begin with Joe Fromm.

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH FROMM, DEPUTY EDITOR, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT

Mr. FROMM. Mr. Chairman, may I first thank you for inviting me to participate in this hearing, dealing with what, I think, is one of the most critical dilemmas we face in this country the dilemma of how to operate an effective intelligence service in the free democracy we have. I am sure it is a dilemma we are not going to resolve

here, but I hope that my contribution at least will help clarify the issue that we are discussing.

For a responsible journalist, the relationship with intelligence officials doesn't differ fundamentally from his relationship with politicians, diplomats, civil servants or businessmen.

All are legitimate news sources. All must be treated with a measure of skepticism when they provide information on a nonattributable basis. A journalist, in such circumstances must weigh the motive of the source and the reliability of the information in determining whether and how to use it.

Similarly, the exchange of information between a journalist and a news source, any news source, is not only legitimate, but is an indispensable tool of successful reporting. If, as a foreign correspondent for 28 years, I learned one lesson, it was that it takes information to get information. The best informed reporters are the ones who find doors open to them and who gain ready access to ordinarily inaccessible news sources.

I should emphasize, however, that the exchange of information must be governed by strict ethical rules, which a journalist violates at his own professional peril. These rules apply regardless of the news source involved, whether a CIA station chief or a Prime Minister.

First of these, confidences must be respected. If a reporter receives information in confidence or on the understanding that the source will not be divulged, he betrays that trust at the risk of jeopardizing his professional credibility. I recall one case—only one case—of an American correspondent in London who betrayed a confidence and who immediately found his effectiveness in Britain destroyed.

Second, the only information that a journalist normally should exchange is that which he has or would feel free to publish himself in his newspaper or magazine or to broadcast.

Third, information should not be supplied for pay except to a journalist's publication or openly to other media outlets. A responsible journalist cannot serve two masters. By that I mean that he must not obtain information as a journalist and then sell it to a businessman, a politician or an intelligence agent to enable them to utilize it for their own particular, nonjournalistic ends. In London some years ago we had such a case, a correspondent accredited to an American media organization who accepted a part-time position as paid adviser to an American industrial firm which was actively engaged in business in Britain. The firm obviously stood to gain from the correspondent's access to official briefings and other privileges associated with his work as a journalist. As president of American Correspondents' Association at the time it was my unpleasant duty to notify the man that we proposed to expel him if he retained his connection with the business firm.

Now, in sketching out these basic principles which I believe should govern the relationship between journalists and their news sources, I am not attempting to discount the special problems involved in dealings between journalists and intelligence officials. Rather, what I am suggesting is that these problems may not be as special or as acute as one might assume on the basis of recent exposés.

Obviously journalists, and foreign correspondents in particular, hold an exceptional attraction for intelligence organizations, foreign as well as American. After all, a correspondent travels widely, often to sensitive or ordinarily inaccessible areas, and comes into contact with a broad range of individuals in foreign countries. In the 28 years that I spent overseas as a journalist, I encountered three special problems in my dealings with intelligence people.

First was the disinformation problem, the attempt not by the CIA, in my case, but by Soviet intelligence operatives to plant information calculated to influence American attitudes. This occurred on several occasions in Japan in the 1940's and early 1950's, and again at the height of the Cuban missile crisis. So blatant were these Soviet attempts at disinformation that I had no difficulty whatever in seeing them for what they were and responding accordingly. My only experience with the CIA in this general area of intelligence activity involved the overthrow of the Mossadegh government in Iran. CIA officials in Teheran at the time ridiculed suggestions that they had engineered the anti-Mossadegh coup. Strictly speaking, this was not so much disinformation as concealment of a covert operation.

I suppose it would have been too much to expect the CIA to confirm the flimsy evidence that I had at the time that the Agency had, in effect, financed and organized the demonstrations that resulted in Mossadegh's ouster.

Second is the recruiting problem, the attempt by intelligence organizations to hire journalists as part-time or even full-time agents. During my years overseas, I was twice approached by intelligence agencies. Neither involved the CIA directly although the representative of the intelligence organization of a friendly power did mention in the course of his attempt to recruit me, that he had consulted the Agency and had received its approval for the overture to me.

As far as I was concerned, there was no difficulty in rebuffing these overtures, either from friendly espionage organizations or unfriendly. For one thing, as I mentioned earlier, I operate on the principle that a responsible journalist cannot serve two masters. Furthermore, that conviction was reinforced in my case by a policy that David Lawrence, the editor and publisher of my magazine, enforced that barred cooperation between any member of the staff of U.S. News & World Report and the CIA or indeed, any intelligence organization, beyond the legitimate relationship between journalists and news sources.

Third, and most tricky for a journalist, is the tasking problem: The attempt by intelligence agencies to persuade a reporter to accept specific assignments on an informal and usually unpaid basis. What makes this particularly difficult to handle is that tasking can take very subtle forms, so much so that one sometimes is barely aware that he is being used. The problem is to draw a distinction between a legitimate news tip that should be acted upon and an effort at tasking by an intelligence official. A simple rule of thumb that I have observed is to accept news tips from any source but on the explicit understanding that the results of my inquiries would be reported to my editors for publication.

To recapitulate briefly, a journalist's relationship with the CIA or any intelligence agency, for that matter, should be guided by four principles: No pay, no tasking, no violation of confidence, and no conscious reporting of disinformation.

Finally, on the question of possible legislation to regulate this relationship between the CIA and the news media: Should the Agency be prohibited from recruiting journalists, American or foreign or both, or from tasking journalists? Should the CIA be barred by law from planting information—or rather disinformation—on American reporters abroad, or even in this country for the purpose of having this appear in journals or broadcasts in the United States?

I strongly question whether such legislation is necessary or even desirable. Existing legislation, if effectively enforced, it seems to me, would prevent the Agency from engaging in such domestic activities. That could be interpreted to apply to deliberate attempts to engage in disinformation in this country. A new law seeking to regulate CIA relations specifically with the news media would, in my judgment, raise more questions than it would answer, both with respect to freedom of the press and the future effectiveness of legitimate clandestine collection of intelligence.

If the CIA were barred by law from employing or tasking journalists or using reporters' credentials as cover for clandestine agents, why should the same provision not apply to businessmen, missionaries, explorers, or diplomats? And would the CIA be obliged by such legislation to spurn an offer by an editor of Tass to cooperate with the Agency?

If carried to its logical conclusion, I suspect that new legislation of this sort either would prove unworkable, and invite systematic violation, or would emasculate the CIA's clandestine collection of intelligence. Neither result would serve the national interest nor contribute to greater independence of the news media.

Thank you.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you.

Mr. Nickel.

STATEMENT OF HERMAN NICKEL, BOARD OF EDITORS, FORTUNE MAGAZINE, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. NICKEL. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to accept the invitation of this committee to state my views on the proper relationship between the press and the intelligence community. I want to stress at the outset that these views are entirely my own and that I do not presume to speak for my employer, Time, Inc., although I obviously draw on nearly 20 years of experience as a Time correspondent in Washington, London, Africa, Central Europe, and Asia.

I hope that these hearings may succeed in demythologizing and desensationalizing a subject on which some people here and abroad seem to have become rather confused.

Over the past 20 years it has been my reporter's job to obtain information from all kinds of sources. Naturally, these have included intelligence sources, many Americans, but of other nationalities as well. They have even included people I assumed to be working for the KGB. In principle, and I would agree in this respect with Mr. Fromm completely, I can see little difference between an intel-

ligence source and any other source. Some are good, some are bad, and a lot are a waste of one's time. Some become your friends. But that does not mean that you should ever forget that sources have their own reasons for talking to you, other than doing you a favor.

Normally, sources talk to reporters because they like to put across their side of the story and, thereby, to advance their own purposes. Frequently they will give you a calculated leak and plant a story with you that may or may not be the truth, or at least not the whole truth. This applies to intelligence sources as it does to other Government officials, diplomats, businessmen, and even, it has been rumored, to sources right here on Capitol Hill,

In extreme cases, this can amount to what in intelligence parlance is known as disinformation. Our job is to identify and keep in mind the source's interest, the effect these have on his or her credibility, and to cross-check the information as much as we can. Especially when the source refuses to be identified in print, we must make sure that we are not just being used to carry someone else's water.

Naturally this involves judgment, and since even reporters are only human, some of the best of us get taken once in a while.

Another reason why sources may be interested in talking to us is that they themselves may learn something in the course of the conversation. As Stanley Karnow put it in the New York Times on December the 18th, information is often the best leverage for acquiring more information. From the reporter's point of view, the name of the game is getting more than you give, but it would be naive to assume that a lot of sources don't look at it in exactly the same way. They have their job and we have ours.

Here the problem starts. As a journalist I see it as my professional duty, indeed, as my service to the public and my country, to gather and to get published information which will hopefully make for an enlightened and vigilant public opinion. It is emphatically not the function of journalists to gather information for their government, except in the sense that government officials can buy newspapers and magazines or obtain the transcripts of on-the-record press conferences or interviews like anyone else. Anyone who allows himself or other journalists to be used in this fashion does serious damage to the cause of an independent press. If the impression were to get around that many, or even only a few, American Journalists allowed themselves to be used in this fashion, it would seriously undermine the effectiveness, access, and credibility of all correspondents for American media abroad, whether they be U.S. citizens or not.

Already, alleged links to the CIA have been used as welcome pretexts for the Soviets to expel correspondents whose reporting they didn't like.

But even greater dangers arise in some of the countries of the third world where mere rumor that a reporter is really an intelligence agent can subject him to arrest, torture, and worse. Only a few months ago, Michel Goldsmith of the Associated Press was personally beaten up in Bangui by Emperor Bokassa because of unfounded rumors that he was a South African intelligence agent. It could just as easily have been a rumor that he was working for the CIA.

It should be clear from what I have said that I basically welcome the new directive by the Director of Central Intelligence which recognizes the special status of the press under our Constitution and puts an end to the recruiting of journalists for American news media. But how effective the directive will be in allaying questions raised around the world by stories that literally hundreds of U.S. journalists have secretly worked for the CIA is another question. When someone you suspect of being a spy gives you his boy scout's honor that he isn't one, you don't necessarily believe him. The insidious thing about the charge is that it shows suspicions which are impossible to disprove.

In the end, the problem can't be solved by CIA policy directives, and certainly not by congressional action which would probably violate the first amendment anyway. The principal burden, I firmly believe, rests on the press itself. When faced with requests they regard as improper, ladies throughout the ages have found it useful to use the little word "No." When faced with requests that could in any way jeopardize the independence and credibility of the press, publishers, editors, and reporters should do likewise. Publishers and editors who allow the CIA access to the files, or allow an intelligence service to use their news service as a cover for intelligence operations in my view do a grave disservice to our profession. When the CIA man you have been having lunch with occasionally asks you to look out for certain things before you go out on an assignment and to let him know afterward, when he tries to turn your occasional get-togethers into regular institutions, or when the requests start coming from him rather than from you, then any circumspect and self-respecting reporter gets the message and backs off.

A reporter who moonlights for the CIA or any other intelligence service because of the lure of money in my view prostitutes himself. But appeals to patriotism, not to mention appeals to patriotism, not to mention appeals to the vanity of people who revel in being picked by their government for an important secret mission, should be resisted just as hard. The mighty U.S. Government has plenty of resources of its own without having to rely on journalists to do things that simply aren't their job. Our patriotic duty as journalists is to keep our independence, for if we don't, we can't properly fulfill our constitutionally recognized function in a free society.

Thank you.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you.

Mr. Just.

STATEMENT OF WARD JUST, FREELANCE WRITER

Mr. JUST. Thank you, Mr. chairman. I just have one comment to make, a short comment on Mr. Colby's statement of yesterday. It seemed to me to be an ecumenical statement, or a statement of ecumenism where the spies, he seemed to be saying, depend upon the journalists to do their work, and the journalists depend upon the spies to do theirs, and I don't believe it for a minute. It seems to me, in a foreign country the problem is not to know the station chief, it is to know the people of the country. I think the loser in these rather intricate relationships that have been described just

previously is the reader of the newspaper or the magazine or the watcher of the television screen because the reader doesn't know where he is. The reader doesn't know where these sources are coming from, and the result is he doesn't know whose hand is on whose leg, in my opinion. I think it is a mistake. I don't believe there should be relationships between journalists abroad and spies, either foreign or domestic.

Thank you.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you.

Anybody else?

Mr. Szulc?

STATEMENT OF TAD SZULC, FREELANCE WRITER

Mr. SZULC. I would like, if I may, to make one comment. Essentially, I agree with Mr. Nickel's and Mr. Fromm's general statements. I believe that it should be emphasized over and over again that in this kind of relationships in the past, as in the future, a great deal of responsibility has to rest on the journalist himself. Is he taken, as has been quite often, does he believe the information which comes from intelligence sources? I think it might be worthwhile to recall the narrative of the fall of Saigon in the Frank Snepp book, which came out recently, in which relationships between correspondents in Saigon and the CIA station are described in some detail, and which indicate that, in effect, some correspondents have almost incredibly relayed CIA information back to the readers, evidently serving the intent of the station and the CIA to affect legislation on the Vietnam appropriations.

The second problem is a more personal and minor one in terms of the relationships between the Agency—the CIA—and newsmen, American newsmen. It is what I found from my own experience and based on the study of my own CIA file which I obtained under the Freedom of Information Act. It is the systematic tracking of movements of American correspondents overseas, their travel, their contacts, whom they see. I believe that this is in some way a violation, if not of statute, because this happens abroad, of the ethical relationship which should exist.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you.

Let me say at the outset what perhaps I should have said before the opening statements and Mr. Nickel's comment reminded me of it. We assume that you are all speaking for yourselves and not any publications that you may work for or have worked for unless you state to the opposite. We have asked you here as individuals, and what we are asking for is your own views on these matters.

Let me start with something that Mr. Nickel had in his opening statement, which is to try to delineate for the committee what you see as the dangers of a CIA-media relationship, just to lay it out for the record.

Mr. Nickel, I think you mentioned first of all perhaps physical danger if there is a perceived relationship or alleged relationship between the media and the CIA. I think you also mentioned the problem of correspondents' credibility.

Am I right in saying that the problem is the problem of credibility of correspondents, what can we believe in what we read in the

paper if there is say, for example, a paid relationship; and then the problem of a physical harm.

What are the other problems?

Mr. NICKEL. Well, Mr. Chairman, you are addressing the question to me?

Mr. ASPIN. Sure.

Mr. NICKEL. Let me perhaps start with one extreme situation which I was involved in as a reporter in Northern Ireland. In Northern Ireland it is in the nature of the situation that the reporter has to report on a lot of activities by various groups, some of which are clearly illegal. It is one of the remarkable things that has happened in the coverage of Northern Ireland, that practically all the groups involved, all the antagonistic groups, whether it is the IRA, the Provisionals, or the UDA, or the RUC, or the Northern Ireland office, or the army, they have accepted the role which the press has to play in talking to each of these groups, and it would be absolutely impossible to provide coverage of that situation if the impression got around that reporters carried the information they have gathered from sources in one group to people in the other group.

I know of no clearer example for the importance of journalistic independence, and I think that this affects our credibility, it affects our access. It is quite obvious that if people were to get the idea that a journalist isn't just a journalist but will use this information for other purposes, that people will become very circumspect in talking to him or her.

I mentioned the physical danger and I am not sure that anything that Admiral Turner can decree as Director of the CIA can eliminate this danger. Of course, as I said, the Soviets have used as a pretext connections with the CIA for kicking out correspondents whose copy they didn't like, and there is no guarantee, with or without directives by Admiral Turner, that this will not be taken as a pretext again. But there have been instances, especially in the Third World—I think, you know, getting kicked out is not something that involves physical danger, but in the Third World, places like Africa, places in Asia, too, it can become a physical threat if people get the idea that you are not on the level, that you are not a bona fide reporter.

Mr. ASPIN. Any other? OK, so you have got "access" to add to the list: Objectivity, credibility, access problems, physical danger, danger of being kicked out of the country.

Let me just ask members of the panel for their comments on the Turner directive, leaving aside the specific wording which we may want to get into in a little bit to see whether it, in your view, is adequate. Are those kinds of directives going to be enough to deal with the kinds of problems that you see? In other words, are they going to be believed? Are they going to be believed abroad, particularly? Are they going to be believed by people you want to have access to? Are they going to be believed by people who might otherwise throw you out of the country, or is that going to continue in any case?

Mr. Fromm?

Mr. FROMM. I could follow up on Herman's point and deal with that as well. I doubt if it is going to be believed. I think the general

assumption abroad would be that such a regulation or a law was just another form of concealment or deception given the nature of intelligence. Whether one is involved in intelligence work or not, you are suspect. In Iraq I was picked up twice as a suspected spy and held in the south and then shipped up north and interrogated for many hours. In Malta once they pulled my suitcases apart because they were sure I was carrying secret messages. I think whether one is or not engaged in espionage, you are going to be suspected.

One has to look at this in the terms of the realities of how people abroad view intelligence. Because journalists are widely used for espionage—as we have seen with the British with Philby and others, the KGB—whether you have regulations or laws or not, the suspicion will remain.

Mr. JUST. I think it is probably better to have that directive than to not have it, but I would agree with Joe that I don't think it is going to make a lot of difference abroad.

One of the reasons it is not going to make much difference abroad is the history of the past and especially when you have had journalists receive CIA briefings before they go abroad, which is, to my mind, a witless practice. I don't understand where in the CIA charter they are obliged to brief American journalists, and this kind of cozy relationship we have been talking about, you have got this contact, it seems to me, a regular, ongoing contact between foreign correspondents, particularly the establishment press, so-called, and this is more or less visible. It seems to me a foreign government could be forgiven for assuming that there is some kind of informal link. That is one of the difficulties and why I think I would propose a little greater distance, I mean quite a lot greater distance between journalists operating abroad and the CIA people there.

Mr. ASPIN. Any other comments?

Tad?

Mr. SZULC. A small comment, which is this essentially: So many years of history have to be stripped away before foreign governments, foreign journalists, foreign intelligence services believe that there are no American newsmen involved in intelligence operations. The directive itself will not change very much. This goes back so far.

I recall that when I went to Latin America in the 1950's, before the world really discovered the CIA, I was often accused of being an FBI agent, mainly because the FBI was the ongoing firm which all the Latin American governments were familiar with at the time.

Specifically, on Admiral Turner's directive—I do not have the text in front of me, but my recollection is that, I think it is the second paragraph, it opens the possibility of relationships with nonjournalistic employees of news media, among whom I presume would be cameramen, if that is what he has in mind, technicians, teletype operators. I think this is a rather dangerous gap or loophole in the directive in the sense that the teletype operator in the news bureau or a television crew would be aware under normal circumstances of the knowledge held in the news office—be it in Rome, in the Third World, or elsewhere, and I think that so long as

that loophole remains open, you have the danger that an illicit relationship would be constructed.

Mr. ASPIN. Any other comments?

Mr. BOLAND. I was interested in Mr. Fromm's comment and also Mr. Just's that there seems to be apparently a different opinion on whether or not Admiral Turner's directive is going to be useful.

Turning that around a little bit, what about the directive really being harmful? What about this kind of directive really being put out and foreign governments who are not particularly friendly saying, "Well this kind of directive that they are putting out is just going to shield them all. We don't believe it anyway. They are all undercover or paid agents." What about that reaction from some foreign governments?

Mr. FROMM. My impression is it won't affect attitudes much at all either way. But I suppose the general attitude would be that the directive, the regulations were inspired by domestic political pressures rather than by the realities of the intelligence situation as they view it. Even though I think we should assume that the directive is going to be implemented, I suspect the general attitude abroad is simply going to be that the situation is not going to change significantly.

Mr. BOLAND. All of you have, of course, long careers of distinguished reporting as foreign correspondents. What about those governments that are not friendly to us—not particularly adversaries, but those that are not friendly? How do they really view American correspondents abroad? How do they really view them? You read a lot about it, but they are oftentimes confusing in whether or not they believe they are all part of the establishment here or all part of the intelligence community.

You have been there and you have talked with a lot of the leaders in those countries.

How do they really view American correspondents, would you say generally?

Ward?

Mr. JUST. Troublemakers.

Mr. BOLAND. That is how they are viewed in America.

Mr. FROMM. Also, you must remember, they view it in the context of their culture. In many of those countries, they just assume any journalist is under the control of the Government. I think the Russians find it very difficult to assume that American journalists are not paid or unpaid servants of the American Government just as Tass and Pravda people are. So I think that they do have a cultural problem in accepting the reality.

Mr. SZULC. If I may pursue Joe's line, in my own experience in Eastern Europe, which is fairly typical of the situation, I think the assumption is that the American correspondent, the permanent correspondent in a given city, or the visiting correspondent, if he is not an intelligence agent for the American Government, he is presumed to have a relationship with the U.S. Government, whether at the intelligence lever or elsewhere which, in effect, serves the same purpose.

I think most of us have had the experience in that part of the world in which we will be approached with trial balloons trying to test out American reactions. If you were to call the American

ambassador because he is a friend of yours or because it is a courtesy call, the assumption is made immediately in most cases—I am talking about Warsaw, Prague, Bucharest, what have you, that you are receiving instructions, if you will. Or that you are filling in the ambassador or his staff on that which you have discovered in your conversations with your local sources, to the point that ultimate information or interpretation is given you with the hope that this will go immediately to the American Embassy even if it does not appear in the newspapers. I think that situation is a cultural fact of life to which Joe has referred.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. We seem to be getting kind of a wide disparity here between the views on some particular points. One, of course, is the views of Mr. Fromm, that it takes information to get information. I understand that very easily. The more contacts you have with people who are knowledgeable in various areas, the more ability to do a better job.

On the other hand, Mr. Just says, let's make it illegal for anybody to even contact an intelligence officer overseas who may have good information.

I would like to ask Mr. Just, do you feel a foreign correspondent cannot maintain his integrity if he speaks with an intelligence officer?

Mr. JUST. I think he can maintain his integrity all right but that isn't so much the problem. I think it, speaking with an intelligence officer, with those fellows you never really know what they are up to as opposed to—well, with any source you are never really entirely sure what they are up to, but with an intelligence agent, they live in a rather different world from the rest of us, and you ask them about this or that, you are not sure what—is he disinforming you or not? You don't know whether he is pushing a particular operation of the Agency. You don't know—he is not a spokesman for American policy. If you want that you can go to the State Department or you can go to the USIA or USIS.

Mr. WILSON. Well, would you cut off contacts with ambassadors and USIS—

Mr. JUST. Oh, indeed not, indeed not. It is the intelligence agencies that I am—

Mr. WILSON. You think the Ambassador never tries to disinform you sometimes?

Mr. JUST. Oh, indeed. Oh, sure, sure, but you can—but that's—I think that is relatively easier to understand than with the CIA people. Among other things, they are very bright, most of them, terribly terribly bright guys indeed. I would not, by the way, make it illegal in any way. This is strictly an ethical problem. It is really more the problem of journalists in my opinion than with the agents. You always have to ask yourself, why are they talking to you? What is being—what purposes of the Central Intelligence Agency are being served when they speak to you over drinks or dinner or whatever?

Mr. WILSON. Well, you have to consider that talking with a politician also. Usually they have ulterior motives.

Mr. JUST. Well, I think it is a little less sinister than talking with a politician.

Mr. FROMM. I would like to make a point here.

Mr. JUST. Let me just add, among other reasons, you can identify the politician. I have an interview and I identify you one way or another. With an intelligence source they are never identified. They are called American Officials or highly informed sources or well placed sources. If you run that fact through to the reader who is picking up the newspaper, he is about three more removed than you are. He doesn't have any idea, you know, who that source is, and it seems to me there is a very serious difference in, you know, in quality there.

Mr. NICKEL. I am sorry. I just frankly can't see the distinction quite as clearly. I think if you, first of all, I don't really regard the CIA as being that separate from the rest of the United States Government. Indeed, it has been known to happen that people who were working in the Embassy who were not billed as CIA officers, and who were working as political officers, I don't know whether it is agricultural attaches or whatever, were in fact CIA people—so sometimes you are really not quite sure as to what the true affiliations of an American official are, and mind you, I am not really sort of being sanctimonious about this because I would agree that obviously one doesn't expect CIA people to run around with a hatband that says I am a CIA agent.

I think also I must say that of all the problems one has to watch out for in talking to the CIA, it also applies to practically almost all other sources, practically, and the fact that they are in some cases brighter than others doesn't put me that ill at ease.

The point is, one has to keep one's wits about oneself, and that is always a question of judgment, and I don't really see that as a rule, that professional ethic, that you never, never talk to an intelligence source really is very realistic or makes sense. I mean, after all, these people are in the business of gathering information and that is something that is part of their job, and that is, of course, the nature of our job, too. And it is natural that, I think it serves the journalistic purpose to go to people who have information to contribute.

On the question of exchanging information, let me make this quite clear, I find it very difficult to conceive of a meaningful question that does not in itself have some degree of informational content. What do you think about this development? What do you think about that development? Obviously, the question without informational content, it practically doesn't exist, and it is unfair to suggest that if we have lunch with somebody, every sentence you speak has a questionmark behind it.

So I wouldn't go as far as my esteemed colleague Ward Just in saying that we should never, never talk to any intelligence source. There are other cases in which the intelligence source is the story. I mean, if the CIA was involved in bringing over a defector or something like that, obviously, then, the CIA is the source.

Mr. JUST. That is a different question, if you are writing about the CIA.

Mr. FROMM. Well, there is a distinction here, too. I think Ward is looking at CIA as a kind of a monolithic operation, that all of these people are out doing dirty tricks. A lot of the people one deals with in the CIA are analyzing information both from covert and open

sources. Some of the best informed people I found in London were people in the CIA station who were dealing with analysis and in cooperation with the British, for example, on the Middle East or Eastern Europe and Russia. Certainly some of the best analysis I heard on the Middle East came from the CIA man there who participated in the Joint Intelligence Committee. As a matter of fact, I remember in early 1973, he gave me a scenario of the Egyptians moving across the canal in a kind of creeping advance that I refused to believe was feasible, and unfortunately didn't accept. That was precisely the tactics that Sadat employed, and it ran against the conventional wisdom of the time.

But he was doing it, I think, not necessarily from the point of view of planting something on me, but discussing the possibilities. I really think that I would have been remiss if I hadn't consulted him. I was remiss in not reporting it in that case.

Mr. WILSON. One point that I want to explore a little bit is the statement by Mr. Just on why should the CIA be obliged to brief American journalists? I don't think there is any order by which a CIA can get in and say, by God, before you travel, any journalist travels outside the country, they have got to come and talk to us, but I think it is offered as an opportunity to gain a little more information, and you have to be perhaps wary about the information, but aren't you cutting yourself off from a source, a possible background that would be helpful to you as you go into a new area, that you are perhaps not familiar with?

Mr. JUST. I don't think so.

Mr. WILSON. You don't think so.

Mr. JUST. No. I have never had one of these briefings. I am told that, you know, they are ably done. Most of the things those fellows do over there, you know, are ably done. I don't think it is necessary to go into the American intelligence headquarters before you go to Vietnam or wherever to get the drill.

Mr. WILSON. It obviously isn't necessary.

Mr. JUST. But again, it is a problem of a journalist. I can understand why the Agency wants to do it. They need as many friends as they can get, I suppose, and that builds a relationship of a sort, but I don't see any purpose behind that and I can't—I really don't understand why it is done. It doesn't seem to me that that is the proper role of the Central Intelligence Agency to brief American newspapermen.

Mr. WILSON. Let me ask one more question, Mr. Szulc.

You stated that—I think I heard you right—did you say that you had—you were sure that the CIA was tasking you or tracking you?

Mr. SZULC. Tracking my movements.

Mr. WILSON. Can you tell me a little bit more of your experience of being tracked by the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. SZULC. Simply from reading the nondeleted parts of my file, which I have obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, there are any number of cables and dispatches from station X to station Y or to headquarters saying Szulc of the New York Times is leaving tomorrow on Pan American flight so and so for Caracas. He may be seeing such and such people. He is believed to have been in contact with such and such groups. This is specifically what I have in mind, and I take offense or objection at being

tracked or followed in that manner by officials of my own government when I am engaged in purely legal and above-the-board journalistic function. That is precisely what I had in mind, sir.

Mr. WILSON. Well, just to conclude my part of this, Mr. Chairman, what it appears here this morning is that Admiral Turner's directive is not going to change the attitude of foreign governments toward harboring suspicions about U.S. journalists being employed by the CIA, and I wonder if any one of you see any initiatives that either could be written into law or into directives to allay these suspicions by foreign governments.

Is that just a part of the business that we have to live with, that foreign governments are always going to suspect that journalists are immoral and unethical and so forth, even if it is against the law?

Mr. JUST. I don't think there is any directive or any law that can be passed that can change that situation. The situation is going to be changed maybe with time, depending on the conduct of this Government and depending on the conduct of the journalists. I can't imagine anything being written out and promulgated from the White House or anywhere else that is going to make any difference to a government that doesn't want to believe it. It doesn't have the evidence.

Mr. SZULC. And also you might—I guess you might add that situations will arise, as have arisen in the past, in which a government may find it simply useful to use the CIA charge against a correspondent in order to remove him for reasons of his perfectly valid journalistic activity. So, therefore, one may argue that it is in the interest of certain governments to maintain this fiction and therefore the problem is compounded.

Mr. WILSON. Doesn't that back up the State Department's position on a journalist who is being tossed out of a country by saying: "look, there is an absolute law or directive that states there will be no connection between CIA and journalists?"

Mr. SZULC. I suppose in theory, yes, but if the government is determined, as a sovereign, to claim that one of us is a CIA agent, they will do so regardless of the statement by the State Department.

Mr. WILSON. It won't probably do any good to call Admiral Turner to testify for Mr. Shcharansky over in Moscow and swear up and down that he is not a CIA agent.

Mr. SZULC. I think it would be a marvelous story if he did. [General laughter.]

Mr. FROMM. You have to remember that usually governments that are throwing out correspondents as CIA agents are not exactly friendly governments to the United States and are not going to be inclined to believe what we say. I think there is the further fact that—the fact that most other governments are believed to use journalists as intelligence agents one way or another, is going to make it difficult for the United States to convince people that we unilaterally are adopting a unique policy in this respect, and I see no evidence that the British, the French, the Russians, and the Italians intend to change traditional practices.

Mr. ASPIN. Go ahead.

Mr. NICKEL. May I just add to this? I agree that in most cases the explanation that the man who is a journalist was a CIA agent is a

pretext anyway. I think it would be more effective for the U.S. Government than waiving this directive in front of a foreign government, to point out to those governments that the United States views a free press as an essential part of its political system, and that countries which come to the United States with requests for aid and other things should keep in mind, that if they cut off the channel of communication by throwing out American correspondents who are going about their proper business as reporters, that this is going to be a factor which the U.S. Government will take into account in dealing with the requests of other governments for aid and assistance and things of that sort. I think that would be far more effective than to refer back to the directives by Admiral Turner which, A, may not be believed anyway, and which, B, go to a pretext which that government has used for throwing out a correspondent whom they wanted to get rid of anyway.

Mr. WILSON. Have you ever thought of going into the diplomatic service?

Mr. NICKEL. No.

Mr. ASPIN. Just a quick follow-up to Bob Wilson's question. We have been talking about the Turner directive or some directives like it in terms of opinion abroad, and in particular I guess we have been implicitly focusing on the case of an essentially hostile government, or anyway, people who have a stake in not believing the Turner directive.

How about in other cases? Do you think that the Turner directive or something like it would have any impact on more friendly countries abroad, closer allies of ours, and/or opinion at home? How about opinion at home? Do you think there is anything to be said for the Turner directive in terms of domestic attitude toward what they read in the paper?

Mr. SZULC. I would say, yes. Within the confines of credibility in general, I suppose that it is a useful thing to have a directive rather than not to have one. I suppose we would like to satisfy ourselves to the extent that we are willing to listen to Mr. Turner, that this is so. It is certainly better to have one.

Would it make others more friendly? I would doubt it for the general reasons that we have stated. I think it is useful to have it at home, and we should have it.

Mr. JUST. I don't think this is a great burning issue with the American public, frankly, and again, it is better to have it, I suppose, than not to have it.

Mr. ASPIN. The general consensus is that it is better to have the Turner directive than not to have it, but don't expect any great results from it.

Let me follow up again on what Bob Wilson was asking and talking about, and I would like to go down the list and ask each of you to comment.

Over on the left-hand side is the chart of activities.¹ We are now getting into the issue of what kinds of relationships the press might have with the CIA, and there have been various reports that we have had *x* number of newspaper correspondents who have had relationships with the CIA. Well, it depends on what you mean by

¹See appendix D, p. 336.

a relationship, I suppose. If you include everything on that chart, you would run into several thousands of people who have had relationships with CIA.

And so the real question is where in your judgment is the kind of relationship which is proper of a journalist to have with the Agency, and in what relations is it not proper, I am talking about the information in the activities information charts. Basically journalists call the Agency to get story confirmation. They get involved with information swapping, meeting with somebody from the CIA and discussing items. There is prebriefing before they go on a trip; there is debriefing when they come back from a trip. There are cases where there has been access to files and outtakes; the journalists have allowed the CIA access to files. And there have been cases or prior tasking for intelligence collection.

In addition, there has been some other work in the support area and agent work that journalists have in the past undertaken on behalf of the CIA. In the support area, they have hosted parties for the CIA people to meet other contacts; they have provided safe houses and post office boxes; they have acted as couriers for information, and for money. They have even done some agent work of spotting agents, assessing agents, recruiting and handling agents; it is not done often. And then we have the whole propaganda area.

But I would like to get your input particularly with respect to that information column. What do you think really are the proper things? What among those items do each of you think is the proper relationship between the CIA and the journalists and which is not proper. As a lead into that, one time Admiral Turner told me about his frustrations with dealing with the press. He gave an example of a case where a journalist was going to make a trip abroad, and the journalist asked if he could come out to the CIA and receive a briefing before he went overseas. So Admiral Turner put on a four-star briefing and really did it up and had a great briefing. The person went on the trip, came back, and Turner ran into him at a social function and said, "How was the trip?" "Oh, it was a good trip." "Would you mind coming out to the Agency and just chatting about it? Let's talk about it a little bit." And the journalist said, "Oh, no, I can't do that, that is not ethical."

And Stan Turner was totally perplexed by this. He doesn't understand why prebriefing is OK, and debriefing isn't OK.

But let me ask each of you to say what you think is OK, and what you don't think is OK.

How about Joe Fromm?

Mr. FROMM. By story confirmation, I assume, you mean that if you have a tip or a story and you wanted to confirm, for example, whether Brezhnev is ill or something of that sort. It seems to me that is very legitimate and it may be indispensable in certain cases. For example the Brezhnev illness. In that case I did go to the CIA and ask what they had on his health. I checked it with other people as well.

Information swapping, as we discussed, I think is legitimate within the limits that I spelled out.

Prebriefing. Again, it is quite legitimate if it is on the initiative of the correspondent. If I go out to the CIA and say I am going to Greece and would like a quick fill-in, an assessment of the military

situation of the relationship between Greece and Turkey--I see nothing wrong with it no more than in going to I and R in the State Department or in DIA in Defense if I wanted to talk about a specific Defense problem.

Debriefing, though, gets into a trickier situation. I would have some hesitance about debriefing in any formalized way. Obviously the CIA's interest is to get information from a correspondent beyond that which he would report or have reported, because otherwise they could get it. I would feel that is quite sensitive.

Access to files, totally unethical.

Prior tasking, totally unethical.

Mr. ASPIN. Tad?

Mr. SZULC. Historical information, essentially as Joe said, no problem there.

Information swapping, this relates to the larger point of relationships with sources. I personally take the view that there should be no difficulty for a correspondent to maintain a normal source relationship with CIA. I have done so in the past--others have--so long as one bears in mind one's own critical judgment of what we are being told. Information swapping, I suppose I would call it comparing notes, which I think is something which occurs very often, very frequently in the social context of a lunch or drinks. If you are in a situation where there is a major political situation developing, I don't mind discussing or comparing notes with someone whom I consider to be well informed. It is a give and take relationship which, as has been said repeatedly here, applies to all officials of the U.S. Government.

Prebriefing, I have no difficulty with it. They are never volunteered by the Agency to the best of my knowledge. I have received several of them before going to Asia, before going to countries which I did not know. I have found them most of the time to be objective, extremely well conducted, and I have found them to be useful to me in the performance of my task abroad.

On debriefing, as Joe points out, we get into a very difficult area. I suppose the best way I could define it in terms of my own experience is that I have never gone to a formal debriefing. I have agreed on one or two occasions, most specifically returning from Czechoslovakia after the Soviet invasion in 1968, to sit down and discuss--and to me "discuss" was the key word--with Agency analysts working on Eastern Europe what were the implications, the meaning of certain situations which I had observed, which they had observed, and to me this really comes under the heading of comparing notes rather than a formal debriefing to which I would not care to subject myself.

Access to files, outtakes, obviously out of the question.

Tasking, obviously out of the question.

Mr. ASPIN. OK.

Mr. Nickel?

Mr. NICKEL. I have little to add to this except for the basic criterion I suppose is does it help me in my independent journalistic job of getting the story. In that context, again, I suppose, story confirmation, information swapping, in the sense, you know, as I said in my statement, I would always try to get more than I give. Prebriefing, I see no theoretical objection to. Debriefing doesn't

really help my story, does it. That is not my job. They can read my story after it comes out. That is, hopefully, if the editor has been wise enough to include everything I found.

Access to files, I can really not see any circumstances when I would do that.

Mr. WILSON. Would you let me interrupt you?

At one time there was a reference to Time-Life having taken pictures of the May Day parade, of the new military missiles and so forth, and the question was: Does Time-Life owe any thing from a patriotic standpoint to the Government to let them look at the photographs that were taken and not published on the basis that perhaps there would be some military information that would be of vital importance to the United States? That case is supposed to have occurred.

Do you find this completely unacceptable?

Mr. NICKEL. My own personal view in this matter would be that this is not our job. If the U.S. Government can't find a way of getting a photographer——

Mr. WILSON. I didn't say it was your job. You just say it is completely unethical for you to do this?

Mr. NICKEL. I would reject it because I would regard it as my overriding patriotic duty to retain my journalistic independence, and once I start providing services like this the line becomes pretty fuzzy, and you get yourself into very difficult situations. So my personal view would be, to be—and I am sure the U.S. Government has a way of taking a picture at a parade.

Mr. BOLAND. That is an interesting position. I know in your statement you said that an appeal of patriotism would have no effect on you because that is not your task. You know, the U.S. Government and it has the means by which it can secure information perhaps better than some of the sources that you or any of you might have. Actually that is true, but on a voluntary basis, that Time or Life, they produce some of the best photographs in the world, the National Geographic does, and you get particular photographers that are much more adept at taking pictures from specific angles, of information that could be helpful, and particularly the May Day parade, where the photographs show some very modern weapons, that perhaps our Government doesn't have knowledge of and no photographs of.

Even in that instance, would you on a voluntary basis refuse or object to a request from any intelligence source, from our intelligence source for a look at the photos?

Mr. NICKEL. I am very leery about the thin end of the wedge. I mean, where can these patriotic appeals——

Mr. BOLAND. Do you have any responsibility as a citizen of the United States?

Mr. NICKEL. Well, let me put it this way. Of course we are citizens of our country, and of course, if I see somebody who is about to rob a bank or about to assault somebody or somebody who is about to assassinate the President of the United States, I don't go to the telephone to call city desk. Of course I run to the police.

But I think I would have to be convinced that there are very clear and present dangers for me to fulfill that function, to alert authorities to something which I think could be a danger to our

country or could involve the violation of a very serious crime or something like that.

Mr. FROMM. I wonder if the question isn't really academic because Time or Life or any publication are eager to sell their photos. If the American Government really wants to get its hands on them, they can buy them through normal commercial channels. In other words, I don't think it is necessary to have any special covert effort.

Mr. BOLAND. Especially, when some of those photographs may be ones that have never been published.

Mr. FROMM. Well, even if they haven't used them, I think Time has a commercial service. They are quite prepared to sell, anything in their files. So I think this scenario may seem to be more of a problem than it really is because most publications are willing to sell their photos. It is a big business to sell them.

Mr. BOLAND. What if it came to the position where you couldn't get them and the only source was the news organization that had it in its file?

Mr. WILSON. Maybe they happened to get a picture of a new weapons system breaking up in the air or some such thing that would be an unusual shot.

Mr. FROMM. I would publish it on the cover of the magazine.

Mr. BOLAND. Actually, Time, Inc. did permit the access of the intelligence agency with respect to some photographs, according to some article I read. Am I correct on that?

Mr. JOHNSON. That's right.¹

Mr. BOLAND. They asked for pictures of the May Day parade. I guess the person in charge decided this was something that really wasn't going to prostitute the competence of the organization, and they permitted the CIA to look at the photographs.

Mr. ASPEN. Let me make an argument. There is another argument which none of you have made but which you might make: Once you allow the Government into those files for patriotic reasons, aren't you compromising your position that says you should not open the files and should not allow sources, in protection of your first amendment rights?

I would think that you could make an argument: The thin end of the wedge not only in terms of becoming more drawn into the Agency, but you might also say look, this is getting a thin end of the wedge on the whole issue of independence and freedom of the press issue.

Mr. FROMM. I think journalists have to be very careful about appeals to patriotism. It is a very easy gambit that is often used to get you to do discreditable things rather than to serve your country.

Mr. BOLAND. That is a judgment call again.

Mr. WILSON. Well, it is sort of a double standard. We can have the Freedom of Information Act under which a journalist can go to the Government and get everything that the Government has said or collected about him, but—

Mr. SZULC. Not everything.

¹See Stuart H. Loory, "The CIA's Use of the Press: 'A Mighty Wurlitzer,'" *Columbia Journalism Review*, September/October, 1974, p. 16.

Mr. FROMM. Not everything.

Mr. WILSON. But under the Privacy Act, you are not obligated to tell anybody anything about what you are doing.

Mr. JUST. But to make the toughest case which you possibly can, which I think is the interesting case, is some bit of information you have, you have interviewed somebody somewhere, and the possession of that information by the American Government could possibly save a life—I can't write the scenario, but assume you got something like that—that is what is hard. I don't know where you—that's too tough for me. I don't know where you come down on that, but I think you would give the information.

Mr. BOLAND. Let me give you this one.

How about saving the life of the CIA agent? Does exposing the name of a Station Chief really endanger his life in any of the areas where you have ever been; I mean, the publication of the names of those who are actually employed by the CIA or the particular person who might be the Station Chief in a particular area?

Mr. JUST. I think that is one of the things you don't do, personally, that you don't do for that very reason. It is one more arrow in my quiver for as much distance as possible between the journalists and those people.

Mr. SZULC. Even if you know the name, I would suggest that one should not publicize the name on the rather simple grounds that my reader doesn't really have to know the name of an individual who is a station chief in a given city. It doesn't really add to his knowledge of the situation and may create a Welch type situation. I think that as a matter of common sense, more than anything else, I would say it is really a bad practice to disclose names of CIA people who are in the field.

Mr. FROMM. Any more than it would, for example, in the Nazi period where the one who disclosed the whereabouts of a refugee or someone trying to escape. I think there are certain moral principles that one must observe, but if one carries this argument to the extreme, obviously there are cases where one is going to report. I mean, if I discovered that the Soviet Union was going to launch an attack on the United States Sunday morning at 8 o'clock, I would not keep that to myself. I think that again one has to use common-sense. My magazine doesn't come out until next Monday. [General laughter.]

Mr. SZULC. Mr. Chairman, may I make a comment on this?

Mr. ASPIN. Sure.

Mr. SZULC. I think what you have raised, sir, is a series of very difficult dilemmas to which there is no single answer. I think they all depend on situations and individuals involved in them, one's judgment of the seriousness of a national security situation on which I suppose every individual has to make his own judgment, in order that he doesn't become trapped into a continual relationship, as Herman just pointed out, always using the patriotic thing.

I would like to offer an example which does not entirely respond to your question, but I think may illustrate it.

In 1968 in Prague I spent a good deal of my time as a New York Times correspondent driving in my black convertible around Czechoslovakia and looking at Soviet troop concentrations because

it was part of my reporting. We wished to know how many tanks did they have, did they have any guided missiles and so on.

Returning to town, I would fairly often touch base not so much with the CIA people as with the Defense Attache's office, which would be the Defense Intelligence Agency, not so much to fill him in but to compare notes because he was a professional who can make a better judgment than I of the military strategic or tactical importance of that which I had observed. Very often he would go out and check on an area which I have seen and in the conversation he would say, yes; you are right, no; you are wrong. Obviously the Defense attaché used this material for his own reporting, which is fine with me as far as national security or whatever is concerned. But this was done in the context of my trying to educate myself, if you will, on the military aspects of the equipment which the Soviets had in Czechoslovakia.

So again, as we see, the areas become so blurred and so gray, that I think there would be an exception for every exception.

Mr. ASPIN. Basically, then, it is the concern about where the boundary line is. On isolated cases you might have debriefings; you might actually let them have some information that you have got in the file, or some piece of information you came across because it is important. I mean, you can concoct scenarios that would. But basically you are worried about the thin end of the wedge I take it.

Let me go to Ward Just who is left to go through the list. Would you do any of those activities on the chart, Ward?

Mr. JUST. I suppose I could see a circumstance for story confirmation, if it is something that would involve the Agency, that where—I mean, obviously if you are doing something on the Bay of Pigs, it would behoove you to talk with Langley on certain military stuff, I suppose.

The rest of it, I—don't know—

Mr. SZULC. The Bay of Pigs was denied when we made an inquiry at the time.

Mr. JUST. Yeah; you guys did very well with that, didn't you?

Mr. ASPIN. So basically you wouldn't engage in any of that.

Mr. JUST. I don't think I would; no.

Mr. ASPIN. And it is really only the CIA that you would have this feeling about?

Mr. JUST. I don't have any problem with the rest, you know, for the reasons that I have said, principally, that you can never be entirely certain—you are less certain with CIA than you are with any other sources, exactly what their motives are. The prebriefing, I just have an ethical problem with walking into the intelligence apparatus of the U.S. Government and getting a briefing. I don't think that is their job, I don't think it is their job to brief me, and I don't think it is my job to go there.

Mr. BOLAND. Well, Ward, let me ask, were you tied down for any length of time in a particular area in a foreign nation as a reporter? You know, were you there for years or were you just itinerant?

Mr. JUST. I was in Vietnam for 1½ years.

Mr. BOLAND. What about other countries, such as in Eastern Europe?

Mr. JUST. I was in London for 1 year and I spent quite a bit of time in Cyprus.

Mr. BOLAND. Would it make any difference if you were the correspondent who was there for a good period of time and not one just going through picking up stories? Would it make any difference to you whether or not you would be talking with the CIA station chief, or someone you know was in the CIA, if you were really sort of tied down there?

Mr. JUST. That is hard to say. I don't know. I would think, say, if you were Eastern European correspondent——

Mr. BOLAND. What if everybody else was getting stories from the CIA?

Mr. JUST. Exclusive stories which held up, exclusive stories which——

Mr. BOLAND. It would seem to me it would make a difference if you were tied down to that area for a length of time.

Mr. JUST. There is a notion, you know, that CIA possesses this vast fount of information and at the mere touch of a button they will hand a cable over to you which would go to Langley. I don't believe it. In Vietnam my experience was, I think the ablest group of people out there were CIA people, man for man, terribly able people. There were an awful lot of able men in that country.

Now, if you got around, I don't think that they were especially helpful. I certainly did my job without—with the exception, only one occasion comes to mind, that one did not need that contact.

Mr. FROMM. Could I just take up this point that Ward is pressing and the problem with dealing with CIA because you may be misled. It seems to me that that is going to happen only once. If you are seeing the CIA station chief in the country where you are based or operating and they have an interest in maintaining the relationship because they get some value out of the exchange, they are going to plant information on you only once because once you discover you have been used, the relationship ends.

Mr. JUST. I take a more pessimistic view of that, which is I think often you don't know when stuff is, you know, sometimes you do, sometimes you don't.

Mr. WILSON. Mr. Chairman?

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Somebody brought out the Bay of Pigs, and I can recall Fortune magazine running an article by Mr. Murphy—I don't know whether Mr. Murphy had any connection with the CIA, but he had probably the most accurate story of what really happened at the Bay of Pigs. I discussed it with President Eisenhower after he retired as President and went to Gettysburg. Bobby Kennedy had gone to Fortune magazine to try to get them to suppress the story because it criticized the President and his actions on the night of the fatal invasion, and Eisenhower told me, he said, I have read that story and it is entirely accurate, absolutely accurate, and he said, if it were suppressed, that I would feel it my duty to tell the American public the truth about what happened.

Now, obviously Mr. Murphy—I don't know whether he was connected with the CIA, but he had to have been to the CIA to get the basic information on that operation.

Now, is that wrong, to inform the American public what really went on?

Mr. NICKEL. It is my view that if you deal with the CIA as a source it is perfectly proper.

Mr. WILSON. That's why—I'm not being critical, Mr. Just, because you are certainly entitled to that opinion, but it seems to me you are drying up possible sources of informing the American public if you just arbitrarily say there will be no contact with intelligence agents.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me ask Mr. Just, would you apply the same standards to other intelligence agencies, for example, Defense Intelligence Agency people? Would you say that you ought not?

Mr. JUST. I would not.

Mr. ASPIN. You would not.

Mr. JUST. You know, Defense Department is something different.

Mr. ASPIN. But even the DIA.

Mr. JUST. Even the DIA part.

Mr. ASPIN. And just a quick question.

Is any of this the kind of thing that you would feel obligated to inform your management about? Would you feel that if you did go into a debriefing or in that special case where you did give information to the Agency other than what appeared in a story or what appeared in print, is that something that you feel you ought to tell management about? Or is that your own source and you keep it to yourself?

Mr. FROMM. It is not something one would conceal from management. On a briefing you would probably write a memorandum. On exchange of information you would write a memorandum probably, indicating the source. I don't think that one should or would normally make any attempt to conceal. It might just be inconvenient to write every time you went to a lunch or something.

Mr. SZULC. It is a question of relevance.

Mr. WILSON. In other words, you wouldn't have to do as Mr. McNamara required his military officials to report every time they had a luncheon with a correspondent.

Mr. FROMM. Every time I go to the Pentagon I don't tell my editors.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me ask this. You have worked for different news organizations. In the news organizations that you worked for, were there any guidelines established by management in the organizations you worked for about what was proper and what wasn't proper?

I know, for example, some places you have a code of ethics that you cannot accept gifts for more than so much. Was this part of the guidelines that were established by the management of any organization?

Mr. FROMM. In mine it was a firm policy.

Mr. ASPIN. How did it work, Joe?

Mr. FROMM. A firm policy of no cooperation with intelligence organizations beyond normal cooperation with news sources, no acceptance of pay, no acceptance of free trips, very specific. Now, this applies to all news sources. We have a policy that you don't accept free trips, any special favors, any gifts. David Lawrence, as I said, had a very firm policy at a time, according to the New York Times story, when many other organizations were cooperating actively with the CIA. I understand David Lawrence was approached

at that time. He informed the CIA that he did not consider it proper. Our policy in no way inhibited my normal relationship with intelligence people, but if it had been discovered that anybody on the staff had what we considered to be an improper association, I think it would have been grounds for automatic dismissal.

Mr. ASPIN. Anybody else? Are there any guidelines on this that cover any other organization?

Mr. SZULC. Well, in my 20 years with the New York Times, we had very clear and firm guidelines on gifts, free trips, that sort of thing. I don't recall at any time the question of intelligence being raised by the managing editor or any of the Times editors with me, certainly not in my case. I would simply assume that the question did not cross anyone's mind that a Times correspondent would engage in improper and unethical activity of that sort, rightly or wrongly.

Mr. ASPIN. OK.

Mr. NICKEL. I believe that in my company I can recall no explicit instructions on where to draw the line when I first joined it in the fifties, but I think it was always implicit that we valued ourselves as an independent organization, and it was our job to be sure that our dealings with the intelligence community were entirely as sources and not as participants.

But the statement, the policy was cleared up again after it became a big public issue with articles appearing in the press about the relationship between the CIA and journalists.

Mr. JUST. I left the Washington Post in 1970. To my recollection there was nothing written down although it was just as rock hard as it could be in anybody's mind that you wouldn't do any of the obvious things, taking money, doing tasks, you know. I assume there is a policy now. In my years in the sixties, at Newsweek and the Post there wasn't any.

Mr. ASPIN. Just briefly, among other activities that are listed—the support, the agent work—is any of that the kind of thing that any of you would consider proper?

For example, it seems to me the most innocuous case under "support" would be if some friend of yours at the CIA asked you to host a party to let the CIA make contact with some of your sources. In other words, they come up to you and said "Say, would you have a cocktail party and invite some of your sources because we would like to get in on the deal, too." Then, of course, it gets progressively more involvement, providing safe houses or post offices, and then acting as courier, or doing agent work.

Would you consider it totally improper to pass on information about spotting or assessing a potential agent for the Agency, saying he might be a good person for you, or to point out a new, young guy working over at the Ministry of Defense that you think is pretty good—a real comer so the CIA might want to keep its eyes open. You might pass that information on to the Agency.

Does any of that sound like something that you would want to be involved with?

Anybody?

No.

Mr. FROMM. I would be happy to accept the invitation to go to their house and meet their contacts.

Mr. SZULC. I might, if I may, for your amusement mainly, cite from memory from a cable from my CIA file in which the agent in Vienna, unsigned, was explaining to headquarters why he had attended a cocktail party given at my house, and rather apologizing for it, and the explanation was: I had to do it because we have to know the turf on which we are playing—and I still don't know who my guest was.

The answer to your point is obviously negative.

Mr. BOLAND. Another area in this accord, Mr. Chairman, is an area, opening a post office box in their name, for an agent of the CIA. You would be all opposed to that?

I think you would welcome it. You could get all the news, then, but you would oppose that?

Mr. ASPIN. Are there any other questions on this, before we leave the subject of activities and go on to another subject?

Mr. WILSON. I am anxious to hear what they say about bonds of association?

Mr. ASPIN. Yes. Let's talk about that for a second.

What you have, of course, is a relationship—and that word covers a lot of things. It covers not only various kinds of paid relationships but it also covers, of course, voluntary relationships. It covers, for example, paid relationships which are short term, contract things, expenses, gifts. It might be occasional payment on a contract basis to get some kind of information, or it might be a regular financial payment, either as a retainer or a salary. So you have a lot of different kinds of paid relationships.

Then, of course, you have a lot of voluntary relationships, and voluntary relationships can be as close as a paid relationship. You either have a voluntary relationship based upon patriotism or based upon some kind of friendship ties. People went to school with somebody, old ties going way back. Or you might have the good old natural voluntary association based upon career advancement. They give you good stories and you do things in exchange, the same danger, I guess, that would apply with any source or any agency.

Let me talk for a second about the paid relationship, and I take it from your comments, that all of you consider paid relationships of any kind to be not ethical and not proper.

And all of you, I take it, would include in that even things like expenses and doing something on a short term contractual basis, is that correct?

[The witnesses nodded in the affirmative.]

Mr. ASPIN. How about this: hospitality? The guidelines would be what, the same as for any source?

Mr. FROMM. Yes, if Admiral Turner invites me out to the Agency for lunch, I think I would go, but that wouldn't make me beholden to him. I think as far as gifts are concerned, my practice is not to accept gifts from news sources although sometimes it gets difficult when the Russians send you a bottle of Vodka for Christmas.

Mr. SZULC. I think this is essentially true. I think my recollection is in most cases I paid for the lunches and the drinks with CIA contacts, as my expense account will reveal. I suppose to accept a dinner or lunch or drink at someone's house who is known to be a CIA official, I see no more harm in that than to have lunch with a

particular ambassador, but anything beyond that is absolutely out of the question.

Mr. NICKEL. I have nothing to add to that. I quite agree.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me probe into a more difficult area, then.

What about a part time or "moonlighting" relationship with the CIA? In what way is that different from other kinds of moonlighting that might be done? Journalists who write for publications do engage in activities on the side and get paid for them. Why isn't it just as proper then to do something for the CIA on the side and get paid for it as it would be, say, to write an article for another publication or do some lecturing at the university?

Mr. SZULC. Because here we are dealing with overt situations. In some organizations—I believe yours is one of them—writers are not allowed to do any outside writing whatsoever. We do not have this problem. The kind of moonlighting that you are referring to, writing books or articles or novels, those are things which appear in public print and they are not concealed or covert relationships.

I think that even in moonlighting great care is exercised. Many of us, for example, would lose our press—Congressional Press Gallery—accreditation if we broadcast for the Voice of America, and I think there have been a few cases involving this. So even such overt moonlighting comes under certain constraints in certain areas, such as congressional accreditation.

So I think the difference is basically between that which you do overtly and visibly for the whole world to see, and the covert thing.

Mr. FROMM. As I mentioned in my statement, I don't think one can moonlight as part time consultant to an industrial firm. If I am the railroad editor of a magazine and I am consulting to the Railroad Association, that is as unethical as being a consultant to CIA. So again it is not a principle that just applies to CIA. I think moonlighting is basically unethical except where you are writing overtly or lecturing overtly, where there is no question of a conflict of interest between what you are getting as a journalist and using to some nonjournalistic end.

Mr. ASPIN. Would you consider it, then, all right, for example, if you are invited to go to the CIA to lecture a training class of new people coming into the CIA for a couple hundred bucks? Would you do that?

Mr. FROMM. I might do it free. I wouldn't take money. In other words, I think it would be acceptable if it were an open thing, where you were participating in a seminar or something of that sort.

Mr. ASPIN. Tad?

Mr. SZULC. I have lectured at a variety of places, the National War College and the Defense Intelligence Agency. I was never asked to lecture at a CIA training class. My instinct probably would be to regret, decline the invitation.

Mr. ASPIN. Why would it be different than doing it at the National War College?

Mr. WILSON. Because they don't have a file on him. [General laughter.]

Mr. SZULC. I suppose it is an instinctive sense as much as anything else of not being drawn into what might become a relationship in the future. Once you come to lecture in what is a fairly

sealed situation at Langley, I think there is a distinction between that and Fort McNair and the National War College or a seminar at the State Department, which are not classified and fairly open meetings for anyone pretty much who cares to attend. I would have certain misgivings about certain CIA invitations because I would not be certain in my own mind whether this might not signify the beginning of a relationship which I might not desire.

Mr. ASPIN. Herman?

Mr. NICKEL. Fortunately the CIA hasn't asked me and the sort of question hasn't arisen, but I would answer the same way that Tad did, because of the special nature of the CIA as against other Government agencies, and the danger of getting sucked into a relationship which was more than that between reporter and source.

Mr. WILSON. Ward wouldn't even get invited. [General laughter.]

Mr. FROMM. He might be the most popular one there.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me talk then a bit about voluntary associations.

The problem with the paid associations is the problem of loyalties being divided. Can't you also be sucked in in a divided loyalty situation purely out of a voluntary association, and isn't that really even much more of a danger than the payment? My guess is that if the danger were of American journalists with the CIA, it would mostly fall under that voluntary association category. What are the dangers here?

Joe?

Mr. FROMM. Well, this raises again a basic dilemma that every journalist faces between one's professional position and one's friendships. Friendships with officials are always very difficult. When a relationship moves from a professional relationship to one of friendship, one gets into a very difficult area. In human terms it is very difficult because whether it is a politician, a diplomat or a CIA person, there is always danger that the other person is going to invoke friendship to ask you to do something that goes somewhat beyond professional bounds.

So I really think that this is a problem that affects the journalist's relationships with all of his sources but perhaps more with intelligence people because they might be a little more inclined to exploit it.

Mr. SZULC. Yes, I think I would essentially agree. It is a very difficult area, it is a blurred area. I think one has to be guided by one's best judgment not to cross this very thin line. I think Joe is basically right.

Mr. NICKEL. That is the most difficult area of all, but again I would agree there is nothing generically different between the associations, the personal friendships that you may have with people in the intelligence community and any other sources.

Mr. ASPIN. Ward?

Mr. JUST. I just think it is wise to avoid tricky areas and thin lines, and everyone is talking about ethical problems. If you are a journalist, the difficulty really, I think, is, I guess as I said before, is there is a kind of natural affinity between journalists and spies. I don't know a journalist that isn't fascinated by the whole apparatus that surrounds the intelligence community. Whether you are talking about spy satellites or safe houses or just the collection of

information, or just the analysis of information, they are very adroit, very nimble at that. To refuse the lunch invitation or to refuse to talk over drinks is often very difficult. They are, as a group of guys, they are about as companionable as journalists, and journalists are about the most companionable people I know. It really is a kind of a—it is almost, it boils down to sort of personal quality, and I think it is very tough to move away from that, and I think it ought to be done. I think it ought to be moved away from.

Mr. ASPIN. And even if, for example, you are out in some country, on your own?

Mr. JUST. Well, Mr. Chairman, if it is 6:30 in the evening in Famagusta and the Greeks and Turks have been shooting at you for 7 hours, and a fellow says come into my house and have a sundowner, you are likely to do it. Anyway, I did, and I suppose that belies what I was saying before.

Mr. WILSON. I think all spies are incipient journalists anyway, judging from all the books that are coming out, and look at all the books that Hunt wrote.

Mr. JUST. I think that is exactly right. I think journalists are kind of spies manque, and kind of vice versa. That is why the relationship, I believe, on a kind of a personal level, is really dangerous because you get kind of a confusement of the realms which is one of the problems with Washington, and I go back to my first principle, which I think the spies ought to deal with their intelligence and I think that journalists ought to write their journalism, and I have a lot of problems when there are too many connections between the two because I think the realms get blurred, I think the information gets muddled, and I think the ultimate loser in all that is the reader which is, after all, the primary consumer of all this information.

Mr. ASPIN. Does anybody else have questions before we go on?

Mr. BOLAND. May I just ask a question?

All of you apparently have talked to people in the CIA, in the long years you spent in the communications area.

What is your judgment on their abilities? How would you rate them percentagewise: low level, mediocre, or superb?

Tad, how about that? You have obviously been in many areas of the world; you have run into a lot of them. What is your judgment?

Mr. SZULC. I think it is a split judgment that would emerge here. In my own experience I found the analysts, the thinkers, if you will, by and large to be in a fairly high intellectual and professional class, because of the numbers, because of the time which they have, because of the ability of the Agency to attract people who have single, double or triple Ph. D.'s, who are much more expert on a small place in west Africa than the average foreign service officer who moves from place to place. I would say that by and large the quality is quite high.

As someone remarked earlier, during the Vietnam period CIA analysts by and large were the best in town. Perhaps someone should have listened to them, perhaps on the question of bombing and NSSM-1, as I recall.

One of the things that I think is a difficulty is on the so-called clandestine side where people tend to develop rather wild operational ideas based on often very weak logical premises. So making

this difference, I would say that certainly in those cases the CIA deserves high marks on the quality of analysis of intelligence, which is really what interests me in my contacts with the Agency—their knowledge or interpretation of an event.

Mr. FROMM. Well, I agree on the analysis side. On the whole, I have found them exceptional. On the operational side—the clandestine people—I didn't find them a very useful source of information because their activities were really rather limited.

But as I say, on the analysis side, it was good. On the clandestine side, on the whole, I didn't have a close association with them simply because I didn't find them—clandestine in terms of action operators—all that interesting.

Mr. SZULC. If I may make a comment that comes to mind, I think there is a very interesting example of the dangers of how the two sides operate, which appears in the Church committee hearings on Chile¹ in which, according to the committee print, the analysis side were unaware of the covert activities of the clandestine side of the DDO, and therefore the national intelligence estimates or the analytical work produced by the analysis side of the Agency could not take into consideration the reality of clandestine operations, and therefore, their judgments, perforce, were inaccurate, which was and is, I presume, a very serious in-house problem which affects the consumer of intelligence, be it you the Congress, or the executive branch.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Nickel?

Mr. NICKEL. I think obviously we deal, it is in the nature of our work that we deal more with the analytical people. I would agree that I think the average quality of the analytical people that I have dealt with is probably on the whole better than that of the average foreign service officer, because of greater specialization.

As far as the clandestine activities are concerned, it is in the nature of clandestine activities that we don't really know a great deal about them and wouldn't really accept sort of an after-the-event, if you find the story about how a defection we brought about or something like that, in which case I think there are instances where the work by the CIA was absolutely superb professionally.

Mr. BOLAND. Ward?

Mr. JUST. The only place I know about in any detail is Vietnam, and there, as Tad pointed out, the analytical people were top of the line. the clandestine side, I think, tended to get a little woolly and wild, but generally very high quality of men there.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you.

Let me just ask a broad question because we are trying to grope for something here, and see whether anything comes to mind.

Each of you in a way sees the close affinity between journalism and the CIA, and each on the other hand treats the CIA differently in your own mind than other agencies. Ward is the most extreme case, but all of you to a certain extent are reluctant to accept, for example, an invitation to give a lecture to the new recruits out at the CIA.

¹See "Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973". Staff Report of the Select Committee to Study Government Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities. U.S. Senate, December 18, 1975.

In what way is the CIA like any other agency, and in what way isn't it like any other agency? I mean, from a journalist standpoint, what is it about the CIA that makes it different from other agencies, and why is it that it causes this kind of concern on your behalf that makes you do things in relation to the CIA that you wouldn't do with other agencies?

Mr. FROMM. Well, isn't there one point about the CIA that made it distinctly different—the way it operated for the past 30 years, this great preoccupation with covert action. If one studies the Church committee report and some of the papers that were done with respect to it, they point out that the CIA for 30 years concentrated on covert operations. The way you got brownie points in the CIA was to be a good covert operator, to come up with projects and to carry them out. The problem that it raised was that in an association with the CIA, they might try to protect or promote or rationalize a covert action that might be questionable. So I think there is that in the past.

I think this is now changing in the reorganization of the CIA. I suppose what made it a problem is that we weren't fully aware of just how preoccupied or how lopsided the CIA was on that side of the house—on covert operations as opposed to collection of information.

I think it is the open part of CIA, the analytical section that allows for a normal relationship. This is, as far as I can see, no different than INR or somebody in a university, because their job is to analyze and report objectively.

Mr. ASPIN. Anybody else?

Mr. SZULC. Well, I think Joe has made the point that I think it is the clandestinity which surrounds the Agency which makes it unattractive or unwise for one to establish the kind of relationship we are discussing here. On ethical grounds, I suppose, it is the concern of being sucked into a situation in which one does not wish to find oneself in, a problem which obviously does not arise when you lecture the National War College or spend a great deal of time at the State Department. I think that is the main thing.

Mr. JUST. Apart, I think, from the secret or covert nature of the Agency is the mentality of the agents, which is really a different kind of people. They really have a different mentality than the rest of us. You just have to go through Bill Colby's statement, talking about the journalists and how you deal with media here and abroad. He speaks of assets and handling people and he speaks of the support of journalists, and then he follows Tad Szulc around as he is making his appointed rounds.

I think with people who are of that mentality, I think they are very difficult to deal with in any sort of open way. I repeat I guess what I said before, but there is a different quality about those guys, necessarily so. It is what they do.

I am not necessarily trying to put it down, but they do inhabit a different temperamental world than the rest of us, and I think you ought to be damned careful when you deal with fellows like that.

Mr. ASPIN. That is a very interesting comment. It is sort of the mongoose and the cobra type of thing.

Mr. JUST. I don't know which is which. [General laughter.]

Mr. ASPIN. All right, any other comment on this before we try another?

Let me go into another subject, if we can.

Tad has already raised the point of the nonjournalist staff employees, but I would like to get all of your opinions on "People,"¹ in terms of the American media. First, the Bush directive of February 1976 prohibited paid contractual relationships with full and part time accredited journalists. The Turner directive issued just earlier this month included stringers specifically, but said that non-journalist staff employees were perfectly okay to recruit, provided management knew about them.

Two other groups of people which have been suggested ought to be included in the directive, and maybe are and maybe aren't, at least in one case, depending upon how you interpret the directive, are, first, the editors and media policymakers, on the grounds that not only the person who is out there in the field writing the story, but also the person who edits it or decides the placement the story gets ought to be covered also; then, second, the category of free lancers, and particularly, I guess, free-lancers who write regularly for American publications.

I would basically like to get any of your views on these proposals. Is the Turner directive adequate? Do you find any ambiguities in what is being said in the directive? Do you find any additions that you want to add to it. Basically, what is your reaction to the Turner directive and to the proposed additions? Are there any questions that you have about the directive?

Joe, do you want to start?

Mr. FROMM. It is a difficult area, really. If I start with free-lancers, I think one gets into the question of whether he is really a freelancer or a CIA agent with a freelance cover. This gets back to the question of whether the CIA should be barred from using any journalist covers. I find this one very hard to deal with. I think it gets into the question of whether you bar the CIA from providing any cover.

Mr. ASPIN. So you would be reluctant to include freelancers in the barring.

Mr. FROMM. I guess I would.

Mr. ASPIN. How about nonjournalist staff employees?

Mr. FROMM. I think any employee of a publication should not work for the CIA.

Mr. ASPIN. And you would include, then, editors?

Mr. FROMM. Well, if the New York Times story is correct, they seem to have been the most cooperative with the CIA, but I think editors certainly would be barred.

Mr. ASPIN. But freelancers you have got some problem with?

Mr. FROMM. I do simply because it gets down to the basic dilemma: Is there a need, in maintaining an intelligence organization, for agents to have covers. If one accepts the principle that agents should have covers, what should the cover be? Should you say they must never have the cover of journalists, that it is OK for them to be missionaries or college professors or Congressmen traveling abroad?

¹See appendix C, p. 335.

I really think we get into a very difficult ethical area here of whether journalists are a special case, I find it a hard one to come to grips with.

Mr. ASPIN. Tad?

Mr. SZULC. Well, Joe is undermining my livelihood here as a fulltime moonlighter or fulltime freelancer, I have to take the view, which I have taken, that the same restraints which applied to me when I was employed by the New York Times, should and do apply to me as a freelancer inasmuch as I do it on a full-time basis and I appear in any number of American Publications.

Where the line is drawn between someone, a freelancer who writes every week, every day for a variety of what we call clients, and the chap who does an occasional travel piece for the Washington Post and the New York Times, I am not sure where the line is. Inasmuch as I cannot define the line, I would be inclined to apply the blanket prohibition to those who claim to be freelancers. If a person is not a freelancer, then he should not invoke his status as one.

Writing a piece a year for a minor magazine, I do not believe is a freelancer as I think most of us understand the words. So I would certainly be in favor of including freelancers as I understand the term, under the basic guidelines.

Mr. ASPIN. How do you define a freelancer?

Mr. SZULC. Well, as I said, it is very difficult. I do it full time and there are some people who do it part time in addition to other occupations, private incomes, what have you.

Mr. ASPIN. So your definition of a freelancer that ought to be covered by this would be a full-time freelancer?

Mr. SZULC. Or one who—I suppose we have to apply the rule of reason or commonsense here, to anyone who spends a considerable amount of his time or derives much of his income from freelance activities from American publications and what have you. I think common sense would indicate that someone who does an annual piece for American Airlines magazine would not necessarily qualify, but here we get into the other area of whether Americans of other professions or activities may or may not be open to CIA employment or contracts.

But I feel very strongly that busy freelancers should be absolutely covered by the same constraints and guidelines as staff people.

Mr. ASPIN. Herman Nickel?

Mr. NICKEL I return to my basic position, that is, that, namely, the basic burden of dealing with this problem is on the press itself, and that for that reason, I don't even have all that much trouble with point B of the Turner directive, but which does not absolutely rule out relationships with nonjournalist staff, but requires express approval.

I would wish that any journalistic organization would share my view that this should not be, but I am not sure whether we are really on the right track in denying by directive, by governmental directive, to the Central Intelligence Agency all kinds of areas for cover, because we do live in the real world where other countries have intelligence services which of course make plenty of use of these possibilities.

So I would like to reemphasize my view that it is up to the journalist to say no, or to publications to say no.

The lines are, as Joe has so rightly said, and I think it was underlined by Tad, very difficult to draw anyway, and I am a little bit leery of getting into a field with clear definitions which, in its nature, is unclear and therefore terribly difficult to regulate.

I am sorry this is a rather broad comment, but I thought I should perhaps state my basic approach to it.

Mr. ASPIN. Ward?

Mr. JUST. I guess since anybody can call themselves a freelance writer, without necessarily being one, that is an awkward job description, I would have thought, and I think my views are probably well known by now, they should stay away from them. It is just awkward with freelancers, but there seems to be some sort of theory, particularly among people in the Agency, that the only Americans who are abroad suitable for their activities, the Agency's activities, are journalists. I mean, everybody is abroad. They have got airline pilots. I have got a list of 12 people here without even thinking about it, lawyers who are traveling, businessmen are traveling, bartenders, gamblers, you know, all the way down the pike. It isn't that there just—that the most suitable cover is somehow journalistic cover. It isn't necessarily true. The Agency acts as if somehow they are denied this great resource, that the clandestine services are going to collapse, which is nonsense, absolutely, bloody nonsense.

Mr. ASPIN. What the agency would say is that the thing they like about journalists is the fact they have access and can ask questions.

Mr. JUST. True up to a point, yes.

Mr. ASPIN. And can ask questions, a lot of questions and meet a lot of people without raising suspicion, which a businessman cannot. A businessman, if he starts talking to labor leaders and politicians and others, might raise suspicions. He can ask a lot of questions about the economics of the situation and see people in the finance department of the Government, and so forth; but there is nothing like a journalist—this is what Colby would say—for being able to go around and ask questions and nobody think that it is unusual.

Mr. JUST. Yes; I suppose that's true.

Mr. WILSON. A journalist is naturally curious.

Mr. JUST. That's right.

I don't think it is beyond really their wits up there to find a guy, you know, who can sort of move around Europe and ask questions without trying to set him up, you know, as a stringer for the Washington Post or Time Magazine or something.

Mr. ASPIN. You know, I don't know what your impression is of the importance of the journalistic ties to the CIA, that is, the journalistic aspects of their clandestine collection apparatus. It is a little hard to judge. What do you ask a person? You ask Colby, "Is it very important?" "Oh, yes; very important," he replies. Well, on scale of 1 to 10, what is it?

How do you quantify how important it is except to say that I think the Agency thinks it certainly is of some value.

Mr. FROMM. Has anybody talked to them about how valuable businessmen are, or other people?

Mr. ASPIN. Well, we plan to go on into that. What is your feeling on it, Joe?

Mr. FROMM. Well, it may be that journalists have just gotten to be more conspicuous in this whole picture. If one has followed the work of other countries' intelligence organizations, you find that they use businessmen, they plant them to become deep agents. They are there for 20 years. They are good businessmen and successful, and when they are needed they are available. I suspect that we may have a distorted picture of CIA overseas operations or covert operations and that journalists have gotten more publicity and we tend to publicize ourselves. My impression is, if they run a good intelligence organization, they don't concentrate exclusively on journalists.

Mr. SZULC. There is an area which I think is a fascinating one which has not been fully explored in the Church hearings last year and the year before, which is the use of foreign students recruited at American universities and colleges as long-term hidden assets. As I understand, part of that was sanitized, at the request of the Agency because of the agents in place, but I think that this is an area of so-called assets of very, very considerable importance to the Agency if we start looking beyond our own craft and that which we write about ourselves all the time.

Mr. FROMM. Actually, I was surprised in reading that New York Times series, about 70 percent of it was pretty familiar to most of us. Either we knew definitely or suspected. So if journalists have been used, on the whole it seems to me they haven't been very well concealed.

Mr. ASPIN. If there are no other questions on this area, let me go into the big area where now the debate is largely centered in terms of what is right and what is not right. That is, the foreign media.

There are a number of people—Senator Inouye in his wrap-up statement last year, the American Society for Newspaper Editors, Charles Seib—the Washington Post, Ombudsman, and others—who have said that whatever standards we apply to American media ought also be applied to the foreign media.

CIA officials take a very strong opposite position, saying that this would cut them off from everything, that they really need the foreign media for collection, for agent handling, for propaganda purposes. "Don't do that to us," they say.

I would like the reaction of each of you as to whether you think we really ought to be applying the same standards to foreign media, or no standards, or maybe different standards. Should there be some kind of restraints on our CIA involvement with foreign media?

Let's start with Ward this time.

Mr. JUST. I have roughly the same feelings about the foreign media as I do about our own. I think there is one critical difference, is that in Europe, there are an awful lot of journalists who are committed, political journalists. They work for newspapers with a clear ideological line of one kind or another. They are not reporters, in the sense, in many countries, in the sense that we think of reporters. If one of those fellows would come to the

Agency and say, "You know, I am prepared to do double duty," well, it's a free country, or in some cases, it isn't I guess. I don't know what you do about that. I don't know what laws, what law or directive that you can pass in Washington that is going to have a lot of effect on the foreign media as a general proposition. You know, I would feel the same way about newspapermen or TV people or magazine people or whatever in Madrid or London or Bangkok or wherever, as I do here. However, I don't think for one minute that any directive that would be put out by Langley or any other place would have a real effect on that if the Agency wanted to recruit. I think they would go right ahead, probably, and recruit because the area is somehow grayer over there.

But as an ethical matter, no, I think they ought to keep their hands off, you know, the media there as well as here, but practically, in the real world, I don't see it having the force, any directive having the force abroad that it would have here.

Mr. NICKEL. Well, in the best of all possible worlds, I obviously would like to see an independent press anywhere, functioning in a free society and therefore not getting mixed up and contaminated with intelligence gathering, which as I said earlier obviously is not our professional job. Well, the fact is also that we do not live in the best of all possible worlds, and the role of a free and independent press is recognized in very few countries. Ward Just just mentioned journalists who have a political commitment, and that is very much the form in many parts of the world, including what we call parts of the free world. Under these circumstances, especially when you know that other intelligence services, including the intelligence services of countries that are not at all friendly toward us have that opportunity and make use of it wherever they can, I am not sure that I wouldn't agree in this case with the Agency, that it would be a kind of a unilateral disarmament if they were now preempted from making contacts. And I am not so sure that it should be done even if, like Ward, some people might wonder whether such inhibitions would actually be observed by the Agency when it came down to cases.

So I would be disinclined to make this a subject of regulation.

Mr. ASPIN. Tad?

Mr. SZULC. I would tend to agree with Herman on this point. I think what we are raising here is a much broader question. Are we talking about recruiting foreign journalists, are we talking about CIA influencing of editorial policies of a foreign newspaper? I think the question which is being raised here calls for a judgment as to whether or not the CIA should abandon its entire covert political action program overseas, of which influencing newspapers, magazines, labor unions, what have you, is obviously a part, and here I tend to agree again with Herman, that this is not a matter to be legislated or held by directives such as we do at home. I think this would place constraints on the U.S. Government which are probably too great in this world which is not ideal, and I think one should add, too, to be consistent, that if the Agency is prevented from having any kind of influence with foreign journals or publications, what do we say about the USIA which sometimes openly, sometimes less so, make available articles, editorials, on various subjects to writers in foreign newspapers, unless we altogether

want to get out of the business of influencing foreign public opinion. Then I would say let's stop it. But clearly this is not the policy.

Mr. FROMM. Take the extreme case where in a number of countries, newspapers are Government operated. Reporters and editors are in fact Government employees. That is true in the entire Eastern bloc and many Third World countries. I think it is hard to distinguish between recruiting them and recruiting a cabinet minister. It would be pretty ludicrous to prevent the CIA from accepting offers of cooperation from Soviet editors, Soviet journalists, if they would like to do it, or other journalists of that sort.

So I think if one feels that it isn't wrong to prohibit recruiting in that kind of a case, then you can't have a general rule.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me put the argument that people would make for not allowing the CIA to recruit foreign journalists, and see how you would respond to it.

What they would say would be something like this: "The United States stands for certain things, and one of the things we stand for is a free press," and that is one of our big selling points when we argue our system versus, say, the Soviet system. When we stand for a free press, it is an important part of the argument that we make, the selling point that we make.

Now, to undermine the press abroad in a sense undermines our whole argument. Unless we respect the press abroad, we are being a little bit hypocritical by saying that we only respect these things that we hold so dear. We only respect them in our country.

You don't find that convincing?

Mr. JUST. I find it pretty convincing. I don't think—I don't find, or I can't, as a writer, approve of the Central Intelligence Agency suborning other writers. I don't care where they work. I really don't think that is their function. I don't think that is one of the functions of the American Government, to go around suborning writers, either through dough or whatever ideological appeal. If a writer wants to come to the CIA, that is something else again. If he says, look, I want to do double duty for you, that is another thing. The fellow can do that.

As a question of policy, and it's a question of Government policy which CIA policy would therefore be, that we should, you know, truck around the world hiring journalists who are writing for foreign publications, broadcasting on foreign television networks, is an outrage, I think.

Mr. FROMM. I think there are two issues here. What you are hiring people for, or what activity is the CIA engaging in? Is it covert political action to hire a journalist to write what they want, or is it to hire a foreign journalist to act as clandestine agent, and it seems to me one ought to draw a distinction here.

Mr. JUST. I don't think it is a distinction, Joe. I don't think a man writing for—pick a newspaper, *La Stampa*, *Los Efiores Romano*—can write his editorials or write his news copy for that newspaper and at the same time be in the pay of the American Central Intelligence Agency. I don't think—I don't know of a man with the capacity of mind to be able to split it right down the middle like that and be faithful to both causes. Now, there may be somebody who can, but I would sure like to meet the fellow.

Mr. SZULC. And then are we talking about planned subornation, are we talking about recruiting, or are we talking about the larger area of CIA, USIA, or State Department propaganda, attempts to influence public opinion?

Mr. ASPIN. I guess we are talking about both, and maybe we are mixing the two.

Mr. SZULC. Because I think I would tend to agree with the first point, Ward's first point, but not necessarily the second one.

Mr. ASPIN. That we should not in one case, but we could in another?

Mr. SZULC. I would most likely be against pure hiring or suborning of foreign journalists. However, I think we have to look separately at the area, to what extent the Agency under covert political action, or what have you, or other agencies of the U.S. Government, may engage in more or less visible propaganda efforts. I think all governments conduct them, and it is a question which is a very valid one, how far should American propaganda be allowed to function in terms of foreign media.

Maybe part of the answer to what you are looking at lies there. There should be a certain distinction.

Mr. FROMM. And we may be moving it out of the CIA and concentrating more on the sort of thing the British do.

Mr. SZULC. Possibly.

Mr. ASPIN. Herman?

Mr. NICKEL. It seems to me we are talking about two somewhat different things. The CIA getting the foreign journalist to provide information, that is one thing. It is another to ask him to write what in effect becomes some form of propaganda which suits our purposes, the propaganda function of the CIA. And I think, as far as I know, there are quite a few CIA people who would be quite pleased to shed that responsibility anyway. If the U.S. Government has a policy of trying to influence opinion in other countries, then let it be done by the USIA. That is a much more straightforward approach, it seems to me. I think it probably would save the CIA quite a few problems.

Mr. BOLAND. Does it get through as effectively though?

Mr. NICKEL. I am not sure how effectively the CIA has gotten through. I am not a great expert on how good the CIA record really is, and whether it is so much better than what could be accomplished by other agencies or by a press attache having people in for dinner and, of course, working on them. We have to recognize that in most of the world the concept of a free and independent press does not exist, and I feel for that reason that there is a certain amount of justice in a countervailing effort to the propaganda that state controlled organs may be putting out.

So I do see some points in favor of an effort of this kind, but I am not at all sure that it should be conducted by the CIA. There are plenty of other means which the U.S. Government can use in those countries. After all, that includes the embassy, there are the USIA information centers—all of which make it their business to cultivate journalists in their host country.

So I really don't see that this is a business that the CIA should get involved in.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me push just a little bit further on the point that Ward was saying earlier. To what extent is media abroad different than it is here? I am not talking about obvious cases where you have the Soviet Union or another totalitarian system; but even in Western democracies, is there a difference that would justify treating foreign press different from our press? In other words, is it a different kind of thing entirely?

Mr. JUST. Well, as I think about it, as one thinks about it yes, there is a difference, I mean, in the nature of the press. The more I think about it, the more I think that that does not mean that the Central Intelligence Agency has any right to go in and buy up journalists.

The point that Herman was making, that in propaganda, whatever propaganda you like, that can be put over into a more or less, into a totally overt form out of USIS or USIA, I don't have any problem with overt propaganda. Everybody has got that. I have got a lot of problems with this kind of thing operating out of CIA.

I don't see the need for it, I don't think it works. And as I say, as a writer, I just, I really can't bring myself, you know, to approve of the American Government buying up writers around the world.

Mr. SZULC. There is a pernicious area in all this which I think should be recognized, which is the planting of false stories or disinformation stories in foreign papers to be played back to other foreign countries to affect the local situations or even to be published at home.

Mr. ASPIN. Right.

That is what I was going to get into.

Mr. SZULC. I think that this then impinges on the problems here at home and probably is an interference in other governments' foreign affairs, because it transcends true propaganda in the sense that—

Mr. ASPIN. Let me ask about that because this is one of the things we did go into. Obviously one of the most important aspects of this whole thing is the question of feedback of propaganda stories planted abroad.

Now, the position of the CIA in all of this is that, in fact, feedback is a minimal problem. They all say: "We can't think of any examples."

In your experience, is it a minimal problem? Is the feedback potential there? Is that something that we ought to worry about? If it is, should we set up some kind of a mechanism to deal with it, or is it such a minimal problem that we don't need to bother with it?

Mr. SZULC. I don't think it is minimal. I'm not sure, as I listen to you, how one would go about defining these areas; the potential is there, feedback, if the New York Times or a wire service picks up a story from an authoritative newspaper in India or France, and this turns out to be a deep CIA plant, this is played back in the United States, has an impact on your decisions in the Congress, has an impact on public opinion, then I think it becomes a very pernicious and dangerous thing.

How does one police this? I am not sure, without getting to the whole question of covert political action of the Agency in general, but I can see the enormous potential for harm in its being conducted, and I am brought back to a point I made earlier concerning the

allegations by Mr. Snapp in his book on Vietnam, on the final days of Saigon, in which the Station deliberately fed pieces of information to American correspondents, mainly for the purpose of obtaining approval by the Congress of extra appropriations for Vietnam and Cambodia, which were being requested at the time. I think this is an area of extreme danger where those things occur, but I think this takes us back to a point which I think has been made repeatedly here, that in the end it has to be the responsibility of the journalist, the correspondent, whether he will lend himself intellectually or professionally to be fed that kind of line and create the feedback and therefore give the Agency the reward it seeks.

I think that we tend to overestimate the harm done by the Agency and maybe underestimate our own professional responsibilities as journalists in sometimes rushing to the typewriter or to the microphone too quickly in situations of this kind, and I think if we are going to be honest, I think this is an area of self-discipline that perhaps is lacking to an adequate degree.

Mr. FROMM. I would like to comment. I think, Mr. Chairman, there are two points. One is the question of planting. If the CIA did it in Saigon—planting stories or information with American journalists with the express purpose of influencing action in the United States—it seems to me this is an overt violation of the CIA charter. They are not supposed to engage in domestic activities. In that case it would seem to me that you already have grounds for action.

The other point is how much damage is done, how much disinformation we are reporting back in feedback. I don't think we know because we don't know how much of this kind of activity the CIA is engaging in. So it is very difficult, it would seem for me, for us to judge. Maybe it is little, maybe it is a great deal, and a great deal is being fed back, but I think two things.

First, normally, if one reports what appears in a foreign publication, you identify the publication and you may even interpolate your own judgment on its reliability and certainly its political orientation. Just last week we had La Figuro being quoted as reporting that Brezhnev was dead, and that the head of the KGB was going to take over in the Soviet Union. I don't know if that was a CIA plant or whether it just was a journalistic dream, but nobody took it very seriously. At least it was not given great weight.

Mr. SZULC. But you never know.

Mr. FROMM. That's right, we don't know. Second, I agree with Tad. I think most foreign correspondents do attempt to evaluate. If the story is absurd and has no credibility at all, it is going to be discredited.

Mr. NICKEL. Well, I think in the total context of faulty, incomplete, misleading, misinformation that occurs in the press, I am inclined to suspect—and one can only suspect—that the feedback problem is relatively minor. It all goes back again to the responsibility of every journalist and editor to use his best judgment and to check out as carefully as he can what comes in.

Mr. ASPIN. There are people in the Agency, for example, who say that one of the factors, is that the noise level is so great. The British and other allies are working the same game, not to say the Soviets and not to mention just normal crummy reporting that gets

reported in the papers abroad. All of that, of course, has a potential for being picked up; whatever the CIA is doing is only one small part of the problem.

Mr. FROMM. I question how much damage it really does. I find it hard to believe that this committee would take very strong action on the basis of a couple of stories appearing in a newspaper here, reported quoting a newspaper abroad.

Mr. ASPIN. One of the best examples we have on the record is, of course, the Allende Chile case studied by the Church committee. The propaganda assessment of the CIA after the event showed that in fact stories they had planted about Allende were getting replay in the United States in the Post and the Times, papers that are read by people who are involved in the decisions.

We asked Mr. Colby to suppose the CIA was going to put out a story to influence events in another country, and they were afraid that it might get another replay. What would they do? Apparently, there is some kind of an informal arrangement—and it seems to me to be very informal—of notifying senior officials that the story is perhaps not the real story and it is not to be taken seriously. They have a system whereby they notify the ambassador in the country and senior officials in Washington, which of course leaves out the press, the public, Congress, and a few others, and it does seem to be informal. I say informal because nobody can answer very specific questions about it, and I am not sure it isn't a very ad hoc arrangement. But the question is: How about cutting the press in on the deal if you are putting out a false story, that is, somehow notify the press that there will be a big article in the whatever Times or some foreign paper, but not to take it too seriously.

Mr. JUST. The guy who gets that wins a Pulitzer prize.

Mr. ASPIN. That's what Mr. Colby says. Colby says you call up somebody with that and, bingo, you have got a story.

Mr. FROMM. Well, they wouldn't do it that way. I imagine it would be done much more on the basis of the normal contacts. They would say, did you see that story in the Times of India, it is just full of baloney. We have been checking it out ourselves? I can't see them calling up an editor and saying look, we planted this story to try to influence the Indian election, but don't believe it.

Mr. SZULC. It gets to be counterproductive.

Mr. ASPIN. But you think they could at least make the phone call and say that we have seen the story in the Times of India?

Mr. FROMM. Well, they could, but I doubt if they could do it on such a systematic basis that they could cover all bets.

Mr. SZULC. A story they planted themselves, you mean.

Mr. ASPIN. Yes.

Mr. SZULC. I mean, I guess it would almost verge on the ridiculous.

Mr. NICKEL. Yeah, you set them up and you knock them down.

Mr. FROMM. And you could have one in Indian and then one in English to say don't believe the Indian.

Mr. WILSON. Of course, as our Chairman has pointed out, one of the reasons we are interested in this subject is that under the regulations that Admiral Turner has proposed, we have issued here, there is no reference to foreign media or foreign newsmen, and I think it would be useful if we could find out specifically

whether you feel this lack of reference has any particular merit or any particular objection?

I for one think that we have a different rule for different ball-games, and we are trying to get our side of the story over in a country that has a controlled press, we have a very difficult problem, and that if they are going to play that rule, we perhaps have to use different rules of getting our side of the story told.

I don't like the idea of false information, but I do like the idea of being able somehow to get across in a foreign country the truth about our country. The USIA can't do it openly, overtly, so perhaps we have to go through another means.

Now, this doesn't jibe with our concept of a free press, but it does jibe with a very real problem we face in dealing with operations in a foreign country that have a very great effect on our future existence and so forth.

Now, do any of you feel that there should be an inclusion in that regulation, any restraint with regard to foreign media, to our intelligence agency dealing with foreign media?

Mr. JUST. I think that there ought to be, but I have already conceded that I don't think it will do any good.

You are right, that it could be written, but I don't have an awful lot of confidence in it. In other words, it would be nice to enunciate the policy.

Mr. WILSON. In other words, you take the policy that the whole set of regulations are really somewhat meaningless.

Mr. JUST. I think—well, as far as the United States is concerned, I think it is better that we have it than we don't. I don't, as a practical matter for abroad, I think it would be wise to enunciate the policy because there are differences in foreign press. I don't have the confidence that it would be followed to the extent that I think this directive would be followed. I do not believe that, you know, that CIA is going to recruit the New York Times stringer in Bangladesh. Now, I'd say I believe that it probably pretty true.

In foreign countries I think the situation is a little chancier.

Mr. NICKEL. Well, I said earlier that it is a somewhat more difficult area for precisely the reason you mentioned, that we are not dealing in the ideal world where everybody's country has a free and independent press where, you know, this impairment of the free and independent press that so worries me about the CIA's relationship with newsmen other than if we get involved in reporting and source. So the situation abroad presents itself somewhat differently, and since it is a very—since there are very borderline cases, my own feeling was that it would be very chancy to try to regulate this, even if one were to assume that the regulations would then be religiously adhered to.

Mr. SZULC. I would simply add as a practical matter if the Agency were to issue guidelines at this point then the question would be raised, why doesn't it apply to foreign labor unions, to foreign chambers of commerce and other areas of possible, potential penetration, and again, I think it comes back to the basic question of what kind of covert political action by the CIA are we willing to tolerate, and I am not sure that you can wholly separate all of the parts of this larger political operation of the CIA.

Mr. FROMM. I think that is basically true. If you accept the need for a clandestine espionage service, this kind of restriction is impractical because it gets to be open ended or potentially open ended.

Mr. WILSON. Now, is it fair to say that as a result of your statements here today, that you feel on the question of feedback from such plants in foreign press, that it is like any other information, it needs to be checked, that really the danger of it coming back and influencing us as citizens of the United States is really not very great? I have gotten that impression, that you feel that any stories that appear that are disinformation that have perhaps been instigated by us still are subject to be reviewed and double checked and so forth, and so they are like any other source of information.

Mr. SZULC. Certainly, you know, planted by the CIA or the KGB for that matter, or whoever.

May I just add one point that comes to mind? In dealing with foreign journalists, particularly in Third World countries, journalists are not always full-time journalists. They are often lawyers, government employees, government officials.

Mr. JUST. Politicians.

Mr. SZULC. Politicians, and this again, this whole picture becomes blurred even more. By tasking or targeting a journalist in Nigeria, is the CIA really tasking a full time journalist, or is it also tasking in the same person an employee of the Ministry of Information, which is often the case, or a member of a political party, or someone close to the local president?

If one were to issue guidelines on foreign newsmen, again, what is the definition, you know? When do you prevent collection of intelligence or political action altogether, and I don't know the answer to this, but I think it is a point to be taken into consideration.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ASPIN. We have kept you here for a long time; but why don't we just get one other item before we quit, and that is the matter of remedies. We have talked about the Turner directive and I guess the summary is that it is better than nothing, but don't count on it to do very much.

What might we count on to do something? Is there anything that might be done in the way of setting out the proper relationships. Perhaps let me suggest some other alternatives, such as having each individual media outlet establishing its own rules and guidelines regarding the activities on the charts. Would that best be established by a professional association of one kind or another, establishing what the right guidelines are? Is there any role in this thing to be played by groups other than the CIA, which is the current place where the rules are emanating from right now, or the Congress? Of course, if the Congress gets in the business of passing a law, we have got a lot of problems with the Constitution and the first amendment.

Does anything come to your mind about remedies that we might further pursue with other organizations or other forums?

Mr. NICKEL. Well, if I may say so—and Joe, I think you probably have your views on this, too, since we have both spent a good deal

of time in Britain—I am not sure that the experience of the Press Council in Britain, which is a professional body which lays down certain rules, including such things as D notices on subjects which are supposed to be taboo for the press when the word is slipped from Whitehall that something shouldn't be printed is all that reassuring. The experience with that, I think, does not really seem very promising for us in the United States, and I have my doubts whether professional associations can or should undertake that job—in fact, I can't really think of one that would serve that purpose without really having to be created.

The proper way of dealing with it, I really think it is up to every individual newspaper, publication and television network, and in the ultimate analysis, the individual reporter. They must draw the line, and I can't really see that edicts of any kind are going to be very effective. Everybody has to live with his own conscience on that point.

Mr. FROMM. I agree with that very strongly. I think that we are in an area here of the independence of the press. I think the news publication and journalist has to observe ethical standards as they define them. If you had rules, if you had association policies, they would not be effective if somebody wanted to violate them, and particularly in this area.

We saw in an earlier period, during the depth of the cold war, that this sort of thing seemed to be quite acceptable. Some of the most respected publications in this country did not feel it was wrong or unethical. Indeed, they thought that they were rendering a patriotic service by cooperating with the CIA.

Times have changed and morals and standards have changed. I think it would be a bad mistake to attempt to set up rules because I just don't think it would work.

Mr. SZULC. I think Joe and Herman are quite right. We would bog down in codes of ethics of journalists, which have been attempted in the past, which lead absolutely nowhere. I can't even visualize the journalistic equivalent of the Ethics Committee of the American Bar Association, for example. I don't know if you have ever attended a meeting of journalists. If you had you would see that they are unable to agree on any point, on any subject among themselves. So I am not sure the remedy would lie there.

It does occur to me, and I am not sure I know the legislative answer, when the White House produces the different charters which I understand are in the works, whether such things as this directive in this form or similar form might not be incorporated in the new legislation, the new National Security Act or the new charters.

Beyond this, I think we would have to fall back on what Joe said, which is the professional integrity and responsibility of any hard-working journalist who does not depend on phone calls at midnight and on handouts.

Mr. ASPIN. Ward?

Mr. JUST. I am for anything that would put a writer to work. The more lines the better. You know, I agree, no councils, guidelines, protocol statements. That isn't it. It really resides with the journalist.

Mr. FROMM. What you find in the professional associations that do exist abroad is that legitimate journalists are very jealous about preserving the integrity of the profession. And on the rare occasions in Tokyo, Rome or London, when we found a journalist violating these ethics, we felt that in terms of our own self-preservation, we should take action against them.

Mr. ASPIN. Is there anything else anybody would like to say that they haven't had a chance to?

We appreciate it very much.

Mr. Chairman?

Mr. BOLAND. I take it from listening to you, particularly your last comments, that you would prefer to have guidelines, regulations, and directives rather than laws which are embedded in legislative concrete.

Is that fair?

MR. JUST. That's right, and no legislation.

Mr. BOLAND. That will make our task easier.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you all very much for coming. We really appreciate it.

[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the subcommittee recessed subject to the call of the Chair.]

THE CIA AND THE MEDIA

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 29, 1977

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF THE
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:07 a.m. in room 2322, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Les Aspin (chairman of the subcommittee), presiding.

Present: Representatives Aspin (presiding), Boland (chairman of the full committee), and Wilson.

Also present: Thomas K. Latimer, staff director; Loch Johnson, professional staff member and William Funk, professional staff member.

Mr. ASPIN. We open the hearings today with a little different perspective on the problem than the ones we have had so far. So far the witnesses on this important topic of the relationships between the media and the CIA have been, on the first day, witnesses from the CIA and, on the second day, was from the media. And both of those groups gave us opinions of the relationship and how they viewed the CIA, but in particular, in regard to the foreign aspect of the question. We thought it would be very useful also to have some people come give us a different perspective, not a self-interest perspective. In other words, individuals who weren't looking at it from the standpoint of the CIA or the journalist profession; but looking at it from a little more objective standpoint, and at the same time a very knowledgeable standpoint. We are very happy that all of you have been able to come and to help us out.

The witnesses this morning, just to give some background, include Ambassador L. Dean Brown who joined the Foreign Service in 1946 and has served in Africa, Canada, Western Europe, and the Middle East. He was U.S. Ambassador to Senegal, Gambia, and Jordan, and presently Ambassador Brown is the director of the Middle East Institute here in Washington.

Ambassador William Porter began his diplomatic career in 1936 as a private secretary to the American minister in Hungary. He was subsequently posted in the Foreign Service to Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Jerusalem, Cyprus, and Morocco, and with the rank of Ambassador to Algeria, Vietnam, Korea the Paris talks on Viet-Nam, Canada, and most recently Saudi Arabia. Mr. Porter also served as Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs.

Ambassador William Trueheart joined the State Department in 1949 as an intelligence analyst and, as a Foreign Service officer, subsequently served in Paris, Ankara, London, Saigon, and as Ambassador to Nigeria. Most recently, Ambassador Trueheart was a

consultant to the Church committee during its inquiry into the American intelligence community.

Gentlemen, we welcome all of you here and are very happy to have you.

Ambassador Trueheart, I understand, has an opening statement. Perhaps we could begin with that, and then if the others may give a short statement or not. We can proceed as you wish.

Go ahead.

Ambassador TRUEHEART. You would like me to read it.

Mr. ASPIN. Yes, please, sir.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR WILLIAM C. TRUEHEART

Ambassador TRUEHEART. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the invitation to participate in these hearings on CIA and the press. It is an important subject and one which I believe has not been closely examined previously, at least in public hearings. It is also a complex subject which does not, in my opinion, lend itself to simple solutions.

There are two main ways in which CIA uses or may use the press, by which I mean to refer to the media generally: magazines, books, radio and television, as well as newspapers. One way is in the collection of intelligence, by using newsmen either directly as agents and agent handlers, or indirectly in operational support of espionage carried out by others. The other way is in the covert dissemination of information and opinion designed to further U.S. objectives, that is, dissemination of such material with its U.S. origin concealed or disguised. This last is a form of covert political action, perhaps the most widely employed form, and some would say the most innocuous.

I would also make a distinction between the American press and the foreign press. It is by no means clear—it is not clear to me, at any rate, that the rules applied to CIA relationships with American media, whether at home or abroad, should also apply to CIA relationships with foreign media. For the American media, it seems to me that on balance the sound policy is that there should be no relationship with CIA or other intelligence organizations, except insofar as the American newsman like any citizen wishes to volunteer information or, of course, to treat these organizations as news subjects. Such a policy would no doubt entail some sacrifice for the CIA. The American newsman could be particularly helpful in intelligence work. He is in the information collection business himself and thus has a sort of built-in cover. He often has access to persons, places and events which are not open to the ordinary citizen or foreign diplomat without arousing suspicion. He has good communications. But these advantages are more than offset, in my judgment, by the consideration that the use of American newsmen in espionage operations or covert political action undermines the credibility of American reporters generally and the institutions they represent. Given the role the press plays in our system of government, that is a price I would not be prepared to pay.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to add a bit here if I could at this point because comments I have seen in the last—since these hearings started—lead me to believe that there is less than uni-

form understanding of this point of the role the press plays in our system of government.

I see for instance that yesterday you were told that no matter what sort of prohibitions might be put on relations between the press and CIA, foreign governments would never believe that American newsmen were not at least on occasion employed by U.S. intelligence, and last night I heard a commentator on television deploring the fact that at the present time the American public tends to regard any relationship between the press and the U.S. Government as somehow dirtying the hands of the press.

It seems to me that both these comments missed the point. As I see it, the press, of course, is in the business of informing us, but its constitutional role or quasi-constitutional role is really an adversary relationship. Its business is to make sure, in effect, that all parts of the Government, the executive, legislative and judicial branches are doing their job, or seem to be doing their job, and the press can't carry out this sort of quasi-constitutional role unless it is truly independent, and it can't be independent if it is, in effect, in the employ of the Government.

So it isn't a question of dirtying—the press dirtying its hands at all. It is a question of serving two masters. Still less is it any question of whether foreign governments believe or not that the press is independent of U.S. intelligence.

But to continue, when it comes to the foreign press, my view is quite different. I would not favor putting specific limitations on CIA relationships with foreign media when the object is the collection of intelligence, as opposed to political action. I see no more reason for putting foreign newsmen off limits than foreign lawyers, foreign doctors, foreign bankers or foreign government officials. Each of those groups would have its special uses in clandestine intelligence collection, each would pose special risks in the event of exposure, but none of them is sacrosanct. It is the responsibility of the governments and professional groups concerned to defend themselves against foreign intelligence penetration and manipulation. We can hardly require that the U.S. Agency charged by statute with the conduct of espionage safeguard its natural targets. The foreign press is among the latter, but it is neither the most important nor the most sensitive target in terms of U.S. foreign relations.

Let me say in passing that I am quite conscious of applying a double standard in this matter. I would justify doing so partly because I believe that in very few foreign countries does the press play the quasi-constitutional role that it does in the United States. But my basic argument would be that the double standard flows directly from the National Security Act of 1947. It has been accepted for 30 years now that that act authorizes CIA to conduct espionage abroad. Espionage involves violating the laws of foreign countries. On the other hand, we do not authorize anyone or any agency to violate U.S. laws. That is the basic double standard.

I turn lastly to the CIA use of foreign media in political action operations, especially the covert use of foreign newsmen and news organizations to disseminate information in support of U.S. policies and objectives. I find it much more difficult to make recommendations in this area, indeed, to make up my own mind.

To start with the negative, the first objection usually raised to these operations is that of fallout. The information planted abroad, which may be true or false or slanted, may find its way back into the American media, thus influencing American opinion in unintended ways. I see no practical means of preventing such fallout. It is regrettable. However, given the ocean of information and misinformation, some of it the product of foreign intelligence agencies, which steadily washes over the American public, I find it hard to believe that this particular contaminant is significant.

A more serious question in my mind is whether these operations have a significant impact on the foreign audiences they are intended to influence. As the recent series of articles in the New York Times brings out, a lot of this sort of thing goes on, or used to: planting articles and editorials without attribution in publications to which the CIA has special access. I suppose it is impossible to measure the impact of such activities objectively, but I do not personally recall any that were remarkably effective, if one excludes such massive special operations as Radio Free Europe. On the other hand, the exposure of such involvements has on occasion been an embarrassment in our foreign relations and the overall effect on our national reputation may be significant.

But perhaps the most serious problem about these activities is that they are not susceptible to the sort of high level review and supervision which should be accorded covert action operations. During the Senate select committee investigation of 1975-76, it is my recollection that, apart from the matter of assassinations, there was no major question on which distinguished witnesses and committee members were closer to unanimity, that is, covert action should be undertaken only when absolutely essential to the national security and after top level review, perhaps even Presidential approval. The type of operations I am talking about very rarely if ever meet such standards of essentiality, and they are too numerous, or once were, and not sufficiently sensitive in most cases to be examined individually at top levels in the State Department, much less at the NSC level or the congressional oversight committees. Finally, these activities tend to develop a life and momentum of their own. It takes a corps of resourceful and talented people to prepare good substantive material, and there is the usual bureaucratic pressure to get the material in circulation once it is prepared.

Taking all this into account, I have reluctantly concluded that the game is not worth the candle, especially when one considers that USIA and the Voice of America are working by overt means at most of the same objectives, as are also the ambassadors and their political staffs. Nevertheless, it is a close decision and one that I do not feel completely comfortable with. I believe that if you were to check our embassies around the world, you would find more than a few cases where overt approaches are not effective and where press output is pretty uniformly adverse to the United States and its objectives. In such cases the capability of placing offsetting material covertly may seem very attractive, especially to the ambassador on the spot. I am also well aware that our adversaries have no compunction about using the media against us and by covert means if necessary, so that I am in effect advocating a

unilateral withdrawal. However, this is the only course which seems to me consistent with a policy of limiting covert action operations to those truly essential to the national security. By the same token, I would not, of course, rule out the use of the foreign press in a covert operation that could meet that strict standard.

To sum up, I believe that there should be a strict arm's-length relationship between CIA, and other intelligence agencies, and the American press. I would favor a statutory ban on operational use of American media for clandestine intelligence or covert action purposes.

I would not recommend any special restrictions on use of the foreign press for intelligence purposes.

I believe that the use of foreign media in the covert dissemination of information and opinion should meet the same requirements for essentiality to national security as other types of covert action and should be subject to the same procedures for review and approval. Such a rule would drastically reduce though not necessarily eliminate such operations.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you, Ambassador Trueheart. I think that is a very, very thoughtful and very important statement, and I thank you very much.

Would either of the other two gentlemen like to comment before we begin the questioning which I think will go over in more detail the points raised by Ambassador Trueheart, because I think he has raised all of them.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR L. DEAN BROWN, DIRECTOR, MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Ambassador BROWN. What I would like to do, I will disagree with some of the points that Bill has raised here, but I would like to take one in the beginning, and that is as he mentioned in summary, the arm's length between the press and the CIA.

Mr. ASPIN. Surely.

Ambassador BROWN. In my field experience in recent years, I have found it is more the press that woos the CIA than the CIA that woos the press. It seems almost automatic as a journalist comes into a small country that he asks to see first the ambassador and second the station chief. I have a feeling that no matter what you do in trying to create an arm's-length relationship, that this will maintain itself, the desire to see first the man at the top and then the man with the theoretical information of what is going on, and I am not sure that in any way you can either legislate or proscribe an arm's-length relationship of the type that Bill has talked about.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR WILLIAM PORTER

Ambassador PORTER. I agree in general more with Ambassador Brown's remarks than with my other good friend, Bill Truehart's. I am convinced of the importance of CIA to this country, a strong CIA, but not a hamstrung CIA. I returned home after 40 years of working abroad alongside our own Agency and of observing those of other countries. I am absolutely against putting CIA at any disadvantage in dealing with any group on Earth as compared to

foreign agencies who carry out the same type of work for their governments.

There are, of course, some requirements. CIA should operate within the laws of our country, and in dealing with Americans, they should function, they and those with whom they deal, should function on a voluntary basis. That is necessary. It is line with our system and way of life, our laws, and I am particularly adverse to separating or pushing apart the CIA and our national press by regulations for the simple reason that would leave the field here to foreign intelligence agencies. Everybody knows what a great recruiting ground for such activities, shall we say, Washington is in particular, as well as other great cities where important newspapers are published in the United States.

Why should we keep our own press at arm's length, or own media I should say more properly, while foreigners have complete access to them, on any basis, paid or otherwise, voluntary or otherwise? It doesn't make sense. I came home to find that we are not only reducing CIA, but keeping them at arm's length away from their natural adversaries, the U.S. media, who are also their collaborators at times. In addition, we are destroying their cover in that there are so many U.S. national governmental agencies which are permitted to refuse them cover within USG organizations. I think that is dead wrong.

If you are going to be—if you are going to do things, you might as well do them right. If you don't want an intelligence set-up, and a good one, then do these things. But you can't have it both ways, and I think that this world, being the place it is today politically speaking, ideologically speaking, we should untie their hands, not bind them. There must be of course, proper supervision to insure that they remain within our laws as far as dealings with Americans are concerned. That they have proper supervision is of utmost importance.

That is all I have right now.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you.

Mr. Boland?

Mr. BOLAND. There is a pretty marked difference there, I would say.

All of you have long and brilliant experience in the service of the Government, and I think you would recognize these problems perhaps better than a lot of us who have not dealt on this particular level in foreign countries, and your opinions, of course, ought to be considered.

I am not sure, though, Ambassador Porter, that the cover was instituted for the benefit of the reporter. It would occur to me that the cover was instituted for the benefit of the CIA. The problem that arises is whether or not a reporter who is nonofficial cover, that is, really working covertly and perhaps being paid, perhaps being under contract, is in the kind of relationship that really prostitutes his reporting to his own organization, and, really, whether or not it might prostitute some of the reports which he might give to our own people in CIA.

So that gives us some pause to reflect, I think, on what is the purpose of the press in a foreign nation. What is it there to do, really? The reporter, the journalist: where is his obligation?

Let me ask all of you, what is his first obligation? To whom? Is it to his government, or is it to the news organization that he represents?

Ambassador PORTER. I, of course, take the position that it is to his government, no question about it, as far as Americans are concerned, in matters of national interest. Now, I don't say that he alone should decide. I believe there should be—the question of supervision, to me, is all important. I don't assume that CIA, let's say, puts a foreign reporter on the payroll for planting disinformation or misinformation, or for other purposes, without that step having been approved at a level well above the station chief level.

That is the important aspect. Where I have found fault with CIA in the past is that there was never or at times there seemed never to be a clear directive or a clearance from on high. Too much was left in the way of important tactics, if you like, in the hands of the man operating locally. If the ambassador knew about it, he could help out, have some say in it. But very frequently, in many cases, ambassadors with political backgrounds were not informed. But supervision is the key to it all.

Mr. BOLAND. It would seem to me the directives that have been flowing from CIA, the one from Director Bush and now the one which is implemented on November 30 by Admiral Turner, really are in the interests of the CIA itself. It bars, of course, any paid or contractual covert operations by reporters. I am not sure you are dealing with them at arm's length anyhow; the reporters may act voluntarily to indicate to the Station Chief or the Ambassador, or whomever he might be dealing with, information which he believes might be essential to the national security. I don't know that there are very many who would agree with you, Ambassador Porter, and I don't know that there are many reporters who would agree with you, that the first obligation is to his country. I think the vast majority of the indications that we have gleaned over the last couple of days, and also reading the rather lengthy and I think rather good series in the New York Times, the 25th, 26th, and 27th of December, suggest there is pretty clear indication those in the press who have been contacted believe their first responsibility is to the news organization. I think, though, many of them would agree that a specific item which really impinges upon the security of the United States or his government would be different. I think perhaps as a citizen most reporters would perhaps inform the proper authorities.

Let me ask you, Ambassador Trueheart and Ambassador Brown, what is your opinion of where the obligation is? Is the first responsibility to the news organization, to their bosses, to their editors, or is it to the Government?

Ambassador BROWN. Let me try that. I am not sure that it is exactly to the bosses. Perhaps it is in line with what Ambassador Trueheart was saying. Perhaps it is to the general responsibility of journalism; that is to say, the responsibility is as a journalist, not an employee of X organization to report things as honestly as possible. Let's say that is the responsibility.

I think there is a responsibility to the Government, but perhaps not in the same narrow sense that Ambassador Porter has phrased it. I would like to differentiate, as you have done in your state-

ment, between voluntary supplying of information and paid information. I think probably the time has come where we have to be more selective in the type of agents that are paid by the CIA, that have to do with the press, and so what I really come down to is a responsibility of a human being toward his profession with another responsibility toward his own government as a citizen. If he feels that something of national interest is concerned, that he should make that known some how, he doesn't have to make it known through the CIA. He can make it known many other ways, many overt ways, and there are very few people who travel abroad, prominent journalists, who do not come back to the State Department, for instance, and say hey, this is what is going on. What do you think? And have an exchange of ideas. I think this is a useful thing. I think this is a function of an observing American abroad, to carry out, in essence, make his contribution to what he thinks is the national security of the United States.

Mr. BOLAND. Bill?

Ambassador TRUEHEART. Well, I think it is clear from my statement that I think the responsibility is to the organization. That certainly doesn't mean that he is unpatriotic, but his working responsibility is to his organization and not to the Government because as I tried to explain in my view that would be quite inconsistent with his constitutional role of the press that he should in some way be responsible to the Government. He is an adversary of the Government, and that is why we have the first amendment, it seems to me.

In any case, I would like to say one other thing about this arm's-length term which I introduced and I am sort of sorry I did because I am not sure we all mean the same thing by it.

I don't mean that a newsman should not volunteer information to the Embassy or the CIA or anybody else he wants to, and I said that, but I don't consider that in conflict with an arm's-length relationship, but any sort of paid relationship, or taking assignment for the CIA without pay would not be arm's length, and I would not agree that that should be permitted.

Mr. WILSON. Do you think across the luncheon table would be arm's length enough?

Ambassador TRUEHEART. Sure. I don't see why they shouldn't meet and have a discussion, nor do I see any reason why he shouldn't try, and I think I—well, also, I see no reason why a newsman shouldn't try to get any information he can out of the CIA people with whom he comes in contact.

Mr. WILSON. And vice versa.

Ambassador TRUEHEART. And vice versa, but it is a ticklish one, as I think some of your witnesses yesterday brought out. The only other thing I would say is, I know people don't always feel this way and I have a vivid recollection many years ago in Vietnam of a senior military official meeting with a lot of people, including the press, and getting some rather tough questions from one of the reporters, and his response was, why don't you get on the team. Well, I think this is just exactly what the press is not supposed to do at home or abroad, get on the team.

Mr. BOLAND. I agree with you, and I think the position you take is one the press would agree with. The press is sort of an adver-

sary. Someone once said that the press is the countervailing force built into our Constitution against all other forces, and I think that is probably true. Failure to recognize that particular responsibility does weaken the Government, at least in my judgment. But I don't know that the contacts which our Foreign Service officers or the Station Chief or the CIA may have with journalists in foreign countries necessarily have to be on a paid basis. I am sure they should not be. That is my judgment now. But I see no objection to the voluntary association. I am not sure that I agree with all of the prohibitions that might be placed against them, and I am not really sure how I feel totally with respect to the latest directive by Admiral Turner. That is why it is good to get the opinion of those who have been working with Station Chiefs and with the press and have good knowledge. Do you have any knowledge of any reporters in your particular areas who were paid or under contract with the CIA?

I am not going to ask you who they are; but do you have of your own knowledge that there are particular reporters who were working covertly for the CIA and at the same time representing their news organization? I refer to accredited reporters and accredited journalists.

Ambassador PORTER. American of foreign?

Mr. BOLAND. American.

Ambassador BROWN. Not in recent years. They may have more experience.

Ambassador TRUEHEART. I don't have one.

Mr. BOLAND. And would the climate of the times make any difference with respect to your statements here? Some periods in history are much more difficult to live through, some are much more dangerous; some are not.

Would it make any difference in what particular climate we might be going through as to what our relationships with the press might be? Or should we really lock into legislative marble some law which deals with the relationship between the press and the journalists?

Ambassador PORTER. I would say laws are not desirable for that purpose. I emphasized in my short first statement that I look at the whole matter of CIA and the American media as one that must be based on voluntary cooperation. Laws don't fit this situation, even regulations. I have doubts, real doubts that recently announced regulations will hold. There is too much interchange already and it is on the increase rather than the decrease, regardless of what may be said this week or next week. There is no way really of controlling it.

I would like to make a point about paid agents, and in that connection perhaps also mention the fact that when I said that man's first duty is to his government, I obviously believe that he should not be expected to report every minor detail of every happening that occurs that he becomes aware of. Obviously common-sense has to enter the picture.

In terms of payment, there is very definitely an obligation by an agent, say in a newspaper, to his employer. I think he is bound by, perhaps, his employer's regulations as well as by conscience, to disclose that he has another relationship, but these situations are

so variable, so unpredictable in their nature that I come back to my basic tenet which is that as a great Nation, we simply can't afford to put our major intelligence, civilian intelligence organization at a disadvantage, and I think that some of the things that have been said here would do that.

Mr. BOLAND. All of you have served in some of the tinderboxes of the world, looking at your backgrounds. In some very difficult areas where there have been some very difficult problems, where war or revolutions could break out at any moment during the periods in which all of you served in those particular areas.

Would the elimination of the kind of covert activity or barring the kind of covert activity that would be barred under Turner's directive, have really seriously impaired our ability to do the job of getting intelligence in the areas you served in during those difficult periods?

Ambassador PORTER. Yes.

Mr. BOLAND. Would a voluntary association with the press be all that was necessary in those areas during those periods?

Ambassador PORTER. Yes; that is my view.

Ambassador BROWN. Yes. I was interested in your question of time phases, when you asked me about relationship to CIA and press. I said in recent years because I think we have to go back. Ambassador Trueheart and I served in Western Europe 20 years ago where there was an entirely different atmosphere, where the U.S. Government was not only deeply involved in foreign governments in Western Europe, it was actually subsidizing newspapers, subsidizing labor unions, subsidizing political parties for a good reason at that time, a time of great political stress and turmoil in Western Europe, and I think when we look back at that period, it was a success for American policy. Somehow I think we were right, what we were doing then, as to providing that little bit of subsidy needed to give the free world forces a chance to organize themselves, given the enormous amounts of money that were flooding in from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to do just the opposite.

Now, I can foresee that happening again. I can see a time of economic stress in the world where some of our major allies and partners start to falter, and I would think we would want to make sure that whatever we do, we don't tie our hands completely, so that we can, with proper consultation—this is what I would hope one of the results of all these hearings will be is a better consultation with the Congress, a better understanding, and a greater demand on the part of the country to be informed on what is proposed, what the risks are, and what the benefits, all of that, yes, but be very careful to make sure that we don't get ourselves in a position where we might be powerless.

Now, I don't think that really the problem we are addressing today has a major part in that, that is to say, the relationship with the CIA and the American press. I don't think that is the important part there. But it shows that there is to be a pattern of fettering of activities, of limiting of access, and I can just see someday a hearing going on here with the American Bankers Association which says they really should not be allowed to have a relationship with bankers, American bankers, or any American firms abroad, because that, once again, is a divided loyalty on the

part of that person. That person should not be reporting to the CIA and also to whatever company he represents abroad, and I am not sure how far we want to get along that path in tying down the Agency's hands.

Ambassador TRUEHEART. I don't think I have anything in particular.

I wanted to answer your specific question, I don't know of any place where I served where in fact there was a relationship between the CIA and the American press, which is what I guess is the question. If it was, it wasn't very effective in making the press cooperate.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Wilson?

Mr. WILSON. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Trueheart, you mentioned in your statement that during the hearings of the last couple of years by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, that it was certainly a unanimous feeling by committee members and the witnesses that covert action should be undertaken only when absolutely essential to national security and after top level review, perhaps even Presidential approval.

In other words, are you saying that the Central Intelligence Agency should not conduct any covert activities in foreign countries unless they are absolutely essential to national security, even if they involve such important things as our stated foreign policies, for example, with regard to the Middle East, with regard to human rights, with regard to other things that are not really national security matters but they are vital to our way of life as opposed to the way of life of the country involved, and is there such a policy that you know in effect today?

Ambassador TRUEHEART. Well, Mr. Wilson, I am speaking about covert political action, not collection of intelligence.

Mr. WILSON. Well, you didn't say that.

Ambassador TRUEHEART. Well, I think I did. That is what I meant, in any case, and I meant to—it is in this section where I am talking about covert political action, not the collection of intelligence, where I say I don't recommend any restrictions on CIA use of the press in collection of intelligence.

Mr. WILSON. Well, I don't mean just use of the press. you said the feeling was in the select committee—and I am reading your words on page 144, you say:

During the Senate select committee investigation of 1975-76, it is my recollection that, apart from the matter of assassinations, there was no major question on which distinguished witnesses and committee members were closer to unanimity: covert action should be undertaken only when absolutely essential to the national security and after top level review, perhaps even Presidential approval.

Are you putting proscriptions on the CIA to only matters involving direct national security endangerment?

Ambassador TRUEHEART. Mr. Wilson, as I say, I am saying covert political action, and this is, as a matter of fact, I think the law, the name of which has gone out of my head, actually proscribes this. So, it is not—it is nothing particularly new. The Congress has already passed a law on this, isn't this right?

Mr. JOHNSON. The Hughes-Ryan Act.

Ambassador TRUEHEART. The Hughes-Ryan Act actually proscribes this, so I didn't think I was advancing anything new here.

Mr. WILSON. Well, I would like to know whether you feel that is unduly restrictive.

Ambassador TRUEHEART. I do not, sir. If I may make a general comment here, I realize, if you go back to the 1950's, you will find some cases, very persuasive, for this sort of action, but it is my personal judgment that over the years these covert political actions abroad have caused, on balance, a lot more damage to the United States than benefits for us.

Mr. WILSON. I would like to ask the other ambassadors.

Ambassador PORTER, do you have any examples where clandestine, covert political action has been beneficial to the national interest in any other countries that you are familiar with?

Ambassador PORTER. It depends on what range you want to cover, Mr. Wilson. Covert political action, does that mean a constant influence exercised over a person in a political position? Is that covert?

Mr. WILSON. I would think so.

Ambassador PORTER. My feeling has been that that sort of activity has been very beneficial in terms of influencing people or at least being able to explain to them our point of view, where we found it difficult, perhaps, because of public posturing on the part of, say, a cabinet minister who had to take a stand, a more militant stand against U.S. interests than he really felt was desirable, to make possible, to make it possible for him to understand all the factors at play as we saw them. We had other channels which we maintained to those people and which we found beneficial in the sense that we were certain that he had the whole picture.

Now, that is covert, not my going down or some officer of the Embassy going down to explain things, as we always did, to people who were hostile or semihostile in the foreign office.

So covert action, sir, takes many paths, and it depends on—I would have to know the precise type of involvement in each case before I can give you—and probably in each case I would give you a somewhat different answer.

Mr. WILSON. I appreciate that.

Ambassador Brown?

Ambassador BROWN. Well, I think there would be a lot more dead ambassadors if we hadn't taken some covert actions with some terrorist groups, without trying to be too specific.

Ambassador PORTER. Where we were not permitted to take covert action or use covert action through the CIA, sir, we had some dead ambassadors as a result, just to mention our own tribe.

Mr. WILSON. Well, I wonder if we might have our counsel explain the technical wording of Hughes-Ryan where it limits all covert activity in foreign operations.

Do we have a copy?

Mr. ASPIN. We must have the language here somewhere.¹

Mr. BOLAND. Our Counsel is in Ohio.

Maybe Loch can.

¹See appendix I, p. 371.

Mr. WILSON. I think we need to review this whole operation if in truth, as Ambassador Trueheart has said, his understanding that the law specifically prohibits any kind of covert action by the Agency—

Ambassador TRUEHEART. Oh, no, sir, only that it has to be approved in certain ways at certain levels.

Ambassador PORTER. Well, there I agree.

Ambassador TRUEHEART. I am not saying that it shouldn't take place. I have clearly said that in my statement.

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Wilson, the Hughes-Ryan amendment requires that the CIA, before undertaking a covert action, get a special finding from the White House, and then that must be reported to the Congress.

Mr. WILSON. OK, I understand that part of it, but some of those special findings are not dealing with national security, they are dealing with other matters that were obviously from a foreign policy interest, and I was a little concerned that not you but perhaps the Senate has decided that all covert action should be under what I would think too great a restraint as far as activities by the chiefs of station and the ambassadors in their various activities.

I would like to ask all of you your appraisal of the effectiveness of the CIA in the periods that you have been engaged in as ambassadors and in Foreign Service, our effectiveness of our Central Intelligence activities in that country as opposed to other similar activities in other countries in that same area.

Ambassador PORTER. Well, sir, if I may say something to that on that, generally speaking, our—

Mr. WILSON. How would you rate CIA?

Ambassador PORTER. Our CIA, I would say, is more effective, or has been more effective along more lines, in more areas than those of other Western countries. We have perhaps more talent at our disposal. We don't pretend that we know all of the answers, and there may be specialists, for example, in the other services, foreign intelligence services may have specialists who are unequaled on our side, but generally speaking, in my experience, CIA has been a very effective organization, and in a wide variety of countries.

Ambassador BROWN. I would agree with that. I think it is probably one of the best of the intelligence agencies. Perhaps its problem is that it has a vacuum cleaner approach.

Mr. WILSON. A vacuum cleaner approach?

Ambassador BROWN. That is, it tends to absorb an awful lot of material.

Ambassador PORTER. That's what the analysts are for. That is what they have got hordes of them back here for. They are supposed to pick through it, and they don't provide the analysis of a situation in exactly the same way we do if we report something. We almost, automatically, immediately go into an analysis, but they have their people back here to do that, and maybe that is better, so they can be vacuum cleaners.

Mr. WILSON. It is almost like the raw files of the FBI, a lot of extraneous and doubtful information, I suppose.

Ambassador Trueheart, do you feel the same way?

Ambassador TRUEHEART. Yes; I feel they are extremely effective, and you know, I don't know, I haven't much basis for judgment, I think they probably are the best there is.

Mr. BOLAND. If you would yield for just one question?

Mr. WILSON. Yes.

Mr. BOLAND. In all the areas where we have representation, are the ambassadors aware of who the CIA Station Chief is? They know who he is? That is correct, isn't it?

Ambassador PORTER. Yes, sir.

Mr. BOLAND. And whether or not you actually know who might be working for the CIA or in contact with him on a covert basis, are you aware of the particular personnel that he is dealing with?

Are ambassadors aware of that all of the time?

Ambassador PORTER. Well, in my case, all I insisted on was knowledge of high level contacts in the Government to which I was accredited, and sometimes I put an end to them when I thought they were into areas where they shouldn't be. Certainly I didn't show any interest in who was behind the bush passing something to somebody else. That is way down low, and they have to assume their responsibilities, but keeping the ambassador informed of anything that is of importance going on and of course, aware of the high level contacts——

Mr. BOLAND. But you might not be aware of all of the agents?

Ambassador PORTER. No; I would not, generally not. I could be, but it wouldn't mean anything to me.

Mr. BOLAND. I know the Church committee asked a question, and I will give it to you now, about whether the ambassadors cleared all of the agents who were working with the CIA in your particular area. They do not?

Ambassador BROWN. They do not.

Mr. BOLAND. OK, thank you.

Ambassador BROWN. I think the answer, in a sense, what Bill says, anybody that the ambassador is dealing with substantively, not just socially but substantively, if he is also dealing with the CIA, the ambassador should insist that he should be informed about it because it is a different relationship.

Mr. BOLAND. Yes.

Mr. WILSON. In the chain of command, when you are an ambassador, you are No. 1 in the country, no question, do you have any policy direction of the CIA Chief of Station in that as part of your responsibility?

Ambassador BROWN. If you don't, the first day you are there, you have made a great mistake. You settle it right away.

Mr. WILSON. You are the conduit through which information from the CIA flows?

Ambassador PORTER. Well, it doesn't work quite that way, but back here when CIA sent a directive to the Station Chief the State Department was informed. They generally told us about it. We did not receive direct communications except in very rare instances, from CIA, but we were informed because of liaison here in Washington.

Mr. WILSON. If you felt that a CIA man who was chief of station was not doing his job properly, would you have the right to ask his removal?

Ambassador PORTER. Oh, yes.

Ambassador BROWN. Yes.

Mr. WILSON. So you are in effect numero uno.

Ambassador PORTER. Well, the Senate group, I think Ambassador Trueheart was working on this, reminded me and I didn't know it because the State Department hadn't told me, but there is on the books Public Law 93-475, which cites very precisely the powers of the Ambassador, and I hadn't seen it before because the State Department had simply not sent it out to us. They claimed they had, but no one could produce it.

Mr. WILSON. You had more authority than you knew.

Ambassador PORTER. Much more, and very necessary because President Kennedy's letter was not enough and Mr. Nixon's letter was not enough, but the public law I mentioned was very useful and very necessary.

Mr. WILSON. Do you feel—and this will be my last question, Mr. Chairman—do any of you feel that oftentimes the chief of station doesn't get the word of policy, and things would operate on their own and get involved in covert and other activities, build up his little sphere of influence, his own little project going?

Ambassador PORTER. Well, sir, there were Station Chiefs at times who acted that way, but everything depended on the Ambassador. This is my experience. As soon as you become aware of it, then of course he comes in and you have a little chat.

Mr. WILSON. So you are assuming responsibility for all accusations made against the CIA in foreign activities?

Ambassador PORTER. I have a thick skin and I didn't worry about that.

Ambassador BROWN. May I answer that?

I think what has happened is that there has been a change in operating techniques, modalities, and what-have-you in the last decade in the CIA, that the sort of freewheeling, swinging sort of Station Chiefs of the past have been put more and more under the control of headquarters, and that headquarters has a better relationship with the NSC and the State Department, so there is more knowledge of what is going on. The various safeguards have been built in over time, accepted by recent heads of CIA, I think have eliminated a lot of the fancy footwork we saw a couple of decades ago or a decade ago.

Ambassador TRUEHEART. I think that is the point. It may have been the case that you suggest some years ago, but I haven't heard of anything like that in recent times.

Mr. WILSON. Well, I can recall in 1953 in the Philippines in the elections when Magsaysay was finally elected, that I was informed that the CIA was engaged in such things as infiltrating the local Rotary Clubs, printing up anti-Communist material, distributing it, actively working in the political field to influence the election of Magsaysay, and they did so effectively. I found no objection to that.

Would you find objection to that sort of an operation against a government that is hostile to our way of life?

Ambassador PORTER. No, I wouldn't find it particularly objectionable, provided it had been properly cleared with the Ambassador and people back here. As long as those who need to know have considered the matter carefully, that is the basis for an operation.

Ambassador BROWN. I absolutely agree with that and I would just hope that in the process of asking the questions, that people would ask better questions than I did in the past. We have always had some sort of safeguard, but too often in the intelligence business it has been a log rolling where everybody just accepts everybody else's projects, and it is generally agreed in some sort of an anonymous committee which in the past didn't report to anybody. I hope we have eliminated some of that.

Mr. WILSON. Well, that's why this committee was set up and the other committee in the Senate, to actually have some complete understanding of what the activities are.

Ambassador BROWN. With a political input to it for the national interest, that's right.

Ambassador TRUEHEART. Only one small caveat, Mr. Wilson. If it is a question of a country where you have genuinely democratic elections, I would have some doubts about whether we ought to mix into it, no matter how it is decided back here.

Ambassador BROWN. As a matter of fact, we can't generally do it if it is a democratic country because it usually comes out the wrong way. I remember when I was a special representative in Lebanon, they were having an election and the various candidates came and said would the Americans support me or that? I said, what you want me to do is support your opponent. That is the way to get yourself elected.

Mr. BOLAND. May I ask one question before the chairman gets into the nuts and bolts of it?

Do you have any opinion of whether the CIA is too large, too many people, too many bodies?

Ambassador PORTER. Back here I have the opinion that it is, but that is just a feeling. I feel overwhelmed by the size of the operation and the number of people you traipse around talking to, all of whom appear to have functions, but you know, unless you live in the building, you really can't evaluate.

Overseas, in my case, I had one place where I thought there were too many, and we fixed that.

Ambassador BROWN. I would like to address that because I ran the intelligence part of Op Red, which was the Operation Reduction several years ago where we went into this problem. One of the things that we are finding—and that was brought out in Bill Colby's testimony—as various Government agencies stop providing cover for the CIA, it is basically reduced to the Foreign Service and to the military, and we are getting a disproportionate number of people in certain embassies where we—and since people in embassies tend to get known one way or another as to what they really do, we are leaving an—we are starting to leave an impression that our embassies are basically CIA stations with the Ambassador as a sort of a general service officer supplying them their daily necessities, and this has always bugged me and puzzled me. This is why I would prefer, where from the long-term interests of the U.S. Government, that there be more people in deep cover than people parked in anonymous corners of embassies.

So I am disturbed by it and always have been.

Ambassador TRUEHEART. I really don't feel I can pass judgment on whether they have too many people or not. I don't know how many they have got, frankly. I have doubts on the covert question.

Mr. BOLAND. Well, that's true, but you hear so many stories about how many they have got and what they do, you wonder whether or not idle minds sometimes become the devil's workshop, and whether sometimes that is how we get the kind of operations that develop.

Mr. WILSON. From the letters I am getting, we are obviously having fewer and fewer each day. [General laughter.]

Mr. BOLAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ASPIN. All right. If I could start out with a question that Ambassador Trueheart addressed in his opening statement, and perhaps you could address it again, I would like to ask each of you what you think of the Turner directive. Whether you approve of it or disapprove of it. And, second, whether you think it would be useful in terms of convincing people abroad that in fact our journalists are not CIA people. The point made by the journalists yesterday, and indeed, by the CIA—the one thing they agreed on—was that they didn't think this kind of directive is very effective. I would like to ask each of you your opinion.

Ambassador Trueheart, you have already stated yours, but would you restate it, please, if you could?

Ambassador TRUEHEART. Well, as I say, I don't know whether we have convinced anyone or not. I suppose it wouldn't, but I don't, as I said, think that's the point, really, about such a directive.

I read this directive, and I frankly don't think it is quite as categorical as I would like. It refers to—let me get—

Mr. ASPIN. Sure, go ahead. Take your time.

Ambassador TRUEHEART. It is the term in the directive "for the purpose of conducting any intelligence activities." It is a matter of definition. What does that mean? If that does not include covert political action, then that could be my real question, and—if it does, if it is meant to include that, then I think it is probably—

Mr. ASPIN. Then it is all right.

So your question is on the phrase "conducting any intelligence activities" and what that term implies. We will have to ask Admiral Turner.

But it may be a broad term meaning all intelligence activities as defined in the 1947 National Security Act that gives the Agency the opportunity to conduct other intelligence operations as the National Security Council may direct. This is, of course, what they use to justify the conduct of covert operations; so if it is that definition, then it would cover covert political action and you would be happy with it.

Ambassador TRUEHEART. Yes.

Mr. ASPIN. What do you think is the point of the Turner directive, if you could say again? I mean, what does it do if it doesn't allay suspicions abroad that we are using our journalists by the CIA?

Ambassador TRUEHEART. Well, I would like to think, sir, that it is a recognition of the point that I made, that it is inappropriate for journalists to be employed by the Government.

Mr. ASPIN. So essentially it is a domestic point, you are saying, as opposed to a foreign point?

Ambassador TRUEHEART. That is what I would think it is, and I feel pretty sure it never would have been issued if there hadn't been a lot of domestic criticism of it.

Mr. ASPIN. But it would really have an impact on the domestic situation rather than the situation abroad.

Ambassador TRUEHEART. So I would think, yes.

Mr. ASPIN. Would others agree with that?

Ambassador BROWN. I would agree with that. It seems to me that abroad, that the analysis would be, is that the United States has found another way to do it.

Mr. ASPIN. I see.

Ambassador BROWN. Inasmuch as—I can think of very few governments, democratic or not, that don't use their press in intelligence matters to a far greater extent than we do.

Mr. ASPIN. And no matter what we say, they will continue to believe that in some way.

Ambassador BROWN. They would assume that.

Mr. ASPIN. Assume there is a loophole.

Do you agree with that?

Ambassador PORTER. I agree with that.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me then turn to the question of the foreign journalists. Ambassador Trueheart has said in his opening statement that he believes this is a different matter, and that in fact we should not tie our hands by proscribing the use of the foreign press. He would not recommend any restrictions on the use of the foreign press.

I take it that the others are in agreement on that?

Is there any disagreement with that position?

You, Ambassador Trueheart, I must say, make the best case for that any witness has made so far. The point, I guess, is that if you are trying to go after Government officials in those countries and other people, why not journalist? That the dichotomy is not really in itself a double standard; really the double standard is established by the National Security Act of 1974. What one is really talking about is that foreign policy is different from domestic policy.

I take it, though, you would not find it particularly offensive that other countries might try and recruit our journalists or subvert our free press in some way.

Is that a corollary?

Ambassador TRUEHEART. Well, I might find it offensive, but I would expect it.

Ambassador BROWN. I would find them acting in violation of the law, because they would have to register as foreign agents under another act.

Mr. ASPIN. It depends on the country, but we might be violating some law abroad, too.

All of you see that kind of a dichotomy and it doesn't make you uncomfortable in any way?

[Ambassador Porter nods in the negative.]

Mr. ASPIN. Let me ask you about this business of foreign journalists. The difference, really, between foreign journalists and domes-

tic journalist, an importance difference, is that I think the use of domestic journalists, is when we did use them and if we continue to use them on a voluntary basis, is almost exclusively, I gather, for intelligence collection. The use of foreign journalists, however, might be for intelligence collection, but it might also be for this item called propaganda. I wondered if each of you could give me an assessment of how important it is to have foreign journalists in this intelligence collection area.

Let's just talk about the intelligence collection for a second. Leave the propaganda for later discussion. What is the utility?

Ambassador Trueheart, I know, mentioned that he thought that there was a potential embarrassment from trying to recruit some of these people. What is your general assessment of the effectiveness of foreign journalists as in intelligence source in intelligence collection?

Ambassador TRUEHEART. Well, Mr. Chairman, I am not sure I am qualified to give you a good answer on that. I am not and never have been engaged in espionage, and I simply suppose because of the natural activities of newsmen, foreigners, that they do have sort of a built in cover and could be quite useful to intelligence work, clandestine intelligence work, but I don't think they are the best targets of intelligence in the sense that they know the most. The best targets, of course, are people with access to classified information, classified by the foreign government concerned.

Mr. ASPIN. So foreign newsmen as intelligence collectors are one step removed. What you are doing is hiring somebody who perhaps can get the news or can get the information, but you are not hiring somebody who has the information the way you would if you were to recruit, for example, somebody in the Government.

Ambassador TRUEHEART. Or who can be an intermediary in the collection of intelligence, the man who picks up the information from the minister or whatever, but you are really asking me to talk about something I really don't know much about.

Mr. ASPIN. I recognize that.

Ambassador BROWN. But on the other hand, just the overt dealing with foreign journalists I think is very important as a way of collecting very general intelligence. I mean, every embassy I have been in, we have always encouraged our overt officers to meet, deal with and have a two way exchange, you know, you go to the United States as well, with journalists, with journalists of all kinds. It is a healthy thing. It is part of the duty, in a sense, of providing, of giving that picture of the United States that you want, but I tend to find that foreign journalists often represent a political point of view. What they are going to give you back is slanted from their political point of view. I mean, you don't find in most places in the world independent media, operating independently. They are controlled or they represent a party or a political faith.

So I think you would find them even in the Agency, regarding them from the intelligence point of view as sort of grade C sources.

Mr. WILSON. Did you as Ambassador ever try to cultivate the foreign press as a means of learning about what goes on in the country?

Ambassador BROWN. Yes, yes, of course. I mean, I have always felt that what you should do is give strong support to your USIS

and press people, make sure that the press people of the country understand that they have access to the Ambassador, receive them, see them and not just see them in formal press conferences, but in informal ways. As I say, it is a two-way street. We are trying to get across to them an American point of view, as well.

Mr. ASPIN. And as part of your job as ambassador, naturally you would see the members of the foreign press or the local press on a fairly regular basis, I suppose.

Ambassador BROWN. Constantly.

Mr. ASPIN. Constantly, I suppose.

Ambassador BROWN. Yes.

Mr. ASPIN. Does the CIA tell you which ones of the foreign press are their recruits, their assets, who they have on the payroll?

Ambassador BROWN. The answer is yes and no.

Mr. ASPIN. Shouldn't it be always yes?

I mean, I don't know how you could, as an ambassador, deal with the press, which is one of the things you have to deal with.

Ambassador BROWN. Once again, what I am saying is anybody that I deal with substantively I want to know, and that would include a publisher or editorial writer or a principal journalist.

Now, whether I would want to include that fellow way down the line, I am not sure, but I would certainly want to know if it is somebody I am dealing with in a substantive way, yes.

Ambassador PORTER. Oh, yes.

Mr. ASPIN. Is that just because of the kinds of ambassadors that you are, or is it the usual routine?

Ambassador PORTER. I don't know. For me it is the usual routine.

Ambassador BROWN. I don't know. I am a little hard put on this one. I would say it is not necessarily the usual routine.

Mr. ASPIN. I would guess my interpretation is that it is not the usual routine either.

Ambassador BROWN. That's right. I think an awful lot of people would say I prefer not to know.

Ambassador PORTER. Let's be clear here. I don't expect them to come and volunteer, but if I want to know and I put the question—

Mr. ASPIN. You expect an answer.

Ambassador PORTER. I expect a correct answer.

Mr. ASPIN. If you don't ask, though, you are not going to get it.

Ambassador PORTER. You might not.

Mr. ASPIN. Let us say you are assigned as a new ambassador for us, and you arrive. Unless you have a meeting with the station chief and unless you put the question to him, saying, "Look, I meet on a regular basis with the journalists and the publishers and the editorial writers and the columnists of this country. I want to know which ones you have on your payroll." Unless you make that a question, you are not going to get the information.

Ambassador BROWN. That's right, sir.

Ambassador PORTER. I wanted to go back, if you are ready, sir, to the matter of foreign journalists on the payroll.

May I?

Mr. ASPIN. Yes.

Ambassador PORTER. I have always had trouble in that particular category, trouble because I suspect most of them who are will-

ing to work for us are working for their own intelligence services. Maybe that is doing a lot of people an injustice, but I can't really guess how much time I have spent making sure that when we are going to make a pass at somebody that we know all about him, and it is very difficult to find out because, of course, they provide their agents with as much cover as possible.

So it is a very dicey field to me.

Now, we use it and I can only hope of course, that the answer is to that, when I voice these fears, that we don't tell them anything. To take what they bring is all right, but I can't imagine a conversation without someone asking your views on certain matters, asking your views, especially if they are newspaper people, they are trained to ask question.

Ambassador BROWN. Out in the Middle East you don't buy them, you only rent them, and everybody else rents them, too.

Mr. ASPIN. Do you make suggestions to the Station Chief, or somebody, either to add to the people that you are buying or renting, or to delete? Have you ever, in your experience as ambassadors, come to the Station Chief and said this name we should try to recruit or with this name we should sever connections?

Ambassador BROWN. The latter, frequently.

Mr. ASPIN. The latter, frequently.

What kind of things would worry you?

What are the kinds of things that make you decide, gee, this is something we ought to drop?

Ambassador BROWN. A suspicion that he is probably working for someone else as well, an analysis of the stuff he provides. You realize that it is not worth anything, that why bother, it is not worth anything. Those two categories mostly.

Mr. ASPIN. The same experience generally?

Ambassador TRUEHEART. I would add only that you could have a case that is so sensitive that you feel that even though the information is valuable, the static of an exposure, it isn't worth it, in other words, and I am afraid you don't always recognize that until too late.

Mr. WILSON. What you gentlemen are admitting is that we have a dual standard under this new directive that it is OK for a foreign government to have a covert operator as a newsman trying to get information from the Embassy, but it is not OK for us to have a newsman trying to get information from a foreign official in that country, and that is really the thing that disturbs me about the Admiral Turner directive.

I can agree to the pay part of it, but I think we are just putting restraints that make it sort of an unfair ballgame with rules against us.

Do you feel that way?

Ambassador PORTER. I feel it is inhibiting.

Ambassador TRUEHEART. As I say, I feel we are sacrificing to some extent by not using a newman in that way, but I think that the offsetting point is overriding, namely, the domestic constitutional point.

Ambassador BROWN. I would hope, though, sir, in answer to your question, what we would not get in answer to all this is a drying up of voluntary things, that we would not get a feeling that anybody

in the media who talks to anybody in the intelligence community is at fault somehow. I hope we maintain that ability to communicate, both overtly and covertly. I would hope so.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me just go back to the question about foreign media and ambassadors. Let us say you are now the Ambassador. You have already asked the Station Chief for the list of people who are now paid assets in the foreign press.

What happens now when they recruit somebody during your term? Do they volunteer that or do you have to ask every 6 months for an update list?

Ambassador BROWN. What are you up to, and I think the more you meet with them the more you get this feeling. You want to remember that the Station Chief has to have a feeling of confidence and trust, too. I mean, he hates the feeling that after the Ambassador leaves, 6 months later a book will come out blowing everything, and you know some of the ones I mean, and that leaves him in that position where he is going to deal on an increasing frankness and honesty over a period of time.

Mr. ASPIN. If you have a situation where you sometimes urge the Station Chief to terminate relations or you have to ask to get information when they bring the new recruits in the foreign media, don't you think we ought to have some kind of a system where at least you ought to have a clearance process where they come to you and say, "look, we are thinking of establishing some kind of an asset relationship with these people in the press." In other words, give the ambassador some kind of a veto power or at least require them to listen to his opinion before they go out and recruit them?

Ambassador BROWN. Yes.

Mr. ASPIN. You think that should happen?

It doesn't happen now I take it.

Ambassador PORTER. That falls into the category of no surprises, please. This is one of the early phrases one uses when you arrive at a post, and make them understand that that kind of thing, too, important pickups are brought to your attention.

Ambassador BROWN. I would expand that to any recruiting at a certain level, influencemaking level, not just journalists.

Mr. ASPIN. Not just journalists, but you would think that it ought to apply broadly. I take it right now it doesn't; it is only under the "no-surprises clause," and it is the Station Chief's definition of what is a surprise and what isn't. I mean, you may be surprised at something that he doesn't think you would be surprised by.

Ambassador BROWN. I hope the new directives will include this.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me move from that to the propaganda area, if I might, and again ask some questions about what you all know and don't know as ambassadors.

One of the things that you have foreign media for is to use them for propaganda, for getting the word out, for getting our side of the story out. I guess there are lots of different kinds of things this might include. One is just planting a story, a one-shot story in the press. Another might be a whole series of false stories or, a whole campaign of stories. They may be true or they may not be true, such as the kind of operation on Allende that came out. Another aspect to it might be that you are pushing a slant; some events are

going on but you want somebody to give it a particular slant, and interpret the current events in a certain kind of way. You might call on your assets that you have to do it. And the final thing, I guess, is that you might want to actually get an editorialist or a columnist to write a favorable editorial or column.

I am trying to think of the different kind of propaganda that you might use the assets that you have, and in each of these cases—never mind the distinction between whether it is true or not true—you could use it both for true propaganda and for false propaganda. But I am wondering, in those areas what are you made aware of as ambassadors?

For example, let's suppose the CIA has planted a favorable editorial in the local paper.

Are you, as Ambassador, made aware of that? Do they volunteer the information that when you get your local paper in the morning and read a favorable editorial, does the Station Chief say: "Hey, chief, you know, don't pay a lot of attention to that editorial. That was us who put it in there." Or are you led to believe that here we have some support for this policy. Look, we have a good editorial.

How does it work?

Ambassador PORTER. All right, Bill, do you want to go ahead?

Ambassador TRUEHEART. Well, a couple of things. One, yes, we are told about it, and my guess would be that in most cases the Station Chief would be there first to let you know what he has managed to do, to bring off this coup.

In general, Mr. Aspin, the area of covert action is one where the State Department and the Ambassador has always been much more involved than that of clandestine intelligence collection.

Mr. ASPIN. Agreed, yes.

Ambassador TRUEHEART. And there has never been the feeling in my experience on the part of the CIA that covert action was something to be kept away from the State Department or the Ambassador, so that in general I would think that the Ambassador would be well informed about the kind of operation that you are talking about, and in general, the kinds of lines that are being used would be cleared in advance in Washington by the State Department, not necessarily at the top level, but in general, the practice used to be, at any rate, for—I forget whether it was weekly or monthly—sort of guidelines for this sort of operations were cleared at medium levels in the Department.

Ambassador BROWN. Well, first of all, I have a very suspicious mind. If I were living in a country with a generally hostile press and I saw a favorable editorial I would call the staff and say, who gets the credit for this one? I mean, how did we do it?

But I do agree, what you have is first of all Station Chiefs who want credit. They like to have a good relationship with ambassadors. In most cases they don't want an acrimonious one because they are afraid that it will end up on a piece of paper somewhere reflecting badly on them back in headquarters that they are unable to get along with X, Y, or Z, and if they have got something good that they have been working on and it has come out and it has worked, by God, they are there parked in your office when you come in in the morning to tell you about it.

Mr. ASPIN. So if you get a good story or if you get a good editorial, they would tell you.

Would they come to you with the idea beforehand sometimes and say look, we want to try to put this editorial, we want to get this editorial placed or we want to get the story out? Or we want to do this? I mean, do they come to you for prior clearance?

Ambassador BROWN. In my experience, most of the time yes. As a matter of fact, what my reply would be is let's make sure we have exhausted every other method of doing this before we do anything like that. Let's make sure we are not paying for something that is free. With a lot of patience you can swing things around, and sudden switches like in a sense what you are suggesting, sudden switches may not be very productive because the editorial that reflects very favorably on the United States as a result of a payment is followed usually 2 or 3 days later where somebody else, with some other country's policy. It is an unstable relationship, and I would rather do it in the other way of convincing the public.

Mr. ASPIN. Let's leave aside the effectiveness issue—in a second I would like to get into that. I am just trying to learn the procedures a little bit here. For example, if you are going to conduct a media operation, such as the Allende operation, and there is a whole campaign mapped out, what I am interested in trying to find out and get a feel for is the approval process. In Washington they probably make the approval in a general, kind of broad-brush way. They don't, obviously, approve every editorial, every story; I wondered at what level those get approved. Does the ambassador get into the issue of approving the placement of a story or the placement of an editorial? Does he get involved in the individual placements?

Do they come for prior approval to you and ask you: "Should we place this story, should we place this editorial?"

Ambassador PORTER. Well, I have had it at both ends, as Undersecretary of Political Affairs, I was a member of the 40 Committee, and other bodies which dealt with such problems. On the other hand, of course, as an ambassador, I had to know what was going on in the field.

To take the latter location, you are never worried about the appearance of an editorial in a newspaper where you were aware of an operation, that we were carrying on an operation. You expected it. In fact, you might ask about it if nothing favorable appeared from time to time. It is up to the Station Chief to come and tell you if he is going to take some kind of new line or if he is going to go into a new newspaper.

In the Allende case that you mentioned back here, the 40 Committee voted, and as you say, only on broad-brush items like money to help friendly newspapers and what have you. There was a consensus.

Now, presumably that consensus was communicated to the President through the National Security Assistant, and we heard later that it was approved. There was no actual consultation face to face with the other members. You would do—you have your background, you have your own people to inform you, your own advi-

sors, and that is the way it was handled. But as I said, very broad-brush.

Mr. ASPIN. And then when that broad-brush got transported out to the country, what happened?

Ambassador PORTER. Then the Ambassador—and this is a matter of the ambassador and the Station Chief, first of all, should have been notified if it is an important one. The Ambassador should have been notified by the State Department. In times past—I don't say times present—sometimes they forgot to notify us, and sometimes the Station Chief came in before he got any indication of what was cooking. But nevertheless, he got to know about it. He could query the Department and say why the hell didn't you inform me? Do I have to be told by the Station Chief or something like that, if he wanted to, or he could ignore that and just take it from where it was brought to him.

Then they chat about it and come to some understanding. But in the normal course of things in the field, when we were interested in newspapers, we didn't worry about—I know I didn't worry about seeing every editorial. When it came out it was brought to my attention in the daily summary.

Mr. ASPIN. Wouldn't you want to have a system whereby the Ambassador ought to be informed beforehand, say, of every editorial or of every story? Maybe he turns that over to an assistant; but there ought to be some kind of a procedure, shouldn't there? The Station Chief shouldn't just operate this thing on his own? He has broad-brush authority from Washington, and within the broad-brush he could plant editorials, plant stories, and columns? He has got a lot of latitude, a lot of leeway there as to how he proceeds.

Shouldn't there be a system whereby whatever he does, particularly I am thinking of this foreign media area, the Ambassador should have prior approval?

Ambassador PORTER. Well, the Ambassador or the Ambassador's immediate staff, like the political section, they very often, at least at some of my posts, did get together; or I would say to them get together with so and so and see that, you know, you get the line straight. You know, there might be something funny in it that I want to fix myself, if they thought it important enough to bring to my attention.

Mr. ASPIN. But again I take it from what you are saying and from what I read elsewhere, too, that what we are really talking about is this: If you have a strong ambassador, he can impose himself on the system.

Ambassador PORTER. Well, that is necessary.

Mr. ASPIN. And if you don't have that strong ambassador, who is willing to actually ask these questions and require that he be informed, then in fact the system would run all by itself without the ambassador knowing about it.

Ambassador PORTER. And generate trouble.

Mr. ASPIN. And generate trouble. So there really isn't any system that keeps the Ambassador informed; it requires the Ambassador to make the effort himself.

Ambassador BROWN. Mr. Chairman, I know of ambassadors in the service who see the CIA station once a month.

Mr. ASPIN. Once a month.

Ambassador BROWN. And you know, that won't do it.

Mr. ASPIN. That won't do it.

Ambassador BROWN. I don't know how you peg responsibility on people who pass it, but if there is a mechanism, it should be done, I agree.

Mr. ASPIN. Yes.

Ambassador Trueheart?

Ambassador TRUEHEART. It is my recollection, I don't know what the practice is today, too, but when it comes to covert action operations, including the press sort of things, that the usual thing would be to direct the agency to carry these things out under the general supervision of the Ambassador because here we are dealing with something, he knows what he is talking about. It is not a technical espionage operation. This is the forming of opinion so that it is quite appropriate for him, and he should take a hand in it, and I think that has been the practice. Whether he wants to review each editorial, that is a different matter. That is a question of how he manages things.

Ambassador PORTER. And his confidence in the Station Chief.

Ambassador TRUEHEART. And his confidence in the people under him.

Ambassador PORTER. Well, he is bound by the law to make himself aware of what is going on.

Mr. ASPIN. Who is, the ambassador?

Ambassador PORTER. The ambassador. The public law is very specific, and that is his strength and his wisdom. It came from the Congress, it was signed and passed and everything else. So he has the wherewithal today if he wants to use it.

Mr. ASPIN. Just to follow what Ambassador Trueheart was saying, I think what you are saying is exactly right, and what we have got now, under covert actions, for example, is a very broad-brush. A directive would go out from Washington having gone through the approval process in Washington; but it would be a fairly broad-brush thing, in these kind of media propaganda efforts. Then the question that I am raising is this: Operating under that broad brush, how much latitude does the local station chief have? Apparently, unless we have a strong ambassador, he pretty well does it as he sees fit. He carries out his instructions in the best way that he sees, and if he has a strong ambassador there, then that ambassador also gets into the act and maybe will say, "Look, we want to see this material before it goes out" and "Don't send out this one, OK, send out that one" or whatever. But unless that ambassador is strong there really isn't any supervision, which is perhaps too bad because obviously there can't be detailed instructions from Washington on that matter; and unless the ambassador is strong enough to muscle into the act, it is probably the CIA operating on its own.

Ambassador BROWN. Yes, I think you will find in talking to station chiefs that there is an awful lot more back seat driving in the last 7 or 8 years than there ever was before, and that they are back and forth, constantly in communication on the minutia of things as well because the people in Washington don't want to be caught short. So there is more of that.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me just ask, then, to go on to the whole covert propaganda operation: How important is it? I mean, why do we need to have covert propaganda at all? Why can't we do it all overtly through USIA and others?

Ambassador BROWN. Well, I think one reason, sir, is in areas somewhat hostile or where press is otherwise controlled, let's take, for instance, large parts of West Africa, where the press has historically been in the hands of those people who were close to the colonial powers, and related to business interests, it may be very difficult, very difficult no matter what overt methods you have, to get something through. It may be much more open to hostile elements or anti-American efforts. I think there is a problem there that you have to face on a case by case basis.

Now, where there is democratic, free press, as in Australia or New Zealand or Canada, I should think that any covert activities in the press there would be absolutely out of the question. There is no need for them, no reason to do it, points of view will get across. They, like Americans, are deluged by information in the media. It is the controlled areas I think that you have more of a problem that you have to face up to.

Mr. WILSON. What about the potentially controlled areas? Let's take Italy, for example, where according to reports we have, there is a very good possibility of it going Communist and becoming a Communist partner in NATO, are we justified to use covert activities in the Italian press to try to influence the election in Italy?

Ambassador BROWN. Actually, this comes back to the point I was trying to make, sir, is, let's make sure that we don't in present conditions bind our hands too tightly against a return to problems where we really have to support—we may have to support certain places democratic institutions. I really think the Italian situation is one that is fraught with danger, and again, I think the U.S. Government has that very difficult task right now in saying OK, under sort of the new rules of engagement, what can we do? What should we be doing to see if we can bolster what is left of a rather fragile democratic process there?

I mean, I think it is one you have to think through very fully.

Mr. WILSON. Well, it is fraught with national security implications because Italy is a member of NATO and they could no longer be if they went——

Ambassador BROWN. But what we know now is if an operation is mounted to do this in Italy, that it would be with the broad approval of decisionmakers, the American body politic, legislative and executive, and it is useful to know that.

Mr. ASPIN. We have heard, for example, from CIA people who think the vast majority of the propaganda they put out now is white propaganda, that is, the truth. They say they are not really putting out much of the black propaganda.

Is that your understanding, from your experiences? Is that right? Is that mostly what we are doing with these propaganda assets we have?

Ambassador PORTER. Yes, I think the vast majority, in my experience, practically 100 percent—I mean recently.

Ambassador BROWN. And in that case, I would rather see the assets transferred to USIA.

Mr. ASPIN. Well, that is what I was going to ask. Why are we spending \$400 million with USIA if they are doing the same thing?

Ambassador BROWN. That is where it should be.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me just push this question about why is it necessary to have a covert propaganda operation.

Let me try and make the divisions. Let me lay it out and argue and tell me where this analysis is wrong.

You have certain countries—you mentioned New Zealand, Australia, Canada—where you don't need covert propaganda, where you just put out your side of the story. They have a free press and so you get at least your side of the story represented.

Then you come to other situations where the press is totally hostile to the United States, and in that case I would think that covert efforts aren't going to be any good at all because you are not going to be able to buy a story in Tass. So you don't need covert propaganda for that.

So, what are you left with? Well, you are left with a situation where I guess the press is up for sale, and unless you get in there and bid, too, your side isn't going to be in because the other side is buying into the story. So you have to buy in, too.

My own feeling about those kinds of situations is that in those countries the press has gotten so bad over the years that people largely discount it. I mean, it has become well known that the press is up for sale in those countries, and they buy the paper to read the social news or whatever else is going on; but they very heavily discount any political stories in there. So I am not sure that I can really conceive of any situation where being able to buy in is really all that essential. In some places it is not necessary, in some places it is impossible. Some places it might be possible, but favorable stories in those countries where the press is bought are so heavily discounted that I am not sure it is worth it. The only one benefiting from that is the publisher who is getting money from everybody to put the material in the paper.

Is that wrong? I mean, is there some category of the press I have left out here that is still useful to be able to buy in with a true story?

Ambassador BROWN. Yes, I think there is in a certain format, and that is the counterstory where out of an agency in Europe somewhere will appear in a series of countries a series of articles let's say describing the slave-like conditions under which the American blacks live, photos, the whole book. You have to counter it.

Now, there are several ways of countering it. You can go actually to the chief of state of that country and say look, the people are buying your press up and they are presenting the wrong picture. Will you give us a chance? Maybe, but maybe he is not friendly. We may have to, at the time, then, to counter—this would be an example, I would think, where we would have a legitimate activity in countering something that really, really frazzling the relationship of Country X with the United States, or the people of that country with our people, and I could see a justification in a well planned—

Mr. WILSON. Well, this would be black propaganda, all right, but it would be white black propaganda.

Mr. ASPIN. White counter to a previous black propaganda.

Ambassador PORTER. By and large, if I could add a comment here, we could dispense with this propaganda effort through the Agency except in special cases which we can't anticipate the nature of right now, but by and large, the publicity side should go over to USIA.

Mr. ASPIN. You would agree with that.

Ambassador PORTER. Oh, yes.

Mr. ASPIN. All of you would agree with it.

Ambassador BROWN. I would agree with that except I will say that—

Mr. ASPIN. Except on very occasional cases.

Ambassador BROWN. But in mass cases, it is just not worth it anymore.

Mr. BOLAND. But you wouldn't bar it completely, of course.

Ambassador BROWN. No, that is the point because I want to come back to what Mr. Wilson was saying, if you get a case where we may need to give assistance where it is in the national interest of the United States, and people think it through as to the risks and the opportunities—

Mr. BOLAND. I was interested in the chairman's observation that in some of the nations the people don't believe the press anyhow. I am not sure that is true in very many nations. How about in our own country where people say they believe everything they see in the press. Most people believe everything they see in the press in this country, and I can't believe that there are any nations in the world where a lot of people don't believe what they see in the press, no matter what the form of government that they have. So it would occur to me then in some of those areas, the propaganda might be very well worthwhile, particularly if you are trying to offset propaganda from the other side.

Is that a fair statement?

Ambassador TRUEHEART. Yes.

Ambassador PORTER. The people who run the country always read the press. They are the ones who put it together.

Mr. BOLAND. That's right, and they ought to know whether what's going in the press is true or false, whether it's black or white or slanted. But I am talking about the people in the country. The people in many countries are avid readers; they like to learn, and I am not sure that the USIA gets through to them all the time, does it? Is that the best means of propaganda, or is it "propaganda"? It's propaganda, but the propaganda, I presume, is true propaganda that is put out by the USIA, is that correct?

Ambassador BROWN. That's correct.

Mr. BOLAND. Or does sometimes USIA put out a little black propaganda?

Ambassador BROWN. No, sir.

Mr. BOLAND. It never does?

Ambassador PORTER. Sometimes it tends to put out the view of the administration in power.

Mr. BOLAND. Of course that would not be slanted under any administration. [General laughter.]

But I am not sure that the use of the press for propaganda purposes, black, white, or gray, isn't very significant in some areas, is it?

Ambassador BROWN. Yes, it is, and television and radio even more.

Ambassador PORTER. In some areas. In some areas it is very useful, but there are large areas where I would rather have a good steady radio, speaking their own language. And preferably outside their borders.

Mr. BOLAND. What are we beaming in the Far East? What are we beaming into Asia? Do we have a Radio Free Asia?

Ambassador PORTER. We don't have a Radio Free Asia. We have, of course, the VOA.

Mr. BOLAND. We don't have a Radio Free Asia?

Ambassador PORTER. The British carry the burden out there about informing the—

Mr. BOLAND. Did we try it at one time? It seems to me I read a story one time about it.

Ambassador PORTER. Yes, we had tried.

Mr. BOLAND. And then somebody told the CIA operators out there that the Chinese didn't have radios, so they hit upon the scheme of hooking radios to balloons, and hopefully the balloons would be whisked by the winds to the China mainland; but the winds reversed and carried them all back to Taiwan.¹ Even under that kind of a scheme, I don't know how in the world the Chinese people would have acquired the radios anyhow.

Ambassador PORTER. Sir, we once had a thing called the Blue Eagle, and it dangled a long wire underneath, because we found out that there was a radio—a television transmitter, an American built transmitter in Cambodia. So, we put on a television program for the Cambodians with the Blue Eagle flying back and forth across Vietnam to send the signal out. The only trouble was, it was terribly expensive and some of us persisted in finding out or trying to find out how many television sets were functioning. There were three, and they were all in the palace of Shianouk.

Mr. BOLAND. That's why I said some time ago that idle minds are the devil's workshop, and I don't know whether or not a lot of these plans are any good.

Ambassador PORTER. Well, we digress.

Mr. ASPIN. That's all right.

Mr. WILSON. Well, on that point, let's talk about the European situation. Have you felt in your experience that Radio Free Europe and the other one—the other radio network—

Ambassador TRUEHEART. Radio Liberty.

Mr. WILSON [continuing]. Radio Liberty, have been effective in putting our side of the story across.

Ambassador PORTER. He knows probably, Ambassador Trueheart.

Ambassador TRUEHEART. I think they've been extremely effective, and they are sufficiently large scale and they have been going on a sufficiently long time so that you can get objective measures to some degree about how much they are listened to and so on. It varies from country to country. I think there is no question that in

¹See the New York Times, December 27, 1977.

Poland Radio Free Europe is perhaps the most popular program. As I understand it, it used to be the case, if you wanted to get the soccer scores of a game taking place in Warsaw, you could probably find out quicker on Radio Free Europe than on Radio Warsaw. But this is a very special kind of operation. I mean, their objectives are not so much to put out the U.S. point of view, which is what the Voice of America does, but to try to supply objective information about developments within the countries they are broadcasting to. Which is why it is so expensive to do.

Mr. WILSON. Well, I have been told by some of these "refuseniks" from Russia that this is a very important means of their keeping in touch with what is going on in this country and in other countries. They may listen only 5 minutes a day, but in their opinion, hundreds of thousands of Russians are listening on a regular basis to what our output is, and it is not just propaganda, it's just actually news, as I understand it.

Mr. ASPIN. So am I right in saying, though, that basically, if you're appraising the whole covert propaganda area, you would not want to eliminate covert propaganda—this ability to buy a story or buy an editorial or whatever; but that basically you think an awful lot of it should be done through open means, the overt efforts.

Ambassador BROWN. One of the best things that could be done, for instance, is to persuade the American networks to cut their rates on reruns of television shows.

Mr. ASPIN. On which?

Ambassador BROWN. On reruns of television. It is very high for some reason.

Mr. ASPIN. Oh, is it?

Ambassador BROWN. I think that is probably one of the best things we can do, oddly enough.

Mr. ASPIN. Right now they charge a lot, so they don't get very many of these reruns.

Ambassador BROWN. They get very old ones.

Mr. ASPIN. I see, I see.

Mr. WILSON. Maybe that ought to be part of the USIA budget.

Ambassador BROWN. Maybe the companies could afford it.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me go on to the question of the black propaganda effort. What do you think of black propaganda? Is that worth the effort? Is it something that we ought to keep as a possibility; should we eliminate it? Give me your views. In your experiences, is it something that is worth while?

Ambassador PORTER. Are you referring to black propaganda planted in the press?

Mr. ASPIN. Yes; abroad.

Ambassador TRUEHEART. Do you mean false information by this.

Mr. ASPIN. Yes, yes.

Ambassador TRUEHEART. Because that isn't necessarily—

Mr. ASPIN. No, no, I meant false information, really. Something that really is a fabrication.

Ambassador PORTER. I can't recall incidents or happenings that indicated effectiveness. It is too easily detected.

Mr. ASPIN. So your experience with it is that whenever it's been tried, it's not been very effective.

Ambassador PORTER. In general, yes. I don't recall anything to the contrary.

Mr. ASPIN. Ambassador Brown, agreed?

Ambassador BROWN. Yes.

Mr. ASPIN. Ambassador Trueheart?

Ambassador TRUEHEART. I agree completely, and I think the point is that where you find black or false propaganda effective, such as "Bodyguard of Lies," for example, in this book, is when you have a war going on and when you are able to control other information, so that it isn't detected. But simply trying to show false information around loosely just doesn't work, because there are too many ways in which it can be detected as being false.

Mr. WILSON. I think Chairman Mao died about six times before he finally made it, the propaganda.

Ambassador TRUEHEART. There's no doubt you can do things that are irritating and what not, but it seems to me we have more important things in this country to do than that sort of business. I am sure it is lots of fun for people that are practitioners of it, but—

Mr. ASPIN. Let me then move on to the question which is the one, of course, which bothers—that has come up again and again about the whole use of foreign media and that is the feedback problem, or the problem of whatever we have placed abroad coming back in and affecting people in our country.

From your own experience in this area, how serious is the feedback problem? We've had people say that they thought it was serious and others say that it wasn't. What is your own feeling about it? Is it a serious problem for U.S. journalism?

Ambassador BROWN. I've never encountered it as a problem, because I've never seen anything that's been that significant that has dealt with something that I've been dealing with. I would rather refer in a sense to the newsmen who had experience in Vietnam as to whether there is something there. But certainly it has not been a problem that I encountered.

Mr. ASPIN. Ambassador Porter?

Ambassador PORTER. I don't recall anything of that nature, a problem, coming back. Including Vietnam.

Mr. ASPIN. Ambassador Trueheart.

Mr. WILSON. Well, Ambassador Trueheart has already told us, only he calls it fallout. The same thing.

Mr. ASPIN. Right.

Ambassador TRUEHEART. I didn't think it was a significant factor.

Mr. ASPIN. Do we have a system in our Government to try and prevent policymakers from being influenced by feedback?

Ambassador PORTER. Our policymakers?

Mr. ASPIN. Our policymakers.

In other words, is there a system whereby people who make decisions are notified on a systematic basis when things are done in the way of propaganda? Is there any such system?

Ambassador TRUEHEART. There used to be.

Mr. ASPIN. How does it work? How far down does it go, who does it cover, what kind of people are informed of this.

Ambassador TRUEHEART. Well, it's my recollection that the primary object was to make sure that our own intelligence analysts,

not intelligence operators, analysts were not deceived by some radio broadcast which was in fact broadcast by our own people. And so you would have to tip off a certain number of people not to include this in their analysis of what's going on in the country. I don't think it would necessarily go very high, unless the thing began to get attention elsewhere, and then, you know, people would be told as far up as necessary about such a thing. But there were specific procedures, in my day, for guarding against misinforming the American Government in this way. But it didn't, so far as I am aware, extend beyond that.

Mr. ASPIN. There also of course have been some particular horror stories of examples where people were fooled. What I don't know is how frequently that is. I mean, the only thing I ever hear about are examples where people are fooled, for example where we set up a radio station, perhaps in Taiwan, broadcasting to imply that it comes from the mainland, and here comes some analyst writing about events in the mainland and he suddenly says, good grief, you know, there's real opposition, there's a radio station broadcasting on the mainland. That was a case where somebody was really genuinely fooled, somebody who was writing analyses back to Washington, and was in fact completely taken in by what was going on there.

Now, you see, I hear about the horror stories and I don't know about other things that didn't go on because there was a good network of information.

Ambassador TRUEHEART. I thought that particular one was taken care of by the protective measures at the time.

Mr. ASPIN. You would call that particular case that I am talking about an example of a success?

Ambassador TRUEHEART. Well, I thought that people were tipped off and did not, at least for very long—

Mr. ASPIN. I thought it went on for some time before they finally got to the analyst and said, hey, don't take that radio station too seriously.

Ambassador TRUEHEART. You may be right, sir. I have forgotten how long.

Mr. ASPIN. Is there anything just in the general area of feedback that we should be doing more to avoid misleading people? Is there anything you can think of, for example, for trying to inform the American press of an operation that is going on by which they might somehow be fooled. Have you, as ambassadors, ever done that in your experience? For example, there is something going on in the country where you are the ambassador and you authorized or maybe yourself talked to the local American correspondent saying, "If I were you I wouldn't pay too much attention to these stories that are appearing in the paper."

Ambassador PORTER. Yes.

Mr. ASPIN. You have done that?

Ambassador PORTER. But we generally use the term psywar.

Mr. ASPIN. I see.

Ambassador PORTER. We'd say, if you hear this or that, that's part of the psywar action.

Mr. WILSON. What do you call it?

Ambassador PORTER. Psywar; psychological warfare.

Mr. WILSON. Oh, psywar.

Ambassador PORTER. We didn't call it feedback or anything of that kind.

Mr. ASPIN. I see.

Ambassador PORTER. We used to say that, tell them these things in Vietnam that it's either the locals making a psywar effort against the other side, or we are involved in some way. Of course, if the locals were producing it, we would generally have a hand in it. But it was—we did our best to alert responsible people.

Of course, when the Europeans picked it up and pushed it into their capitals, we didn't do too much to—except in one or two cases where we had particularly close relations—but we didn't do too much to correct the impressions that others were getting.

Mr. ASPIN. So generally it was aimed mostly at U.S. people.

Ambassador PORTER. Our efforts.

Mr. ASPIN. Our efforts at that. We didn't try and extend—

Ambassador PORTER. And a few close allies.

Mr. ASPIN. And a few close allies. But in other cases it got picked up in some.

Ambassador PORTER. Picked up.

Mr. ASPIN. Would it ever then get relayed around via the third country. I mean, did that sometimes, could that happen?

Ambassador PORTER. I don't know. I didn't deal with that situation.

Mr. ASPIN. Did you find generally that journalists were cooperative with this effort?

Ambassador PORTER. Well, I think they appreciated knowing, they appreciated the comment, and I think they kept it in mind. And if it developed into something, they might or might not recall it. As a matter of practice we didn't try to search out the degree of cooperation.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you. Let me go on to another area, if I could, just to ask everybody's opinion. On the chart we have a list of activities¹ that the CIA might want journalists to do on their behalf. Here are the kinds of relationships we might have between the Agency and media people, starting with the activities listed under information from the most innocuous, the story confirmation, through prior tasking of intelligence collection. And support activities: hosting parties, providing safe houses, acting as courier. And then agent work and propaganda. These are the kinds of relationships that can develop between the Agency and journalists. What I would like to ask is the question of what kinds of relationships you have with the press, as people from the State Department. For example, which of those activities does the State Department or you as ambassadors do in a foreign country?

I take it, for example, that much of this would be the normal policy between the journalists and his sources, for example things like story confirmation. A journalist might call the State Department or the Ambassador or the Embassy to confirm a story or to say, "Here, look, we've got this story, what's your reaction to it?" Information swapping would be just the normal give and take between a journalist and his source.

¹ See appendix D, p. 336.

Does the State Department do that? Do you brief journalists before they go abroad or when they come back, meet with them and try to pick up information they might not have put in their stories?

Ambassador PORTER. Well, on the prebriefing aspect, if they want to talk to someone, say a desk officer, they are going to visit a country, or someone in the media side of the Department, yes, we try to accomodate them. That will—they will usually make inquiries about personalities and the country they intend to visit and details of the parties and the things of that kind, and there is a good deal of printed material.

Debriefing, we have—unless they walk in and say they want to give an account of, you know, just their stay or something—although they may already have done so in the Embassy out there—they are welcome, but I think the Agency took the lead in that particular aspect of the matter, debriefing. My colleagues may have some comment.

Mr. ASPIN. But basically you would do it if they made the initiative, but you don't make the initiative to contact them.

Ambassador PORTER. No.

Mr. ASPIN. Do you ever ask journalists for information they have in files or outtakes? Do you ever ask journalists for access to their files or ask TV media people for access to the outtakes that they have?

Ambassador PORTER. More in the field of TV shots. Perhaps there has been an interview and you missed it, you heard about it, perhaps attracted some attention, and we can get and do get from the networks the actual film of the interview. And we frequently run those things off in the Embassy abroad or back here in the Department if there are people really interested in seeing it.

Ambassador BROWN. Our main source of who the killers of Ambassador Davies in Cyprus were came from TV shots.

Mr. ASPIN. Oh, is that right? TV shots that did not appear on the TV?

Ambassador BROWN. Well, they may have appeared but just very briefly, you see, and there were a lot of people shooting and what appeared on TV was very short, and we asked the stations could we see all the footage so we could examine it at length so we could see if we could identify who was shooting, from where. And it was very helpful.

Mr. ASPIN. I see. When a journalist comes in for a prebriefing, do you ever give them prior tasking? Do you ever ask them to look into a particular matter for you, as part of their trip: "Look, one of the things we are interested in is such and such. Would you ask, when you interview the President of the country, his reaction to this and this." You know, that kind of question. Do you ever suggest things to them that you want to know and ask them to come back and give you the information?

Ambassador PORTER. Yes.

Ambassador BROWN. Yes.

Ambassador PORTER. Particularly in matters pertaining to health.

Mr. ASPIN. I see.

Ambassador PORTER. Very rarely in my case at least, political questions to ask or things of that sort. But how a man looks, his appearance, any oddities that they notice and so forth.

Ambassador BROWN. And your reaction as a trained journalist to the personality of that gentleman. I must say, to tell you the truth, Mr. Chairman, it's far more often the question in, say, a country like Jordan, when a journalist would come in who had an interview with the King, the question would be like this, well, Mr. Ambassador, if you were me, what questions would you ask him.

Ambassador PORTER. Well, that happens, too. I myself don't venture too deeply into that.

Ambassador TRUEHEART. He may be more interested in finding out what Ambassador Brown thinks than finding out what King Hussein thinks when he asks that question.

Mr. ASPIN. Yes. He may be interviewing you by asking you those questions.

How about some of the support functions. Obviously providing safe houses is not in the State Department line, but acting as a courier? I could imagine that could be very useful if a journalist is going to the Middle East and is going to talk to Arafat; you might want to run a message. Do you use journalists for that sort of thing? The great story about John Scali up in New York at the time of the Cuban missile crisis is one that has come into the public. So, I take it that it is not unheard of for the State Department to use journalists at least as couriers of information.

Ambassador PORTER. Did you say Arafat? He's a no-no.

Mr. ASPIN. He's a no-no.

Ambassador PORTER. I don't know of anyone who would venture to use a journalist as a courier to Mr. Arafat because of general restrictions, policy restrictions here.

Mr. ASPIN. I see. I was just trying to think of somebody that we don't have normal diplomatic relations with whom we might want to communicate some way.

Ambassador PORTER. Yes. I can't remember anything of that nature.

Ambassador BROWN. I know cases, but nonjournalists.

Mr. ASPIN. I see.

Ambassador BROWN. More often, nonjournalists, to carry that message to that person.

Mr. ASPIN. I see. A case recently came out where the CIA was very interested in trying to stop the publication of the *Glomar Explorer* for example, and under the Freedom of Information Act, information came out about their rather heavy investment in that project and how they tried to keep that information out of the press. Is that the kind of thing which sometimes goes on in the State Department? You get wind of a story that is about to happen or you think is going to be published, and you would like it not to appear, or you are trying to delay it or you are trying to kill it. So you get on the phone to the journalist or maybe to his or her editor. Is that the kind of thing that has gone on? Is that a possibility?

Ambassador BROWN. There is a two-way flow, here, Mr. Chairman, of things like that, where if someone has a story and a responsible newspaper will call someone fairly high along the line,

not the Secretary but someone very close to him and say, we have this, is there something you want to add to it. Or the other one is where the journalist has the story and in the processing of checking it out, it becomes knowledgeable to people that he has the story. And then there is very often the question of saying, well, let's make sure that what we think is the correct interpretation or the facts are presented to him, and a call is made from the news division, or access is made available to the desk officer, country officer, Assistant Secretary. That happens frequently. I think that is a logical and acceptable practice.

Ambassador PORTER. Sometimes we just prepare the spokesman. If the question comes up, this is it, this is the reply.

Ambassador BROWN. Very often, because we have a noon press briefing at the State Department, you know, and what you have at 11 o'clock in the morning is a frantic activity of telephoning all over the building trying to get ready for what you think is coming up. There has been a little story out of Tel Aviv or a little story out of somewhere or another, and you have to be prepared for it, and so in a sense you are forming opinions. But I think that is the logical thing, because that is why you have a press spokesman.

Mr. ASPIN. Yes.

Ambassador BROWN. And they try to keep it honest.

Mr. ASPIN. One other area that I would like to ask about, and that is the point that Mr. Colby was making before this subcommittee about the dangers of diminishing cover. Do you see any reasons why the Agency should not be able to use USIA or AID for cover?

Ambassador PORTER. I see no reason why they should not use these agencies, other agencies, and I think there should be a national policy indicating that cooperation is expected. A man may have this or that feeling, a director or whomever, but it is not a useful thing for a government to be so fragmented that you can't cooperate when necessary in an important matter. I am not saying that the other agency should be loaded with low level people, but at certain times in certain places, other agencies of government should understand that they are part of this Government, and if people high enough up and in enough authority consider that there should be cooperation, then there should be.

Ambassador BROWN. I would like to see it a national policy stemming from the NSC, so that the agencies themselves don't feel or don't have the ability to escape constantly, as they do.

Mr. ASPIN. So that there be a national policy on this issue, at least as far as government agencies go, stating there is a use for cover.

Ambassador BROWN. That's right. I mean, it needs a good discussion, not only at the interagency, Cabinet or NSC level, but also with you, as to this whole problem of cover. I think we've got to get into it sometime.

Mr. ASPIN. When you are an ambassador in a country and you've got x number of employees working for you in that country in the embassy or attached to the embassy, do you know which ones are operating under cover for the Agency? Do you know which ones are the Foreign Service officers?

Ambassador BROWN. Yes.

Mr. ASPIN. And you know exactly who they are? That happens as a matter of absolute routine?

Ambassador BROWN. Absolute routine. There's a section of the Department, a liaison section, which is in contact constantly, and the Embassy is always informed, and this includes all visitors, by the way.

Mr. ASPIN. All visitors that come in, too, is that right?

Ambassador BROWN. TDY visitors, anything.

Mr. ASPIN. But that one you don't have to be a strong Ambassador to find out. That one you get no matter what kind of an ambassador you are. They tell you that one.

Ambassador BROWN. Yes.

Mr. ASPIN. And there is no problem that you see here? I mean, you are not uneasy about the fact that some of your employees are working on other things? I am trying to get at whatever the mindset is. It's not fair to ask why AID or USIA does not want to have employees. But anyway, you feel that there is no problems for you when you've had situations where some of your people have been working for the Agency under your cover.

Ambassador BROWN. I think it's mandated in a sense; it's part of the responsibility.

Mr. ASPIN. Yes.

Ambassador TRUEHEART. I think it is a little more complicated.

Mr. ASPIN. OK.

Ambassador TRUEHEART. I wouldn't want to bar the use of any U.S. Government agency as cover for the CIA. I think that is what the others are saying here. But I think in looking at this, you want to look very closely at some of the problems that are involved. If the cover is really used as cover, that's one thing. But if in fact, it is transparent, it's another. And I think if you take an agency like the Peace Corps, let's say, where the members do not have diplomatic immunity, unless I am mistaken, they may be exposing people to a lot more risk than you are in an embassy.

Mr. ASPIN. I see.

Ambassador TRUEHEART. That's just one point.

I think one needs also to look closely at this whole business of official cover to see whether, in fact, the Agency has used it effectively in the past and at the present time. You know, cover is a hard thing to have. It doesn't amount simply to getting a designation as First Secretary and getting your name in the phonebook. You have to work at your cover job if you're going to have real cover, otherwise your position is known to everyone. And it is even more difficult than that. When you come back to Washington, you don't—let's say you've been in State cover abroad and you are never seen around the State Department when you get back to Washington—so that the Agency is rarely, in my experience, willing to make the sacrifices in terms of inefficiency, to get really good official cover. I think this is the point that you have to have in mind, that it isn't just a question of having more places to put people, but how much work are you prepared to put in and how much work are you prepared to put in and how much sacrifice you are prepared to make to make the cover really effective?

Mr. ASPIN. By inefficiencies you mean because they are going to be spending part of their working time——

Ambassador TRUEHEART. Because they are working for somebody else.

Mr. ASPIN. In order to maintain that cover.

Ambassador TRUEHEART. And the CIA has a very heavy workload abroad. Their people have to work long hours. They have to do lots of work at night and many things, many more hours than other people because of the nature of their business, and it is very rare that a man can work fulltime at a State Department job and still have any time to do his intelligence work. This is where the real problem comes.

Mr. ASPIN. That is very interesting.

Who has diplomatic cover among Americans abroad?

Ambassador TRUEHEART. You mean diplomatic immunity?

Mr. ASPIN. I mean diplomatic immunity.

Ambassador TRUEHEART. Those that have diplomatic passports.

Mr. ASPIN. Which would include AID officials?

Ambassador BROWN. They are included.

Mr. ASPIN. And USIA?

Ambassador BROWN. Yes, Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce—

Mr. ASPIN. All those kinds of people.

And there are certain obvious benefits of using people like that. I know one of the problems about journalists is that they don't have diplomatic immunity, and so they are usually open to a certain amount of concern about their physical safety when the CIA is using some of the members.

Mr. WILSON. Would the gentleman yield?

You say there isn't any problem? Well, there is a problem. They are proscribed from members of USIA and Peace Corps.

Mr. ASPIN. Well, that is the problem we are addressing here, whether they should be, and I was asking what they thought. It is an interesting point about the extent of cover. It is your feeling that in fact—perhaps not through its own fault but because of the pressure of work or whatnot—the people working for CIA have not worked hard enough at maintaining their cover in these situations.

Ambassador TRUEHEART. Well, I will just say I don't think it has ever been a very high priority with them.

Mr. ASPIN. That is interesting.

Ambassador PORTER. My experience with that has been that the person involved in doing, let's say, work for another department connected with the embassy is simply caught between the demands of the Station Chief, to share the burdens of that office, and of course, his ostensible purpose which might be commercial matters or something of that sort, Treasury, whatever. It is too much for him. It doesn't work. It isn't a good idea. He is blown in very short order, first to local employees, then of course to others, say commercial contacts in town who expect to know the commercial officer or person, and he is not available, and then of course, they have a great psychological problem in avoiding their own tribe outside the office, ordinary socializing. There are many different ways of determining who is what in this business, and we are pretty transparent.

Ambassador BROWN. Terribly transparent.

Ambassador PORTER. We are not sophisticated enough, and the only answer, of course, is deep cover, and how much of that has been done I don't know.

Mr. ASPIN. Deep cover.

Ambassador PORTER. Outside.

Mr. ASPIN. Outside the official cover.

Ambassador PORTER. Not within official cover.

Mr. ASPIN. Without official cover.

Ambassador PORTER. But that entails great inconveniences and danger.

Mr. ASPIN. Because you are outside of the diplomatic immunity.

Ambassador PORTER. Outside if you are exposed, and if you appear to be an ordinary civilian, if you are successful, people don't always feel they have to be as careful about you, about doing away with you. It is dangerous but it is the only effective thing. I don't consider the cover we provide today very useful.

Mr. ASPIN. That is interesting.

You had some more question?

Mr. WILSON. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to ask you gentlemen your opinion on the Turner directive?

Do you see it possibly weakening or hamstringing our options to collect foreign intelligence?

Ambassador PORTER. To collect foreign intelligence?

Mr. WILSON. To collect intelligence in foreign countries.

Ambassador PORTER. Not particularly. I think there is more latitude, or more latitude is allowed in the foreign field than of course in domestic.

Mr. WILSON. I know, but I am talking about with U.S. media abroad.

Ambassador PORTER. U.S. media abroad, I think it is definitely inhibiting and I think it is not a good thing to do. The availability of cover is narrowing whereas we should be trying to expand it. When you narrow your cover it means you reduce your complement and you get rid of your contacts. You are gradually eroding the basis for operations. That is what bothers me. We are not going the right way in promulgating or announcing regulations of this kind.

You have heard my philosophy and you may disagree with it, but either we are in the game or we ought to get out of the ballpark, and we can't afford to do that.

Ambassador TRUEHEART. Well, of course, I disagree. I do not think that is the first step in a lot of others. I think the press is really quite unique and has a special position.

Mr. WILSON. And you are still—after our interrogation, you still feel the same way, Ambassador Brown?

[Ambassador Brown nods in the affirmative.]

Mr. WILSON. Well, do you see any circumstances where United States journalists might be the only source that we might have to obtain vital information overseas?

I mean, because he has got contacts, he has got the confidence of a lot of foreign government officials, if he is daily contacting them, are there any circumstances you can see where they might be really the only way we can get information?

Ambassador BROWN. It could happen.

Ambassador PORTER. It could happen.

Let's take the example of recruiting agents within the Government. It might be that he might be the only one that would have contact with certain people of such a nature that he could put that question to them. And that has been eliminated.

Mr. WILSON. Did you want to say something?

Ambassador TRUEHEART. I could conceive of such a case.

Mr. WILSON. In other words, we are hamstringing them to a certain extent.

Ambassador PORTER. Yes.

Mr. WILSON. Do you believe that there is a danger to our institutions if we continue to utilize U.S. newsmen? Is this, on a broad philosophical basis, is this a real danger to our institutions, or will they continue despite—I mean, suppose the directive were reconsidered?

Ambassador PORTER. I don't see any danger to our institutions. I think if I were a journalist I would be taken aback by the obvious implication here that I don't know how to handle myself when I see, or talk to, or know well somebody from the Agency.

I think that—if there is one group in this country that knows how to take care of itself, it is our media, in every way imaginable.

Mr. WILSON. Well, as Ambassador Brown pointed out, the CIA, the press courts the CIA rather than the other way around in many instances.

So doesn't that leave the ethical problem up to the press rather than to the CIA?

Ambassador BROWN. I think it poses both ways, yes.

I do think that we do have something unique in this country, that a few of our friends and allies share, and that is a free press, and if the press in itself feels that this association has become dangerous over a period of time, then I think it is the time perhaps to close this avenue off, that is, the covert activity of the journalists. I hope this does not kill the voluntary ones.

Mr. WILSON. I would hope so, too. In the last 3 days I have become resigned to the fact that the Turner directive is not going to have that much impact as long as we don't go any further, as long as that is as far as we go, and we allow the operation to go ahead as it is prescribed by the Turner directive. But I must say there have been, particularly among former CIA people, very grave concern that this was going to be more difficult, make it more difficult for the CIA to do their job.

Do you see the need for any further restrictive legislation or directives as far as CIA activities go in foreign countries?

Ambassador BROWN. No, sir, statutory, no. I mean, I think the process, the oversight process can be deepened in time as the Agency feels, you know, it has entered into that measure of trust arrangement that I was talking about before between ambassadors and station chiefs, the same thing with the legislature. I think that is the way to do it rather than iron clad statutes that bind us for all time, and when the time comes that we see that some activity is in the national interest we simply say, hey, you can't do it.

Mr. WILSON. Well, the Turner directive does say—and I have to admit, at the very end, the exceptions—no exceptions to the policy

stated above may be made except with the specific approval of the DCI. Well, that assures that while publicly we are taking this stand, but if it becomes necessary, we may have to do it some other way. That ought to confuse everybody.

Ambassador BROWN. The Agency, though, has a bill with escape hatches.

Mr. WILSON. And in your way of thinking, that perhaps is the only way you could operate it instead of having tight statutory requirements.

OK, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ASPIN. OK, let me ask one question I forgot to ask before, and that is your experience with some of these English language newspapers. The point always is that foreign propaganda is always aimed at the foreigners and not at the Americans, and hence, our discussion about feedback; but there is a certain kind of puzzle about that whole policy. If that is true, why does the Agency spend so much time and effort in subsidizing and in other ways supporting foreign language newspapers in places around the world?

What is your experience about who reads English language newspapers in foreign capitals? Is there really a foreign language community that really reads them? Are we influencing anybody other than our own tourists and our own correspondents who happen to be there?

Ambassador BROWN. I usually thought that they were put out for the edification of the staff. You have got to get the baseball scores and things like that, and the language, since most of them aren't speaking the foreign language anyway. No, it's a kind of old joke.

Mr. ASPIN. Not taken seriously?

Ambassador BROWN. Not taken seriously, at least in the European and Middle Eastern context.

Ambassador PORTER. If they are aimed at Europeans in the English language or others, other people, other continents, there is not much practical use.

Mr. WILSON. Wouldn't you say the Paris Herald-Tribune?

Ambassador PORTER. Well, because I think there is a large enough American community within easy range of—within the operating area of that newspaper to make it worthwhile.

Mr. WILSON. But is it a credible publication?

Ambassador PORTER. It is as credible a publication as the New York Times and the Washington Post.

Mr. WILSON. That makes it incredible.

Ambassador BROWN. I think it is a good newspaper.

Ambassador PORTER. It is a relief to get it out there. I subscribe to it, even now. I like it, it has a certain touch that you don't get at home, and I think it is worthwhile for me.

Ambassador BROWN. But the real point is that English language newspapers published abroad are basically for an audience that doesn't read the local language, and that consists of the American, the British and maybe the Germans in a French speaking country who reads English, some government officials who like to read things in English, a certain amount of the elite that have English, but you will find that they are also subscribing to other publications because they are the kind of people that are buying the

Economist and Time magazine and things like that anyway * * *. So it is additive, and I don't think it really contributes that much.

Mr. ASPIN. Rather than the danger, what you are saying is that it is probably a waste of money.

Ambassador BROWN. That's right.

Mr. ASPIN. And it is more of a waste of money.

Ambassador BROWN. If we are putting money into those things now, then we are wasting our time and money.

Mr. ASPIN. Any other questions?

Loch, maybe you would like to ask a question?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes; I just have two very quick items.

Ambassador Trueheart, given your philosophy and your comments on the Turner directive, I wonder if you find it odd that no mention was made of American freelance writers, even those who may write on a regular basis?

Apparently under the Turner directive, they can continue to have a paid, contractual relationship with the CIA.

It that your reading of the directive?

Ambassador TRUEHEART. Well, I haven't read it all that closely, Mr. Johnson, frankly. And I didn't really—usually things like this, you can find missing points, and I haven't studied it that much, but in my own view, such people should be included.

On the other hand, I would not include an American citizen working for a foreign publication. I didn't say that in my statement, but I do make that distinction.

Mr. JOHNSON. But an American freelancer who is contributing on a regular basis to an American media outlet you would include in the Turner directive.

Ambassador TRUEHEART. I think so.

Mr. JOHNSON. And Ambassador Porter, you might view it as just a further erosion of possible cover if freelancers were included, and so you would be against that.

Ambassador PORTER. That's right.

Mr. JOHNSON. And Ambassador Brown?

Ambassador BROWN. I feel myself as, under the category of stringer and as a cover, in a sense.

I don't know, maybe they won't.

Mr. WILSON. Maybe it is a so-called stringer.

Mr. ASPIN. You would treat them the same if it included stringers.

Ambassador BROWN. If he is doing what Mr. Johnson mentioned, if he is doing it on a regular basis, it seems to me he fits into the category of stringer one way or the other.

Mr. JOHNSON. Does it matter what the person is writing about? What if, as apparently is the case of a Station Chief we had in Bonn, he is writing about music only on a freelance basis? Does it matter if the person is writing on rather extraneous matters from a public affairs point of view, as opposed to someone who is writing regularly as a freelancer about international issues or domestic issues?

Does that make a difference?

Ambassador BROWN. The difference you are making is the CIA man writing for someone.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

Ambassador BROWN. Well, I don't think we want to prevent the CIA man, or if George Bush wanted to write an article in Foreign Affairs, we would encourage that.

Ambassador TRUEHEART. But in this case his cover occupation was a music critic.

Ambassador BROWN. Well, now, that is kind of ridiculous.

Mr. JOHNSON. The final point I wanted to touch upon concerns a statement from an ambassador which I will paraphrase here. This ambassador said that if he had additional resources, the first move he would make would be to reestablish political reporting officers in the several consulates in his country. He went on to explain that by law the Foreign Service must carry on a number of consular functions and that with ever-tightening resources, the political reporting function has been squeezed out.

Was this a problem for you gentlemen in your tours?

Ambassador PORTER. Or in countries, for example, like Canada, we can do very little political reporting in the provinces, and we are now paying for that. We are not in a good position because of budgetary reasons.

Mr. JOHNSON. My point is, I wonder if we are misusing our resources and channeling them, wrongly perhaps, in the direction of propaganda activities in the CIA instead of using resources for political reporting for the State Department which may bear more fruit.

Ambassador PORTER. Well, you find in practice you can't get them to shift their budget or their funds to take care of a position like that, say be filled by a Foreign Service officer. They will quite happily turn up the money if you will put one of their people in there. But that isn't always wise, and certainly in a place like Canada, not at all. I wouldn't countenance that at all. We do need political reporting, but not the kind that they are supposed to do. We need, first, reporting events plus analysis right away, by a man who is on top of the situation. They are not thinking of that.

Ambassador BROWN. But you are right. What you were talking about then would be what you would call a foreign affairs budget, which money could move around much more easily. We are not at that, unfortunately. In the State Department the number of Foreign Service officers is fewer now than it was 10 years ago. We've had a series of Op Reds and force reductions of one kind or another, and the sacrifice has been made in political reporting.

Mr. JOHNSON. Of course, the Congress might be in a position to discourage CIA spending in the propaganda area and encourage State Department spending in the political reporting area through the legislative process, moving funds from propaganda to political reporting. Would that be a useful transfer of funds?

Ambassador PORTER. Yes; that would be useful in my opinion.

Ambassador BROWN. It would be useful if you could hold everybody to it. Basically, what is happening with Foreign Service personnel is that consular demands are increasing constantly. You are mandated by Congress to carry out certain consular responsibilities; you cannot abdicate from those. So therefore if the demand increases for consular services abroad, you have to sacrifice somewhere. And where you sacrifice, let's say in Montreal, where God knows we should have some good political reporting officers, what

you have is consular officers carrying out their mandated responsibilities and very little political reporting from what can be a gut political issue.

Mr. ASPIN. What is consular activities? What kind——

Ambassador BROWN. Issuing visas, issuing passports, visitors visas, immigration visas, getting people out of jail, all these things——

Ambassador PORTER. Port activities.

Ambassador BROWN. They are all mandated by law, and there is no way you can escape from them. In other words, let's put it this way. For an American to go to England, he needs no papers at all, just his passport. But for an Englishman to come to the United States, he has to have a visa, which has to be issued by our Embassy or one of the consulates, a piece of paper stamped in his passport. Now, all of that requires an enormous amount of time and effort, but with very little practical reasoning, but there are thousands of people tied up in this activity.

Mr. JOHNSON. How does our political reporting compare with the political reporting of the Soviet Union?

Ambassador BROWN. I wouldn't know. I would like to know.

Mr. ASPIN. What you are saying is that the political reporting gets squeezed out on this and that we don't get the kind of political reporting that we ought to have in the Montreal case.

Ambassador BROWN. Right. But I am agreeing basically with what Ambassador Porter says, that where the squeeze has come is in what they call constituent posts, the posts that report to the Embassy. The Embassies themselves have held on to their political reporting responsibilities, but have tended to knock—when they are confronted with cutting of staff, they tend to knock it off in these constituent posts, and that has happened on a global basis in the last 10 years.

Mr. ASPIN. Does this suggest that some of the consular things could be changed? I mean, has the Department ever made recommendation to Congress or through the system that, for example, that we do away with visas for Englishmen visiting the United States?

Ambassador BROWN. We've done it, done it, and it's always fallen on deaf ears, the visa business, for the last 10 years.

Mr. WILSON. I understand from your previous statements, I guess it was Ambassador Porter's, that we have no CIA operations in friendly countries like Canada——

Ambassador PORTER. To the best of my knowledge——

Mr. WILSON. To the best of your knowledge.

Ambassador PORTER [continuing]. We have no operation in Canada outside of the normal cooperation with Canadian services.

Mr. WILSON. Or at least any covert activity.

Ambassador PORTER. That's right. It's not a standard CIA operation.

Mr. WILSON. But is it conceivable that when there is a problem such as is growing in Montreal and that area, that it would be helpful to our foreign policy to have better reporting and better——

Ambassador PORTER. Not if it's covert activity involved, no. I think that would be a very dangerous thing for us to engage in, in a country like Canada.

Mr. WILSON. OK. Now, just one thing on Loch Johnson's question about freelancers and why should it be included in the Admiral's directive. We have about 20 prominent members of the press here, and I imagine if we ask them to give us a specific definition of what is a freelancer, we would get 20 different logical answers.

Ambassador BROWN. Yes.

Mr. WILSON. That is one of the reasons why—what is a freelancer? How big is a horse? You know, I just don't think it is possible to include it and I am frankly glad it is not included.

Mr. ASPIN. Anybody else?

Thank you all, very, very much for coming. It has been very interesting and very useful.

Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 11:47 a.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 9 a.m., Wednesday, January 4, 1978.]

THE CIA AND THE MEDIA

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 4, 1978

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF THE
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:10 a.m., in room 2322, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Les Aspin (chairman of the subcommittee), presiding.

Present: Representatives Aspin (presiding), Mineta and McClory.

Also present: Loch Johnson, professional staff member.

Mr. ASPIN. We begin this second week of hearings this morning on the CIA and the media with two witnesses who have given this topic a great deal of thought.

One of the witnesses today is Dr. Morton H. Halperin, who is presently the director of the Center for National Security Studies, an organization sponsored by the American Civil Liberties Foundation and the Fund for Peace. Dr. Halperin has a Ph. D. from Yale University, was on the faculty at Harvard University, served as a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Department of Defense, as well as a senior staff member on the National Security Council, and has been a senior fellow in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution. His most recent book is entitled "The Lawless State."

Our second witness, Mr. Stuart Loory, has been a journalist for the past two decades, including service as a foreign correspondent in Moscow for the New York Herald-Tribune. He has also been a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Kiplinger professor of public affairs reporting at Ohio State University. Presently Mr. Loory is managing editor at the Chicago Sun-Times. In 1974, Mr. Loory wrote an influential article for the Columbia Journalism Review, entitled "The CIA's Use of the Press."

A third witness was scheduled, Mr. John P. Roche. Unfortunately, his responsibilities as academic dean at Tufts University now prevent him from joining us today. We regret that, but we are delighted to welcome Dr. Halperin and Mr. Loory.

Who wants to start?

STATEMENT OF MORTON H. HALPERIN, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES

Mr. HALPERIN. First I should say, having been at some of your other hearings, I want to put three statements, in the spirit of full disclosure, on the record.

First, I have in fact, at the invitation of the CIA, lectured at their headquarters, I have been paid for it and I would do it again if invited to do so.

Second, when I functioned as a freelance journalist, I have used the CIA as a source of information and if they were prepared to continue that relationship, so would I. When I was engaged in graduate study I in fact went for employment at CIA and was told that they were not interested in people wearing glasses and it was the shortest interview I had.

I have a prepared statement that I would like to ask be printed in the record as written, with the attachments, and also request permission to add some additional attachments on those issues.

Mr. ASPIN. Without objection.

[The prepared statement of Morton H. Halperin follows:]

[The attachments referred to above appear as appendix J. p. 372.]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MORTON H. HALPERIN*

Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin by taking this opportunity to commend you and this committee for holding these public hearings on an issue of vital importance.

My own remarks will focus on two issues:

(1) the CIA use of the American and foreign press to influence events and opinions in the United States and (2) the CIA conduct of background investigations of journalists without their permission and knowledge.

As you will no doubt have been told in these hearings, members of the press, on their own initiative, talk frequently to officials of the CIA both at home and abroad as part of their regular news gathering activities. No one would want to prevent this. The difficulty arises when the CIA exploits these relations or uses its network of foreign propaganda assets to influence American perceptions or to affect politics in the United States.

The CIA's position is that it simply supplies information to American reporters at their request (presumably as its contribution to keeping the American public informed), and that when it supplies false and misleading information to its foreign assets, it views the feedback into the United States as an unintended and undesired consequence.

Even if that were the case, CIA propaganda activities which distort American perceptions are, in my view, unacceptable and should be prohibited. There is, however, considerable evidence that the CIA has in the past and continues to use its various disinformation techniques to influence what appears in the American press, either to indirectly influence events abroad or to affect events in the United States. (I leave aside CIA efforts to suppress or censor stories relating directly to CIA activities). I want to review very briefly several episodes which have come to light. These are:

1. The CIA effort to discredit studies critical of the Warren Commission Report;
 2. The CIA effort to present Salvador Allende as a threat to a free press in Chile;
 3. The CIA exploitation of the murder of Robert Welsh, its station chief in Greece;
- and
4. The CIA effort to discredit Elias Demetracopoulos.

THE WARREN COMMISSION EPISODE

On April 1, 1967, the CIA sent a dispatch to some of its field offices directing them to take action where there was discussion of the John F. Kennedy assassination to discredit and counter the claims of American authors challenging the results of the Warren Commission Report.

The cable provided a list of themes to be used and directed the stations "to employ propaganda assets to answer and refute the attacks of the critics. Book reviews and feature articles are particularly appropriate."

The attached material, to be used in attaching the books, contained information about the political activities and views of Americans from CIA files, including

*Morton H. Halperin is the director of the Center for National Security Studies whose activities are sponsored by the ACLU Foundation and the Fund for Peace.

innuendos about Communist Party membership or control. Here is an excerpt from the CIA's cables:

Joesten's American Publisher, Carl Marzani, was once sentenced to jail by a federal jury for concealing his Communist Party (CPUSA) membership in order to hold a government job. Available information indicates that Mark Lane was elected Vice Chairman of the New York Council to Abolish the House Un-American Activities Committee on 28 May 1963; he also attended the 8th Congress of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (an international Communist front organization) in Budapest from 31 March to 5 April 1964, where he expounded his (pre-Report) views on the Kennedy assassination.

Why the CIA felt obliged to attack the critics of the Warren Commission remains unclear. That the Agency should not be permitted to attack Americans or their writings seems very clear. Such activity is inappropriate. Moreover, its spill back effects in the United States should have been clearly anticipated.

At Tab A are documents released to Mark Lane by the CIA under the FOIA detailing this episode.

ALLENDE AND THE CHILEAN PRESS

As part of the effort to prevent Salvadore Allende from coming to power or remaining in office, the CIA spread the word through its media assets that he would abolish freedom of the press in Chile. The recent New York Times series on the CIA and the press reports that the CIA arranged for the Inter-American Press Association to issue a statement charging that freedom of the press was being jeopardized in Chile. This statement was reported in the U.S. as well as the Latin American press.

The CIA must have known that these efforts would be reflected in the American press, but it went a step further in providing a briefing to Time magazine, at its request, and perhaps to other magazines as well. The Church Committee described this episode as follows:

Third, special intelligence and "inside" briefings were given to U.S. journalists, at their request. One Time cover story was considered particularly noteworthy. According to CIA documents, the Time correspondent in Chile apparently had accepted Allende's protestations of moderation and constitutionality at face value. Briefings requested by Time and provided by the CIA in Washington resulted in a change in the basic thrust of the Time story on Allende's September 4 victory and in the timing of that story.

As a result of a lawsuit filed under the FOIA, I have obtained most of the text of the briefing given by the CIA to Time and perhaps other publications. (They are included as Attachment B). They show that the CIA provided Time with the same information that was being put out to its assets in Latin America. In particular, the documents emphasized the threat to freedom of the press in Chile.

This was done despite the fact that the DDI intelligence estimates were apparently suggesting that no U.S. vital interests would be threatened by an Allende regime. Time requested a briefing on Chile. It was given a propaganda document by an official of the clandestine services. Such officials, in my view, consider contacts with the American press as "operations" designed to foster the objectives of whatever covert activity they are engaged in. For that reason, I would suggest that contacts between the press and the CIA in Washington—or at least briefings arranged by the press office—should be limited to officials of the DDI. I would not seek to prevent journalists from seeking out members of the clandestine service, but they should fully understand what they are likely to be getting.

THE WELCH ASSASSINATION

The Welch Assassination case is the only episode that I am aware of where there is clear evidence of CIA manipulation of the American press for the purpose of influencing events in the United States. The CIA successfully exploited the murder of one of its station chiefs to set back efforts to bring the CIA under constitutional control.

The facts are no longer in serious dispute.

Sometime before Welch went to Greece, an American magazine, Counterspy, identified him as station chief in Peru. This did not lead to cancellation of his assignment. When Welch arrived in Athens he decided to live in the home that CIA station chiefs had occupied many years. A cable from Langley urged him to live elsewhere, pointing out that it was widely known in Athens' political circles that the CIA chief lived in that house. Welch was warned that with anti-American and anti-CIA feeling running high, he risked assassination if he remained in the house. He tragically rejected the advice.

When word of Welch's murder reached Washington, the CIA assistant to the Director for press relations, Angus Thuermer, called many Washington reporters and told them on deep background, that an American magazine had published Welch's name and that he was now dead. Lest the point be missed, Thuermer, or some other CIA official, said on background—for attribution to "a U.S. intelligence source"—that "we've had an American gunned down by other Americans fingering him—right or wrong—as a CIA agent." Thuermer did not tell anyone that the Agency had warned Welch not to live in that house. Indeed, Daniel Schorr reported in the Washington Post on December 27 that, months later, when the Senate Intelligence Committee was investigating this episode, the CIA Director sought to persuade the committee not to make that fact public.

American newspapers the next day reported, on their own authority that Welch's name had been published in an American magazine and now he was dead. Consider how different the Welch episode would have been if the stories had begun: "Two months after he was warned not to live in a notorious house long known to be occupied by CIA station chiefs, Richard Welch was murdered as he returned to the house late last night." That the stories instead suggested that Counterspy was responsible for his death was the result of a deliberate CIA manipulation of the American press.

I urge this committee to get to the bottom of this episode by questioning Mr. Thuermer and his supervisors.

THE DEMETRACOPOULOS EPISODE

On December 6, 1977, the New York Times carried an article by David Binder, describing the activities of Elias P. Demetracopoulos. The story contained the following sentence: "CIA records show that in 1951 Mr. Dimitracopoulos (sic) offered his services to the agency and was turned down. They show that he offered to work for United States Army Intelligence in August 1951 and was again turned down. The CIA further alleges that in the 1950's he was associated with both Yugoslav and Israeli intelligence services." I understand that Mr. Binder has since confirmed to journalists that he was shown portions of Mr. Demetracopoulos' CIA file.

Mr. Demetracopoulos has been seeking his files under the FOIA. He has seen, I understand, no files showing the alleged contacts with U.S. intelligence. He has been given a CIA memorandum saying that the agency had no record of his having worked for any foreign intelligence service.

Why did a CIA official show portions of Mr. Demetracopoulos' file to a New York Times reporter? I urge this committee to explore whether this was not part of a deliberate CIA effort by the clandestine services to discredit a persistent critic. Whatever the motive the CIA cannot be permitted to deliberately provide information from its files about individuals without their permission. Such action may well violate the Privacy Act. It certainly violates the CIA charter.

These four episodes may be the tip of the iceberg; they may not. This committee has an obligation to find out.

Let me turn briefly to one other matter.

As a result of a deposition taken in the case related to the background briefing for Time magazine, which I discussed earlier, we have learned that the CIA routinely does background investigations of journalists who ask for or who offer information "to try to get a feel whether there is any potential problem." As a result of the investigation, the journalist may be given a security clearance but may not be told that it has been granted. A copy of the deposition is attached.

The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has recently held in *Weissman v. CIA* that the agency has no authority to conduct background investigations on any American with no connection with the agency. I do not believe that a journalist's request for or offer of information establishes a sufficient connection to justify a background investigation under the reasoning of *Weissman*. In any case, I do not believe that the CIA has or should have the authority to secretly investigate the lives of American reporters.

Mr. Chairman, I am honored to have been invited to participate in these hearings. I would be glad to any questions the committee may have or to submit additional documentation for the record should the committee request it.

Mr. HALPERIN. I would like therefore simply to talk from my statement rather than to read it.

I want to focus on two issues. One is the question of the CIA use of the American and foreign press to influence events and opinions in the United States directly, rather than as an inevitable or

unintended consequence of trying to influence opinion abroad and, second, what I understand to be a continuing CIA practice of conducting background investigations of journalists who approach the CIA for information or to give the CIA information, which is done without the permission or the knowledge of the journalist who is subjected to this background investigation.

Now of course the CIA claims that it does not seek to influence events directly in the United States, and does not seek to influence the activities of Americans functioning within the United States, and that it is only an unintended consequence of what they do to the foreign press. I think that is wrong, that in fact the CIA has in the past and continues, on some occasions, to seek to influence what appears in the American press.

The most obvious example, and one that I assume the CIA would not deny, is where the information has to do with what the CIA calls its intelligence sources and methods. The CIA has been to court once to stop the publication of a book and it has discussed recently going to court again against Mr. Snepp and others. It has tried to persuade publishers of various books not in fact to permit those books to be published.

We know that the CIA feels free to acquire by any means manuscripts or outlines of books, and that it came into unauthorized possession of both Mr. Marchetti's outline of his proposed book and Mr. Agee's manuscript before either of them had authorized it to do so. Mr. Snepp, aware of that practice, went to great lengths to see that it did not come into unauthorized possession of his.

I think, in addition to where CIA sources and methods are involved, there are situations where the CIA does feel free to try to influence what appears in the American press for the purpose of influencing what happens in the United States.

I have in my statement, and I want to go through four cases that we happen to know about because the documents have been either released or come to light through congressional investigations or through Freedom of Information Act requests. There is no way to know whether these are the tip of the iceberg or 90 percent of what is going on, but our experience in other areas I think would suggest if we know about these four cases, there in fact is a substantial number of others. Let me look at them in turn.

The first has to do with the Warren Commission report. The CIA had a deliberate clear policy, enunciated in a cable which is attached to my statement, of directing its stations in any country where there was controversy about the Kennedy assassination to engage in a major effort, using their communications assets, their ability to influence editorials, newspaper articles in the foreign press, including we know a great many English language newspapers in countries where English is not the main language, but also in countries like England and Australia, to do what it could to discredit the critics of the Warren Commission.

Now why they chose to do that, they seek to explain in the cable, as having to do with the fact that some people have accused them of being involved. I would like to stay out of the question of why they were concerned about this and simply focus on the question of what they did, which was to send out a list of objectives and to tell them to try to get book reviews and feature articles explaining the

seven reasons that they identified as objections to the critics of the Warren Commission.

One of the things they succeeded in getting which I do not mention in my statement was an article in the *Spectator*, a distinguished British publication, which apparently, according to the documents, was written in Langley, Va. at the CIA headquarters, placed in the magazines by assets of the CIA in Britain. Now that is obviously a magazine widely read by Americans and one which could not have helped but to influence the debate within the United States on the Warren Commission report, as well as abroad.

In addition, the documents show that the CIA, despite its proud record of resisting McCarthyism during the fifties, was prepared to engage in what I think can be fairly described as character assassination, using information which it had in its files about the lawful political activities of the critics of the Warren Commission.

One of the kinds of information which the cable instructs the assets to try to place in newspapers and magazines is the paragraph that I quote in my prepared statement, which includes, for example, the statement that Mark Lane was elected vice chairman of the New York Council to Abolish the House un-American Activities Committee. Now that was a lawful political organization within the United States.

I do not believe the CIA ought to have in its files the fact that Mark Lane was elected vice chairman of the New York Committee to Abolish the House un-American Activities Committee. I certainly do not think it ought to instruct its assets, its propaganda assets around the world to publish that information as proof, as the cable suggests they do, that the whole attack on the Warren Commission is Communist-directed, Communist-inspired, and run by people who are engaged in a Communist activity.

Now presumably the CIA thought that people would think that that organization was a Communist organization. As far as I know it is not, but it seems to me that is again irrelevant, the CIA should not be in the business and clearly, at least in this case, was in the business of spreading what it considered to be derogatory information about the lawful political activities of American citizens in order to discredit their first amendment-protected activities of writing books and articles and making speeches abroad as well as at home about the Warren Commission report.

Let me mention that a lawyer for the American Civil Liberties Union, Mark Lynch, on behalf of Mark Lane, sought to get assurances from the CIA that they would not engage in the same kind of activities in connection with the recently-published book of his relating to the Robert Kennedy assassination. A letter was received back, which I do not have with me but which I will submit for the record, which I think can be fairly described as equivocal.

[See p. 443 for letter.]

The CIA took the position it would not do anything that would interfere with Mr. Mark Lane's first amendment rights, but they did not define what that was nor did it say that any of the activities described in the cable they would agree violated his rights nor whether they would not violate his future rights. So again we have the problem which, while the documentation is from the past, the CIA is unwilling to give assurances now to people who were in the

past subjected to this technique that they will not use it in the future.

The second case that I refer to has to do with Mr. Allende. I think it relates to a point which I would like to make about the feedback issue.

There was some discussion that you have had about whether or not the CIA could notify American newspapers that stories were fake. Everybody has agreed "no," at least in the current climate, that the story the next day would be "CIA has planned stories, seeks to steer American press away."

I think the issue is more serious; namely, a lot of foreigners that the CIA is seeking to influence read the American press, particularly Time magazine, Newsweek, the international edition of The Herald-Tribune, New York Times, and so on. Therefore, part of the process of influencing foreign opinion on broad general questions like "Is Allende a threat to democracy in Chile?" depends upon that information appearing in the American press as well as in the foreign press. It certainly depends on the American press not having a different view of what is going on. So we know the CIA was going around using all of its Latin American assets to plant the story that Allende would seek to abolish the free press in Chile, and in fact was a threat to democracy and a free press.

If Time magazine had run a story saying "There is really not too much to worry about, this man looks like he is prepared to operate within the democratic traditions of Chile," that would have undone throughout Latin America what the CIA was trying to do. So it was not a question of wanting or not wanting feedback.

Part of the image of getting this policy in Latin American depended on Time magazine writing a large story presenting a very different image and an image, by the way, which was consistent as far as we know with the image the analysts in the CIA had, namely, Allende would not do anything posing a threat to American interests.

What happened was that Time magazine went to the CIA and asked for information. The CIA arranged for a briefing, not by the analysts in the CIA who would have essentially confirmed the story Time magazine intended to run, basically a story saying there is no reason to be hysterical about this man. Indeed they were put in touch with the operators, the clandestine services who viewed the effort of Time magazine as part of their efforts, as part of the effort to carry out the operation that they had been instructed to carry out, which was to discredit Allende and indeed create a climate in which a coup against him would become possible.

So they were given a briefing, a copy of which I have obtained and attached to my statement, which is essentially the same as the information they were giving out to the foreign press. It is not clear that any specific sentence in that document is known to be false by the people who wrote it down, but the point is that it created the impression as it was intended to create the impression, contrary to what the analysts in the CIA were arguing, in fact there was a grave danger to freedom of the press from an election of Mr. Allende's coming to power. Those documents were given to

Time magazine, according to the Church committee report.¹ They had the intended effect, Time canceled its favorable story and later wrote a much less favorable story about the Allende episode.

I think those documents are important because they show the CIA using the propaganda that it prepared to give to its foreign assets, giving that propaganda to an American journalist, a journalist by the way who had a clearance, at least one of them they gave this information to they had previously cleared, and they still assert the connection between the CIA and this information, at least some of the information, is in fact classified.

The third episode I want to talk about is the Welch assassination. I think it is clear and I think some of the statements Mr. Colby has made before this subcommittee confirm the basic facts of this situation, namely, that Mr. Welch was living in a house long known to be the home of the CIA Station Chief in Greece, that he was in fact murdered returning to that home, so the people who killed him did not have to know what his name was and that knowing his name would have done them no good. What they needed to know was the man in that car was in fact the CIA Station Chief. The critical fact was that he was the resident of that house, not his name, since he did not have his name displayed. The critical fact is that this was known to be the home of the CIA Station Chief.

The CIA knew that was dangerous. Indeed, they had sent him a cable telling him not to live in that house because it would be a threat to his life if he did so. Yet the CIA not only did not release that fact when Welch was assassinated but, as Daniel Schorr recently reported, tried to persuade the Senate Intelligence Committee not to release the fact that they had warned him not to live in that house. They succeeded to the point that the fact appears in the Senate Intelligence Committee report in a rather cryptic footnote, which does not make entirely clear what happened. But my understanding in fact is that he was sent a very clear cable saying it is known that that house is the home of the Station Chief, there is anti-CIA sentiment in Greece which, by the way, I think has much less to do, as Mr. Colby tried to suggest, with general agitation in Greece and more relates to the coup in Greece. That was a basis, not that American critics were saying that the CIA was doing inappropriate things.

When Welch was killed, Angus Thuermer, the CIA Assistant to the Director for Press Relations, called every journalist, or as many as he could reach of the journalists in town covering the CIA, and said to them on deep background that his name, Welch's name, was published by Counterspy magazine. That meant the reporters could use the information but not attribute it to the CIA.

So if you look, as I have, at the stories filed out of Washington on the date of assassination, they all, or almost all lead with the same sentence: "Several months after his name appeared in an American magazine Mr. Welch was killed tragically in Greece."

If Mr. Thuermer had called those people and said, we told him not to live in that house, he ran that risk, the stories would have

¹See "Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973". Staff report of the Select Committee to study government operations with respect to intelligence activities, United States Senate, December 18, 1975.

said "Two months after he disobeyed or ignored a warning from the CIA he was murdered," the discussion would have focused not on Counterspy magazine fingering him but of the whole question, which I think does deserve attention, of a proper CIA cover for CIA operatives abroad if they are going to have them.

That episode, the Welch episode, continues today to be cited as an example of the dangers from too much public discussion about the CIA, because it leads to assassination. I would call to your attention, and I will submit for the record, a Washington Post editorial which I think is a good example of the degree to which this effort succeeded, the editorial in effect saying that the critics have gone too far, they published the names, and this has tragically led to assassination, a very different assessment than the one Mr. Colby gave this subcommittee.

The fourth episode and very recent has to do with a story written in the New York Times by Mr. David Binder last month dealing with the activities of Mr. Elias Demetracopoulos. That article shows right on its face Mr. Binder was given CIA documents which the CIA has thus far declined to release to Mr. Demetracopoulos under the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act, and they also apparently gave Mr. Binder information which is apparently contradicted by that which Mr. Demetracopoulos has in fact received.

He is, as I understand it, a permanent resident alien of the United States and therefore is covered not only by the U. S. Constitution, but is even a "United States person" as the Justice Department has recently used it and is covered by the Privacy Act. I think this raises questions about the CIA selectively leaking from its own files to an American newspaper for the purpose of influencing events in the United States.

Mr. Chairman, let me turn briefly to the other issue that I want to raise. That is the question of the CIA conducting secret background investigations of American citizens, particularly as relevant to this hearing, of journalists without their permission and without them having applied for a job at the CIA.

The deposition that we have taken in the case in which we have gotten the Chile background briefing, which I have submitted for the record, indicates that the CIA, when approached by journalists for information or when it is approaching journalists seeking information from them as a result of trips they have taken abroad, will at least on some occasions and continuing into the present, conduct secret background investigations of that individual. That will clearly include checking with the FBI, with the Passport Office, with the Secret Service and with other domestic agencies to find out about that individual.

It would also include going out into the field and gathering information about the journalist without his or her permission and without identifying the investigators as from the CIA, as a result of which the CIA conducts a file on the basis of which it makes a determination whether to give the journalist a clearance. There are in fact a number of American journalists walking around this country with CIA clearances without knowing that that honor has been bestowed upon them and without knowing that the CIA gives them information as it gave this information on the Allende brief-

ing, only because they have succeeded in getting clearance. The fact of this is clear from the deposition.

I would like to also submit for the record what I do not refer to in my statement, that is a set of documents that Mr. Richard Dudman, the head of the St. Louis Post Dispatch Washington Bureau, has received under the Freedom of Information Act. I would like to hand these in now and include them in the record. They show that the CIA in fact ordered such an investigation of Mr. Dudman in 1972 as a result of his contact with the agency after he took a trip to China. As a result of his contacts with the agency on his China trip, the CIA conducted a background investigation, it requested the FBI and other agencies to give reports on him, and a request was made to grant him a security clearance. I think the documents do not make it clear whether in fact he was granted that clearance. My understanding is Mr. Dudman was not informed that investigation was being undertaken and that the CIA was going to decide whether or not to give him a clearance.

Now the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Court has ruled in a Freedom of Information Act case that such background investigations of Americans with no contact with the CIA violates the CIA charter. I think it also raises grave questions for the CIA's relation to the press when the CIA uses the excuse of a journalist seeking information or the excuse of their approaching a journalist to ask him or her for information to do an investigation of that journalist to find out about them. As the CIA official doing the deposition, Mr. Briggs, told us, he said we want to get a feel as to whether there is any potential problem.

I do not know quite what that means but I do not think the CIA has the right to use its secret intelligence gathering facilities to find out what it wants to know about journalists with whom it is conducting relationships.

That completes my statement. I am of course delighted to answer questions.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you, Mr. Halperin.

Let's hear next from Mr. Loory.

Mr. McCLORY. May I join in welcoming Mr. Loory here this morning from my native State, a distinguished journalist, the managing editor of the Sun-Times, a great national metropolitan newspaper. I want to say I am delighted he is here with us, and look forward to hearing his testimony and his responses to our inquiries.

STATEMENT OF STUART LOORY, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES

Mr. LOORY. Thank you very much, Mr. McClory.

Mr. Chairman, I did not realize that we were expected to make full disclosure, but I will.

I have never lectured at Langley at the CIA headquarters and have never taken a fee for any lectures that I have never given. I did once there have a very good lunch with Mr. Helms in his dining room, a working lunch. He was a very good source of information to me, and indeed the CIA has been a source on many stories and, like Mort Halperin, I hope they will continue to be.

Thanks for inviting me here to air my views on the relationship between the CIA and the press.

I would like to discuss two matters with you this morning: One, the need that I see to air completely the past relationships between the CIA and the press, including revelation of names, dates, places and duties—and now that Mort has raised it, the issue of whether or how many reporters there are walking around with security clearances that they do not know about. I think this is necessary in order to wipe the slate clean and create the conditions for a future free of suspicion.

Two, I think there is a need to determine the extent to which the CIA, during the cold war, functioned as a propaganda machine aimed largely at affecting public opinion in the United States. Frankly, I do not believe that the primary purpose of the agency's propaganda effort was always only to support U.S. policy overseas. I think that it also worked to create a favorable climate at home for the enactment of foreign policy.

To expand on my first point, ever since former CIA Director William E. Colby revealed in November 1973 that the CIA had retained American journalists as paid agents, there has been a significant disagreement on just how pervasive that relationship has been. Colby in 1973 said there were "some three dozen" American newsmen on the CIA payroll.

Carl Bernstein, in his article in Rolling Stone earlier this year, said the agency had had relationships with 400 American journalists. The New York Times in its series last month said "more than 30 and perhaps as many as 100 American journalists" have worked as salaried intelligence operatives. Obviously there is great disagreement here and the real truth is not yet known.

I think the American people are entitled to a more specific accounting on the extent of the relationship. They are also entitled to know more specifically just what those journalists did for the agency, whether they functioned as intelligence gatherers, which raises one set of issues, or as propaganda disseminators, which raises yet another and I think far more serious set of issues.

I also think that until the agency makes complete disclosure of its past relationships with the press there will be little reason to think it is telling the truth when it says it is sticking by its new policies.

I agree with others who have appeared before this committee who argue that there must be no attempts by the CIA to use the American news business as cover. The agency, even in Admiral Turner's latest directive on the subject, still insists on allowing ambiguities. We have no way of knowing just how ambiguous the directives are unless we are made more familiar with past practices. Our definition of freelance writer, for example, or stringer could vary significantly from the agency's. Even our definition of a paid relationship could be at variance, and the last sentence of Admiral Turner's directive even allows a huge exception in saying any exception has to be cleared by himself.

If you believe the agency, the past practice was that, whenever journalists were being retained, that retention had to be cleared by the Director of Central Intelligence or one of his deputies. So that in essence, even with the very nicely drafted statement of Admiral Turner, what we have is the old policy restated.

That brings me to my second point.

There have been reports that even some of the most distinguished of American journalists have at times disseminated CIA propaganda, sometimes knowingly. If this is so, it makes a mockery of the historic arm's-length relationship between the press and the Government in the United States. The news business in this country just cannot function properly if it is to become a handmaiden of the Government, if its reporters are to moonlight clandestinely for Government agencies, if its dispatches are to be polluted unwittingly, or wittingly, with untruths or slants that alibi for the Government.

Mr. Colby has told the New York Times that the agency instructed foreign journalists in its employ what to write "all the time," and that is his quote. He denies that such was the general practice with the American journalists in his employ.

Frankly, I think we need a more detailed look at the record before that statement can be believed with confidence.

Mr. Chairman, I think there is good reason to investigate the past and make public a more detailed and specific record about it. Permissible future activities cannot be delineated or defined properly without knowing what went on before. That goes not only for the CIA but for the news business itself.

Thank you.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you, Mr. Loory.

Let me turn to questions from the other two gentlemen who are here this morning: Mr. Norman Mineta, who has been attending these hearings last week, and we are grateful to have him back again; for the first time here at the hearings, Bob McClory from Illinois.

Mr. McClory, do you have some questions you would like to address to the witnesses?

Mr. McCLORY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Halperin, we were sort of involved in this Welch matter in the Select Committee on Intelligence in that his assassination occurred at a time that the Pike committee was operating, so we got rather close to that matter. The thing that concerned me, following the event, was the suggestion in some of the news articles that leaks had occurred which resulted in the identification of this CIA station agent.

When I heard that, as the ranking member on the committee, I communicated with the CIA and asked if they had provided any information to anyone that any leak had occurred as far as the committee was concerned, notwithstanding that the news articles implied or inferred that such had occurred. They informed me that they had not represented that there had been any leak from any committee.

Do you have any information that—in this deep background that you refer to, information to the contrary?

Mr. HALPERIN. No. My impression is that the CIA simply took the position that the publication of the name—that they did not get into the question at all of how the name had come into the possession of the role Counterspy magazine played. This was not an accusation about a leak.

Mr. McCLORY. I have tried to determine, too, whether or not Mr. Colby—and I do not believe Mr. Colby at the time knew where

Welch was living or had himself indicated where Welch was living. Do you have any information that Mr. Colby did know or that he personally had made any decision about Welch's abode in Greece?

Mr. HALPERIN. Well, Mr. Colby has discussed this matter before this subcommittee last week, and I would not want to paraphrase him. I would urge you to look at that record.

I think he is indicating there that he did in fact know about his living in that house and he attributes the activity that the agency took on the first day to emotion and being upset about the death of a CIA Station Chief. But my assumption is that when something like that happens, the counterintelligence file on that individual, in fact, is brought to the attention of senior officials of the Agency. It was the counterintelligence staff, that is the staff that is responsible for protecting CIA agents, that had urged Mr. Welch not to live in that house, and I find it difficult to believe that that fact was not on the director's desk within minutes after the assassination.

Mr. McCLORY. You are suggesting—of course you are suggesting review of these four incidents, too—

Mr. HALPERIN. That is right.

Mr. McCLORY [continuing]. To which you have made reference.

You are suggesting, are you not, that the reason why Welch was assassinated was that he was living in a house that had been used by CIA agents or Station Chiefs—

Mr. HALPERIN. Station Chiefs.

Mr. McCLORY [continuing]. In Greece? At the same time, you appear to be denying that the publication and identification of Station Chiefs in Counterspy magazine was not the cause?

Mr. HALPERIN. That is right. I think Mr. Colby in his testimony earlier last week essentially agreed with that, said that he thought the publication of names had added to the climate in which there was a tendency to take action against Station Chiefs, but I think is no longer suggesting that the publication of the name of the particular individual, Mr. Welch, which identified him by the way as being in Peru—

Mr. McCLORY. Are you condoning the publication of the names of Station Chiefs in a magazine without authority?

Mr. HALPERIN. My position is that individuals who have obtained that information as a result of security clearances should not in fact publish those names. I think where the CIA has not seen fit to provide appropriate cover for individuals, and it is easy, as Mr. Colby concedes, to determine the name simply by looking at State Department publications, official publications of the State Department, that it is difficult to condemn people who do that. I think in fact it is counterproductive. I have not engaged in it, have urged people, when they asked me, not to do so, but I do not think it played any role in this assassination or in any other way.

Mr. McCLORY. You made reference to the Allende case and then described some of the things that the CIA was doing there. Actually, the CIA is a branch of the executive, part of the executive branch, and the CIA was not doing anything which was inconsistent with national policy with regard to the Allende regime, was it?

Mr. HALPERIN. Absolutely not. I did not mean to give that impression. I think the CIA was operating under clear instructions

from the White House, doing exactly what the White House wanted it to do.

Mr. McCLORY. With respect to these background investigations that are done, do you think that the background investigation of—frankly, I would think if they were sending a journalist to Communist China, it might be important for us to know whether or not he has any contacts or relatives or whatever over there.

Is it your feeling that these background investigations are all right as long as you tell the person about it, but they are not all right if you do not tell them about it?

Mr. HALPERIN. I think they are all right if you get the person's permission. I think if people want to have the CIA investigate them—there is a separate question of whether the CIA charter prohibits them from conducting them at all and some other agency of the Government ought to do so. I think if an individual wants to have the Government investigate him and they get his or her permission, the Government has a right to do it. The question of whether CIA does is another question.

I do not think the Government has the right, and specifically I do not think the CIA has the right, to investigate people without their permission.

Mr. McCLORY. I was intrigued recently reading in this volume, "A Man Called Intrepid," by a man called William Stevenson, who conducted masterful espionage and counterespionage prior to and during World War II, operating in the Rockefeller Center in New York primarily in this country. He developed a story with regard to astrology which was conducted by a person by the name of de Wohl. This story was a pure fabrication, but it had substantial effect around the world in undermining Hitler and his influence by predicting his demise and his defeat.

This was picked up by Associated Press I think and it was—although it was pure fabrication, it had a substantial effect in the turn of events in World War II. I would judge that as being a masterful intelligence activity consistent with what the writer's goals were and our substantial goals at that time, although this was before our entry into the war.

What do you think about that?

Mr. HALPERIN. Well, I think that questions about Hitler always are the hardest to answer about all of these issues. I think clearly when Congress declares war the situation changes, and I think the question of what kind of restrictions all of us would accept change if Congress declares war. If Congress has not declared war, then I think these activities are in fact unacceptable in democratic society.

I think the fact that most of us now looking back at Hitler would approve of those activities in retrospect, in relation to a single historical individual, does not make them right.

Mr. McCLORY. Two things, you make a distinction between war and nonwar?

Mr. HALPERIN. Between Congress declaring war—

Mr. McCLORY. Then you make a distinction between the objective of the propaganda story or the fabricated news story as to what the objective is?

Mr. HALPERIN. Right.

Mr. McCLODY. Who is going to make these important decisions?

Mr. HALPERIN. Well, I think that it is up to Congress to, in general, make them about the historical period in which we live, and we do not face a Hitler. I think that that is a fact that Congress ought to take account of in deciding what kind of authority it wanted to give to a secret intelligence service.

Mr. McCLODY. Some people at that time thought Hitler was a good guy.

Mr. HALPERIN. That is true. That is the judgments you get paid to make, and I would urge you to make them—

Mr. McCLODY. I am sure I have used up my 5 minutes.

Mr. HALPERIN [continuing]. I am sure not enough.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Mineta.

Mr. MINETA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me go back to an article, Mr. Loory, that you had in The Washington Post back in 1974. You are recounting your experiences in Czechoslovakia some 15 years ago and how you had been able to travel about, get interviews and then being, I guess interviewed would be a proper word, by an embassy officer. You made the statement in that article. After being questioned at some length by the embassy officer, you say, "Unwittingly I had become an agent of my government rather than a representative of the American people."

Why do you say just because you were interviewed you had unwittingly become an agent of the government rather than a representative of the people?

At that point I assume you had not written any article. Does that kind of a "debriefing" make you a government agent?

Mr. LOORY. I think so. I think particularly in the context of the times, Congressman, it was just a relatively short period of time after an Associated Press correspondent in Czechoslovakia had been arrested and jailed for spying. It was always considered in this country that he had been very badly bum-rapped, that action had been taken against him without any justification. All of a sudden, after my experiences in the embassy in Prague that day, I can understand just how Czechoslovakian officials might have considered Bill Otis a spy, without Bill Otis doing anything that he thought was unjustified.

The circumstances were that I was a young correspondent in an Eastern European country who had come into the possession of a lot of information that I could not evaluate myself, based on interviews with various Czechoslovakian organizations. I went to the American Embassy and I said, "I need help. I have all this information and perhaps there is somebody here who can tell me which of it is good and which of it I should be careful with."

Instead of getting that kind of help, I found myself being subjected to a real intense questioning. "OK, what else did he say? Did he have anything to say about this or that?" And the person who had been named to help me was all of a sudden my interrogator, taking notes furiously. It was an unnerving experience.

With all of the stories that we hear about how embassies are bugged, having just passed a policeman in a guard box on the way into the embassy, not yet having written a word, if the Czechs were listening in, if they noted my coming or going they did not know

whether I was going to write a word. All they had perhaps on their tapes and in their records was the fact that I had gone around to see a whole bunch of Czech officials and then I had first thing run right to the American Embassy and dumped all of my information.

Sure I think that kind of debriefing is not justified; simply on appearances if for no other reason at all, I think it compromises a correspondent. If I had to do it over again, I never would do it, under those circumstances, as soon as I saw how the session was going.

Mr. MINETA. There is no question that you do not think that journalists should be propaganda disseminators and you are making an equally strong case for information—gathering as well?

Mr. LOORY. That is right.

Mr. MINETA. As far as making that relationship between the journalists and the CIA?

Mr. LOORY. That is right. I think we do our job best when we report for our readers. If the CIA can find any value in my dispatches, terrific, I am all for it, but I do not think that I should disclose to them the contents of my notebooks beyond what I report in my dispatches.

Mr. MINETA. But you would still be willing to go to the CIA as far as intelligence gathering for any information they might have?

Mr. LOORY. Absolutely. Also, in a subtle kind of way, to trade information with them, because when I conduct an interview—

Mr. MINETA. Have you not crossed the fine line at that point when you say trade information.

Mr. LOORY. Well, these lines are fuzzy lines and I was going to amplify on what I mean by trading information.

When I conduct an interview, it is not always so one-sided that I simply soak up information without giving information. If I am interviewing you on what this committee is after I might say, "Congressman, I understand that it is not your purpose to go into past associations between the CIA and the press," and you may give me an answer. I will say, "Well, that is funny because Congressman Aspin told me the other day just the opposite."

Well, I have just given you a piece of information. That is the kind of trading of information that I see no problem with, but it is when I am going specifically to give information that I would not be giving to my readers.

Mr. MINETA. Dr. Halperin, do you make that same distinction between propaganda disseminating and information gathering, and how do you feel about that arm's-length relationship?

Mr. HALPERIN. Well, I would make a distinction between what I think the CIA ought to be prohibited from doing and the question of ethics the particular journalists want to follow in their own profession.

I would think the CIA ought to be prohibited from giving false information or propaganda information to journalists and ought to be required, when a journalist comes to CIA headquarters for a briefing, that that briefing be given by the analytical staff of the agency based on their analysis, rather than the clandestine services of the agency.

Beyond that, I would leave it to the journalists as to whether they want to get information from the CIA, whether they want to

trade information in the form of questions or in the form of reading from their notebooks. That, it seems to me, is a question journalists ought to decide for themselves.

I guess my view would be if I were a journalist that CIA operatives in the field are in the field to carry out operations of the U.S. Government, and therefore I would be very skeptical of what they told me.

On the other hand, my experience when I was in the Government with talking to Station Chiefs is that they generally know as much about the politics of a country as anybody, and if I was a journalist I would not want to stop talking to the Station Chief. I would do it, knowing at some point he might be giving a particular line. I think the journalist has to decide for himself or herself what he or she may want to do, in what they are prepared to trade to get what they want, because you cannot conduct a one-sided interview, nobody has ever been able to figure out how to do that.

Mr. MINETA. As both of you have seen the recent directive by Admiral Turner relative to the press-CIA relationship, do you feel that regulation goes far enough and is clear enough to stand on its own; or should it be amplified further?

Should that be backed up by legislation?

Dr. Halperin.

Mr. HALPERIN. I would say it clearly required immediately an executive order then finally legislation.

There is a final sentence which says the DCI can change this for any particular purpose he wants to. In terms of public assurance that this is not going on, the directive is meaningless. There is a general exception.

That means the DCI tomorrow, yesterday, or the day after, may make exceptions.

Mr. MINETA. On a case-by-case basis?

Mr. HALPERIN. It doesn't say that. He can say, "This does not apply to the 12 largest newspapers of the United States." He could have made that pronouncement secretly; and if you called and asked they would say, "It is protected information." That phrase makes the document meaningless. You have to be prepared to make rules and stick with them.

I also think there are a number of problems with the specific wording of the document which could be better and more clearly stated than the document it replaces.

Mr. MINETA. What about "stringers" and "freelancers"?

Mr. HALPERIN. I think freelancers should be covered in the sense that anybody identifies himself as a freelance journalist. This is defined as somebody who has credentials which authorizes him or her to represent himself or herself as working for a newspaper or is officially recognized by a foreign government as working for a newspaper organization.

You can define "stringers" as somebody who identifies as a freelance American journalist writing for American publications. I would include such persons.

Mr. MINETA. Could a freelance journalist be accredited for a one-shot story?

Mr. HALPERIN. Yes; that often happens.

Mr. MINETA. That would place them in what relationship with the CIA under this directive?

Mr. HALPERIN. They are still not covered. Often they will get accreditation from a foreign government. But as a freelancer, the directive only covers those who are recognized as representing a news organization. If a journalist goes abroad and says, "I am a freelance journalist and covering the story to write articles for magazines," that person is not covered. Also, it does not include those covered by a fake news organization.

Mr. MINETA. A fake news organization?

Mr. HALPERIN. Yes. If I go abroad and say, "I work for the Washington Sun Times," and there is no Washington Sun Times, I can go all the way around the world with fake credentials and, in fact, be a CIA agent. I think those directives should prohibit the persons of the CIA from representing themselves as working for nonexistent organizations. That has the same corruptive effect on the press.

Mr. MINETA. Mr. Loory.

Mr. LOORY. I would agree with everything Mort said.

On the question of freelancers and can they be accredited, we do that all the time. Somebody will come to me and say, "I have just been invited to China and I am going with the Chicago Trade Delegation. How would you like some articles from me?" We say, "Certainly; we would be happy to take a look at them when they come in and if they warrant it, we will publish them."

At times, we provide letters to them saying they represent the Chicago Sun Times and please extend whatever courtesy you can.

I think this directive clearly allows the CIA to use people like that; perhaps to seek our cover.

The question of the fake organizations, once again, is apparently, from what the New York Times reported in its series, a very serious one. I think the way to provide an answer to this is to find out just what they have done in the past in the way of using those organizations and how those organizations were used.

Once again, I think there was a big propaganda component in the use of those organizations. Not only do they provide cover but also information which found its way into the American press.

Mr. MINETA. What about legislation? Should this area be legislated?

Mr. LOORY. I would disagree with Mort as to legislation as a matter of principle. I think the whole area of the news business and its responsibilities and rights and privileges are covered by the first amendment and I would hate to see us get into legislation on any matter dealing with that if we get to questions of accreditation or how reporters should specifically be dealt with.

Mr. MINETA. Should the directive be clarified or legalized by executive order?

Mr. LOORY. I think you are going to have an awfully difficult time getting a directive written that will cover all the definitions adequately. I think the CIA will always want the kind of loophole that Admiral Turner has left for himself in that last sentence. They are not in the business of limiting their prerogatives. What they are trying to do is limit their prerogatives in a way they can live with later on if they need an exception.

Mr. HALPERIN. May I comment on the legislation issue? I agree there should not be legislation which seeks to regulate the conduct of journalists and which seeks to regulate the relationship between the press and the CIA but as to the use of CIA as to operational activities, that is a rule which has to do with the CIA's authority to enter new relationships. That is for nonnews gathering. I think legislation in that one area is appropriate and desirable.

Mr. MINETA. I don't recall, Mr. Chairman. Was the relationship between the CIA and Peace Corps volunteers and AID legislated?

Mr. ASPIN. No; that is just an agreement of successive heads of those organizations. It is strictly an informal agreement; nothing even made public.

Mr. MINETA. That is not by legislation in that instance. Are we going to follow the format of going through the charts?

Mr. ASPIN. Sure; go through them.

Mr. MINETA. The chairman has prepared three charts of various areas covering the press and the CIA, as to their "activities;" "people;" and "bond of association." I wonder if we could go through those charts.

First, as to "activities" as far as information, story confirmation, information swapping, prebriefing, debriefing, access to files/outtakes, prior tasking of intelligence collection.

Who would like to start on that?

Mr. LOORY. Story confirmation; I see nothing wrong with that. Information swapping; once again, in the informal way I alluded to, nothing wrong with that.

Prebriefing; I think oftentimes that can be of terrific value to a journalist if you are going overseas to some foreign country. It would be normal to go around to the appropriate state departments and get a briefing and also go to the CIA and also perhaps to the Pentagon and get their briefings.

Debriefing; certainly not, in any formal way, in any kind of informal way. Once again, in the nature of story confirmation, I see no problem with that.

Mr. MINETA. The question there would be who initiates it; whether the CIA comes to you or whether you voluntarily come in.

Mr. LOORY. If I initiate it, fine.

Access to files and outtakes; no.

Prior tasking of intelligence collection; absolutely not.

Mr. MINETA. What about the CIA coming to you or one of your staff photographers and saying: "There was a picture in the paper showing this, but what about the other 83 pictures that you have not published? Can we take a look at those?"

Mr. LOORY. No, I wouldn't permit that under any circumstances. I would sell them copies as we sell anybody copies of pictures that have already appeared in the paper.

Mr. MINETA. Would you sell pictures that haven't appeared?

Mr. LOORY. No, we don't do that.

Mr. MINETA. You don't do that even as a commercial business?

Mr. LOORY. No.

Mr. McCLORY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MINETA. Yes.

Mr. McCLORY. In line with your willingness to provide debriefing if you initiate it, wouldn't you, if you had photographs which you

didn't publish, which you thought would be useful to the CIA or our national security, want to provide those photographs?

Mr. LOORY. No, I would like to think any such photograph would be of such news value that I would use it in my newspaper. The only reason I wouldn't use the photographs is if they didn't contain a significant amount of information.

Mr. MINETA. What about that May Day parade? You don't know if it is a 9.3 millimeter gun and maybe if we knew it was a 1.5 millimeter taken at f/15 at a certain time in the afternoon we could figure out if it is a 9.3 or whatever.

Mr. LOORY. I covered four May Day revolution parades in the Soviet Union and they are indeed a funny sight. The best pictures are always taken by the wives of the military attaches who practice for days beforehand in the use of lenses this wide. And then you look around in the stands and they are taking Brownie Kodak pictures. Those pictures are all processed within minutes and are on their way back to the United States before we get back to our offices to write our stories. I am not disclosing any information because I am sure there are pictures of all the people who take pictures in files all over the world.

Mr. HALPERIN. And pictures of the people who take pictures. [General laughter.]

Mr. LOORY. The May Day thing is something which comes up. I reported in my own article, in the Columbia Journalism Review, that the editor of Life Magazine used to allow government people to come up and look at their pictures which they didn't use. I don't think I would do that; as a matter of fact, I know I wouldn't.

Mr. MINETA. Doctor.

Mr. HALPERIN. I again would distinguish between what I think the Government should regulate and what journalists might want to do as a matter of their own ethics and style. The only thing I would require is that the CIA be prohibited as to propaganda, and the debriefing process should be done by the analytical staff.

As far as what journalists would do, the basic rule I would follow is to treat the CIA as everybody else. I have occasionally spent time trying to persuade newspapers to sell me a picture they didn't publish. In some instances there is flat refusal; in other instances I am told by the publisher to go to the photographer, "Maybe you can make a commercial arrangement with him."

The only thing I have to say about this is, if you wouldn't make the picture available to a private individual or a commercial organization, then the CIA should not be treated in a different manner.

If you go in to see people in the CIA and say, "What can you tell me about the construction of grain silos in Bulgaria?" and they say, "We don't know anything about that at all, but we would love to know." Has that person violated the directive? I would say there is no way to define that; it is up to each journalist in terms of his or her own ethics.

Mr. MINETA. Under this first category, what about foreign journalists? Would you distinguish between foreign and domestic?

Mr. LOORY. No, I wouldn't. The danger of blowback is you feed propaganda to a foreign journalist and the first thing you know you are reading it in the Chicago Sun Times because it was picked

up by an American news organization and transmitted back to this country.

Second, I think there are extremely ethical and moral problems involved in polluting the world's information network with false information. I would like to see some indication that there was or is any value to that kind of thing.

Congressman, you raised the issue before of *Intrepid* in World War II, and that wonderful propaganda coup Mr. Stevenson pulled off.

I would like to see some indications that the CIA, with all the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars it spends on its propaganda effort, produced anything of value other than Djilas' New Class and the revelation of Khrushchev's secret speech. Those are the only things they point to and say there was any success involved. What else did they do? Frankly, I don't think very much.

Mr. ASPIN. They overthrew Allende didn't they?

Mr. HALPERIN. I think they painted a picture of Allende so that when he, in fact, was overthrown, they thought maybe that was good or maybe important for our national security which is not what the analyst in the CIA believed.

I think they have been successful but I would emphasize again they can only be successful on local issues. If they are trying to create an image of Cuban activities in Africa, in order to be successful they have to permeate the American press. We know they were trying to do the Chinese one. If you look at the Smith book,¹ he fabricates the story that the Chinese were sending troops into Indonesia. It was picked up by the American press and it was pawned off as a worldwide effort of the Chinese expansion. The CIA was trying to pawn that off. They were not off on their own doing this. It was through a directive of the President. The success depended on it being picked up by the American press. You can't successfully paint a picture of Chinese expansion if you say, no, the Chinese are worried about their own security and have this coming out from an unidentified source in Singapore. I suggest this committee may want to get to the bottom of those worldwide propaganda examples. Mr. Smith ran a staff in headquarters concerned with worldwide propaganda themes. If you look at those themes you will find they have been substantially successful and the successes have involved the taking of the themes by the American as well as the foreign press.

Mr. MINETA. What about the support activities? The three categories there.

Mr. LOORY. I am not sure about those parties.

Mr. MINETA. Where the CIA might ask a journalist station head in, say, France—

Mr. LOORY. I don't think any of those are appropriate for journalists to carry out. Similarly, in agent work, I don't think those are appropriate and I don't think the dissemination of propaganda is appropriate. There probably are times we do it unavoidably for the reasons Mr. Halperin is talking about. We get it unwittingly and reflect it in our news stories.

¹See Joseph Burkholder Smith, "Portrait of a Cold Warrior." Putnam: New York, 1976.

Mr. HALPERIN. All of these are covered in the cryptic sentence: " * * * for the purpose of conducting any intelligence activities * * *" in Admiral Turner's directive. I think they all should be prohibited explicitly by regulation. I would add to the executive order a statement which says; "Conducting any intelligence activities includes but is not limited to * * *" and lists all those things. Again, I would not try to prohibit a journalist from inviting a CIA Station Chief to a party but I would prohibit a Station Chief from having a party—

Mr. MINETA. What about foreign journalists?

—Mr. LOORY. I think the same thing would apply to foreign journalists.

Mr. MINETA. Doctor.

Mr. HALPERIN. I think I disagree. It depends somewhat on the country and whether or not there is a free press in that country or not. Certainly for countries where the press is part of the government prohibiting the CIA from recruiting agents, and I am assuming we are continuing to have a clandestine service, it doesn't make sense to put Tass service recruits off limits simply because they function in one sense as journalists. So I think I would try to make a distinction between countries with a free, independent press and countries where the press is, in fact, a part of the government and not prohibit it in the latter.

Mr. ASPIN. What would you say in the case where the press is up for sale?

Mr. HALPERIN. I guess I have less problem with the CIA using the foreign press for nonjournalistic purposes partly because, in fact, as you suggest, other people do, so there is nothing we can do to make the foreign press clean in that sense because their own Government is not going to issue a regulation. One rule to think about, I think, is if the foreign government has adopted a similar rule for its own press, we should respect it. I would be amazed if any government adopted rules like this. If the Canadian Government had a rule saying the Canadian journalists cannot do these things, we clearly should not do that. And obviously you run it through a continuum here. Where exactly you draw the line is not entirely clear. It is clear, on the one hand, you don't want to do it with the British and Canadian press but, on the other hand, you want the CIA to do it with the Russian journalists.

Mr. MINETA. What about the problems of blowback?

Mr. HALPERIN. I would limit it to activities which don't involve placing information in the press. I would, absolutely, if they are trying to convert a Tass correspondent into giving them secret information from the Russian Government or using the Bulgarian correspondent to pick up information from the Bulgarian Government. You don't have a blowback situation. I would be prone to prohibit that activity if you are going to permit it at all.

Mr. MINETA. What about the "people" category; first as far as the U.S. media is concerned?

Mr. LOORY. As far as the American media is concerned, they should all be excluded, full- and part-time accredited journalists, stringers, yes. To nonjournalist staff employees who appear to be excluded in this directive from the prohibition, editors, media policymakers, certainly, and freelancers as well, yes.

The question of free lancers is somewhat difficult when you get the definitions. I think the definition that I would use, and this might have to be amended, is a freelancer is defined as somebody who primarily earns a living by writing and selling what he or she writes because there is the question of the occasional writer, the lawyer, the doctor, the businessman who wants to write for the hometown paper. Here, I think it is just illustrative of the dangers we get into in this whole area. The CIA can retain that person then get that cover or ask them to get the cover of the local newspaper to give them access to information once they get to a foreign country that they may not have had otherwise.

Mr. HALPERIN. I would say on freelancers, once somebody invokes the name of an American news organization, at that time they should not be considered a freelancer. If you go to China with a letter from Stu's paper saying, please give him courtesy, et cetera, he is not a freelancer. If I am going abroad as a CIA agent and claim to be a businessman, the fact I occasionally write an article for a newspaper should not discredit me so long as I don't, while I am abroad, represent to be a journalist. The key is whether a person identifies himself as a freelance journalist. I would include them all in terms of the American media.

Also, I would raise a question as to the directive. Editors seem to be left out. I have great respect for the drafter of this directive, but paragraph "a" refers to full- or part-time journalists, those accredited. Paragraph "b" talks about nonjournalistic staff. Paragraph "c" talks about using the name.

Editors are not mentioned. I don't know why they are not covered.

Mr. MINETA. They are not covered?

Mr. HALPERIN. No; "a" says:

The term "accredited" means any full- or part-time employee of U.S. or foreign nationality who is formally authorized by contract or by the issuance of press credentials to represent himself or herself either in the U.S. or abroad as a correspondent for a U.S. news media organization or who is officially recognized by a foreign government to represent a U.S. news media organization.

Mr. MINETA. The editor wouldn't necessarily be under that?

Mr. HALPERIN. Not necessarily; he might be. There are some editors—I suppose Stu goes out and covers stories and would be covered but there are some who sit there and edit. Therefore, they are not covered by that paragraph and I think they should be explicitly covered. We ought to know if the CIA should be an "a" or "b".

Mr. MINETA. What about an editor who doesn't write a word; isn't that person still considered a journalist?

Mr. HALPERIN. I think he is but I don't think he is covered by the CIA's definition. It says, full- or part-time, including accredited by, et cetera. Then it goes on to define what accredited means. It is clearly not intended to be all full-time or part-time journalists. No part of the sense in the CIA directive is accidental.

Mr. MINETA. Mr. Loory.

Mr. LOORY. It is not a question of how we interpret the regulation. I like to think editors are journalists, there are some reporters around who don't think editors are journalists. It would seem to me editors would be covered as journalists until you get down to

the point where they talk about correspondents, then perhaps the point Mort raises is certainly valid that they have in mind not covering editors, which covers the question of somebody who sits in a large bureau overseas functioning as an editor, say, in the wire services or in one of the larger newspapers of London or Paris. Maybe they did specifically intend to exclude editors.

Mr. HALPERIN. We should ask them.

Mr. ASPIN. One of the reasons we structured the hearing so that Admiral Turner comes last is that we have a long list of questions to ask him. Clearly one of the things we have to take some time on is a whole bunch of questions you have raised because you have added some to the list.

Mr. MINETA. Foreign media.

Mr. LOORY. Once again, I think they should be excluded.

Mr. MINETA. Do you make this distinction that Mr. Halperin does as to whether or not the press is an agency of the government in another foreign country as compared to a free press?

Mr. LOORY. Yes. I suppose when you get down to the question of a state-owned press, the Tass people or the Moscow television people, we just have never considered them to be legitimate journalists. We have always considered them to be intelligence gatherers for their government of the kind we are trying to prohibit here in these hearings. So I guess I would agree with that distinction. I don't think I would go beyond trying to convert someone in a state-owned organization into an intelligence gatherer.

Mort says he wouldn't hire a British correspondent, yet the British Government did all the time. That is on the record. People like Kim Philby, for example.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me put the case to you from the other side as to why it is not bad and I am now summarizing what other witnesses have said before this committee. One point you have already alluded to, that is that a lot of foreign newspapers are not the kind of models of objectivity we would like to think of when we think of the U.S. press. Obviously some are government-owned or totally government-controlled, some of them are up for sale. There are lots of different categories and clearly the first question—that we apply the same standard to foreigners as we do at home—runs into the problem that our newspapers are not in the same category as abroad.

The second thing is the noise level abroad of the British, the French, and others. You have the Russians buying up information; you have a lot of ideological baggage being covered by newspapers. They all come with this great slant. You have just normal, crummy reporting problems.

The third point people make is the question as to why the distinction. Why is it wrong to subvert journalists, but not to subvert cabinet leaders, and so on? We believe in a free labor movement; yet we have no qualms as to getting labor leaders to act in this area. What are your comments as to this?

Mr. LOORY. To take some of them, I am not sure I will mention them in the same order as you gave them to me, but, generally, from everything we know of the revelations of the past few years, a lot of very shoddy practices were started by American espionage organizations overseas which were eventually imported into the

United States and became very much a part of the domestic scene. We started all kinds of clandestine intelligence gathering functions overseas, then we were using the same functions at home. We started various types of harassments overseas which became dirty tricks at home. Generally, it breaks down our resistance to the use of those techniques. From that aspect, it is bad practice.

Second, we are not always in a position to make judgments about the press organizations that we are talking about. We can, in a very off-hand way, say the press in this country is for sale. As long as it is for sale, we ought to buy. Then we create the conditions under which a press is for sale which might not have been until we created a buyer's market. I think that is bad practice.

Third, I don't think I am expressing only a vested interest when I talk about the need to maintain an independent information gathering organization overseas that operates as a kind of distant early warning mechanism for the American public. It should be kept as pure and clean as possible for the benefit of the whole country.

Once you start to pollute that directly or indirectly, I think you are laying this country open to all kinds of great peril and I think one of the models that I am talking about is Vietnam in the early 1960's where the independent American press was so far ahead of the Government organizations in reporting what was actually going on over there. I can see situations like that arising again. We just need good, pure, clean, unadulterated, independent reporting for overseas in anything that is done. To tamper with that I think is perilous.

Mr. MINETA. I gather you make a distinction differently from Mr. Halperin. He talked about propaganda planting and its distinction with the intelligence gathering as far as the foreign media is concerned.

Mr. LOORY. We are both talking about, obviously, keeping foreign propaganda planting off limits. I think he is talking about the foreign press and so am I. I am going further by saying I think we ought to keep other activities out of bounds for the foreign press as well. I got the impression from Mort that he would be a little more permissive as far as that is concerned.

Mr. MINETA. What about "bonds of association"? The voluntary bond first, then trying to get journalists to work based on patriotism or friendship ties or career advancement?

Mr. LOORY. You are talking again about giving information, performing various support tasks, this sort of thing?

Mr. MINETA. Right.

Mr. LOORY. I don't think it should be done. I think the higher order of patriotism in all of this is that the journalist is maintaining the arm's length relationship and performing a greater service to the country as a result of that.

Once again on the basis of friendship ties, career advancement, the scoop, I don't think it is necessary.

Mr. MINETA. Mr. Halperin.

Mr. HALPERIN. I guess it depends on what it is for. For the information activities I don't think you can prohibit voluntary association and I don't think you can tell a journalist, "For the purpose of your story, you can exchange information with the

CIA." I would permit that category on any of the motives of voluntary association. I wouldn't permit any of the other activities.

Mr. McCLODY. Will the gentleman yield for a question I think is relative?

Mr. MINETA. Surely.

Mr. McCLODY. The representatives of the press I know have contacts with each other. Take, for example, a journalist who is in a foreign country and in his association with a journalist from, say, the Soviet Union or wherever, is given information by the foreign journalist who discloses he is fed up with that system; he wants to defect.

Now, you are not going to report that in your story to the American people and make this a public disclosure, yet if you apply the rule you are talking about, whether it is patriotism to your country, whether it is friendship to this guy, or other people or whatever it is, you are going to withhold that information from the CIA or whatever intelligence representative it is that would benefit, or you would expect to benefit from this kind of information?

Do I understand it either has to be laid out in your story and the public has to know about it or, in the alternative, you can't disclose it to an intelligence agency?

Mr. HALPERIN. Your question shows how hard it is to write directives or codes of conduct.

Mr. McCLODY. We need some exceptions.

Mr. LOORY. Absolutely. Under those circumstances I would have no qualms in stopping at the American Embassy and saying, "Let me tell you what 'Joe Blow' just told me."

Mr. HALPERIN. I would not advocate any rule at all. I would leave it to the conscience of the ambassador. Conversely, certainly if the journalist learns the ambassador is going to be shot when he walks out the door, we wouldn't keep that to ourselves. I don't think that type of circumstance is one you can regulate.

Mr. ASPIN. Just to finish up what Norm Mineta started, I take it you both agree there should be no financial arrangement between the press and the CIA, not even for expenses.

Mr. LOORY. Right.

Mr. HALPERIN. Yes.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me move from these topics to the interesting issues Mort Halperin raised and the general philosophical issues Stu raised. The questions raised by Mort Halperin concern some important issues as to what is going on now. Let me take them in reverse order, the case of Demetracopoulos. Do you have any back-up material on that?

Mr. HALPERIN. I will be willing to submit that information for the record.

Mr. ASPIN. We ought to put in the Binder information and so on.

Mr. HALPERIN. I will put those in the record.¹

Mr. ASPIN. For the record, fill out who Demetracopoulos is.

Mr. HALPERIN. He is sitting in the audience here. He is a permanent resident alien, he lives and works in the U.S. as a journalist and also has some business dealings as well. The record suggests

¹See appendix J, p. 372.

the CIA has been concerned about him in substantial part because of his activities related to the coup in Greece. The allegation is that the CIA may have been involved in that. What the document he has shows is in relation to what the CIA gave to Mr. Binder, at least according to Mr. Binder's story, that the CIA showed Mr. Binder documents they have declined to release to Mr. Demetracopoulos and they accused him of having worked for foreign intelligence services when, in fact, he has been given a summary document prepared by Mr. Colby indicating that the CIA has no evidence that he has ever worked for any foreign intelligence service. They have given Mr. Binder false information and also, additionally, they are withholding the information from the subject himself, while giving it to the journalist. The question is, why is the CIA showing portions of this file of a person who is a permanent alien of the U.S.

Mr. ASPIN. It is an interesting case. Most of the issues we have discussed have been issues which have gone on in the past. What this case does is bring the CIA right into this picture and it raises the very interesting question about the CIA perhaps using files and other things to harass people who it thinks are damaging in terms of image or other things. What we had, of course, in the Binder article was a summary article about the CIA, about Mr. Demetracopoulos and his background as an interesting figure in all the relations that have been going on.

Then the question you have raised is the question Evans and Novak raised in their article; that is, why is the CIA doing this? What is the possible motive for this thing? But the question you are raising here is access to files.

Mr. HALPERIN. I think because this is the file of an individual protected by the Privacy Act as well as the Constitution, I think there are questions as to whether it is a violation of the Privacy Act; but I think it is more than that.

Mr. ASPIN. Are we taking it for granted there was access?

Mr. HALPERIN. Mr. Binder has said on the record that he had access to the file and he has said that to Mr. Demetracopoulos and other reporters.

Mr. ASPIN. Was he actually shown the CIA files?

Mr. HALPERIN. I think you should ask him. It is my understanding he is now saying he saw documents from the CIA.

Mr. ASPIN. That is the first question. Does that kind of thing make a difference? Leave aside this particular case. We would have to ask Mr. Binder to find out whether it was going on. But does it make a difference? For example, does it make a difference in your mind whether the CIA in talking to somebody about somebody actually shows them a file or just relays them information? Is there a distinction?

Mr. HALPERIN. I think it may, in some cases, make a distinction but I think the fundamental question is, is the CIA conducting an operation through an American newspaper? Is this a situation where they are simply playing their responsible role as a part of the Government which is accurate and viable or is this, in fact, a CIA operation with the information given out carefully tailored to give the impression the CIA wants to create. This story has all the earmarks of the latter.

Mr. ASPIN. Clearly in this case of Mr. Demetracopoulos, the State Department has been involved in a campaign to discredit him. Why does the CIA worry what the State Department does? Does that worry you, too?

Mr. HALPERIN. Yes. Because it has to do with information of a person's personal file. Wiesner's Worldwide Wurlitzer, it has a worldwide capability for propaganda. The CIA, as Mr. Smith says in his book, the CIA ends up doing it in America to Americans as well as foreigners. You are dealing with people who are doing this and who are not subject to checks and balances required of other agencies. Domestic agencies are subject to a lot of checks and balances. If they put out a story that the mayor of Chicago is doing such and such, there are a lot of places you can go to check out the story. The problem is less acute because, on the one hand, they don't have a vast number of people trained in propaganda. CIA people are trained in this as part of their indoctrination.

Second, they have a lot of internal enemies. Again, if the Navy puts out a story, 3 days later somebody will have the Air Force version, et cetera. The CIA is compartmentalized. Smith reports putting out a story about the Bay of Pigs. He says he wrote in the story one of the reasons they were defeated is because the Cubans had modern Soviet tanks. He said he found out later it was a lie. But he wrote this. He had no indication whether it was true or not because the information as to the Bay of Pigs had been kept within a very small group. Very few people in the agency or in the Government knew whether the story was false. The normal ways we have of checking information don't work in this instance.

Mr. ASPIN. What should we change to make this kind of case? Never mind the other cases we will get into, but the case of discrediting someone, whether they be a journalist or Mr. Demetracopoulos.

Mr. HALPERIN. You could go a long way in preventing it if you made the CIA observe the Privacy Act which prevents them from releasing information about an individual except where explicitly authorized by law to do so, to anybody else without the explicit permission of the individual.

Mr. ASPIN. Does the Privacy Act cover the CIA?

Mr. HALPERIN. They are exempt from some provisions but not, in fact, from that provision. That should be looked into. The CIA is exempted from some portions of the act and that should be looked into. But the basic problem is to get the CIA to know they are bound by that act. More generally, the question is how do you prohibit the CIA from engaging in propaganda activities? One way to do that is to prohibit it by regulation. Another thing to do is to prohibit contact between the clandestine services and the press at the initiative of the CIA.

Mr. ASPIN. That applies to a different case.

Mr. HALPERIN. I assume this was done by a clandestine operation.

Mr. ASPIN. How could you write a regulation that would apply in this case? We can clearly apply the Privacy Act if that is the question. We have to look into that and that is a good suggestion. But what else can you do? This gets to the point I was raising as to whether, in fact, the CIA was giving a reporter its files or just

talking from the files. You can probably write something which would not require the handing over of the files.

There is a lot of bad mouthing of people going on all over, all the time. Someone calls and asks, "How do you think so and so is running such and such a department"? Terrible. It is very difficult to deal with this sort of thing legislatively.

Mr. HALPERIN. I think, as Mr. Colby and Admiral Turner point out, if you choose to join the clandestine services of the CIA, you give up some things. You don't initiate press contacts or have press contacts because you are in a very special service, a secret intelligence organization which is supposed to operate abroad. I don't know if Mr. Binder went to the CIA. I would say the CIA should not be in a position to initiate contacts through its clandestine service. The contacts with the press are with the analysts. The analysts produce analyses and I would be delighted to let them share their analyses as much as they want to with the press.

The operators are in the business of carrying out operations and I would not permit them to carry out those operations through the American press.

Mr. ASPIN. How do you deal with it from the standpoint of the journalist? How does he deal with that? I would have thought Binder dealt with this correctly in the sense that he quoted the source, at least generally speaking the sources; or in the one case he gave Mr. Demetracopoulos a chance to respond by asking him what he thought of what they said.

Is that not the way you ought to deal with it if you are the journalist and the CIA has come up to you? Without naming the person, you at least indicate the general position of where it came from and give the other person a chance to respond. Is that not the proper way to deal with it?

Mr. HALPERIN. I think I would not want to comment on the journalistic efforts in general. I think that is a problem for each journalist as to how he checks his sources, how far he goes, how much he worries about why he is being told what he is being told by the people.

Mr. ASPIN. Do you know of any other case outside of this one of individual harassment by the Agency in this kind of way?

Mr. HALPERIN. The Agency has clearly done it to people who were former employees. Witness the incident of Agee drinking in Cuban bars and the allegation he is an agent of Cuban intelligence.

If you look at David Phillips' description of Agee in his book, assuming what Dave Phillips knows is accurate, and he ought to know, the allegations of Agee's connection with Cuban intelligence are very, very preliminary and circumstantial, yet CIA people are saying on the record, off the record, and in every way that he is in fact connected. I believe that is a disinformation campaign. Mr. Phillips' description of what the agency knows and how it knows, and how it knows it is in fact accurate, that is in fact a hunch some people have made and not one that has any evidence behind it.

I think they have suggested, I have been told informally by reporters that any former CIA person who starts writing articles criticizing the CIA, they will be told "Well, he did not get his promotion, he has always been a troublemaker," or whatever.

Apart from people with a connection with the Agency, I do not know of any persons where the documentation is sufficiently clear that I would say there was a CIA campaign going on. Of course, going back, Mark Lane is a case, not only Mark Lane, but all the critics of the Warren Commission, the CIA had gathered and disseminated abroad for publication in the press derogatory information about those people, simply because the CIA did not like what they were writing about the Warren Commission.

Mr. ASPIN. The thing that makes this different from other agencies doing it or other people doing it is what?

Mr. HALPERIN. Is that there is much less ability through the normal processes of the press and of the Government—

Mr. ASPIN. To check it?

Mr. HALPERIN [continuing]. To check it and counterbalance it.

Mr. ASPIN. The implication is that they have information which, of course, a secret operation would have which State Department or Defense would not have; so it has an air of credibility?

Mr. HALPERIN. Yes. They also have the capacity for constructing false information. That is one of the things they are trained to do. It is not, I assume, an easy thing to do if you have no training in it, but they are trained in how to do it, how to write things that look real which are not and how to fake documents, and so on. That is what they are trained to do. That again makes it much more serious.

Mr. ASPIN. But you have not heard of any allegations about current reporters? I have some evidence perhaps this is not an isolated case?

Mr. HALPERIN. I would again suspect it is not, but I do not have anything further.

Mr. ASPIN. We will check it out a little further, but I think that there is some additional evidence. Again you do not know how prevalent or how frequent these things happen to be.

Mr. HALPERIN. Or who has authorized it.

Mr. ASPIN. Yes; or who has authorized it; whether it is a grudge by somebody down the line, or whether it is in fact an authorized episode.

Let me ask about the Welch case, because I think you are absolutely right about that. I think the Welch case is a very successful CIA-media operation in the United States.

Just to put all of the things on the record, you mentioned the cable that went from the CIA to the station, which is one of the less well-known aspects of this. But, in fact, besides him living in the house, there are other reasons why it was fairly easy to determine who Welch was. The Station Chiefs lived in that same house since the forties and had a title of Assistant to the Ambassador in the State Department Embassy hierarchy. All Station Chiefs had the title Assistant to the Ambassador and so did Mr. Welch.

There is the problem of light cover in most of these European countries. It is very, very easy to determine who the Station Chief is, and indeed in some cases we make a big deal out of it.

When Cord Meyer was sent to London, there was a big article as if he had been appointed Under Secretary of State or something. There is a big show. Now this was not the case with Welch, but I think he was not an unknown.

Mr. HALPERIN. Ray Cline was the Deputy Director for Intelligence and then went abroad as a Station Chief. I think very few people in Germany believed he had ceased to be an intelligence officer and was now whatever he was called in the volumes.

Mr. ASPIN. I think that is right. In fact, somebody who I know and my staff knows, a Greek journalist, sat down and rattled off every Station Chief we had there since 1950. He just knew them, knew their names.

Mr. HALPERIN. There is a bartender in every foreign capital who could do that. [General laughter.]

Mr. ASPIN. There was a story, and I never knew whether it was followed up, that Welch's name was one of seven that was listed in the Athens newspaper about a month before he was assassinated. Was that right?

Mr. HALPERIN. I have never been able to find anybody who will produce that article.

Mr. ASPIN. I see.

Mr. HALPERIN. My understanding is that it reported he was the Station Chief and reported something like six other people who were supposedly working for him.

Mr. ASPIN. And that after he was assassinated, in fact, those six were not removed and, according to the story I heard, one of them was appointed his successor.

Mr. HALPERIN. It would not surprise me.

Of course Mr. Welch was appointed Station Chief in Greece after his name was published in Counterspy magazine. This did not happen before. I mean he was in Peru. His name appeared in Counterspy magazine. As David Phillips tells the story in great detail, Welch had always wanted to be Station Chief in Athens. He came back and lobbied hard and got the job. Nobody at Langley said no, you have been blown, you are on that Counterspy list, it would not surprise me somebody on that list was promoted.

Mr. ASPIN. He was named in the Athens News, named in Counterspy, and also in that East German book that came out.

Mr. HALPERIN. Almost everybody is in that book.

Mr. ASPIN. So there is a whole list of publications that might have been the reason or might have been the source.

Mr. HALPERIN. But his name, I would continue to argue, was irrelevant because they did not need to know his name. The fact that you knew the name of the Station Chief would not help you if you were trying to assassinate the Station Chief unless you knew where he lived or what he looked like.

Mr. ASPIN. Bill Colby, when he was up here, said that it was only the first couple of hours—

Mr. McCLODY. Would the gentleman yield—

Mr. ASPIN. Sure.

Mr. McCLODY [continuing]. For clarification on that?

Is it not a fact that Richard Welch was in Greece earlier and that he had been involved in a CIA activity or operation which made him a particular target for the assassin in Greece, so that when you say it does not make any difference about the name or the identity—

Mr. HALPERIN. No, I did not mean that. The fact that he had been in Greece, which he had, and the fact that the CIA was

believed by many Greeks to have been involved in the colonels' coup, was I think something that made him the target.

What I am saying is that you had been able to put a face to the name before the name did you any good. The way to do that was to do what assassins have done, based on their letters, which is that they watched the house and they saw the man who clearly lived there. Once you knew that, you did not have to know his name.

Mr. McCLORY. They had to know it was the same man who came back; it was not just an arbitrary Station Chief.

Mr. HALPERIN. But they knew that—

Mr. McCLORY. It was the individual.

Mr. HALPERIN. But they knew that from the State Department directory of the Greek Embassy which listed his name. So if they knew he was previously there as a CIA agent which had not been published, and I had not discovered, so that was not a fact that was in Counterspy magazine. If they knew he had previously been in Greece as a CIA agent, which I suspect they did, all they needed was the directory of the Greek Embassy personnel to know that he was back; they did not have to know that he was back as Station Chief.

Mr. McCLORY. I think this whole incident is a great tragedy. I just think it presents a very poor type of example of news manipulation. I think there are many, many reasons perhaps why Richard Welch was identified and why he was assassinated, including kind of a reign of terror that seems to have been prevalent, and other incidents; I mean the identification of the house is one thing, but certainly exposing the cover must likewise be involved. So I think it yields to a number of different explanations and hardly satisfies me that it is a deliberate kind of manipulation of the news that has misled the American people.

Mr. HALPERIN. The news manipulation is the phone calls Angus Thuerner had made. If he had called up everybody in Washington that day and said, there are many reasons why this guy got killed, there was anti-CIA sentiment, he had lived there and the directory of the embassy showed him as assistant to the ambassador, I would have no quarrel with it. Whether that was in fact one of the factors in how you weigh, it is hard to assess that. But he did not do that. He said, "His name was in the magazine and now he is dead."

Mr. McCLORY. But the press is not that inadequate. Their investigative potential is not such that they are limited to that kind of information.

Mr. HALPERIN. Right.

Mr. McCLORY. As a matter of fact, the stories which attributed the identification of Welch to leaks from congressional committees certainly was not—that information was not provided by Thuerner or whatever his name was.

Mr. HALPERIN. It took the press a couple of weeks to catch on, but you never catch up with that first news leak. The image that most Americans who followed this issue still have is that Welch was murdered because Counterspy magazine published his name.

The press has actually done a good job I think of following up on the story, there was a very long, very good story in the Washington Star, laying all this out, talking about the manipulation of the

Washington press by the CIA, but you never catch up. I think the casual references to the Welch episode in this hearing show that.

Mr. McCLODY. My own inquiries there, and of course I was pretty close to the CIA and its activities, certainly do not bear out this sophisticated news manipulation story.

Mr. HALPERIN. Well, I would submit that that was part of the news manipulation, part of the manipulation of this episode. I will say absolutely flatly that Angus Thuermer called up the reporters who covered the CIA and told them that on deep background, and Mr. Thuermer is around and I would urge this committee to call him in and ask him whether he did that, and ask him why he did that, and ask him who instructed him to do that, and ask the people who instructed him to do that whether they knew about the other factors that contributed to it.

Mr. McCLODY. That would be interesting but it would be only a part and I think maybe a small part of the overall explanation.

Thank you.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you.

Bill Colby did say when he was here that they put out the story linking the Welch death with the Counterspy magazine. He said they only did that for the first few hours, and then a more balanced presentation was put out after that. Is that your understanding of what happened, or does that make any difference?

Mr. HALPERIN. I think in this case they certainly did not go around correcting the story. That is, there are no stories on the second or third day saying American intelligence officials admitted yesterday that they were too hasty in attributing this solely to the story in Counterspy; they now admit the story about the house—if Daniel Schorr is correct, and I have no reason to doubt his reliability as a reporter—that they were trying months later to keep the Senate Intelligence Committee from revealing the fact of the house.

That cable is not public, by the way, and I would urge the committee to get that cable and see whether it cannot be made public. They were concealing that fact weeks later, urging the committee not to make it public. So if this were discovered at a later date they had operated in the heat of the moment and their quite understandable shock and outrage at the murder, they did not try to correct it at all.

Still to this day, Mr. Colby's statement before this committee is really the first time that any former or present official of the CIA has said on the record what they have known for a long time was true. So if they now think it was a mistake, it has taken them a long time to correct it.

Mr. ASPIN. OK. What does this episode say from the standpoint of remedies? What do you do about a thing like this, Mort? Especially, you can say that reporters ought to check the story before you go with it, but you have a fast-breaking story and there is not going to be anybody else in town who knows as much about that as readily available. None who knows about the other factors that might have gone into the identification of Welch that we now know in retrospect. How do you handle that? What do you do?

It is one of the most frustrating things about this. I do not know any remedy from the standpoint of Congress directive or from the journalists' standpoint that protects against this.

Mr. HALPERIN. I think there is only one remedy that I know of; that is the Oversight Committee's getting after them as soon after they do something like this as you can find out about it, and making the full story public and making it clear to the agency that the committee does not tolerate this kind of activity. That is what makes the Demetracopoulos episode important. It occurred just last month.

I think the committee ought to get to the truth and say, "We do not find anything inappropriate here," or "We do" and tell why. I think it is precisely one of those cases where oversight in fact can work and is the only thing that can work.

Mr. ASPIN. I think it is possible and I think the Demetracopoulos case is one that is current, and the evidence that we have is that maybe it is going on with other current reporters. I do not know, and this case comes up every once in a while. But oversight is about as much as you can think of to do about it?

Mr. HALPERIN. I think oversight would make a very big difference.

Mr. ASPIN. Stu, do you have any ideas about either of these two cases? Are you familiar enough with the Welch case? Do you have any remedies or anything to suggest? How do you handle this kind of stuff?

Mr. LOORY. I have been sitting here thinking as I have been listening, and once again this only confirms for me the need that I see for this committee to go into the past; I know you are reluctant to do it, you are afraid of witchhunting, of naming names and creating uncomfortable situations for a whole lot of people without any justification. But it does not seem to me that a set of directives can be written that would at once be tight enough to take care of all kinds of situations and still be loose enough to allow the legitimate kind of newsgathering to go on that has to go on. Then of course there are the uncomfortable exceptions that Mr. McClory raised and we can go on and raise many of them.

I would not agree with Mort, for example, that we should allow CIA analysts to talk to the press and not clandestine operatives, because there are times when you are going to run into a clandestine operative who is going to have some good and legitimate information for you as a reporter.

Mr. HALPERIN. I would not let the CIA initiate that contact. I would not stop the reporters.

Mr. LOORY. OK, I misunderstood you. I thought you were prohibiting it all around.

The point is I think that if we lay the record bare, find out exactly what it is that they were doing, how they were doing it, the extent to which they were doing it, then we in the news business can make judgments on how we were at fault in dealing with the CIA, and I have no doubt that a lot of times we were at fault in accepting as truth information that was not necessarily truthful, that could have been checked elsewhere, if we knew that we should distrust this organization, that is.

On the other hand, we would have a much better idea of just what the agency was doing that should be prohibited or treated with great skepticism in the future. That is why I think that your oversight function does not only deal with that which is immediate; I do not think your committee can perform that oversight function really well without having some kind of base line against which to judge everything. Not only your committee, but the committees that have come before you, have been reluctant to get into the past. I just do not think that it is necessary to treat the news business with the kind of kid gloves that you have been using in other areas.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me go into that issue later because I do want to go into those philosophical issues you raised in your statement. Let me not go through that now but save it for later.

Let me go to the Chile case, Mort. OK?

In the documents, what you have is some pretty clear evidence I guess that what the CIA was putting out as to their assets, and ultimately what they gave to Time magazine, is very different from the kinds of things that the intelligence arm was saying in its NIE's. Right?

Mr. HALPERIN. Right.

Mr. ASPIN. Give some quotes. Do you have some?

Mr. JOHNSON. If you look at the last two pages of your document, here are a couple of phrases that may illustrate what you are getting at, Mr. Halperin.

Mr. ASPIN. First of all, what are you quoting from?

Mr. JOHNSON. This is from the document Dr. Halperin entered into the record, dated September 18, 1970, which is, I take it, based on a briefing given by CIA to Time magazine, and perhaps other journalists.

Mr. HALPERIN. Right.

Mr. ASPIN. This is a document that comes from the CIA that they used in briefing Time magazine for sure and other journalists maybe; is that what happens?

Mr. HALPERIN. Yes. At least some of this was given to a reporter for Time magazine. Some of it may have been given to a reporter for some other publication and not Time magazine. It is a little ambiguous, but all of these pieces of paper were apparently by an official of the clandestine services of the CIA to one or more journalists, and they were obtained as a result of a lawsuit under the FOIA Act.

Mr. ASPIN. Was this document sent out to others?

Mr. HALPERIN. We do not know, we are not able to find out.

Mr. ASPIN. All you know is that it is an internal document for sure and it was one used in briefing reporters, is that right?

Mr. HALPERIN. Actually apparently handed to one or more reporters.

Mr. ASPIN. All right. Give a quote from it.

Mr. JOHNSON. The second to last page:

But violence as a desirable and necessary political factor has not disappeared as a matter of Socialist Party policy or as a part of Salvador Allende's makeup.

Then on the last page the document refers to a small rally in Santiago on September 13 where apparently:

Allende told the audience that he and his party would paralyze the country if anyone tried to steal the "people's victory." The rally had obviously been called to intimidate those who might be thinking of blocking Allende's ascension to the Presidency, and his message of terror got through despite the small audience.

Is that the kind of message?

Mr. HALPERIN. Yes. There are copies available for the press, I might say; the point of course of those who might be thinking of blocking his ascension to the Presidency is somewhat ironic since that was the CIA and the White House who seemed to be thinking mostly about doing that.

As far as I can tell, it is not obvious that any one of these sentences was believed to be untrue by the person who wrote it down. It is simply that the job here, and again it is described both in Smith's book and in David Phillip's book, the job here was to pull together all the evidence to prove the point they were trying to prove; he would overthrow the free press, et cetera, so doing that, as they related in their books, you look for everything that is true that supports that, you make things up, you stretch the truth, and you end up with a propaganda document which is as close to the truth as you can make it, but which gives a very different impression than the one that the Senate Intelligence Committee reports the CIA analysts had reached, which was that the ascension to power of Allende in Chile would not in fact pose a threat to vital American interests, and he was not likely to end democracy in Chile.

So that was the contrast between those.

Mr. JOHNSON. I see the point you are making. I have one difficulty with it.

In your opening statement you say in particular the documents we are referring to emphasize the threat to freedom of the press in Chile. If you look at the Church report, which you also quote occasionally, it reads:

The 1970 NIE stated in strong terms that an Allende administration would proceed as rapidly as possible toward the establishment of a Marxist Socialist state. It would be a Chilean version of a Soviet-style, Eastern European Communist state.¹

This implies to me at least there would be some possible violation of freedom of the press.

What I do not understand is, does not the NIE itself suggest there would be a violation?

Mr. HALPERIN. Again it is not clear and we do not have the documents.

My understanding is that the analysts did not think that there was a high probability that the free press would be ended, and when they talked about a Chilean version of it they were suggesting among other things the maintenance of a free press.

But certainly I think the Church committee report makes clear there was a sharp contrast between the tone and the style of the documents given to Time magazine.²

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, I think that is documented quite well in the Church report on pages 46 and 47. Let me give you an example:

¹See "Covert Action in Chile, 1963-73." Staff Report of the Select Committee to Study Government Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities. U.S. Senate, Dec. 18, 1975, p. 44.

²For an exchange of letters on the subject between Dr. Halperin and Time, see appendix K, p. 475.

"A 1972 Chile NIE noted that Allende to date had sought to avoid irreparable damage to his relations with Washington." Later a 1971 NIE stated that Chile was "doing its best to maintain an ideological distance and closer economic ties to Cuba." So this is a much more benign look at Chile than is the statement written by the CIA on September 18, 1970.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me ask, Mort, let's go to the case and see again what does it mean and what are you doing with it?

I think one of the difficulties is one that you have said: probably they would have said that everything in the briefing or every statement in that briefing is defensible, I guess the question then becomes: What do you do about it if they are presenting their point of view? So they are giving a selective version.

Mr. HALPERIN. I think here the remedy is clear, because this was Time magazine formally coming to the CIA and saying, we would like to know what you think about Allende, what you can tell us about him?

I think in cases like that the agency either does nothing or it provides a briefing from its analytic services. I would not try to tell those analysts what to say, but you do not provide the briefing, as was done in this case, from a clandestine service person who viewed that briefing as part of his worldwide campaign to create an image of Allende as a man who would use violence and end democracy in Chile.

I think the CIA directives ought to say that requests to the Agency for briefings by the press, if they are responded to at all, ought to be responded to by an official from the intelligence analysis side of the agency, who shall provide as much information as can be provided on an unclassified basis in response to the reporter's questions.

Mr. ASPIN. Is this a general principle because basically you agreed more with what the intelligence side of the agency says?

Mr. HALPERIN. No, because they are engaged in producing analyses. If you talk to the people on the clandestine side, they will tell you their conversations with the press are part of their foreign operation while the analyst's job is to produce analyses. So by the way they function would say what they believe which may be American policy or not.

Mr. ASPIN. You wouldn't, of course, prevent the journalist from contacting whomever he wants?

Mr. HALPERIN. Absolutely not.

Mr. ASPIN. You are saying if a blanket request comes in for a briefing as to China, India or whatever, that briefing should be conducted by people from the analyst side of the agency?

Mr. LOORY. If I might interrupt. Frank Snepp, in his new book, has several examples in which the CIA station in Saigon prepared information ostensibly as intelligence reports going back to Washington and other embassies around the world that were, indeed, propaganda to rally public opinion in support of the collapsing Saigon Government.

Mr. McCLORY. We got that kind of information from Bundy and the late President and we got it from former Secretaries of State and everybody was trying to paint the thing in rosy hues, whereas

it was an impending disaster. So we ought to direct our rebuke against all agencies of government, should we not?

Mr. LOORY. Sure.

Mr. ASPIN. Mort, looking again at the Chile case, let's go beyond the domestic case of the briefing for domestic correspondents to examine the campaign abroad and the possible feedback. In the case you mentioned in your statement, what was the name of the association who passed the resolution?

Mr. HALPERIN. The Inter-American Press Association.

Mr. ASPIN. What is the moral of the story as far as remedy goes from that particular case?

Mr. HALPERIN. I think this makes clear the point I have been hitting over the head maybe to death here this morning, namely, that it is not just uncontrolled feedback, that picking this up in the American press is essential to the operation. You can't have Time magazine saying don't worry and have that campaign work. For anything of significance, that will be true.

Therefore, I think the alternative would be to shut down Mr. Wiesner's Wurlitzer for good.

Mr. ASPIN. How far would you carry that?

Mr. HALPERIN. I would prohibit the CIA from disseminating knowingly false information and from conducting propaganda campaigns. That, I think, can be done because in order to conduct those campaigns they have the staff Mr. Smith¹ describes, which this committee and others can insist be closed down by legislation. They send out worldwide directives to people. They produce the copy which is to appear in newspapers. All that activity can be stopped. You can't prohibit an official of the CIA in Burma from saying something which is true but is misleading in the hope the Burmese will write it in a Burmese newspaper, but the difference between that and the Worldwide Wurlitzer—

Mr. ASPIN. So we are talking about the campaigns such as the Allende example.

Mr. HALPERIN. And we are talking about worldwide.

Mr. ASPIN. How many are really going to be worldwide?

Mr. HALPERIN. Most of them are directed at Russia, China, Cuba, Chile, where you are trying not to affect simply views in a particular country but a general set of views.

Mr. ASPIN. But the Allende incident was directed toward that government and the United States.

Mr. HALPERIN. I wouldn't limit it to prohibiting it worldwide, but I would say if you want to prohibit what is going on, the place to begin is with the directives which come from that covert staff in charge of disseminating worldwide information for those cases. If you adopt Stu's suggestion of looking at some of the past, that's when it doesn't involve a particular journalist or particular covert operation just look at what they have been peddling through that Wurlitzer over the past years.

Mr. ASPIN. What is the difference? For example, suppose you wanted to have propaganda on things which were essentially true?

Mr. HALPERIN. We have an agency that is supposed to do that.

¹See Joseph Burkholder Smith, "Portrait of a Cold Warrior." Putnam: New York, New York, 1976.

Mr. ASPIN. But suppose you think the true stuff should only be done through the overt USIA and other overt means and there is no necessity to do a covert propaganda effort even on things you would agree are true?

Mr. HALPERIN. One could construct a case but the price to have that mechanism in place—

Mr. ASPIN. Another remedy would be to have a procedure whereby the campaign is given approval through the system, such as a covert operation might be given approval.

Mr. HALPERIN. I assume it is a covert operation and if it is not I don't think the committee is getting it—I don't think we should be in the business of secret propaganda and corrupting of the press in this society or in any society.

Mr. ASPIN. I am fuzzing over the big trouble, which is the truth according to whom? From whose standpoint are you telling the truth? Probably what we were saying about Allende was true to some people and to others it was false.

Even something you would agree was a true campaign and a campaign targeted against a deliberately false campaign on the other side, you still wouldn't want to do it?

Mr. HALPERIN. You prompt me to make a speech about the first amendment. I guess if we have the things that are true and we have the proof it is true, and trust the people will pick it up. We ought not to be sneaking it in the back pocket of an editorial writer who we own, we ought to make it public. Where there is a free press, we ought to hope people will be able to see the truth.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. McClory.

Mr. McCLORY. Along that precise line, I would say the principal theme of this book by William Stevenson, prior to the time the United States entered World War II, was that he didn't want to disclose any information or cooperate with J. Edgar Hoover for the simple reason that J. Edgar Hoover, when he got information which he thought was useful, called a press conference and publicized everything, blowing the entire operation and really cancelling out their effort, including the fact that they had decoded, decrypted the Nazi code and were able to intercept communications of all kinds which the Nazis were carrying on.

So, there most definitely must be limitations on the value of letting the public know about all kinds of information.

Mr. HALPERIN. I was referring to information about what we believe to be going on in foreign countries, if we believe Allende will close down the press if elected, and we have information to prove that, we ought to put it out. If we have information now that the Cubans are involved in activities in various African States, we ought to put it out and not sneak it in a French newspaper.

Mr. McCLORY. The fact that Allende might be in contact with Castro, which we knew from reading those communications, if published would kill the whole operation, so there must be limitations on how much the public must know about what we know.

Mr. HALPERIN. I agree. But if that is a secret fact, we should not be giving it indirectly to the press either.

Mr. McCLORY. That leads me to a line of inquiry I would like to ask both you gentlemen while you are here. What about a code of ethics or guidelines for the journalists? Do you think you should

adopt something along this line so that we could have a guide for reporters and for journalists? I am thinking, for instance, what about a journalist or reporter who pays for information and corrupts a domestic or foreign agency in order to get information that he thinks will make an exciting and interesting, newsworthy story? You would certainly oppose any such practice, would you not?

Mr. LOORY. Do you want me to handle that?

Sure, I would, and I think most newspaper publishers would. I would oppose any kind of code of ethics for journalists. Once again, out of the kind of absolutist view on the sanctity of the first amendment which I take, the first amendment says nothing about the need to be responsible in your reporting or in the airing of your views. I take the point of view that there is a marketplace for information and ideas in the same way there is a marketplace for goods and people will buy the truthful, buy the reasonable, and discard the rest. I think that is what we are talking about here this morning. The whole idea that the marketplace is being unnecessarily polluted with misinformation and wrongfully manipulated to the extent that the American people, who are the beneficiaries of the first amendment, are coming up the loser.

The other part of the argument is that I don't think the codes can be drafted either for the news business or for the CIA in a way that will be meaningful.

You can write a very nice directive giving the CIA all kinds of prohibitions. If they want to ignore them they can, with impunity, and we would never know about it.

Mr. McCLORY. We certainly would want to oppose any practice, for instance, of a journalist who leaked information from a committee or committee staff, then undertook to sell the information which he obtains.

Mr. LOORY. I didn't know we were going to get into that today. I don't want to oppose any journalist who gets leaked information. We live on leaked information and we use it. Selling? I think I am selling the evidence when I take a leaked story and I put it in a newspaper. I earn my money, my living, doing exactly that. To that extent, sure, I don't want to oppose it at all. The news business in this country is free, private enterprise and I think that is exactly the way we want it. We don't want to trade it in for anything else.

Mr. McCLORY. I happen to agree very strongly with the view as Mr. Halperin expressed it and I know it really characterizes the function of this committee that congressional oversight of intelligence activities is extremely important and provides the kinds of controls which I think are necessary in order to have a responsible and an accountable intelligence activity.

On the other hand, I would like to say on behalf of this permanent committee that it has a very good record of retaining confidences and secrets disclosed to it and I want to commend the CIA and other agencies in being very frank and forthright with us. I don't think there has ever been an instance where intelligence agencies have disclosed voluntarily more information to this committee and I suppose the Senate counterpart of this committee.

On the other hand, our earlier experience with the select committees, I think, left a great deal to be desired and I think a great deal of damage was done to our national welfare, perhaps to our

national security, as a result of leaked information which resulted from our committees having received voluminous information from the intelligence agencies.

Do you have any view with respect to what this committee should recommend or what should be done with regard to those who violate the rules and leak information or disclose essential information, or declassify secret information which when leaked does damage to our Nation.

Mr. LOORY. When you talk about the rules, Mr. McClory, I would like to know more specifically what it is you are talking about. We, of course, have no official secrets act in this country. I would be very reluctant to do anything which is going to inhibit the free flow of information from the Government to the people.

Mr. McCLORY. We have a statute, of course, which prohibits individuals from revealing information or copying or communicating information which relates to our national defense and provides punishment.

You don't find any fault with that, do you?

Mr. LOORY. I have to say I am really not familiar with the statute which you are talking about.

Mr. McCLORY. Mr. Halperin, you recently wrote an article, October 1977, on the subject of the classification system. In that article you made this statement:

An official learning of a covert operation designed for purposes other than intelligence, which has not been approved by the President or reported to the Congress, would be obligated to make the information public.

Wouldn't that mean every employee of the Federal Government, especially every employee of the CIA or any intelligence agency would be an informant or stool pigeon for revealing any kind of information that comes to his attention that he feels is not for an intelligence activity?

Mr. HALPERIN. Well, you have an advantage over me since I don't know what the article is. But that is in the context of a proposal for reforming the classification system.

The proposal is there would be a legislative classification system requiring certain categories of information to be made public. One category would be revealing an illegal activity by the U.S. Government. One ambiguity is who decides that it is illegal. A prudent Government official might well take his suspicions to the Attorney General or some other official before he makes such an allegation. In such circumstances I think Government officials now have, and I would want them to have, that obligation to make that information public.

Mr. McCLORY. What if a person in the exercise of his independent judgment makes a mistake? He reveals it to the public and it does damage to our national security.

Mr. HALPERIN. We have suffered much more damage over the past 25 years by people not making something public and I would be willing to run the risk.

Mr. McCLORY. You don't think the individual ought to be punished?

Mr. HALPERIN. If he makes it public and it was a mistake?

Mr. McCLORY. Yes.

Mr. HALPERIN. A person who makes an allegation in good faith should not be subject to criminal prosecution.

Look at all the things people kept secret that impaired our national security.

Mr. MCCLORY. I happen to feel a good deal of the leaked information has done really serious damage to the entire intelligence community and our national security. I don't want to go into any of the details of all the different things but—

Mr. HALPERIN. I would doubt any would involve allegations of legality. My own judgment would be I would be surprised if anything that has been leaked has damaged our national security. That would be a long and complicated argument, but this is limited to activity in violation of the law. I don't know of instances where somebody has made something like that public and it has, in fact, damaged our national security.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Mineta.

Mr. MINETA. You accredit journalists. Does the CIA credential press people?

Mr. LOORY. No; at least not to my knowledge. The only credentials I know of in the Government—no, not from the CIA.

Mr. MINETA. Do they conduct background investigations on journalists as to whether or not—

Mr. LOORY. The first time I have heard of such background investigations was this morning when Mort mentioned them.

Mr. MINETA. Mr. Halperin, is that something done in the regular course of business?

Mr. HALPERIN. The CIA seems to have a practice—here is the quote from Mr. Briggs on page 19 of the deposition.¹

... you are familiar with the fact that we have contact with U.S. business or academia or whatever, for the purpose of acquiring information from them. We will run a security clearance to try to get a feel as to whether there is any potential problem. In that instance the individual does not sign any security agreement.

I think the document as a whole makes clear—and I can pull out additional quotes—that the CIA has a practice when dealing with a journalist in exchanging information of doing a background check on that journalist. In fact, they did this to Mr. Dudman in 1972. My view is that the practice has not stopped, the Agency still continues to conduct such investigations and continues to have a list of journalists who have clearances and, according to Mr. Briggs, those persons would't necessarily know they had a clearance; the individuals, indeed, wouldn't know.

Mr. MINETA. What about CIA management?

Mr. HALPERIN. If they asked, they could find out.

Mr. MINETA. What about newspaper publishers?

Mr. HALPERIN. No.

Mr. MINETA. From a journalist's viewpoint, what is your reaction to that?

Mr. LOORY. The only Federal accreditations I have ever gotten have been from the congressional press galleries, the White House, and when I have traveled abroad, from the Defense Department in places such as Southeast Asia.

¹See appendix J, p. 372.

I think it is pernicious to have an agency like the CIA going around conducting clandestine background checks and giving what amounts to clandestine clearances and accreditations to some reporters.

If I understand what Mort is saying, properly, the situation is that the agency is doing these kinds of background checks, then establishing a list of cleared reporters to whom it will give information. What can I say beyond the fact that that is very wrong?

If the agency is talking to any American reporters it should be talking to all of them.

Mr. MINETA. On page 9 of this same deposition there is a phrase as to the limited press background briefing, with an allusion that it could only have been to one person.

Mr. HALPERIN. It is clear from the deposition they gave the information to the reporter only because he or she had a clearance and that reporter may not have known this. The only reason the reporter got the information is that the reporter had a clearance. If some other reporter had gone to the CIA and had no clearance—they follow the normal procedures of the Executive order in giving clearances—that reporter wouldn't have gotten the information. The reference to the White House makes clear the distinction between the CIA's method of operation and the other agencies. If you go to the White House and apply for a pass and you don't get it, you know it. The ACLU had a case in court asking that the White House declare rules. We were able to fight that in the courts. In this instance with the CIA clearance, the reporter does not know whether he has a clearance, does not know whether the CIA was prepared to clear him or not. It was all done in secret. If the CIA had its way, they would continue to do it in secret based on their own judgment. If you apply for a Government job and you are denied clearance there are certain due process rights you have to appeal. If the CIA is denying a reporter a clearance, they don't even know they have been denied a clearance.

Mr. MINETA. They would know in the sense that they would not have access to.

Mr. HALPERIN. No; because they might just think that the CIA was not giving it to anyone. They do not know somebody else came in and asked for the same information and got it and used it without saying they had gotten it from the CIA. This is not done in a heavy-handed way. They might say "Nobody can get it," or give you some other information; you have no way to know that you have or have not gotten the accurate information.

Mr. MINETA. Does the White House credentialing process include a security or background investigation?

Mr. LOORY. It includes a Secret Service investigation and I am not familiar with the extent of it.

Mr. HALPERIN. But again the extent of it is laid out to some extent in this case. It is not openly—that is if you apply for White House credentials, the Secret Services goes about getting your records from other places and asking people about you. But the people they ask, they say,

We are from the Secret Service, so-and-so has applied for White House credentials. What can you tell us about this incident in which he threw a pie in the face of so-and-so, which is a fact.

When the CIA goes around, they do not say, "We are from the CIA, we are trying to clear this reporter." They say, "We are from an insurance company" or whatever, gathering information from people who do not know they are giving information to the CIA. The CIA then has constructed a secret dossier on this individual, which presumably, if he writes a book about the Warren Commission they do not like, they will use that information to discredit him, or whatever it is they do not like right now.

Mr. MINETA. Thank you very, very much for your helpful testimony today. It has been very enlightening.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Mr. ASPIN. It is not just journalists we are talking about, because there are others concerned; but what is the legal status of this whole business now?

Mr. HALPERIN. Of the background investigation?

Mr. ASPIN. Yes.

Mr. HALPERIN. There was a Freedom of Information case called *Weissman v. CIA*, which involved a file constructed on a person who the CIA was thinking of hiring; they conducted a background investigation of this kind, gave him a clearance, never told him about it, never offered him a job, and then sought to withhold his file under the Freedom of Information Act on the ground they had conducted a lawful national security investigation.

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that this was in fact a violation of the CIA's congressional charter, that the CIA was not authorized to conduct background investigations of American citizens, at least, the opinion said, where they have no contact with the CIA. The Government decided not to appeal that decision to the Supreme Court. So that is the law, at least in the District of Columbia circuit. But it is not an injunction against the CIA. It simply prohibits them from withholding information based on that exemption.

I have been trying thus far without success to get the CIA to say whether they have in fact ceased this kind of activity or not. There is a court opinion, which the Government has not appealed, saying it is a violation of their charter, but it is not an opinion that requires them to stop, and I think that this committee should try to find out.

Mr. MINETA. It seems to me it is not only a case of what gets released but to whom it gets released that becomes, as Mr. Loory says, the pernicious aspect of this.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me just quickly go over the Warren Commission case, Mort, that you were talking about, that is the issue of trying to discredit the people attacking the Warren Commission. Can you quote again from the document to give us some kind of feel for what it is that worries you about this?

Mr. HALPERIN. Yes. That is a cable, one of the documents that is in this set, a cable that went out to CIA stations around the country titled "Countering Criticism of the Warren Commission Report." It begins with their concern, which is about the critics of the Warren Commission. It says:

Action: We do not recommend the discussion of the assassination question be initiated where it is not already taking place. Where discussion is active, however, addresses are requested, one, to employ propaganda assets to answer and refute

attacks of the critics. Book reviews and feature articles are particularly appropriate for this purpose. The unclassified attachments provide useful background material for passage to assets. The policy should be pointed out that critics are wedded to theories adopted before the evidence was in; two, politically interested; three, financially interested or infatuated with their own theories.

Then they suggest singling out Mr. Epstein's book for attack, using an article in *The Spectator* which they had in fact prepared in Langley and published as an attack on Epstein's book. They go through the answers, no significant evidence, critics usually over-value particular items and ignore; conspiracy on a large scale is suggested, and critics are enticed by a form of intellectual pride.

Then they go on and have this unclassified attachment, and item 2 of the unclassified attachment says:

Some writers appear to have been disposed to criticism by anti-American far-left or Communist sympathies.

Then they go on to give a paragraph of information about the political activities of both foreign and American journalists, reporting that one individual was once sentenced to jail by a Federal jury for concealing his membership in the Communist Party.

Mark Lane was a member of the committee. He also attended the 8th Congress of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, what they describe as an international Communist front organization. And he thanks in his book a man named Ralph Schoenman, who they point out works with Bertrand Russell, which I gather the CIA thinks is some sort of criticism of the individual.

Then they go on to talk about his financial rewards, other people's financial rewards, and one of the techniques is to raise questions which again seems to the CIA to be inappropriate. It goes on for a number of pages, attacking their love of theorizing and lack of commonsense.

Then they say the likelihood of further criticism is enhanced by the circumstances that Communist propagandists seem recently to have stepped up their own campaign to discredit the Warren Commission. Then they quote from that propaganda.

In other words, it is an all-out attempt to describe how to deal with critics, including information about lawful political activity, which I think is the worst but only one of the instances.

Mr. ASPIN. The information in this was sent out to field offices?

Mr. HALPERIN. Yes. It was sent out with the action instruction that where discussion is already taking place, the addressees are required to employ propaganda assets to answer and refute the attacks of the critics.

Mr. ASPIN. Do you know whether they were sent to field offices in the United States?

Mr. HALPERIN. I do not. Of course the CIA does have operational field offices here.

Mr. ASPIN. Yes.

Mr. HALPERIN. I do not know whether that was sent to them or not. I am looking to see whether there is a distribution instruction. There either was not a distribution list on this document or it was deleted from the copy that we were given.

Mr. ASPIN. What do you say about remedies in this kind of a case, Mort?

Mr. HALPERIN. This is the worldwide Wurlitzer. I think it is clear that the CIA should be prohibited from the business of using its assets, if it is going to have any, and I would prohibit the assets from commenting on American books and articles published by Americans, published within the United States, I would make that an absolutely flat prohibition.

I would also prohibit them from engaging in this kind of a worldwide propaganda campaign. Again it inevitably influences the United States. Americans' perception of the Warren Commission is affected by what people are saying in the rest of the world or the rest of the world is saying this is responsible journalism and the CIA has no business in that at all.

This case is very clear. This kind of thing should be prohibited. I say you could write a regulation which, if you had active oversight, you could tell whether the regulation was being violated even though at the margin—

Mr. ASPIN. What is the remedy in this case?

Mr. HALPERIN. Prohibiting CIA directing its agents to comment on books and articles written by Americans. I think that is an easy rule.

I would go further and close down the whole worldwide propaganda operation. But in any case I would have that rule, that the CIA should not be in the business of getting its assets to write articles and editorials and ought not to be writing in Langley, Va., book reviews of books published in the United States.

This case I think is quite easy. The Privacy Act was not in existence at the time. This would now be a violation of the Privacy Act. I do not know why even the CIA has in its file who was the vice chairman of the Committee to Abolish the House Un-American Activities Committee.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me ask Stu before we quit about a couple of the philosophical issues that you raised.

I had almost come to the conclusion before you got here today, even almost before these hearings began, and maybe you ought to persuade me to the contrary, that the least interesting question that we are talking about in this is the number of journalists. That that seems to me to be a definitional problem: what do you define as a relationship, and whether Bernstein is right about 400 or the New York Times is right about 42. Whatever the number is probably depends on where you are on that list of activities, what you are talking about; because if you include everything on that, including story confirmation, you are probably talking about thousands.

Mr. LOORY. Exactly.

Mr. ASPIN. So numbers do not really mean much unless you are talking about what activities; therefore, the point really is to talk about the activities rather than the numbers.

Mr. LOORY. Well, if you are coming down to salaried association in that category, you get anywhere near the 400 figure, that Carl Bernstein figure, I think then you certainly want to know because you really have a serious problem on your hands. The number is apparently somewhere between the some three dozen of November 1973 in Director Colby's leak, and the 400 in Carl Bernstein's article. Certainly I do not think he meant to say all 400 were

salaries, or paid in any way, but we just do not know. That is the point.

We do not know how serious the problem was and then we also do not know what these people did to earn their payments. If it was a matter of picking up an expense check to fly to Bulgaria, to check on the construction of a new hotel that agents might want to check into the next time they are in Sofia, that is one thing. If it was a retainer so that these people would file book reviews, stories or anything like that, back to their publications in the United States, that is another thing.

I think we certainly would want to know about it.

Mr. ASPIN. I think that is right.

The difficulty of course with all of these things is you never know enough. I mean there is always more that you need to know. I am not sure that in anything you ever really feel comfortable you know enough to do it.

What worries me slightly is that if you think, "Gee, we really do not know enough and we ought to conduct more case studies or more investigations," you can do case studies from now until 5 years from now on these issues. Sure you are going to know a lot more; but the point is, in the meantime of course, you have not done anything. I do not know where the tradeoff is between knowing enough to do something that makes some sense and the point where you just keep studying things and studying things.

I take it you feel we do not know enough about this subject now to do anything very sensible in the way of regulations.

Mr. LOORY. I think frankly we have just scratched the surface.

Mr. ASPIN. What do you think?

Mr. HALPERIN. One can do endless studies about when you know enough to act and when you should do more studies. I guess I think we do not know enough really to act in this area. It is important enough that the committee ought to do more research.

One, it would help if you started with some notions of what a piece of legislation or an executive order might look like, and then ask yourself what you need to know about past practice in order to understand how to write that properly, or what issues have come up that you do not know how to deal with because you do not know how serious the problem is.

Second, my feeling is that the world was sufficiently ambiguous in the 1950's and even in the 1960's that I would be very reluctant to see the committee go into the naming of names or the forcing of the agency to describe events sufficiently publicly, or I think even privately, so that the names become clear.

I think you can learn as much as you need to know about the past without getting into who were the reporters on this newspaper who did what, and I think it is very easy now to look back and say it is all wrong, but I think the world did look very different to an awful lot of people then and I do not think it is appropriate to go back and try to find out who were the particular reporters who did these things. But I do not think you need to do that in order to learn about how the system works.

I guess I would finally say that I think the most important cases have to do with understanding the way the CIA operated rather

than understanding how they dealt with a particular reporter, what precisely one reporter or another was willing to do for them.

Mr. ASPIN. How comfortable do either or both of you feel that the current mood is the mood that will and ought to prevail?

I know Mr. Loory talks about the arm's-length relationship which we usually think of between the press and the Government. It is quite clear in the 1950's there was no arm's-length relationship, and nobody would have thought there ought to be an arm's-length relationship. I mean it was a different mind-set which believed clearly that the country was really being threatened and all kinds of security problems for the country were obvious to people who now in retrospect we might question. At the time there was no question that the country was facing a very, very grave danger.

So the relationship between the CIA and the media in that time was a very, very different kind of relationship. Now there has been a change. There has been a change. In other words, the regulations that we would have written in 1955 are nothing like the regulations that we would write in 1978.

Now the question is how do we know that 20 years from now the mood is not going to shift again, either toward more of an arm's-length relationship or, because of the threat to the country, back the other way toward a closer relationship and the horrors of the past that we will be uncovering 20 years from now are the reverse.

In other words, we will be uncovering all kinds of horrors where newspapers did not cooperate and did not help the country, that would be the horror story, just as they are now that they cooperated too closely. One of my problems I have with writing any regulations is getting anything into concrete that is not going to allow for changes in attitude later. I have no confidence that we are now at the sensible point that is going to exist forever.

Mr. LOORY. That is one of the things I am arguing against this morning, the drafting of regulations. That is why. I do not think you can write regulations that will cover all cases and last for all time. That is why I think that the best course is to simply lay out the record and then let responsible, intelligent people evaluate what has happened and conduct themselves in the future as is judged best, and give this committee and its sister committee—

Mr. ASPIN. If we lay out the record in the way you were suggesting, you really are making a judgment on the past from the present.

Mr. LOORY. Yes, but I think different people will make different judgments. There is a significant number of my colleagues around, I know, who will look at that record and say "What is the matter with all that?"

Mr. ASPIN. They will not say it in print.

Mr. LOORY. Oh, yes, they will.

Mr. ASPIN. Well, not very many of them, in the current mood.

I would guess right now if you lay out the record the way you were saying it, you really are imposing a judgment of the current 1970's attitude on the 1950's.

Mr. LOORY. I think certainly to a great extent that is true, but there are people, I know there are people, I have talked to them, still around who see nothing wrong with that approach.

Mr. ASPIN. I agree. I could not get any of them to come to testify, incidentally. There are reporters who believe that and whose views on the CIA-media relationship are indistinguishable from Ray Cline's, for example.

Mr. LOORY. Yes.

Mr. HALPERIN. I am not sure that is fair to Ray Cline.

Mr. ASPIN. I suggested that some of them ought to come on our panel of journalists because we needed somebody to represent that point of view, but they would not do it.

Mr. LOORY. Could I bring up one more point?

There are people around who are being bum-rapped now, about whatever it is they may or may not have done in the past. I am kind of struck by this letter from Desmond Maberley of the New York Times, yesterday; he is the managing editor for North America of Reuters.

As you know, Reuters was named in the New York Times as an organization where the CIA planted stories, and Reuters knew it. Mr. Maberley was quoted in those articles as dismissing the charge as old-hat, and he writes a letter denying that he specifically dismissed those charges; also expressing great surprise about Reuters knowing it because Reuters did not know it.¹

When I did my piece for the Columbia Journalism Review in 1974, Reuters was one of those agencies mentioned to me as an example of how the CIA planted misinformation. It was used in a very specific way, with a very specific story, and I told that story and I mentioned it as an example.

There was never any confirmation of that until the New York Times series came along. All of a sudden the New York Times went further, saying that the stories—plural, and I used only one story—were being planted by the CIA and some were bogus—again more than one.

I said: "Terrific, finally 3 years later I have been confirmed." But along comes Mr. Maberley to deny it all once again. So Reuters still has not had a fair shake because the CIA still has not been compelled to produce whatever it is that it has done or not done to Reuters.

There are other people in that situation. I quoted John Bross, a ranking CIA man at one time, in my piece as saying that there is today, high up in the American news business, a person who once worked as a CIA agent with journalistic cover. He would not name the person before I wrote the article. After my article appeared he named that person to me and I went to that person and I said, what is going on here? The person expressed complete surprise. He hired a lawyer, went to the Agency; he had it checked on.

It turned out that Bross was completely in error in naming that person as a former CIA agent. When both the person and I went back to Bross and asked him what he had done, in the most offhand way he said, "That is what Dick Helms told me," and it was just an offhand comment as if it was gospel. The guy did not know what he was talking about.

That is, once again, why I think it is necessary to get at the record specifically and see just what was going on specifically,

¹See appendix L, p. 478.

because we are all dealing with the long ago recollections of a lot of people talking about it.

Mr. ASPIN. Mort.

Mr. HALPERIN. First I would ask you to add to your list of questions for Admiral Turner whether Reuters is covered by their directive. I think it is not, my understanding is it is not a U.S. newsgathering organization. I think it clearly should be.

Mr. ASPIN. It may not be covered by the Turner directive, but it may be covered by agreements with the British.

Mr. HALPERIN. I think not only is the British Government entitled to know that, but I think we are entitled to know that also.

Mr. ASPIN. We will ask him.

Mr. HALPERIN. Second, on this question of how do you write regulations now about the future? I think again I would suggest what you all get paid for is to take the opportunity of the current change of climate to write regulations which you would want in effect when we go back to the mentality of the fifties but could never pass in the 1950's. Admittedly that is not an easy job.

I think one tries to step aside from the current either keen understanding or hysteria, depending on who you talk to, and try to figure out what are the principles here that we really want to live with. It is like, if I may, writing a constitution. There is always the danger in that that you go too far and/or not far enough.

It seems to me important in our society to require that change be publicly debated. You are not legislating for all time. What you do by legislation is require that if people want to change the rules they have to publicly argue about why to change the rules. Somebody could come in and say there is now a leader in the Kremlin who is in fact like Hitler and we no longer can afford to forego whatever it is one can argue about.

The problem with directives like this, which say that the DCI can secretly change it, or the way the CIA functioned in the past is that it was able to change its rules in secret. We found that out in 1957 when the CIA's dealings with universities were made public. Everybody said "Oh, this is all terrible." Others said "Let's not go too far." So Congress did not legislate. It left it to the CIA and to the executive branch, the so-called Katzenbach directive came down, the CIA sat down and figured out how to get around the Katzenbach directive. They did.

They discovered loopholes in that directive that they could and did drive most of their programs through in one form or another. They were able to change the guidance by changing an Executive order or changing a secret Executive order.

So I think you have to look upon legislation not as a judgment for all time, but a much more modest position of saying we are going to require that, if people in the future want to change it, they publicly justify the change.

Mr. ASPIN. Agreed. That is why we are holding these open hearings.

Norm, you had a question?

Mr. MINETA. The question was raised about whether there are three dozen or 400 journalists with a CIA connection; it depends upon the kind of association and the dollars involved.

Mr. Loory, I was wondering, as far as the Sun-Times is concerned, do you have a prohibition on gifts reimbursements or expenses on occasion or financial payment; are there rules and regulations for your people?

Mr. LOORY. Yes, we do.¹

Mr. ASPIN. Are they specifically directed to CIA?

Mr. LOORY. No. I assume you are talking about a blanket prohibition against gifts, that sort of thing?

Mr. ASPIN. Yes, regulations in your organization; about what is considered proper conduct for employees.

Mr. LOORY. Yes; we have those kinds of internal regulations.

Mr. ASPIN. Would this be a proper way to proceed with this whole media-CIA relationship?

I know you are very leery of Congress, and I am kind of leery of Congress doing much in this field. I think we can sharpen up the Turner directive and other things. Maybe with the executive orders, when we have to approve them we can do some things; but it is clearly limited.

To a very large extent what we are talking about is a media issue as opposed to a CIA issue.

Mr. LOORY. That is right.

Mr. ASPIN. So one possible way to go about it, which is one of the things we are going to raise with the witnesses tomorrow—the managers, some people from management of newspapers who are coming tomorrow—is the whole question about the possibility of doing this thing through individual media outlets.

Mr. LOORY. Yes; individual organizations, individual newspapers, wire services. I think they should all give thought to this in establishing codes of conduct for their employees. Again I think they have to be impressed with the seriousness of the situation.

Mr. McCLORY. Mr. Chairman, we have been talking here today about the press and the journalists. I gather that you both are recommending some action, either by way of guidelines, directives, regulations, or legislation.

Do your thoughts apply likewise to the other media, radio, television?

Mr. LOORY. Yes. I talked about the news business to be all-inclusive; generally the press takes in the electronic organizations also.

Mr. HALPERIN. I would agree.

Mr. ASPIN. Tomorrow we will meet at Rayburn 2350, which is around the corridor the other way. That is at 9 o'clock.

I thank you both very much for coming, very interesting.

[Whereupon, at 12:30, the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at 9 a.m., Thursday, January 5, 1978.]

¹See appendix M, p. 480.

THE CIA AND THE MEDIA

THURSDAY, JANUARY 5, 1978

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF THE
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:10 a.m., in room 2359, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Les Aspin (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Aspin (presiding), Mineta and McClory.
Also present: Loch Johnson, professional staff member.

Mr. ASPIN. So far in this series of hearings on "The CIA and the Media" we have heard testimony from former CIA officials and foreign correspondents, as well as from individuals who have written articles on the topic.

Today we shift our focus somewhat to examine the views of a panel of media managers, including editors, representatives, and members of newspaper associations, and a publisher.

The publisher on our panel is Robert Myers. Mr. Myers brings a unique perspective to this discussion, for he has also accumulated many years of experience as an intelligence analyst for the U.S. Army and an agent for the CIA. He served in the CIA for 12 years, and was stationed in Indonesia and Cambodia, among other locations.

Before leaving the Agency in 1965, Mr. Myers worked as an aide to Mr. William Colby. Entering the publishing world in 1965, Mr. Myers first helped found and finance the Washington Magazine; he then became publisher of the New Republic in 1968, a post he continues to fill.

He is also vice president of New Republic Books. Mr. Myers—or perhaps I should say Dr. Myers—holds a Ph. D. from the University of Chicago.

A second number of our panel is Clayton Kirkpatrick. His distinguished career as a journalist expands 40 years of reporting and managing with the Chicago Tribune, since he joined the City News Bureau in 1938.

Today, Mr. Kirkpatrick is editor of the Tribune. He is also chairman of the International Communications Committee of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, and appears before this subcommittee in this capacity.

The current president of the American Society of Newspaper Editors is a member of this panel, too. I refer to Eugene Patterson, winner of the Pulitzer Prize for Editorial Writing (1966).

Mr. Patterson began his career in journalism 30 years ago as a reporter with the Daily Telegram in Temple, Tex., and the Tele-

graph in Macon, Ga. Today he is editor and president of the St. Petersburg Times in Florida and president of the Congressional Quarterly in Washington. In between, he served as manager of the UP London Bureau, editor of the Atlanta Constitution, and managing editor of the Washington Post.

Our fourth witness is Gilbert Cranberg, who has been with The Des Moines Register-Tribune since 1950, and is now editor of its editorial pages. Mr. Cranberg is also a former chairman of the Professional Standards Committee of the National Conference of Editorial Writers—though, I understand, he speaks today not as a representative of the conference, but as an individual who has thought about the issues before this subcommittee.

Gentlemen, it is a privilege to have you with us.

Maybe we should have the opening statements of you gentlemen, if we might, starting with Mr. Kirkpatrick.

PANEL OF CLAYTON KIRKPATRICK, EDITOR, THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE; GILBERT CRANBERG, EDITOR, THE DES MOINES REGISTER-TRIBUNE; EUGENE PATTERSON, EDITOR, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES; AND ROBERT MYERS, PUBLISHER, THE NEW REPUBLIC

Mr. McCLORY. Will the chairman yield?

Mr. ASPIN. Yes.

Mr. McCLORY. Thank you. I just want to state, Mr. Chairman, that I join with you in welcoming this distinguished panel here this morning, especially to extend a warm welcome to the editor of an extremely important organ insofar as I am concerned, the Chicago Tribune, Clayton Kirkpatrick, a long-time friend, also.

I notice that in the Saturday, December 31, 1977 issue of the Tribune a very significant editorial on the subject of the CIA and the press appeared in the Herald Tribune. So, I want to say I am delighted to have Mr. Kirkpatrick here, and I look forward to his testimony, as well as that of the other members of the panel.

Thank you.

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. Thank you, Congressman.

Since you have read the editorial, it seems hardly necessary for me to testify.

Mr. McCLORY. I think we ought to ask leave that the editorial be made part of the record.

Mr. ASPIN. Without objection.¹

STATEMENT OF CLAYTON KIRKPATRICK

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. I think that the overall position of the ASNE with respect to the relationship between the CIA and the press will be covered by Mr. Peterson. I am going to focus largely on the international aspects of these relationships.

I have a short opening statement which I will read, with your leave.

I wish to state at the outset that I believe the Central Intelligence Agency is a vital instrument of our national security. I would not wish to see its effectiveness impaired, but I would wish to see its abuses and excesses corrected.

¹ See appendix N, p. 490.

The CIA has been guilty of practices that reflect unfavorably upon that organization, upon the United States generally, and upon the free news media of the world.

It is this last aspect that concerns me most. The credibility of American news media is damaged when evidence is produced, and even when mere rumor is circulated, that reporters, editors, and publishers are used to support and promote governmental policy.

These reports are damaging domestically, but they are even more damaging internationally. A campaign is being waged by totalitarian governments, with the Soviet Union as the leader, to deny access to news in large areas of the world and to restrict the free flow of news to these areas.

The principal targets of this campaign are the news agencies, the newspapers, news magazines, and news broadcasting enterprises of the United States and other free democratic nations.

At a general conference of UNESCO in November 1976 an attempt was made to adopt a declaration that would have given international sanction to government controls over news media so that they could be used as instruments of government. It was vigorously opposed by representatives of the free press of the world and it was not approved.

I was a member of the U.S. delegation at that conference, and I observed the close and effective cooperation of all free media around the world in opposing that resolution. It was a united effort.

Now, since then the advocates of news controls have renewed their campaign for such a declaration. Part of their argument—often repeated in international conferences on press freedom—is that the press of the free world has allowed itself to be used by the CIA.

Two of the principal international press associations, both strongly committed to press freedom, have been falsely smeared with this charge. I am a member of both organizations, the Inter-American Press Association and the International Press Institute.

I have personally investigated these rumors. I assure you that these organizations which are among the leaders in the fight to keep the world's press free have not had and do not have any clandestine relationship with the CIA.

Yet, the rumor persists and it handicaps the campaign for freedom. The rumors do not die because of disclosures that in the past the CIA has subverted some newsmen and some news media.

Now, it is very much in our national interest, it seems to me, to keep the credibility not only of our own news media high, but that of the foreign news media, the free news media, because many of the basic decisions that are made by government leaders around the world are based on information that is carried to these leaders by the Western and the free democratic press.

This is because these agencies have credibility. You don't find nations in the Third World making decisions on the reports of Tass, of Hsinhua of Tanjug, the Yugoslavian news agency, or any of the other news agencies where it is well known that the reporters, the sources of the information are subject to government control, or even are agents of the government.

So, I think it is very much in the national interest that we preserve the purity of our news reporting, not only from our own agencies, but from other international agencies that operate in a free environment.

I do not urge enactment of a law to restrict CIA activities. The CIA deserves and needs some flexibility. I strongly urge, however, that the CIA extend its commitment to avoid recruiting American journalists to a broader commitment to avoid recruiting all journalists, foreign as well as American. I would urge the Congress to monitor that commitment closely to insure that it is kept.

Thank you.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Kirkpatrick.

Mr. Patterson, I hope you will give us your whole statement, because I think it is a very important statement.

STATEMENT OF EUGENE PATTERSON

Mr. PATTERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

With your permission I will do that. I do have some additional information that I would like to bring to the committee's attention at the end of the prepared opening statement. It is a letter that I received yesterday from Stansfield Turner, which I would like to enter into the record of the committee.

Mr. Chairman, it is essential that the Central Intelligence Agency be brought to recognize that it must not destroy the validity of American institutions in order to save them.

Former officials of the CIA urged this committee last week to endorse a double standard for the United States—to profess respect for truth at home; to demonstrate abroad that we don't mean it.

Former CIA Director William Colby told you it would be "unilateral disarmament" if the United States ceased to subvert foreign journalists, with money, to serve the purposes of American intelligence. He thought putting our ideals into practice abroad would deal us a 'self-inflicted wound' in our ideological battle against authoritarian systems that deny freedom by subverting the truth themselves.

In sum, you and the world have been told that truth is a weak armament against propaganda, that a press free of manipulation by governments is an undependable force in the world.

This is cynicism. Worse, it exhibits a grasp on unreality that ought to alarm Americans who depend on the judgment of their intelligence agents for a measure of their Nation's security.

The United States unilaterally disarms itself in its ideological conflicts when it abandons its beliefs and adopts its opponents'. The wound is self-inflicted when we rush to fall on our adversary's knife.

To scrap our strength in a war of ideas and embrace the authoritarians' weakness is defeat by default. Yet, this committee was told the opposite by witnesses for the CIA.

The facts seem pretty simple to this editor who lives 1,000 miles from Washington working on the second largest newspaper in the Nation's eighth largest State.

The first amendment established a free press for Americans whose forebears learned under authoritarian monarchies that there can be no freedom unless there is free expression.

We advocate a free press for peoples who don't have it abroad. We know that few have freedom, but that all in the world yearn for it. We set out to use the power of our American example to kindle their faith that it works. That is the essence of the ideological conflict we are in.

Yet the CIA had to be forced by public opinion to stop hiring American journalists to serve its intelligence purposes, and it still insists on the right to recruit journalists of foreign nations into its pay.

On the one hand our Government and our press stand for a belief in expression free of Government influence everywhere. On the other, the intelligence agency of the U.S. Government reserves the right to subvert journalists anywhere abroad, and its former agents express pride at having done so.

If that is not unilateral disarmament in the war of ideas, the American eagle flies backward.

The intelligence-gathering arm of the U.S. Government presumes to set its own policy at variance with American institutions, and destructive of their credibility. The Constitution announces what this Nation stands for. An agency of our Government advises the world to forget it.

The New York Times quoted Ray S. Cline, a former official of the CIA, as uttering last week one sentence of testimony that is so astounding it deserves to be engraved on stone and planted as a permanent signpost pointing the wrong direction away from the American future.

"You know, that first amendment is only an amendment," he said.

If Congress permits the CIA to go on regarding the anchor of the Bill of Rights as only an amendment, the Constitution itself can come to be seen as only a piece of paper in the eyes of the world and of ourselves.

Mr. Cline testified that he regards the anxiety his attitude has created in the American press as a wave of sanctimony. A cynic may see sanctimony where others see fundamentals.

Every citizen recognizes the importance of the CIA and credits the difficulties it encounters in gathering intelligence vital to the Nation's security. As a former officer in the regular U.S. Army I have a particular regard for the bravery and the sacrifice of those who follow the hard path of devotion to securing this Nation.

But some terribly counterproductive paths should be closed to the Agency's intrusion in order to serve the larger national interest. The CIA has accepted an arm's-length relationship now with the domestic news media unless information exchanges with journalists come on a voluntary and unpaid basis.

Until it accepts the same policy with respect to paying off foreign journalists and fouling foreign news media, nobody in this world can credit the truthfulness of the American claim to stand for a free, untainted alternative to manipulated news.

Not even Americans can be sure of the news fed back to them from abroad if it is planted there to mislead others. Why should this Nation mislead anybody with calculated untruths, abroad or at home?

If this creates difficulty for CIA operations in lands where we all know the media are agents of the government, that price is worth paying to establish universally the far larger fact that Americans live by their title deeds and offer to others an ideology that works without cheating.

Strength flowing from such a cleanup of ethical sloppiness is visible in recent years across a wide spectrum of our National and our international life. As new and open policies have supplanted mistaken or unworthy shortcuts, American institutions have been invigorated, not weakened.

The President stated a priority last week for restoring "a tone to our Nation's life and attitude of what we stand for." That restoration started before he took office and with our help can endure long after he leaves.

It is clearly reflected in the Congress. It is welcomed among the people who have faced painful truths across the past decade and sense now, with relief, that we are finding our way back to a fundamental hold on what the Nation stands for. We are remembering that this is our armament.

The CIA has resisted this swing toward honoring the institutions it defends, and it should be helped forward by Congress and the President.

Surely it is time to remove American intelligence bribery from the world's channels of information, no matter the inconvenience, if the far larger American ideal of freedom is to be credited and believed abroad.

I am presenting to this committee a resolution adopted unanimously by the board of directors of the American Society of Newspaper Editors at its Honolulu meeting in October of 1976. The burden of that resolution is contained in the following quotation, which was valid then and overdue now:

At the UNESCO conference in Nairobi—

To which my colleague, Clayton Kirkpatrick, has alluded—

American delegates urged all nations to respect humanity's right to news uncontrolled by governments for their own ends. Those words lack force so long as an agency of the American Government refuses to give assurance that it will forego employment of foreign newsmen for its own ends.

The CIA has refused to give the world's people that assurance. We believe the American people through their elected representatives should require it to do so. The interests of the United States are not served if a U.S. agency reserves the right to interfere with other peoples' sources of information.

To extend America's own respect for a free and independent press to the efforts of news media abroad would serve the highest purposes of the United States, and stand in telling contrast to the practices of totalitarian systems which Americans expect their government to reject, not emulate.

Mr. Chairman, that remains the position of the American Society of Newspaper Editors on the practice of CIA payoffs to foreign journalists.

Quite aside from this hiring of foreign journalists that has damaged the world's trust in our professed belief in free expression, by what right does the CIA speak for America in its covert propaganda?

The U.S. Information Agency was created to speak the American message to the world out in the sunshine where it belongs, overtly, truthfully, and proudly. Let us rebuild respect for the institutions

America is supposed to stand for by stopping practices that discredit the faith in freedom that we profess.

Mr. Chairman, as I indicated, I have received a letter dated December 27, which came to me in St. Petersburg, Fla., yesterday, from the current Director of Central Intelligence, Adm. Stansfield Turner.

I will present this letter for inclusion in the committee's records, if you would like. But, if I may, I would like to read the principal part of it to the committee.

I had written Admiral Turner in my capacity as ASNE president, asking him what his reaction to the ASNE resolution would be with respect to a cessation of hiring of foreign journalists working for foreign media. He replied by noting that his new November 30 regulation does stop paid relationships between CIA journalists for the American media.

But then he addressed himself to the ASNE's question about the foreign media in the following manner, and I quote his letter:

Let me attempt to address the issues raised in your letter by sharing with you the major reasons why our announced policies are carefully and specifically delineated to cover journalists and staff of U.S. news media organizations.

The underlying rationale for this position, of course, is CIA's abiding recognition and appreciation of the special status afforded the nation's press under the Constitution.

Accordingly, in order to do our part to allay the understandable concern expressed in some quarters that unregulated and widespread CIA relationships in this area tend to undermine the integrity and independence of the U.S. press, we have taken special pains to impose stringent limitations on ourselves in our dealings with U.S. news media organizations themselves, and any employees thereof throughout the world regardless of the nationality of the employees.

Although upon occasion the severity of these restrictions and prohibitions will unquestionably present obstacles to our ability to expeditiously and effectively perform our statutory responsibilities in the area of foreign intelligence collection, CIA has chosen to formulate and operate under these limitations in the interests of and out of respect for the separate responsibilities and status of the U.S. press as a free and independent institution in our society.

At the same time, it is our considered opinion that any further extension of the scope of the restrictions beyond U.S. media organizations is neither legally required nor otherwise appropriate, in light of the potential barriers which such action may pose to this agency's ability to carry out its critical duties in furtherance of the nation's foreign policy objectives.

In closing he writes—

I hope you will understand the reasons why this agency cannot support the position taken in the October 1976 resolution of the ASNE.

Mr. Chairman, the ASNE cannot support the position taken here by the current Director of the CIA who, like his predecessor, has taken the position in this letter that I have read to you. I would only comment briefly in this respect.

I appreciate his recognition and appreciation of the special status the Constitution affords the American press. I appreciate his understanding that there was a understandable concern that unregulated CIA paid relationships with American media members tended to undermine the integrity and independence of the U.S. press.

I appreciate his statement that despite unquestionable obstacles that his new policy is going to present in gathering intelligence he has taken steps to regulate paid contacts between CIA and American media members.

But, Mr. Chairman, I don't understand why, if we in the United States, standing in this world as examples of what freedom is about, hide behind our own Constitution in our own country, and yet permit this agency of the government in the rest of the world, in all the other countries of the world, to make us suspect as to our beliefs in a free press there.

I recognize, as he said, that if he introduced a regulation barring paid relationships with foreign journalists, just as he has instituted a regulation barring paid relationships with domestic journalists, it could present barriers—his word—abroad to intelligence gathering, just as it presents obstacles—again his word—domestically.

But, Mr. Chairman, this committee faces a very much larger question. Are we in America hypocrites, are we following a double standard, when we say to the world, in this ideological conflict between authoritarianism and democracy, at home we preach and practice this, abroad we do it the other fellow's way?

I feel that the very much larger issue lost behind the inconvenience and overshadowed by the barriers that Admiral Turner sees, lost there, is the greatest strength this Nation has, a Nation which through its feats of arms has defended freedom across a couple of centuries, but a far larger strength, if we look back across our history, that the power of our example is the greatest power we can throw against authoritarianism in this world; perhaps the greatest examples we have set have been the American Revolution, which triggered dreams of freedom all over the earth, have been the Emancipation Proclamation, have been Woodrow Wilson's 14 points, Franklin Roosevelt's four freedoms, the demonstrated change of the civil rights revolution in this country—these are the strengths of America.

If our ideology, democracy, is going to prevail in the conflict with authoritarianism, we have to pay a price of inconvenience, we have to recognize that freedom presents certain barriers to efficiency, to order.

But, we also have to recognize that if we are going to base a foreign policy on human rights, one of the foremost human rights that we respect at home, Admiral Turner's word, we should respect abroad, whether it is present or not in the contemporary world.

We stand against the treason trial of Shcharansky in the Soviet Union. Whether we can prevent it or not, we stand against it. We stand for justice in South Africa, a capitalist country, and we could not prevent the death of Steve Biko, but we stand for something which the world perceives.

There is no free press in much of the world. But, as Clayton Kirkpatrick has said, we have turned to those Third World countries, to which Russia is saying: "Look, make your press an instrument of your government, that is the way to go."

Arrayed against that are the few of us with a free press saying: "That is not the way to go, look at our example, it works."

But Admiral Turner's letter serves notice that the respect he feels for this free institution in his own country does not extend abroad, because that might present barriers to intelligence gathering.

Mr. Chairman, I hope that this committee will grapple with the larger question, what are we going to stand for in the world, the

human right for a free press, whether it exists or not—do we stand for it? If we don't, it is my considered judgment that this kind of cynicism and hypocrisy over a period of time could lead to the death of the American dream by our own unbelieving hand.

Thank you.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you, Mr. Patterson, for a very important statement.¹

Mr. MYERS.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT J. MYERS

Mr. MYERS. Testifying after such eloquence will make my statement seem more cynical than it was intended.

As I have followed the reporting of this committee's hearings, the consensus seems to be that the interchange of information between CIA intelligence officers and American journalists abroad on a collegial basis is useful and is sanctioned by the people and organizations involved.

Using American journalists abroad, however, in what one might describe as a witting operational capacity is not to be sanctioned. If one had nothing but these hearings to go on, one would conclude that the CIA intelligence officer and the American journalist were almost interchangeable links in the reporting process, or at the very least bore a symbiotic relationship which covered a wide area of concern.

The fact is that the circle of overlap between the intelligence officers and journalists is exceedingly small. That is why, I suspect, the CIA did not grieve much over issuing its November 30, 1977 regulation governing the relationship or, should I say, almost eliminating the relationship between CIA overseas and American journalists.

The reciprocal relationship between the CIA and the American press, as has been testified, has been of value to both parties, the CIA and the press, and often to the individuals themselves whose careers may have mutually benefited by such connections.

But the relationship is not vital to CIA or the press. There are in any case self-limiting factors at work that keep the levels of such collaboration minimal and manageable for all but the philosophical purist.

One hears about the danger the CIA causes to the first amendment in terms of interfering with the freedom of the press. This case has not been made in a significant way, in my opinion, by either Carl Bernstein in Rolling Stone, or the New York Times in its recent stories.

The American press is not so feeble that it can easily be run down in the street. CIA intelligence officers may have a different view on a given situation—say in Vietnam—than other departments of Government, but one could take that or leave it.

All branches of the Government have an influence on the press by their presentation of problems. What constitutes unwarranted governmental influence? Legislative hearings, for example, and the mailings of various legislators favoring positions on legislation to

¹See appendix O for the letter from Admiral Turner, as well as other correspondence from various news associations concerning the CIA.

the press are for the purpose of reaching certain ends. The press is swayed or not swayed. Should that kind of influence be prescribed as well? I think not.

It might be useful to break down CIA activity overseas into two categories—one intelligence and the other propaganda. In the intelligence field, in terms of covert activities of a substantial sort—and I don't mean finding out what a subcabinet minister of a friendly allied country has in mind—on the hard Soviet and Chinese targets which are supposed to be CIA's top priority, there is not much an American journalist can do in any case.

The job of the CIA intelligence officer is to recruit, often through a progression of agents, key figures who have access to that information and who would never meet an American journalist to begin with.

I have heard of American journalists being used to pass money to friendly foreign politicians, for example, so that there could be plausible denial that the money did not come from the U.S. Government.

To me, however, for the CIA to resort to such a tactic shows a depressing lack of operational imagination, both in terms of the clandestine nature of the project and in operational procedure.

In the propaganda field the use of American journalists apparently was more widespread. In the 1950's there was the battle for men's minds, and whether the CIA propaganda efforts helped win it, I don't know.

But again in the foreign field, the use of an American journalist to promote or plant a propaganda line tips the hand of the sponsor, and again is self-limiting, for no news organization—aside from openly sponsored Government ones—can afford to traffic in inaccurate and slanted news and stay in business.

In black propaganda efforts, again using an American journalist in anything other than as a cutout to a third party who might be of the proper local nationality is of not much value.

So, I doubt whether the CIA does or doesn't use American journalists abroad will ever be decisive in the progress of the Republic. There may be a slight diminution of the press' own evaluation of its own importance overseas.

I doubt if CIA foreign operations will substantially be altered by the November 30 regulation. Whatever the CIA's relationship with the American press has been in the past it apparently will be less in the future.

I do think it is a bad idea, however, publicly and apparently officially, to rule out the use of any American group overseas, official or nonofficial. That makes the job that much easier for hostile counterespionage organizations, and makes CIA intelligence officers more vulnerable behind the diminished cover available.

I would concede, however, that on the positive side the November 30 regulation may force the CIA to be more imaginative in its use of covers as well as how to manage its clandestine affairs in the field.

As others have testified, over the years the relationships between CIA overseas and the American journalism profession have stabilized into ground rules that prevent most of the horror prospects

that some see in the possible CIA contamination through planted foreign stories of the domestic American press.

That seems to me a bit like the argument over whether or not to have nuclear powerplants. I don't think new legislation is needed to cope with that one press problem exaggerated, I believe, out of any reasonable and honest proportion. The CIA has unilaterally backed out of all but the most innocuous association with the Galahads of the press.

The ongoing attention to the CIA and the press, however, continues. The pressure on the CIA to reveal the names of American journalists who have rendered assistance to their Government's intelligence efforts in the past is great.

At the present, any American journalist would be loath, I should think, to offer any help whatsoever or accept a request for assistance, however innocuous, for fear of being held up as a traitor to his employer and to his profession. This seems to be the sorry end of the matter.

It also carries with it the implication that the CIA might not be able to protect its clandestine sources, as has often proven true. Any journalist knows that if one cannot protect his sources, he won't have any.

If that is the message from this controversy, the job of the CIA to find out the intentions as opposed to the capabilities of our enemies will be more difficult.

I think that in a reasonable time, perhaps aided by the airing of the question of the relationship of the CIA to the American press overseas will be seen in a calmer perspective.

Neither organization is essential to the other, but they may as well coexist and cooperate where the interests of both are best served. I don't think that is likely to destroy either the Constitution, the press or the U.S. Government.

Thank you.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you, Mr. Myers. That is a very interesting perspective on the American press.

Mr. Cranberg?

STATEMENT OF GILBERT CRANBERG

Mr. CRANBERG. The statement I have is modified slightly from the one I submitted earlier.

Mr. ASPIN. OK.

Mr. CRANBERG. I want to say at the outset that I am here as editor of the editorial pages of the Des Moines Register and Tribune and that I am not representing any membership organization.

We print on our pages a substantial number of articles from foreign sources. Members of our editorial page staff rely on U.S. and foreign publications for information in forming the judgments we express.

I am concerned, therefore, about the possibility of being an unwitting mouthpiece for CIA propaganda. I know many editorial page editors share the concern.

It is of special concern that the November 30, 1977 CIA regulation on relations with the U.S. news media exempts freelancers. The agency can, under this regulation, have in its employ American and foreign freelance journalists who contribute to U.S. publi-

cations. We make frequent use of material purchased from freelancers in this country and abroad.

The CIA's November 30 position on freelancers represents a step backward from the position expressed June 24, 1976, in a meeting with representatives of the National News Council. At that time the CIA said that its February 11, 1976 directive barred relationships with anyone in a journalistic capacity with U.S. news agencies, including freelancers. Now freelancers are exempted.

The latest policy defines accredited but does not define U.S. news media organizations so that you cannot tell what organizations are covered.

The regulation also makes it possible for the CIA to establish news services overseas and for material distributed by the services to be picked up here and abroad.

Perhaps the regulation's most far-reaching deficiency is that the Director of the CIA can, by granting exceptions, apparently approve the hiring of any journalist working for a U.S. news organization.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in 1976 was asked at the annual meeting of the National Conference of Editorial Writers about the CIA's overseas covert propaganda activities, including the planting of false and misleading information.

He answered: "I don't believe that putting misleading information out as news is ever justifiable * * * I would think that any information that is placed through any American governmental organization should be such that it could be published here without misleading the American public."

Secretary Kissinger added, "If it was done in the past, I doubt very seriously that it is being done today."

Official CIA spokesmen were asked several months later about the Secretary's statement that it is never justifiable to plant phony stories in the foreign press, and they said that the Agency concurred.

They stated that the CIA nonetheless wished to retain the option to engage in "black propaganda." The officials said they recognized the inconsistency of wanting to engage sometimes in conduct that is never justifiable, but that is their untenable position.

These same CIA spokesmen discounted the likelihood of fallout in this country from overseas propaganda activity by the CIA. But they admitted that the Agency does not attempt systematically to gauge the extent of domestic fallout. Moreover, the Agency has a peculiar definition of domestic fallout. It defines fallout as the verbatim reprinting in this country of a story planted overseas.

If a story dispatched to this country draws on material planted abroad by the CIA, but the story does not quote it in full, that apparently would not count as an example of the rebroadcasting of covert CIA propaganda to Americans.

In any case, the CIA should be required to quit planting false and misleading stories abroad, not just to protect Americans from propaganda fallout, but to protect all readers from misinformation. This Government should not deliberately deceive foreign readers any more than it should deceive its own people.

Any unilateral disavowal by this country of black propaganda and similar media dirty tricks would leave readers here and abroad

still subject to the covert propaganda activities of foreign intelligence agencies.

Soviet disinformation and other covert foreign intelligence propaganda are as likely to be picked up and relayed to the American public as is the CIA's brand of false and misleading stories.

If pollution of communications is to be eliminated, all of the major polluters should be curbed.

I would hope that this government takes the lead in renouncing the covert employment of journalists for propaganda purposes and in developing support for an international convention against the infiltration and misuse of the press of other countries by intelligence agencies.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you, Mr. Cranberg.

Mr. McClory?

Mr. McCLORY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Kirkpatrick, the statement you made I think is a most significant one, and especially insofar as our current relations with other countries on the subject of human rights and the demand on the part of the nations that have the controlled press that antigovernment statements must themselves be considered as offenses against the government which are punishable, either criminally or in some other way.

Likewise, I am sure you will agree that at these conferences the charge is also made that while the Government, except to the extent that the CIA influences the press, under our Constitution, and our laws, that several large corporations really control the news in contrast to the Government's controlling the news in other countries.

That, of course, is an argument that we have to dispel, and we have to be constantly alert to, as well.

I am just wondering whether we should be directing all of our fire against the CIA, because is it not true that the CIA is merely pursuing national policy in the positions that it maintains, whether it is trying to influence in devious ways the political outcome of affairs in Chile, or in Western Europe, or elsewhere in the world?

Mr. Myers, you appeared to cast an accolade to the current President in setting a very lofty tone and condemning the activities of past decades. On the other hand, in the testimony here, Mr. Myers brought out the wide open use in the 1950's and 1960's, before the last decade.

What about the position of the Congress with respect to doing something about controlling the CIA and its activities during this period, since it really came into existence in 1950 or 1947? What about the role of the Executive? We don't have a bunch of volunteers here, do we, as far as the CIA is concerned?

My experience last year on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence was that the abuses and excesses which were experienced, for which frequently the CIA was condemned, was because the Executive or an agency of the Executive wasn't following the rules, wasn't complying with the statutes.

Shouldn't our fire be directed at the Congress, at the Executive? Mr. Turner is not issuing this statement, is he, just as a volunteer? Is he overriding President Carter's position or policy on this subject? I rather doubt it.

Do you have some comments as to other areas of our concern beside the CIA?

Mr. Kirkpatrick and Mr. Myers primarily.

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. I think that when you go back into the recent history of our intelligence activities, you will find a great deal there that is distressing to all of us at this time. Attitudes have changed. World conditions have changed.

A good many of the activities that took place in the fifties and sixties were in an environment of great international tension, where there was a feeling that there was real material danger to the welfare of the United States.

We are living in a different environment now. I am grateful for that.

During that period, certainly there were excesses which could be chargeable to the CIA, to the Congress, to the executive, and to the news media. Things were done in those days which the people themselves who participated now regret.

An example would be Dan Schorr's column in the New York Times this morning, confessing to his associations with the CIA. I don't think there is much profit in going back into history to try to assess blame.

In my presentation here I have asked for a vigorous, an active oversight activity on the part of the Congress and on the part of the executive to make sure that those excesses do not occur in the future. There is a responsibility there.

Now, with respect to the question of whether there is urgency or danger in the situation that we have today, Mr. Myers has said that he didn't think that the American free press is so feeble that it might be run down in the street.

I don't think many people are aware how close we came to losing the battle at Nairobi. In Paris, in 1975, in December, there was a meeting of a UNESCO committee, and at that meeting this resolution was proposed, which would have placed the world's press, if it had been approved and sanctioned, under an obligation to respect the directives of the governments of the various nations.

At that meeting we were plowed under. The western democracies of Europe were plowed under. There were 84 nations there. The United States was forced to withdraw from the committee meeting because they absolutely had no opportunity to win the votes necessary to carry our position.

So, they withdrew and the seven Western nations of the economic community withdrew. At the end of that meeting, freedom lost by a vote of 48 to 8. That was the circumstance that we faced when we went to Nairobi.

The Third World nations were virtually united behind the proposition to turn the news media into instruments of government. The only reason we won there, frankly, is because in the first place the United States was withholding \$43 million of its assessment to the UNESCO budget. That was a powerful weapon.

In the second place, the Third World nations of Africa decided that they did not want to become pawns in an ideological struggle between the United States and Russia. So, they refused to vote for the proposition which the Russians were espousing.

This struggle is continuing. It will come up next year at the next General Conference of UNESCO.

We are in a fight, and as long as we have this two-faced hypocritical attitude toward the freedom of the press in the United States, and the willingness to accept influences on the press in the other parts of the world, our world position is going to be eroded, and we are going to be weak in this international struggle to preserve freedom.

Mr. McCLORY. We do have to guard the independence of the press and we do have to guard against the attacks which charge the press with managing the news, with monopolizing, with anti-trust violations and other activities which present other nations and spokesmen for some of these other nations with strong arguments that the press of our Nation is controlled by a very few individuals, don't we?

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. Those charges are made.

Mr. McCLORY. And we do have to guard against those?

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. Yes.

Mr. McCLORY. Thank you.

Mr. PATTERSON. Mr. Chairman, if I may add, Clayton Kirkpatrick has said out of personal experience far more eloquently than any of us can say out of theory what I perceive to be the challenge to Congress at this moment. That is, at this very moment across the world the Soviet Union has closed the combat when it comes to a free press. They are saying to the nations of the Third World, your press should be an instrument of your government. A small and hardy band of American and a few Western European editors and a few delegates of the United States to UNESCO are holding the bridge at this moment.

Yet, if we turn and look at Admiral Turner's letter saying it is not appropriate to apply the same overt respect to the press of the world as it is in the United States, if that is not a direct undercutting of the United States in the battle that is now being actively waged, I don't know how it could be more clearly shown.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me follow that question if I can. Go through just briefly for us the UNESCO situation, could you, Mr. Kirkpatrick? What is the meeting and what was the resolution proposed by the Soviets, just to make the record clear on what it is we are talking about?

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. The title of the resolution is significant. It was a draft declaration on "Fundamental principles governing the use of the mass media in strengthening peace and international understanding in combating war propaganda, racism and apartheid." This is quite a bundle and there are some very key code words in there.

Most people would be reluctant to assail anything which carried the label of being against apartheid. Certainly I would.

Nevertheless, when you read the resolution you saw that it provided for several things. For one thing it said that States will be responsible for the mass media in their jurisdiction. It said that legislation should be proposed to regulate mass media and to see that it was responsible.

Now there are all kinds of semantic problems here. Responsible in the United States has one meaning. Responsible in the Soviet

Union has another meaning. Responsible in Uganda has a different meaning. Responsible in Kenya has a different meaning. The word freedom has great semantic differences among the democratic nations of the world and the totalitarian nations.

As Congressman McClory has said, one of the great arguments in that international dialog is that the Western press, the press in capitalistic nations, is a captive of capitalism. We argue to them, you are not free because you have to respect the orders of your government. They argue to us, you are not free because you are the captives of the capitalistic system. In addition, they argue that we are not free, and we run into this in international conferences all the time, they say why are you opposed to this resolution which wants to put the mass media in the service of the government for good purposes? We want to develop this country. We want steel mills here. So we think the mass media should go out and campaign for steel mills. We want to develop waterpower projects. We want to develop irrigation projects so we want to use the mass media to influence our people to support those projects. It has a certain surface plausibility.

But when you start using the mass media for those purposes it is not long before you are using it to support the ruling clique in power. In those nations the ruling clique in power is a small minority of the entire population.

Mr. ASPIN. In November of 1976, was that the first time this issue came up?

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. No. This issue has been before the UNESCO since 1970.

Mr. ASPIN. What happened? Is it just getting more and more support, or what is happening with it?

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. Yes. The United States through really massive efforts has been able to ward it off. This time I would say that our State Department did very significant and useful work in opposing this. They circulated before the conference position papers to 106 governments, including many of the Third World governments that were involved in the conference, pointing out the dangers of this kind of resolution. So that this is a continuing problem.

Now there have been conferences since then. There was a conference in Florence last April. The General Counsel of UNESCO went to that conference, Dick Schmidt. The same arguments came up. We said, "We don't want to adopt a resolution that would give international sanction to turning the press over to the control of the government". The Russians came back to us and said, "This is silly, your people are being used by your government right now." The evidence they cited was, "Your people are in the service of the CIA."

We also argued, "that their people are in the service of their government." They came right back to us and they quoted from the record that "our people," they said, "were in the service of the CIA."

Mr. ASPIN. Let me press it a little further.

We questioned foreign correspondents about the Turner directive. One of the things that foreign correspondents are always being accused of is also working for the CIA. Their concern was

that it might lead to their physical harm or lack of access to sources because a source thought they were working for the CIA.

So we asked this question of them: "If the Turner directive is stated and put into effect, will people abroad believe it?" In other words, will some other country believe that American journalists are no longer working for the CIA? The journalists thought probably not, but they thought it was a good idea to have the Turner directive mainly for domestic reasons.

My question to you is: Suppose we now extend the Turner directive to include foreign correspondents, is it really going to have any affect on any of these votes at UNESCO?

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. I think so. I think the openly stated policy of the Government is going to have some significance. There will be cynics who won't believe it. I don't think the Russians will believe it. But, nevertheless, when it is on the record, what other defense do we have? What other credibility can we offer except that this is the stated official position that we intend to support. It is the best we can do.

Mr. ASPIN. They won't fall back and say you are really being controlled by capitalism or some other way of saying you are under control anyway? In other words, will it change any votes?

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. I have heard it in Russia, China, Third World countries. They certainly are going to continue to say it. But if we stop the practices—and there is proof that the practices existed, there are admissions—If we stop the practices, if we say we are not going to do it anymore, I think it is certainly going to help.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me ask: What difference does it make if UNESCO passes this resolution?

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. That is a very pertinent question. UNESCO doesn't legislate. UNESCO doesn't have the power to enforce its regulations. But I think that in international relations there is an increasing sensitivity to world opinion. I think that the progress of dissent movements in Russia and Poland, even in China, is an indication that even in the most totalitarian of states there is a certain sensitivity to world opinion. Because there is that sensitivity, I think that if you had an international body such as UNESCO that adopted as its official policy a declaration that it was proper for states to control the mass media, I think it would have an effect.

I think that when we would go into one of the Third World nations and say we would like to have a reporter here to report what is going on in your country and they said, well, we don't want him here because we can't control him, we can't influence what he is going to write and certainly the American media is never going to tolerate or accept that.

Mr. MCCLORY. Would the chairman yield for this observation?

Mr. ASPIN. Sure.

Mr. MCCLORY. The Helsinki Charter was designed to provide a greatly expanded freedom of the press and opportunities for news gathering, especially in the Eastern European nations. I am sure that you would agree, would you not, that the actions in UNESCO are sort of a counterattack against the freedoms that we are trying to establish little by little through implementation of the Helsinki Charter?

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. We are talking about moral forces. If you look at the course of history, I think you will see that we are making progress a little step and then another little step and then another little step and maybe we slide back two and maybe we go forward three. I think that everything that we do to accelerate that very slow progress is going to be helpful.

Sure, the Helsinki Agreement is not going to transform Eastern Europe, persuade them to democratic institutions immediately. But it is a step. It represents some kind of progress. I think that is the way we are going to proceed.

Our position in opposing these declarations in UNESCO is going to be based on the strength of our moral position. That is why I think Mr. Patterson's comments here are so important. They represent a moral position. I think that that is going to be our strength.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me push it a little further. This really is a very fundamental difference that we have come across with people talking about the press: the relations between the press of the United States, the foreign media, and the CIA. Mr. Patterson has presented a very eloquent statement. I am not sure what I believe on this yet because I think it is a very difficult and very complex issue.

Let me push a little further on the whole question to you, if I might. What is the UNESCO resolution talking about? It is talking about control over media within the country. In other words, they are saying that they are trying to justify the use of media in country X for the Government's purpose which you rightly say will lead to the support of the current clique in power in country.

I see the dangers of it. You are absolutely 100 percent right in what you are trying to do to get UNESCO to make a stand. What I am asking here is: aren't we doing that already with the Turner directive? In other words, we are saying about our domestic press: All right, our domestic press is no longer an arm of the CIA or will not be an arm of the CIA. We will now have an arm's length relation between our domestic press and the CIA, but foreign correspondents are up for grabs according to the current round of the Turner directive.

I am saying that the UNESCO resolution is addressed it to the domestic press. In other words, the UNESCO resolution isn't saying you can use foreigners for your purposes; it is saying you can't use the domestic press in country X for their purposes. We have already done that with the Turner directive. I am not sure that extending this ban to the foreign press is really relevant to the UNESCO argument.

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. Let me say that this is not a domestic and parochial issue as far as the nations that are in favor of this declaration are concerned. It has that aspect. The delegate for Guyana, for example, said we regard the news media in our country as a national resource. It is just like coal or water power. We want to use it for any purpose that serves our needs.

But the delegate from Tanzania said this: We don't want foreigners in our country reporting what is going on because we can't control them. They will tell lies, they will misrepresent. They will be subject to all kinds of distortions. They will impose their cultural standards on our system and therefore they will give a distorted picture. So what we want is a position where our minister of

information will deliver information at the border about Tanzania and there is a great deal of that in these countries. Reporters have been thrown out of nation after nation in Eastern Europe and in Africa on the grounds that the Government found their reporting displeasing.

So what the effect will be is that there will be a shut-off of access to information around the world. Only 30 percent of the world's nations right now have what we consider to be a free press, only 30 percent. You not only will have access shutoff, but you will have the right to distribute shutoff. In other words, the reporting of the free world news agencies will not be going into those countries.

Now I think that most of the world's decisions are being made now on the basis of information that is provided by the free news agencies. Even in the totalitarian countries you will find that the government leaders are reading the foreign editions of Time, Newsweek, they are reading American newspapers, American news agencies, Japanese news agencies. They are reading German, French and British news agencies, German, French and British news publications. These are the instruments they use to gather the reliable information that they need to make intelligent decisions. It is this access, this distribution, this free flow of information which I think is so essential and which I think is damaged when people are able to argue that the sources of information of the United States and the other free nations are polluted to some degree by government influence.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me go to the second point that both of you raised and which is more a moral point, I guess; the question about the issue of whether it is morally correct for the CIA to use foreign media and the fact that we do stand for something unique in the world in regard to a free press which other nations do not have. And the question about whether, because so few other countries have a free press, we ought to stand for something and therefore apply the same standards abroad.

I think people arguing the other side would take the same set of facts and use it to argue that we ought to do something abroad. Because there are so few free presses in the world and because most of these countries have a press which is either controlled by their government or partially controlled by their government or one which is rather corrupt and you are buying stories into the press, that in order for us to survive in this kind of a climate, it is necessary for us to get our side of the story out, to engage in this kind of activity. We have to have this kind of activity in order to get our side of the story out, even if what we are trying to get out is true. That doesn't convince you?

Mr. PATTERSON. That doesn't convince me, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ASPIN. How we get our side of the story out in these situations, given that there is only a free press in 30 percent of the world and there are lots of gradations? How do we get our side of the story out? We make a good moral point by restricting ourselves and not taking the position; but how do we get our side of the story into those parts of the world where the press is not free and overt ways are not going to be effective?

Mr. PATTERSON. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Kirkpatrick and I, 2 years ago, spent 3 weeks inside China. Our group of American editors

was able to get daily broadcasts from the Voice of America and we knew what was going on in the world. It was easily monitored there. It could be monitored in English and Chinese. Modern electric communications are moving the truth around the world. We can pick up BBC in Peking. The channels of communication are becoming total and universal. You can't shut the truth out. In a country that says we believe in a free press, Admiral Turner says he respects the need to erect obstacles to his intelligence gathering by respecting the independent and free American press.

We are saying why not transfer that respect to the world at large and stand as America should stand as not only a believer in a free press but as a rallying point for the world.

One thing history tells us is that you can put dictators over peoples, you can suppress them, you can hold them down for 40 years in totalitarian systems such as we have seen in this century in Spain, but the minute that cork gets a little out of the bottle it pops up because people yearn for something free. You see a return of democracy because it is what the people want. Why the United States cannot stand for that, it being our basic strength—I don't like the word moral because it sounds bluenosed or blue-sky. It sounds a little pretentious. I prefer simply to say why don't we believe in what the United States stands for and represent it in the world.

Congressman McClory, I think, properly asked why we are blaming the CIA? Is it their fault? They are carrying out national policy. That is precisely true, Congressman. This Congress makes national policy along with the executive. Therefore, Admiral Turner has stated to you what he as the intelligence director thinks is appropriate in his work. But you are the makers of national policy so the question comes to you as to what to say to the executive branch and through them to Admiral Turner.

My hope would be that through whatever method, I agree with Kirk, passing laws in areas of this type give editors cold chills because we don't want any limitation on our ability to report news. The first amendment says you cannot pass any law abridging freedom of the press so we are very slow to mention statutes.

I don't know what courses are open to you. You do. Could you memorialize the President if it be the sense of Congress that you want this done? You certainly have power to limit appropriations for expenditure of CIA funds for this purpose. There are many avenues open.

Mr. McClory. We can pass laws, too. We can spell this thing out in legislation if we choose. What I would like to ask you, Mr. Patterson, is this: In what way do we enhance freedom of the press around the world by restricting CIA contacts with representatives of the foreign press? I am thinking, for instance, of using the foreign press as a means of information. Of course, even recruiting the foreign press to provide information which might not be available readily in other ways, how does that enhance the freedom of the press or detract from freedom of the press in those other countries or even in our country?

Mr. Patterson. The answer in my mind to that is that it enhances freedom of the press all over the world when we stand for it. Admiral Turner says we reserve the right to subvert foreign

journalists even though we are not going to do it with our domestic press. I want to make a different point about unpaid relationships which are not barred.

Unpaid relationships certainly and properly could continue with journalists across the world talking to CIA or vice versa. But it is the matter of moving in with American money to subvert. We are saying we have a better system. Let's serve the purposes of our Government and let's be free.

But Admiral Turner's letter says we reserve the right with American tax money to come in there and subvert your journalists.

Mr. McCLORY. But we should express the hope of wanting them to be free.

Mr. PATTERSON. We should give the example and keep the faith.

Mr. McCLORY. That would make a wonderful commencement speech.

Mr. PATTERSON. I would hope I am more effective than that.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Cranberg?

Mr. CRANBERG. We are under somewhat of a handicap in responding to a question about the advantages of the use of covert propaganda abroad because we don't have access to the kinds of materials that the CIA uses abroad and the advantages that flow from that. The Senate Intelligence Committee has had access to that kind of information. Senator Inouye made this comment in his recent report:

I have come to the conclusion that no intelligence agency should be involved with working journalists. The problem of the flow-back of propaganda to the United States is a far greater danger than any benefits which might accrue than the services of a journalist working for an intelligence agency might be able to perform.

I take it we are disadvantaged more by the use of foreign journalists than any benefits we get from it.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me follow up on these questions.

Basically I guess what you are saying is that it is important we take this position because it is important we stand for this principle of ours both abroad as well as at home; that the UNESCO vote will be influenced by our stand along these lines and this is something of some importance; and that if we cut the CIA off from using it, the truth will get out in any case and, anyway, we have other means of getting the truth to the public in spite of not being able to recruit foreign journalists.

Let me ask a further question: Why would we restrict this to just foreign journalists? For example, we also believe in a free labor movement and yet we recruit labor leaders abroad. We recruit Cabinet officers and yet that is abhorrent to the thought that the CIA would control Cabinet officers here in this country. In other words, why is journalism different from these others, or would you extend it to these other occupations?

Mr. PATTERSON. In my view, Mr. Chairman, the essence of democracy is letting the people know what is going on. If the CIA is paying Cabinet members in some foreign country or labor union movement leaders, if you have a press free in that country, it will report that to the people. I know I am stating the ideal to you, but I do consider the first amendment as being first by design by the founders of this country that so long as you let the people know what is going on and stay out of their channels of communication

with attempts to subvert or foul them in some way, that all else will be settled by the people. So speaking ideally, that is my answer.

Mr. ASPIN. So you have much more concern about, recruiting journalists abroad than you would have about recruiting Cabinet officers or labor leaders, to take the two examples?

Mr. PATTERSON. I do, particularly in view of the fact that we are supposed to stand for a free press and are presently arguing in the UNESCO forum to the whole world that we should not use mass media as instruments of government. We are saying this in an ideological conflict with the Soviet Union which is saying the opposite. It seems to me the position of Admiral Turner plays into the hands of our adversaries.

Mr. ASPIN. You might end up with the unusual situation where you are recruiting the Minister of Information in the country who gives the orders to the press, but you could not recruit the press. If you have a very heavily influenced press by the Minister of Information, under your guidelines you could not recruit the editorial writer at the desk but you could recruit the Minister of Information who told the editorial writer what to write.

Mr. PATTERSON. There is no question that this is not an easy matter, but it is a crucial matter as to what the national policy is going to be. Even in Admiral Turner's November 30th regulation relating to the American press, he leaves a hole there you could drive a truck through.

Mr. ASPIN. We have some problems with that.

Mr. PATTERSON. He can make exceptions which presumably means he can hire American journalists if he says so. He can come to me and if he gets my secretary, he can hire my secretary to report on everything I do. This is all under that new regulation. You can't cover every rat hole, but an essential statement of policy has occurred with respect to the American press which I think would be enormously helpful to the United States if it were extended to the world press.

Mr. ASPIN. How far would you carry this? Suppose somebody came in and volunteered, actually came in off the street and volunteered? Suppose a TASS reporter came into the embassy and said, "I want to help you." Would you then say no, you are a journalist and we can't recruit you?

Mr. PATTERSON. No. I would take every bit of the information he would give me voluntarily.

Mr. ASPIN. If he said, "I want to do things for you", would you say, here is a list of things we want information on, or would you say we can't do that because you are a journalist?

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, I don't pay for news tips. I have been in the business 30 years and I have never paid a nickel to anybody who came to me saying I will sell you something hot. First, I don't believe it, and, second, I think it is unprofessional. I think the fellow who comes in and says in the public interest I want to spill some beans to you, that is the useful information.

Mr. ASPIN. Suppose he wants to spill the beans and he is willing for you to give him instructions as to what to do? Here is a TASS reporter and he wants to help. You are the CIA Station Chief in Moscow and you say to him: "OK, here is the list of things we want

you to do. Here is what we want you to do for us." Or do you say to him as a Station Chief: "You are a journalist and we cannot do this?"

Mr. PATTERSON. No. I would give him a laundry list of things to do for me, but I wouldn't give him a nickel.

Mr. ASPIN. So what you would do with the foreign press is you would prevent the CIA from going out and recruiting people and you would prevent them from going out and paying people? But as for voluntary associations of any kind, you would make all the use out of them you could?

Mr. PATTERSON. That is a precise extension of the Turner regulation with respect to the American press. It is a matter of recruiting paid, bribed, subverted, members of the media to be agents for American intelligence. That is what we are against. But we are not for any cessation of unpaid relationships between reporter and spook or between spook and reporter. It is conceivable in some extreme circumstance that a reporter might consider it his duty to step forward and give information to the CIA just as a reporter who has witnessed a murder would step forward without hesitation to be a witness in the trial of the murder.

Mr. McCLORY. Mr. Myers deals directly with this subject.

Mr. ASPIN. I know. I was going to ask the others.

Mr. McCLORY. He is the publisher of the New Republic which I assume is a conservative publication. [General laughter.]

Mr. MYERS. It doesn't have that reputation.

Mr. McCLORY. I was going to ask your views on this subject.

Mr. MYERS. I think everything has been said that supports the basic thing I tried to say, namely, that the free press is a very powerful force, the truth is very powerful. The dangers of the CIA being able to seriously compromise that seem to be very minimal. It is a proposition that is self-limiting as has been said. If you have a free press that can report on what is going on and it does—and we certainly have had a great deal of that over the last few years, particularly in the terms of the CIA—I think it is a minimal problem. It is an important problem, of course. Everything is a question of degree. But it seems to me that in terms of the American press, the self-limiting problem has pretty well handled the CIA situation, that is, the Turner directive is not 100 percent of what some people would like, but it seems to me that it reduces the risks given the strength of the press.

The UNESCO thing I don't particularly follow. If 70 percent are against our position, why they can't get the votes I don't know. As far as foreign journalists, to exclude them as a group, especially for intelligence purposes, I don't see why. In terms of using a Tass reporter in propaganda, that is self-limiting. He is not going to be putting out too many favorable American stories and maintain his job. If he has access to what the Soviet Union has in mind in terms of the missiles they are building, I can't imagine why anybody would think you wouldn't want to use somebody like that. The idea that he works for Tass is secondary. Communist reporters are not going to be doing very much propaganda.

Mr. ASPIN. I think it is important to keep these things distinct, although they do overlap. One is the question of our relationship with foreign media and the second is the question of whether we

ought to be conducting propaganda efforts abroad. If you have a big infrastructure of media people who are assets, you can use them as the Wurlitzer¹ to grind out propaganda. But you could also have propaganda operations even though you were not paying journalists abroad.

So the two questions are not automatically together. Let me ask you about the separate question. Take, for example, the journalist recruitment. Do you see any problems with the idea that the United States should recruit journalists abroad? Would you, in other words, extend the Turner directives to the foreign press?

Mr. MYERS. No. I think the purpose would almost have to be different. I assume we are not talking about recruiting Canadian journalists. I can't imagine why you would want to do that. I think if you take seriously the CIA's requirements, namely, to concentrate on the bloc, or maybe some Third World countries that have access to the bloc, this is the area where the CIA has fallen down very badly. Maybe that shows that whether you have the directive or don't have it, it won't make that much difference, as I also suggest.

But this is one of the problems in the DDO shakeup. I would have to assume that foreign agent operations are not flourishing. It seems to me that they must if we are to know what our opponents intend to do as opposed to what they are capable of doing. We know they can blow us up 20 times over, but what you want is the early warning and the knowledge of their capability.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me ask Mr. Patterson and Kirkpatrick then. Is your concern about this essentially just the moral issue or the principle itself? Does it make any difference what these journalists are used for that you would recruit abroad? Suppose you were using journalists abroad only to gather information and you were not using them for propaganda efforts? Would that make any difference in your view, or is it the ethical question?

Mr. PATTERSON. It is both moral and pragmatic. Morally, yes; this Nation is supposed to stand for something and we ought not depart from it. If it is right to respect a free press and not pay journalists in the American press, it is right everywhere. We all know that only 30 percent of the world has a free press, but who is going to stand for it if we don't?

The pragmatic part of it as Kirk has described is that there is a great tide running in the world and the Soviet Union in the UNESCO forum is encouraging the world to believe in the press as an instrument of the government. That will bring a shutdown of the lamps of knowledge throughout this Earth. If we can't get reporters into Africa or other countries, we are not going to know what is going on there. If we believe in free flow of information for our own Government, fine. The propaganda part I believe is a separate question. I have said what I believe. The USIA was created for that.

Mr. ASPIN. It doesn't matter what they are used for: you would be against the recruitment of foreign journalists whether they are

¹For a discussion of the "Wurlitzer" see Stuart H. Loory, "The CIA's Use of the Press: A 'Mighty Wurlitzer'" *Columbia Journalism Review*, September/October 1974, pp. 8-18.

used for intelligence or propaganda? You are talking about the ethical issue of foreign intelligence?

Mr. PATTERSON. And the flat truth that as long as we overtly are practicing abroad what we are not preaching at home, when we have a double standard, how can the world believe in our professions of faith in freedom. That is supposed to be our ideological position.

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. Let me give you a concrete example from my experience.

Last November I went to India to attend a series of seminars on freedom of the press organized by leading editors of India and sponsored to some degree by the International Press Institute. The purpose of this was to draft some kind of a declaration, that the Indians would draft some kind of a declaration defending the position that they had taken for a free press in India, a country where it had been suppressed for 19 months during the Indira Ghandi emergency.

At Calcutta during one of the sessions that we were holding to talk about the free press and its value to the citizens of India, one of the editors of what they call a language newspaper raised a serious objection to the presence of representatives of the International Press Institute. There were five of us there, one from the United States, one from Britain, France, Germany and one representing the IPI, itself.

His objection was this: What business does the IPI have coming to India to talk about a free press? Everybody knows that the IPI is an agent of the CIA.

It seems to me that this is very damaging to our whole campaign to try to persuade the peoples of the world that a free press is an advantage to those who want freedom and who believe in democracy. This is a serious problem. It happened that one of the editors there was a director of the IPI and he was able to state on his own knowledge and with his own credibility that this was a false rumor. But it has gone all through India. There are people in India, and we met them, who said that the stringers that are employed by the U.S. agencies there are not trusted in India, they don't get background, confidential information on government affairs because they believe those stringers are not only serving the agencies, UPI and AP, but they are also serving the CIA. For that reason some sources of information are shut off to them.

Mr. McCLORY. The CIA, of course, in addition to its important role as far as our national security is concerned, likewise performs many, many other functions. They secure economic information and they supply information regarding agriculture and other subjects. At the present time we are laying great emphasis on human rights in other countries.

I am wondering about this. I know that there are exceptions and there is a difficulty in applying these rigid rules. But it must be that the representatives of the foreign press would have more information about dissidents, about the deprivation of human rights in those countries than anyone else. The person deprived of human rights would try to publicize his position and communicate with representatives of the foreign press.

Would you think it inappropriate for the CIA to keep in contact with these representatives of the foreign press who might have peculiar advantages in getting information about the deprivation of human rights, which information could be used constructively in trying to promote human rights and human freedom in these other countries?

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. Not at all. I think the CIA would be justified in getting information from those people as long as it did not project the image of these people being agents of the CIA. That is where the problem comes. We are swinging here from wild extremes, from high idealism to practicality. Let me say something on the practicality side now.

I don't think there is any problem in the CIA's getting information without going to the newspaper. The newspaper reporters in these countries where dissident movements are flourishing are getting that information from the dissidents themselves. I don't see any reason why the CIA couldn't go to original sources. In the practice of law, and some of you are lawyers I am sure, you always recognize it is best to go to the best source possible. We try to do the same. I don't think the CIA is particularly handicapped from being restricted from turning journalists into agents. It seems to me there is a whole spectrum of information available there to them just the same as it is to the journalists.

Now, Mr. Chairman, you presented a rather dramatic contradiction here between the restriction that we propose on using journalists and the possibility that they might use the information minister, an officer of the Government. This is the same topsy-turvy logic on its face as I see right here in our own situation where we say to the CIA, you can't use the Peace Corps, you can't use USIS, Fulbright scholars, AID personnel, but it is all right to use journalists.

What kind of logic is that? That is the logic given to you earlier in these hearings by Mr. Colby. It seems to me this is logic turned upside down.

Mr. ASPIN. To be fair to Mr. Colby, he was in favor of being able to use USIS, Fulbright scholars, and others.

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. He wanted to use all of them.

Mr. ASPIN. He wanted to use everybody.

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. But he apparently accepted the barrier as far as these other agencies are concerned, but he did not want to accept the barriers to the use of newsmen.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me carry this one step further. Here we have been talking about either/or situations. Suppose we had a situation where you can't use foreign journalists. Senator Inouye and others argue your same point, that we ought to not get involved with foreign media any more than we do with domestic. In other words, whatever we have at home we ought to apply abroad. You also have the other point of view argued by many people, too, that foreign media should be fair game—although they recognize it is important to have restrictions on domestic media. That is an either/or situation.

Suppose you have a situation where you said we would not recruit foreign media in those places of the world where there was the free press, the 30 percent, but we reserve the right to recruit

foreign media in the parts of the world where there is not a free press. Would that have the right kind of incentives?

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. There you have a situation where we could defend it cynically if we wanted to. We could say in the totalitarian nations the journalists are not really journalists anyway, they are government agents, so we don't care. But I think that is a very cynical position to take and I would not favor it.

Mr. PATTERSON. As a practical matter, who is going to judge what is free, what is semifree and what is slave?

Mr. ASPIN. The practicalities are not easy.

Mr. PATTERSON. As a practicality, it is impossible and as an idea, as a representation of our belief in freedom, it says to those peoples living in lands that don't now have a free press that we reserve the right to subvert and treat you as a pariah.

Mr. ASPIN. It also gives them an incentive to get a free press.

Mr. PATTERSON. I am not sure about that. I remember a conversation with a young visitor to the St. Petersburg Times last year from a Central America nation. He was writing fairly freely, he said. He was saying what he thought. He said, we have a law at home that anything that you write that is an economic disadvantage to our nation, we can be put in jail. I said, have you been? He said, "Yes, I spent 6 months in jail a couple of years ago." I said, "Do you think you will go back?" He said, "Yes, I probably will."

Right now he is writing fairly free information for his people because the people running the country are in a sort of generous mood at the moment. This is the way foreign journalists operate. These people have to have an enormous belief to take the risk, and jail terms. They look to us. They say this country really works. A free press is something to dream for and to work toward politically.

That is the flag we should be flying in this world. The news accounts of Mr. Colby's testimony said during the height of the world war 50 percent of the CIA budget was spent on covert propagandizing. It is down to about 2 percent now. Two percent dishonesty could be dispensed with to the great advantage of the United States and without, it seems to me, much convenience to the CIA.

Mr. ASPIN. Is there anybody else who would like to talk about this subject or maybe we can move on to others? It is a very interesting issue and one of the more interesting aspects of it is that Mr. Kirkpatrick is against the use of foreign media and Mr. Myers doesn't feel that way. We have somehow got the New Republic to the right of the Chicago Tribune.

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. This is a demonstration of the diversity of the American press, one of its great virtues. [General laughter.]

Mr. MYERS. I would not make a statement on the opinion of the ownership, but I don't think there is that much difference when you get down to the bottom line on some of these questions. I think without beating it to death, the self-limiting idea on propaganda is quite obvious. There is only so much people can do and maintain their credibility. In a competitive situation you get quickly discredited for doing obvious things.

The question of whether or not to use foreign correspondents as intelligence agents if they could get to second or third parties is something else. If you had a French journalist somehow related to

a Hungarian journalist with a brother-in-law in the KGB who was anxious to defect, it seems to me that is an obvious way to use a journalist. Using him in the media for propaganda I think is a marginal thing.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Cranberg?

Mr. CRANBERG. When a particular covert operation is examined in depth, in the case of Chile you find that the use of the media was extensive and covert propaganda was probably the single largest component of that covert operation. So perhaps while what Mr. Myers says is applicable to the situation today or in many places, it is also possible for covert propaganda to be a very, very significant factor in a particular country, in a particular situation.

I think this is one of our concerns. What can happen at some future time and what kind of safeguards will we have to prevent that? It always seems when a problem is examined, well, things were terrible yesterday but things are fine today. If things were terrible yesterday, they can be terrible again tomorrow. That is one of our major concerns.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Mineta?

Mr. MINETA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think the testimony we have had this morning has been just great. I have enjoyed this very, very much. I think it is very enlightening.

Mr. Cranberg, since you do rely on freelancers and many pieces come from not only domestic freelancers but abroad as well, how do you protect yourself from what was quoted of the blowback problem of gray or even black propaganda that may be placed in the foreign news media?

Mr. CRANBERG. We have no protection. A freelancer contributes an article. We know something of the credentials of the freelancer. If he is in the employ of the CIA or a foreign intelligence agency and if we ask him if he is in the employ of an intelligence agency, he would be bound to deny it, which is one of the especially pernicious aspects of the employment of a journalist by an intelligence agency. It is reasonable to want to know what kind of financial connections a contributor to your newspaper has, whether he is employed. If he is contributing travel articles, does he work for a chamber of commerce in some foreign country? If you put that question to him, you have a reasonable expectation of getting an honest answer. Does he have a conflict of interest? If you put that question in terms of do you work for a foreign intelligence agency, you cannot expect a forthright answer and you won't get a forthright answer. That is one of the reasons this gap in the regulations is a serious gap. It ought to cover freelancers.

Mr. MINETA. There is not a distinction between intelligence gathering and propaganda when it relates to foreign news media.

Mr. Patterson makes a stronger case of making that clear distinction, as does Mr. Kirkpatrick. Mr. Myers feels that in terms of intelligence or information gathering, in a voluntary association this is all right.

Would you even go so far in a paid relationship in an overseas media that it would be all right for intelligence gathering, Mr. Myers?

Mr. MYERS. Yes, and I would suggest that is maybe the only motive in some cases of getting people. The motivation of all kinds of people are different. The value of paying somebody comes obviously in terms of control, being able to expose them.

Mr. MINETA. But there is no difference so far as domestic journalists are concerned as far as paid relationships, contractual relationships of any nature, either for intelligence gathering or for dissemination of propaganda.

Mr. MYERS. I am only discussing the question of foreign journalists.

Mr. PATTERSON. And I feel, Congressman, we should have the same policy abroad as we have at home. Your distinction between journalists hired abroad to put propaganda into publications or journalists hired abroad to gather intelligence for the CIA, these are two distinct chores.

But, both of them I think represent hiring, subverting journalists of foreign news media to do one or the other. I think that paid relationship, which is now banned with respect to the American press, should be banned with respect to the foreign press.

Mr. MINETA. What about in terms of the voluntary associations here we have on that chart?¹ Going to the next category of salaried associations, do all of your publications have some code of ethics that you require of your employees and stringers and freelancers, if you do take an article from a freelancer, to be free of gifts, reimbursement for expenses, occasional payment on contract basis, or regular financial payment?

Mr. PATTERSON. By outside organizations?

Mr. MINETA. By outside organizations.

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes, we have a national ban on it.

Mr. MINETA. You have a code of ethics that you require of your employees?

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes, we mail back all Christmas gifts that come into the food editor, any person in the news room. We send them a nice note and mail them back. The business of occasional payment on a contract basis, they cannot moonlight or write for competitive publications or for those that might bring them into conflict.

This is a very broad rule that a lot of newspapers observe. For instance, if your education reporter starts writing for the local education association journal, that is a clear conflict of interest. If your business editor starts writing an annual report for the local banker, that is a conflict of interest and is barred.

These are the kinds of codes of ethics that we operate under.

Mr. MINETA. Is this the case of the Tribune?

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. Yes; that is very common. We have a code of ethics that requires that we pay for theater tickets and all that sort of thing that used to be accepted rather universally. We have tried to raise the ethical standards of our people. I think that we have had some success.

Mr. MINETA. The New Republic the same?

Mr. MYERS. Yes.

Mr. MINETA. The Des Moines Register?

¹See appendix E, p. 337.

Mr. CRANBERG. Yes. In addition to the codes that individual newspapers have, there are, you might say, industrywide codes, the ASNE has a code, the National Conference of Editorial Writers has a code, AP Managing Editors has a code.

But, it is rather difficult to apply these standards to people who are not in your employ, and especially to people whose contact is minimal; that is, freelancers.

Mr. MINETA. Having sat through these hearings now for 2 or 3 weeks, as we have been going through this, there is a great deal of reticence to legislate in this whole area.

I am wondering whether or not maybe it is better to do it from the news side, from the media side though a code of ethics, rather than from Congress trying to legislate in this vast area that has so many pitfalls in it.

I am just wondering what the reaction would be.

Mr. PATTERSON. Congressman, we are slow to ask for legislation. But I am quick to point out to you that the resolution of the American Society of Newspaper Editors that I read to you this morning was passed 14 months ago. No action was taken by Director Bush, no action has been taken as we learned today from Admiral Turner, and none is intended.

I happen to know from conversations that various high members of the executive branch are for changing this rule, to extend the prohibition on paid relationships to foreign journalists. But nothing seems to happen.

I have come to believe that leadership must come from Congress, that somehow you must say to the executive branch, "This won't do." How would you do that, would a concurrent resolution be a course, even a joint resolution?

Certainly you have the power in limiting the expenditure of the appropriations you make for that intelligence agency to determine what policy they will pursue. You have great power in this area.

Mr. MINETA. Mr. Cranberg mentioned that freelancers ought to be included. There was an interpretation yesterday given to the regulations suggesting that they may be saying that editors are excluded from coverage of the policy itself. Would you say that is the case? If that is the case, should editors be included as well?

Mr. PATTERSON. You mean in the CIA regulations?

Mr. MINETA. That is right.

Mr. PATTERSON. Absolutely. I think any paid relationship between an editor of a newspaper and the CIA is wrong because that pollutes the whole publication, the whole medium, everybody under that subverted person has been betrayed. I think most of all the editors should be above suspicion. No question.

Mr. MINETA. What about fake organizations being set up by the CIA, front organizations, for dissemination of, let's say, gray propaganda?

Mr. PATTERSON. I think it destroys the people's faith in the written word or the broadcast word—just to deliberately tell calculated lies. I don't think the truth has ever let us down.

I think that the reputation of this country in the world has been enormously enhanced by the USIA, the Voice of America. I think that has been our strongest weapon.

I think probably some of the most unworthy episodes in our contemporary history have resulted from being found out as having lied or as having misled.

Wherever in any country, where their press is free or slave, that we go in, as an agency of the U.S. Government, and put out a cynical gray or black propaganda publication, I think we simply contribute to the cynicism and disbelief of those people that freedom will ever work.

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. Congressman, it is also self-defeating, and I think that is probably why the record shows that the Voice of America and Radio Liberty agencies which at one time had a strong connection with the CIA no longer have it because we discovered that this doesn't work. It doesn't help these agencies to lose their credibility when they are recognized or exposed as having a propaganda purpose.

So, it seems to me that our experience has demonstrated that this is counterproductive as far as our purposes are concerned. All we are doing here—the CIA has backed away from these practices. I don't think it is because somebody really held a torch to their feet. I really think that it was probably that they discovered that it wasn't really productive.

So, now if they have backed away from these practices, why not go all the way and exempt the world's press from CIA paid associations.

Mr. MINETA. Mr. Myers?

Mr. MYERS. I think, again, as Mr. Kirkpatrick says, it doesn't work, this kind of thing. I think that is the whole strength of the free press idea and the truth. You just cannot get out there and put out a lot of propaganda through subverted organizations or through subverted reporters, if you are going to put it that way, and make it effective.

That thing is self-limiting, and it destroys itself, it is gone. I think that the places where it has been used—there has been mention of Chile, my mention of the Kurds, Tibet, and so on. Those kinds of operations are disastrous, and we are out of those things, and should be.

I think, though, that it doesn't change my view on whether in certain cases you might want to use foreign journalists. The stringer problem is open in this kind of thing, American stringers, I guess.

It seems to me there is more protection against using stringers then mentioned. We do use stringers, but if somebody sends in something that we find is incorrect or slanted in certain directions, that it doesn't make any sense, we obviously are not going to use them again. So, they are in fact unemployed.

I think the dangers of stringers are not great because there are competing sources of information, competing channels. It is not so easy for people to go out, even if they go out to a very distant country, and write something misleading that your editors won't catch.

So, it seems to me that a good deal of the problem that the committee is addressing itself to is the kind of problem that an alert and strong press takes care of fairly easily, in stride.

The exceptions are so unique that it seems to me, even if you have legislation or prohibitions, it is like anything else, there is always somebody who violates the rule, and who is easily caught as the culprit.

It doesn't mean that the institution is bad. It seems to me there will always be a few people that will be difficult to deal with.

Mr. MINETA. Mr. Cranberg?

Mr. CRANBERG. This regulation permits the CIA to establish foreign news services under the fiction that it would not be a U.S. news organization. It obviously is a U.S. news organization, financed by an American organization, financed with American funds. I think that is absolutely not permissible.

Mr. MCCLORY. Would the gentleman yield for a question at this point?

Mr. MINETA. Surely.

Mr. MCCLORY. Frequently the controlled foreign press will print articles quoting from the American press. They will select, for instance, something that is very critical of our Government, or our Government policy, and then they will quote that, and they will say this is the way the American people feel about this position.

Do you think that the CIA or do you think any other agency of the Government has an obligation to try to bring a little balance, to try to shed a little light, to really bring the truth or understanding of the issue to these people in the foreign country?

Do you think that the Voice of America or the USIS or other agencies, are they adequate to take care of that situation? Or, is the American independent press itself capable of some responsibility there?

I am quite sure that our Government policy would be that if the CIA can balance that through some clandestine or some sophisticated means, that that would be consistent with our overall Government policy.

Mr. PATTERSON. I don't think we need the CIA to put out information from a free country. I think we are going to be lied about in countries that are hostile to us. We always have been. We have assumed that the truth is stronger than the falsehood.

We have observed that across most of this century the most widely respected news organizations in the world have been the United Press and the Associated Press, and Reuters, and to some extent Agence France Presse, it is a free press.

That is where people turn to learn what is going on. They turn to the Voice of America and to the U.S. Information Agency. Those are the organizations that you constituted to make the answers of the type that you mentioned.

I don't want the CIA covertly fighting fire with fire on my behalf without any policy maker here in Washington being in charge of what we are saying or misstating.

Mr. MINETA. But hasn't there been a question of Reuters reporters being used by British intelligence?

Mr. PATTERSON. There have been, of course. But by and large I think the Reuters record has been good. I have been astounded to learn from The New York Times pieces in the last couple of weeks—as I am sure my colleague Danny Gilmore of United Press International here at the press table is surprised, to learn that Don

Allan—who once worked for us in Rome when we were in Europe in the 1950's with the old UP, has stepped forward and identified himself as a former CIA agent while he was on our payroll.

We didn't know that. And, you know I have been had. I should have known. He was a pretty good reporter, too.

Mr. MINETA. In looking at the regulations, what about the word accredited? Is there some ambiguity there? Do we have to tighten what is meant by accreditation in that directive, or the regulation?

What does it mean? What does it really mean? If I am a freelancer and I am going to go off to China, and I come to you and say, "Mr. Kirkpatrick, I am going to be going to China and I would like to write an article for you once I get back, but I am wondering if you would write a letter for me on my behalf, just to open up the doors," does that make me an accredited newsperson of The Chicago Tribune?

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. Yes. If you give him your credentials, if you give him credentials identifying him to the public as a representative of The Chicago Tribune, then in my opinion he is accredited.

Now, the accreditation actually is done by the foreign government. They accept or refuse to accept the accreditation that the newspaper has given to the person.

Mr. MINETA. Is there a distinction between accreditation and credentialing?

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. Yes. You give him credentials, and then it is a question of whether the agency that he is intending to work with will accept those credentials—just the same thing I think as you have in the White House. You might have a reporter who has been given credentials of his newspapers, but they might not be accepted in the White House for one reason or another. That is the distinction, as I see it.

Now, we have many requests for that kind of credential.

Some years ago we were approached by a former broadcast reporter who in the fifties had written a long interview with Chou En-lai, and from that moment on he had some special relationships with the People's Republic.

He told us that he thought—and at that time, and still this is true—he told us he thought that because of his special relationship with Chou En-lai he could get into China and possibly establish a bureau.

We were very much interested in having a bureau. We told him that if he could do that, we would undertake to give him our credentials, with the hope that he could become a permanent correspondent in China.

Since then, I have been extremely grateful that the Chinese Government refused to accept him because now I firmly believe that he was a CIA agent.

These are the hazards that you will run into in this business.

I think that there is a necessity to make a distinction between people who are credentialed, and who are an integral part of your news gathering staff, and the casual people who might want to be or who might come to you with tips or something like that.

I think there is a genuine distinction there.

Mr. MINETA. The next area I would like to ask about is security clearances by the CIA for those people from the news media who

cover the CIA. Should there be a CIA background investigation of those journalists as to whether they are going to be accredited by the CIA to cover it?

For instance, if you might have a reporter that covers the intelligence community, should the CIA conduct a background investigation of that journalist prior to his being accredited by the CIA?

Mr. PATTERSON. Do they now do that, Congressman?

Mr. MINETA. In testimony we received yesterday there was reference to a background investigation of a journalist, and the purpose of it was to find out how they felt about that person. Whether or not there might be problems, I think was the way it was presented.

It extends to even briefings, as to whether or not journalists would be getting briefings from the CIA, based on how they feel about that journalist, whether or not they would have problems with that person.

Mr. PATTERSON. It is a close question in that you would not want a KGB agent wearing a Tass credential to walk into the most sensitive briefing the U.S. Government is putting on. You would expect some care would be exercised there.

The possibility of grave damage results, though, if the CIA is to be able to name those favored correspondents who are privileged to cover them. But, I am not sure there is anything we can do about it, sir.

Recently I received, at my request, under the FOI Act, the full FBI file—I assume is it full—on our publications, the St. Petersburg Times and the Congressional Quarterly. In going through it, it was quite obvious that whenever a reporter would even call for information on the FBI, that his file was pulled and he was checked out and a notice was made as to what his background was, pro or con, favorable or unfavorable toward the Agency.

So, they have got the records. I would assume that there is very little that we can do about that.

Mr. MINETA. But isn't that again what was described as pernicious in the sense that if a journalist who is writing unfavorable articles, questioning some practices of the intelligence community, that all of a sudden they could become foreclosed from pursuing their own professional efforts.

Mr. PATTERSON. Of course, that is pernicious. The late Director Hoover's pencilled notations in our file made it quite clear that if an unfavorable piece had been written about the FBI by a reporter, he would write down there, "Take him off our mailing list." If a nice editorial had appeared in your newspaper he would say, "Put him on the mailing list," which meant special access.

Power is used and misused. It is pernicious, of course, but human.

Mr. MINETA. Is it an area that we can legislate in?

Mr. PATTERSON. I don't see how you could, Congressman.

Mr. MINETA. Mr. Myers.

Mr. MYERS. As Mr. Patterson says, that is a very difficult area. I would not be in favor at all of the CIA being able to say or the intelligence community saying who can cover it. But what happens is exactly as he has described. In other words, if somebody tries to cover the CIA or any particular group that don't want that person, they simply don't cooperate in a meaningful way.

Mr. MINETA. A leak with a simple phone call, isn't that just as damaging? Let's say, a leak to a reporter to try and bring something of a favorable nature to the intelligence community is just as damaging as giving false information.

I am just wondering if this is something where we have to keep that arm's-length relationship between the press and the Government. How do we protect ourselves from this?

Mr. MYERS. Over the years it has been the skill of the various journalists, to either get by that or not.

Mr. MINETA. But journalists get sucked in, too.

Mr. MYERS. That is why I qualified it with skill.

Mr. McCLODY. Will the gentleman yield.

What we are talking about is certainly not limited to the CIA. It pervades the entire scope of Government. What we are talking about is more limited or more unlikely to occur with regard to the CIA than it is with regard to the White House or HEW or the Department of Justice.

Mr. MYERS. Right. It is mainly an executive branch problem. The legislative branch by comparison is much more outgoing.

Mr. PATTERSON. If I may, Congressman, there is a self-policing dynamic that operates in the press. In this town it is very damaging to a reporter to be known to have gone into the tank for the FBI, the CIA, Congressman McClory, President Carter.

If he becomes a water carrier, and a message bearer, in order to get his news tips, he is hurt professionally. He is judged on his work and his work is done right out in the open every day. There have been people in this town who have operated that way, but it hurts them professionally.

Mr. MINETA. But a good journalist, whether he gets a tip from Joe Califano, or from Admiral Turner, is going to verify what he is getting, is going to do other investigative work, not just take the CIA handout and say, "I have been misled." And when he gets misled by some other agency, to be criticized because he didn't do a good verifying or investigative job.

Mr. PATTERSON. That is our business, to verify and not be misled and not be misinformed. Of course, that fine line between cultivating news sources and being used by news sources is the one that the professional has to be very careful on. He is judged very harshly by his peers. I don't know any finer jury.

Mr. MINETA. Mr. Cranberg?

Mr. CRANBERG. Superficially, you could say that the news leak was a form of covert propaganda. But I think there is a significant difference. The reporter knows the source of the information. He is under no obligation to make use of the information.

Moreover, his editor can request the source of the information and expect a truthful answer when the reporter has no monetary obligation to the source.

That is not the situation at all where you have someone who is in the employ, in the clandestine employ, of an intelligence agency, and is given information—there is an obligation thereby to make use of that information, and to plant it and to spread it.

At the same time, the recipient of that information has an obligation, a positive obligation, not to disclose the source.

Mr. MINETA. I am wondering if, Mr. Chairman, we might be able to request this distinguished panel to submit for the record a copy of their own code of ethics for their firms.

Mr. ASPIN. Good idea. If all of you could do that, that would be very, very useful.

Mr. MINETA. Thank you very much.

Mr. McCLORY. Would the gentleman yield.

Does the Society have a code of ethics?

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes. We will be glad to supply that.¹

Mr. ASPIN. Let me pick up on some of the questions that Mr. Mineta was asking because I think there are some very important areas here.

Let me start out with a couple of questions about the Turner directive. You see the middle chart over there, entitled "people." From what we can tell, the Turner directive applies to full- and part-time accredited journalists. He includes stringers in what he covers, and he includes nonjournalist staff employees, provided that management is aware.

It is not clear that he includes editors and media policymakers. He apparently does not include freelancers, and he does not include foreign media.

Let me ask first about this business of nonjournalist staff employees with management knowledge. What is your impression of that? Should nonjournalist staff employees be prohibited entirely? Is it all right to have management knowledge? Do you feel comfortable with that kind of arrangement?

Mr. McCLORY. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. It is not just about knowledge. It is with express approval of senior management.

Mr. ASPIN. Approval of senior management.

Can you see yourself giving approval to the CIA for something like that?

Mr. PATTERSON. Oh, no.

Mr. ASPIN. You would never do it?

Mr. PATTERSON. Of course not. There might be in this diverse American press some CIA prone publishers who would.

Mr. ASPIN. Anybody have a different view?

Mr. MYERS. No, I won't do it.

Mr. ASPIN. You wouldn't do it.

Do all of you believe that the editors media policymakers ought to be included, making the Turner directive more explicit on that? You see no problem? How about freelancers?

Mr. PATTERSON. I regard editors as being journalists, don't you?

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. Yes, we always hope so.

Mr. ASPIN. That has come up in the discussion, the question of what is the definition of a journalist. It is not clear that the journalist would define these terms the way the CIA would. So, it is one of the things that we have to straighten out when Admiral Turner comes to testify.

Mr. PATTERSON. This unfavorable construction of the definition of an editor obviously has come to you from reporters. [General laughter.]

¹See appendix M, p. 479.

Mr. ASPIN. How about freelancers? Bob, do you think freelancers ought to be included in this?

Mr. MYERS. I think American ones, yes.

Mr. ASPIN. American freelancers?

Mr. MYERS. I think the distinction between Americans and foreigners to me is a meaningful one.

Mr. ASPIN. But anyway, Americans in the freelance area.

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. I really don't see how you can control that. Freelancers are freelancers. They owe no allegiance to anybody except to themselves.

I don't see how you can identify them, categorize them, organize them, in such a way that you can give them some kind of credential which the CIA can recognize instantly.

I think you have great practical problems there.

Mr. PATTERSON. I agree on that. Ideally, yes, freelancers should be covered. But I don't see how you could. An editor who goes out and buys a piece from a nonstaff member he doesn't know, it is his fault. He should know that person. It is our judgment that is involved.

Mr. MYERS. We are talking about the CIA.

Mr. ASPIN. From the standpoint of the CIA. If the Turner directive to the CIA said "Do not get into a paid relationship with freelancers," I can see from your standpoint how it would be difficult to enforce. How would you know that the person was a freelancer?

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. How would they know? A freelancer might be somebody who writes one piece in his lifetime.

Mr. ASPIN. All right. But you have to define a freelancer a little bit.

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. You certainly do.

Mr. ASPIN. But I think that is not impossible to take a crack at.¹

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. Take a crack at it. But, I would hate to have the assignment.

Mr. ASPIN. All right.

Mr. PATTERSON. I am uncomfortable defending exempting freelancers. I would like to take an absolute position. But I don't know what a freelancer is. A freelancer is a fellow who comes in to me with a good idea, a well written story, "I want to do this for you," but it is my fault, I think, if I hire a spook to do that for me. I should know the person.

You pays your money and takes your chances. All people approach freelancers very carefully, all editors do. Writing a definition of it, of course, some people are known freelancers. They have shops. They turn out a constant stream of pieces.

But Kirkpatrick said, other people write one a year. Maybe they are a professor or in your local college. Maybe they are writers for your Sunday magazine. It covers such a wide spectrum, I cannot get a handle on how we would bring them under the regulations.

If it can be done, fine.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me ask you, I get the feeling from the way you talk that you really are very wary of anybody working for your organization having any kind of a relationship with the CIA. I take

¹ For the definition of "Freelancer", see appendix O, p. 491.

it that you would very much disapprove of anybody having any kind of a paid relationship, even for expenses or moonlighting for the CIA? I take it that with or without the Turner directive you would not hire somebody who had worked for the Agency, and you would fire them if you discovered they were in any case. You feel that much antipathy toward the idea of somebody working in your organization and having a paid relationship with the CIA?

Mr. PATTERSON. The answer to your questions are all yes, but this is not an antipathy toward the CIA which is an agency I admire. They have a tough job. I think we are supporting them in trying to give them policy guidance as to what is and is not acceptable.

The CIA in this Government deserves respect. I think it is beginning to earn it. What we are saying here is not designed to weaken this intelligence agency. It is designed in my view to strengthen it.

Mr. ASPIN. Would you apply the same standards to other agencies of the Government?

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes.

Mr. ASPIN. You would not hire anybody who had a moonlighting job at State or anyplace else?

Mr. PATTERSON. No.

Mr. ASPIN. And if they had a moonlighting job with any other agency?

Mr. PATTERSON. At one time we would have. Times have changed. At my newspaper we have tightened down on those arm's length relationships.

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. Our attitude is not specific to the CIA. We would have the same attitude with the American Federation of Labor, the National Association of Manufacturers, the Federation of Teachers or any other group outside our agency.

Now we would, from time to time, use material from these people, possibly, but we would identify it publicly so that our readers would not be confused into believing that they were hearing from an objective, disinterested source. But the same objections that we raise to the CIA we would raise to any other special group that had a particular purpose for getting into the newspaper.

Mr. PATTERSON. I frequently print pieces in my paper from a former CIA agent, but that is in the title to the piece.

Mr. CRANBERG. I think freelancers ought to be included under any directive. I think it is possible to fashion the definition of a freelancer. He is a journalist who does not draw a regular wage. There are some businessmen who may travel abroad and write a travel article about wine tasting in France, a one-shot kind of thing. That person clearly is not a journalist. There are other people who regularly submit freelance articles and make a living that way. There are still others who more or less regularly contribute freelance articles. We run a number of those. These people are on the Harvard faculty.

It seems to me that if the CIA is contemplating a relationship with an individual, it ought to take into account the fact that that individual contributes articles to the media on a more or less regular basis. I think that type of journalist ought to be included as among those the CIA will not have relationships with.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me press on a little further with this line of questions.

We are worried about a paid relationship. Maybe a paid relationship is the only thing that we can really get a handle on, but isn't the danger of a voluntary relationship just as great, I mean the ties from a voluntary relationship can be just as close even though no money changes hands?

What Mr. Patterson was saying about carrying water I understand, but it is pretty clear at least from what we know on the public record that there were some journalists who had a very, very close relationship with the CIA in the sense of doing a whole lot of activities. They were prior tasking, doing some agency work of spotting and assessing agents; doing a lot of support work for CIA activities—and they were not doing it for pay. Not a dime changed hands. They were doing it because of patriotism. They were doing it because of friendship, old school ties. They grew up and went to the same schools that the establishment, CIA people did; or they were doing it because they were getting good stories from the CIA. That is a powerful inducement.

The CIA has within its power to give a journalist the Pulitzer Prize. There is no doubt about it that if the CIA wanted to bestow benefits on a reporter, it could make him or her. It could do a tremendous thing for them. Because of all of these ambitions, you can develop ties between the CIA and journalists which do not depend upon a payment at all. I guess that raises a whole series of questions for media and media managers and what do you do about that?

Maybe the only thing you can really control is the paid relationship, and maybe as managers that is the only thing you can really ask about or can put into your code of ethics.

Is there anything else you can do about a too-close voluntary relationship?

Mr. PATTERSON. I have concluded that the paid relationship is the sole one that you as policymakers for this Nation can control. I think it is up to those of us in the press to control these other areas. My reason for that is not that I don't see the dangers that you describe, but they are familiar to us and it is our job as professionals to control that in the entire press.

Second, if you get into the business of attempting to write detailed regulations governing these areas, you are very close to blocking the free flow of information that is useful to the American people in keeping them informed. You don't want to throw up any barrier between the press of America and its intelligence agency or any other agency of this Government. That would be terribly dangerous.

The reverse of regulating the CIA might be regulating the flow of information to the American public and we should stay clear of that.

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. I think you have a problem of appearance and reality. There is a distinction which other people can draw there if money passes. I am thinking about the foreigners who are watching our operations. When they see money passing, they see split allegiance. When they see somebody operating informally through friendship or perhaps ideological bias or something like that, I

think that they can understand that this is informal, not sanctioned, not an overt splitting of allegiance.

So I think there is a distinction there, imperfect as it may be, that is useful.

Mr. ASPIN. I think what you are saying is really true, Mr. Patterson. It really comes down, in a lot of sense, to the fact that the paid relationship is not a very interesting question. It is probably the only thing that we can really regulate. Really the more interesting questions all have to do with the voluntary associations. All of those kind of cases that came up yesterday of how they have a story, et cetera, all of those areas are impossible to legislate in.

Basically what it comes down to is the ethics of the press. It means in a large sense this whole relationship is really a media issue much more than it is an Agency issue. I guess it comes back to the possibilities of these kinds of ethical standards and guidelines.

Is it really a possibility that the associations would put out ethical guidelines? Would anybody pay any attention to those, or are the associations too weak and the only way to do it really is through each media outlet itself?

Mr. PATTERSON. The American press is a pretty ornery bunch. I think somebody once said the American Society of Newspaper Editors, if it were any looser, it would fall apart and if it were any tighter, it would be a menace.

Yes, I do believe that the statements of principles and codes of ethics that we have published, and we all have, NCEW and others, revised and brought up to date these antiques we used to simply publish at the beginning of our proceedings. They set goals and targets that are probably beyond most newspapers at this point.

There are things like banning any appearance of a conflict of interest. I imagine a lot of small dailies here and there have some pretty apparent conflicts of interest. But you set the standard like you tell the world we believe in a free press and we are not going to subvert yours because someday we hope it will be free.

It is amazing to me living through the past decade at what an enormous change has occurred in the ethical posture of the American press. The changes we have made with respect to accepting freebies and junkets and gifts, with respect to being in the pockets of politicians or executive department agencies in payment for news tips, the heightening of the professional approach to the news I think has served the American people very well. This is a cross action between hundreds and hundreds of newspapers.

But people are setting standards. I think certain newspapers lead the way for other newspapers to follow. The adversary relationship, which has its drawbacks, but the arm's-length relationship between press and Government that you have seen since you have been in Washington developing has many pluses because there have been times when the press has been too close and gullible. We hope it has not become too suspicious and too cynical.

But I think the net gain is a strengthening of the press posture in American society.

Mr. ASPIN. In regard to ethical standards that have impact, it would be much more the ethical guidelines put out by each newspaper or media outlet?

Mr. PATTERSON. Right, but as far as disapproval in our professional publications and others on those organizations that have too close an association with government agencies, there is a restraining influence. We have a vast role to play. In my judgment the American press is playing it. In the case of the Congress, I think you are right, that the one handle you can get is the obvious one, the paid relationship whereby you are subverting people for money into the service of an agency of the American Government.

Mr. ASPIN. How are the media guidelines or ethical standards established? How democratic is the process? Is this the management decision handed down to all the employees saying, "If you want to work here, here are the ethical standards we think are appropriate," or is there some discussion with the people working there? What if a person says:

I want to work for the CIA and I want to get very close to them and I am an individual, I am a free American, I have my own standards, it is a patriotic duty to go to work for them? I didn't have any part in the process of establishing these ethical standards, to hell with the ethical standards.

In other words, how do the standards come about and what loyalty do members who work in the press feel toward these standards? Is it something they ignore, something put up on the bulletin board; or something taken seriously?

Mr. PATTERSON. In the case of our own newspaper it is a free country and reporters have civil rights, too. You can't sit down and say you can't work in political campaigns because that would be a disservice to him. Here is a free citizen. He has a right to vote. I wouldn't want to have a deadhead reporter on my staff who didn't care.

So basically this is a body of knowledge accumulating over a period of years centered on a newspaper and its way of going. If you say to your staff, look, you are free but this is what I think, the first amendment gave us a special privilege and that puts on us a special responsibility and while we have the same civil rights as any citizen, as professionals what do we owe the people who look to us for objectivity? Your staff buys that. If a reporter came in and said I don't like your policy on the CIA and I am going to take a moonlighting job with them, I would explain to him he didn't understand the nature of his employment because in that case you are damaging the newspaper and you would be unprofessional. You would do the same thing there that you would if you found him taking money from a press agent. That is out.

In the case of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, that is a conglomeration of all the individual newspapers. Kirk probably formed a code of ethics in his shop different than how I did mine, but we hope this is a common experience of all American newspapers. When we rewrote the ASNE code of ethics 3 years ago, we had a subcommittee and then a committee go over the thing and if you have ever seen a committee of editors going over a statement of principles, you would realize that lawyers are not the only ones who are windy.

Then the board of directors argued it through again and then we took it before the convention where it was argued again, but finally we fell back in exhaustion and published what we had.

Mr. ASPIN. How does it work in the paper? That seems to have more impact than the American Society of Newspaper Editors.

Mr. PATTERSON. When you set a standard in a newspaper, a good staff takes pride that you have it.

Mr. ASPIN. But that is essentially a management function. Do you discuss it with the guild?

Mr. PATTERSON. We don't have the guild, but we have such an open communication that a lot of the changes we make come up from the staff saying why are we doing this. You have to react as management. So it goes both ways.

Our policies on freebies and gifts, we don't have it written down, but everybody knows that we don't take anything from anybody anytime that is free. That is covering everything, travel, football games and the works.

Mr. CRANBERG. There has been an ethics explosion in journalism, but I would caution placing too much reliance on the code of ethics protection in this area that we are discussing. The codes with just one exception are statements of good intentions. If there is a breach of an ethical injunction, well, there is a breach. There is no provision for filing complaints, no provision for professional sanctions. The one exception is the Sigma Delta Chi code of ethics. There is provision there for censuring the journalist who departs from the code of ethics. The NCEW Code or AP editors code contains no such grievance mechanism. So the professional organizations are really handicapped when it comes to making the codes meaningful.

A particular newspaper is not under such a handicap. A newspaper can enforce its code of ethics. I suspect that the issue of a paid relationship is already covered by the code of ethics. You are not supposed to have outside employment. It conflicts with your work.

I suspect you would get into considerable difficulty attempting to write a code that deals with some of these issues. For example, on the question of the extent of a journalist's cooperation with the CIA after he comes back from abroad, should he furnish information to the CIA? Probably many journalists would decline to do that on the ground that he should not be an arm of the government. But I can imagine that a fair number of journalists would consider that acceptable, they would consider it perhaps a patriotic duty.

Mr. MINETA. Mr. Cranberg, are you thinking of a voluntary debriefing where the journalist comes in?

Mr. CRANBERG. Yes.

Mr. MINETA. But what if the CIA seeks out the reporter and says, I understand you just came back from Czechoslovakia and we would like to talk to you?

Mr. CRANBERG. I can visualize substantial disagreement on that. I would not participate in that. But I imagine that a fair number of journalists would consider that OK.

Mr. MINETA. How about prebriefings prior to going overseas on a trip? Again, the same thing, you would not consider prebriefing?

Mr. CRANBERG. No; I would make a distinction there. I would regard the CIA in that connection the same as any other source of information. If I were planning a trip abroad, I might want to stop

off at the State Department or any agency that might have useful information.

Mr. ASPIN. But the point that you are raising here is a good one which is, what do you do about the areas in dispute and how do you establish a code of ethics in those kinds of cases?

Mr. CRANBERG. I am dubious that on this particular question—the one on debriefing—that you would find a consensus. I think it would be very difficult.

Mr. ASPIN. What would the code of ethics that you have, for example, say about a voluntary association with some organization that those people are covering? Take a political campaign. Obviously, if the person is covering the Carter campaign or covering the Presidential campaign for your newspaper, you don't want him as a paid worker in the Carter campaign. But would you want him as a volunteer worker in the Carter campaign?

Mr. CRANBERG. No.

Mr. ASPIN. Would your code of ethics prevent somebody from volunteering in the campaign if they are covering it?

Mr. CRANBERG. Our newspaper would.

Mr. PATTERSON. I think all you could do would be discourage it. The reporter does have civil rights. It is a free country and you can vote for whomever you please and support whomever you please. If my reporter covering the Carter campaign turned out to be a volunteer for Carter, he or she would be off that story immediately and I would put somebody else on who had a less personal involvement.

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. There is a spectacular instance of that. Laura Foreman up in Philadelphia had a romantic liaison with a candidate she was covering which has become a celebrated case of ethics. I think in most cases journalists think she was guilty of a breach.

Mr. PATTERSON. Of course, we could hold a hearing on that case alone.

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. The Inquirer wrote 44 columns on it. It is well documented.

Mr. ASPIN. In each of the cases the code of ethics has kind of evolved over the years and it is essentially a document or a standard which is promulgated by management; but it is something which has kind of evolved over the years with a give and take. Is that how you would describe it?

Mr. PATTERSON. Through the practice of the profession. The second paper I worked on in the forties, the managing editor moonlighted by writing the wrestling story every Saturday night and got \$25 for writing it. We don't do that. I served as vice chairman of the Civil Rights Commission for President Johnson for 4 years because he needed a southern white man to do it. In the 1970's that would be totally impossible to do. It would be a clear conflict of my present policies.

We have evolved very rapidly into what I believe is a purified state, but a little short of sanctified.

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. Some of my colleagues criticized me for accepting the appointment as a delegate to UNESCO because they thought that somehow violated my responsibilities. I rationalized

that by saying I was going over there to fight a battle for the free press and therefore it was acceptable.

So you have those hard problems. In the case of our own staff, the impetus for a code of ethics came from the staff itself. About 4 or 5 years ago there was a great flurry of writings in professional publications about the problems of ethics, the Columbia Journalism Review, the Chicago Journalism Review, the Wall Street Journal, several magazines were writing about this problem. The reporters on our staff came and said we have a professional interest in this, we feel that any breach of ethics in this organization reflects on us personally. We think that there should be a uniform policy that would make it possible for us all to be satisfied that we were operating under the same management theory.

So the code of ethics actually was drafted by junior editors in cooperation with staff members and of course it came on up through the ranks of authority and ultimately was signed by the editor. But it was generated at the lowest level.

Mr. MINETA. I am wondering if I could go to that first chart in terms of activities and information.¹

What about access to files and out-takes by the CIA? Would you allow that?

Mr. CRANBERG. I would not treat the CIA any differently than any other organization. If we gave access to our library, for example, to any community organization, we would give it to the CIA. But I cannot imagine that we would allow anybody to see reporter's notes or material that did not make its way into the story.

Mr. MINETA. Pictures that are taken that are not published, would you allow them to be accessible?

Mr. CRANBERG. Our policy on that would be the same for all organizations. I believe on occasion we will allow organizations to—no, I cannot say that we will allow anyone to see our photo files. unpublished photographs.

Mr. MYERS. It is not a problem for us in that sense because we don't use that. I think the only things that are sacred are the reporter's notebooks which they guard zealously.

Mr. PATTERSON. We don't give access to agencies of government, the CIA, FBI, local police, to photo or news files. We feel that treating everybody alike is the best policy. That is a flat policy.

Now, having said that, there is always the room for the exception. If, for instance, the police had reason to believe that a sequence of pictures, maybe we printed two and had three left, might lead them to a murderer and had good reason to believe that, I would make an exception. Just as if we had pictures of missile sites in Cuba and the CIA said the picture you took, have you any more because this may be a great danger to the nation, I would show them, yes. But otherwise, we have this flat policy.

Mr. MINETA. Mr. Kirkpatrick.

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. We would have the same policy, I think. We make a distinction between what we publish and what we do not publish. And we are very wary of providing access to the information that we do not publish.

¹See appendix D, p. 336.

We sell photographs. The photographs that we have published, if people want to come in and get them, we will make copies of them and sell them. We do not permit, however, excursions into our files, just fishing expeditions, particularly from lawyers, personal injury lawyers, where we get a lot of that. Lazy prosecutors, lazy defense counsel, who think that the easiest way to find the evidence they need to prove their case is to come to a newspaper and ask us to open our files. We don't do it.

Mr. MINETA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you.

Let me hit a couple of issues about management's relations with the Agency and see what your reaction would be to them. One of the things that seems to be true, although I don't know, but it certainly seems to be true, is that the Agency over the years has had a close relationship with managers, probably closer relationships with managers of the media than with the reporters, though there certainly are some very close relationships with certain reporters. But basically it seems to have evolved into a fairly close relationship. And what that involved at times is the CIA asking managers to do certain things. Let me give some examples.

One example would be they would ask the managers to kill a story or to delay a story: the *Glomar Explorer*, or the Bay of Pigs. They apparently have tried to influence the assigning of reporters to stories; who gets covered where and who does what.

There has been also clearing of stories with the CIA; if some reporter writes a story that may have some information in it, the managers send it to the CIA or ask the CIA to read it, I guess, to get a clearance on it.

Which if any or all of these things are proper and what would be your reaction to the first example to start with? If the CIA called and said "We know that some reporter from your publication is on to a story here and we think that it is highly dangerous to the national security if that story gets out." What is your reaction to that?

Mr. PATTERSON. Skepticism. I would defend the right of the CIA to approach a newspaper, just as I would defend the newspaper's right to approach the CIA. The CIA should use that very sparingly, as I believe they have, and without much success, which I think is proper. Because in this country if you know something and don't print it, that is almost a professional crime, because the only story you ever get in trouble with in this country I think is the one you don't print.

If you ever have information and think you as an editor ought to keep it under your hat and not let the folks out there know about it, that is an arrogance that always catches up with you.

But I would say, Mr. Chairman, that considering the nature of some of the information that the CIA conceivably could deal with, that could have to do with the life or death of this Nation, I would not want to cut off any access they had to me or any opportunity I had freely to make a judgment based on the ad hoc case.

But I have a very strong presumption running toward listening to them and saying "No, thank you," and printing the story.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Kirkpatrick.

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. I would listen to them and make up my own mind.

Mr. ASPIN. I take it that in the current either enlightened view or anti-CIA attitude, depending upon how you look at it, nobody would listen seriously to the attempt of the CIA to influence what reporter gets sent where or what would happen—as has come out in a couple of reports.

Mr. PATTERSON. No.

Mr. ASPIN. What about the clearing of stories under the current mood? Suppose you were writing a story or you had a long piece being written by somebody, a long investigative piece, maybe a series, not a fast-breaking story, but a fairly in-depth study of some problem, which could potentially contain some information that was of interest to the national security? Would you as a matter of course now think it proper to send that to the Agency and ask their views on it?

Mr. PATTERSON. No.

Mr. ASPIN. You would not send it?

Mr. PATTERSON. No. I would send the reporter to the Agency to ask the questions that would support his position. That is a part of the reporting process.

Mr. ASPIN. No. Separate from the reporting process. I am talking about the finished product now, or semifinished, maybe in a draft. You would not think it proper to send that to the Agency and ask their opinion?

Mr. PATTERSON. No.

Mr. ASPIN. Even if you said, "I'm going to reserve judgment here. I want to hear if you object to anything in the story. I am going to hold back. I don't say I'm going to take whatever you say." But you just would never send it to them.

Mr. PATTERSON. No. I am the editor. The CIA is not. And the reporter answers to me. If he has a story there that looks like dynamite and looks like it might damage the national security, I would talk to the reporter and say, "How do you know this? Who have you checked it with?" And if it looks as though it ought to be checked with the CIA, I would tell the reporter, "Check these facts you are uncertain of with the CIA, but don't take them the story to read. Take them the questions you have about it."

Mr. ASPIN. No. We have the facts in the story. Let's assume the story is absolutely true. But the only question is as to whether the publication of this will contain information which is of a security nature.

Mr. PATTERSON. Once you submit it to the CIA or to any agency of Government, you are asking them to be your censor. You are asking them to raise red flags. You are giving them an authority they should not be handed. It is our responsibility. But the story that is published should have gone through every filtering mechanism we have to be sure it doesn't damage the national interest and that it is factual. That requires asking questions of the CIA to support your story. But submitting your story for their fatherly approval is to me unprofessional.

Mr. MINETA. Would the chairman yield?

Mr. ASPIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MINETA. Just to expand on that in a generic sense, what about the Agee or Snepp kind of situation?¹ Should there be the prior approval kind of requirement?

Mr. PATTERSON. I'm not sure I understood the question.

Mr. MINETA. In the case of Mr. Snepp, who has written a book now, or Philip Agee, some of the others who have written books.

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, I gather when he joined the CIA he signed a statement that he wouldn't do so, did he not?

Mr. MINETA. That is right.

Mr. ASPIN. So that makes it absolutely different, if you have that kind of arrangement.

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes. You are getting over into the internal workings of the CIA itself there, about which I am not too knowledgeable.

Mr. ASPIN. But basically your position would be if they hear that you are about to write a story, like the *Glomar Explorer*, and called you up, you would listen to them.

Mr. PATTERSON. Oh, yes, sure.

Mr. ASPIN. But if they did not hear about it and you are about to write a story, you would not call them?

Mr. PATTERSON. Probably would.

Mr. ASPIN. You might? You would call them?

Mr. PATTERSON. Probably, yes. I would not call them. But I would ask the reporter "Have you checked this with the CIA?"

Mr. ASPIN. I see.

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. I think that my answer might be slightly different. I think that in wartime, for example, where we are dealing with matters of very sensitive security and where we might not recognize all of the factors that might be affected by what we have printed, I think in circumstances like that I might take that copy to a reviewing agency. We have never done it with the CIA, but we have done it with the Defense Department.

I cannot really see any instance where we would take it to the CIA, but we might take it to the Defense Department.

Mr. ASPIN. Well, for example, in the New York Times series, and it is the New York Times reporting on the New York Times, so I guess it is right, they talked about a time when they wrote a story. The story was that they were checking out the U.S. intelligence operations abroad, and whether in fact there was a propaganda machine; and so they asked their various foreign correspondents in the various capitals, to send in what they could find out, and they put it together in a story. They did check it, and they checked it with Mr. McCone,² who was not the head of the CIA at the time, but somebody who obviously had close ties with it. And so it wasn't actually submitting it to the CIA.

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. It wasn't for censorship.

Mr. ASPIN. And I presume even if you submit it to the CIA you are not submitting it for censorship. You are not saying, "OK, you delete from this and give it back to me and I will run it." You are saying, "I am sending it to you and I want to hear your objections.

¹The people referred to are authors, respectively, of the following books: "Decent Interval," Frank Snepp, Random House, New York, 1977; and, "Inside the Company: CIA Diary," Philip Agee, Stonehill Publishing Co., New York, 1975.

²Mr. John McCone was director of the Central Intelligence Agency from 1961 to 1965.

That doesn't mean I am going to follow your objections. But I would just like to hear if you have any problem with it."

I would see nothing wrong with that, but maybe you do.

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. Well, you are actually asking for verification and for further information. I think that is part of the reporting process. It is just the mechanics of how you do it, I suppose. You are not asking McCone to censor it. You are not presenting it to him for his approval. You are asking is this correct, is it complete.

Mr. ASPIN. You are not even asking him that. I think you are just asking him is there anything in there——

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. That you could add to or challenge.

Mr. ASPIN. Yes. Or say it was of a national security nature.

Mr. PATTERSON. In my experience, though, Mr. Chairman, whenever you are indiscreet enough to submit your reporter's copy to any expert, the answer usually is "You aren't going to print that, are you?"

Mr. ASPIN. I am sure that is what they would say. They would say it is terrible. But that is not the question. So you just say, "Look, give me the answers to my questions and never mind your editorial comment." No, I am sure that is what you would get. You would get a lot of reasons why the story should not be run at all.

Mr. MYERS. I don't know of any cases where we have submitted stories, although we write quite a bit in that area. That would be the decision in any case of the editor.

I have not been in the CIA for something like 13 years. But the civil rights of former CIA employees are ones that are easily trampled over. You always have that assumption, that somehow you are going to do something to their benefit. So one finds oneself going over backward to demonstrate that you are being tougher than everybody else. And I think over the years you can see the stories we have run in the New Republic demonstrates that.

The only case I can recall submitted to anyone in executive branch—and this is a good example that I think supports what is likely to happen—was a piece about Carter and the banks, on his financing of his campaign. Jody Powell somehow heard about that, and so he wanted to comment on it. So what we wound up doing in the end was running his comment on our piece. But I didn't think it was terribly enlightening.

But this is the kind of thing you run into.

I think if you have done a good reporting job and checked your facts as best you can, conscientiously, getting into that kind of situation is something I would prefer to avoid because they can always find some problems.

Mr. ASPIN. Other questions?

Well, we have gone very late, but I hate to leave without at least asking Bob Myers some followup on the point where you say that the American journalists really are not that important to the Agency in what it is doing. And I think that is an interesting remark, because although there have been some hints of that from other witnesses. I think the Ambassadors more or less implied the same thing, and even Ray Cline, although unfortunately not when he was testifying, but later said something about "Well, you know, it isn't all that important." But I think others might say to the contrary.

Let me ask a couple of questions about that.

First of all, is it really fair to judge the worth of the American reporters to the intelligence community on the basis of just the China and Soviet Union example? I mean my understanding is that there is very little in the way of human intelligence that we get in those cases anyway, and it is mostly technical or mechanical devices that we use to get whatever intelligence we have. And that really the human intelligence component is much more in other countries of the world on which the ideological battle is raging or something else is going on. And it is not really a Soviet focus in any case.

So to judge it as not being very effective against the Soviets is stacking the deck.

Mr. MYERS. Well, I think the CIA has been long deflected from its important intelligence-gathering target because it has been easier to do the other things.

Let me briefly mention, from my own experience, which may or may not be relevant.

I was all the time in the Far East division. I spent 12 years in Asia. In terms of propaganda, if we are talking about American and foreign journalists overseas, I think generally that is not very valuable, for the reasons we have all discussed. It cannot really carry the day against competing sources if it is wrong. You really cannot get away with the big lie. And the point of those operations, which are after all approved in effect by the President, certainly now is dubious.

If you want to talk about intelligence operations per se, if you use two countries I have served in, Indonesia and Cambodia, there were not many Americans, or certainly there were not in those days. You really could not pursue the Chinese or bloc targets very effectively through a passing or based American journalist there.

The limitation is that the average journalist is, let's say, somebody who has not been there 5 or 6 years, comes down for a few weeks if there is something going on and little information of intelligence value because you have had a station there for a number of years which presumably, if it has been doing anything at all, has developed decent sources against two or three top priority station targets. And you are judged on what things you are working on. One of the easiest things to cover is local politics.

So you also have the Embassy, political officers, the Ambassador, seeking people in various guises, to keep themselves plugged in on the local scene.

As far as information goes, there is not too much an American journalist is going to give you that is not known by people who have been specializing in it for years.

On the operational side, if you are trying to reach a certain target, if we are talking about those two countries, sending an American journalist or getting them involved with an American journalist might be a very compromising thing right off the bat, even though there is no relationship whatever, if you are trying to work against people that are going to give up that protected bit of information. So there is not really that much operational use for the average American journalist.

In the years I was overseas, I had almost nothing to do with American journalists whatsoever. I think on one occasion I briefed a reporter from some now defunct magazine because of a telegram from Washington asking me to do so. And that was it.

Now, in Europe there may be other considerations. I have no idea. But simply from the mechanics of it, John LaCarre novels aside, the average American journalist has just not that much a clout in terms of real clandestine operations.

So I don't think in that sense the American journalist would actually be missed much.

On the other hand, foreign journalists do have intelligence opportunities. I am not talking about propaganda ones. Those people tend to cluster around the American Embassy. They speak English. That is another curse of a lot of these places. They often do speak English. They are a group that may have studied abroad and so on. There is a natural way of meeting all those people. And that is why I think over the years foreign journalists have been involved quite naturally with whatever is going on with the American group.

If you can take them from there into someplace else, it can be very valuable.

If they are simply a local gossip source, that may be of immediate interest to the Embassy perhaps, but not in terms of what as I see the CIA is supposed to be doing.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you. That is very interesting. Further questions?

Mr. JOHNSON. I know the hour is very late and everyone is hungry, so I promise to be brief.

Does any member of this panel believe that the names of journalists who have been employed by the CIA should be revealed by the CIA or by this panel—past associations?

Mr. CRANBERG. I think they should, but I realize they won't. And the CIA I think makes a fairly good case that it is prohibited by law from doing it.

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. I don't see any great value to going back.

Mr. JOHNSON. When Mr. Colby came here to testify, he mentioned that roughly 2 percent of the current CIA budget is devoted to false propaganda. He really didn't say anything in that testimony about CIA true propaganda, if there is in fact such a program today.

Do you believe there should be the planting by the CIA of truthful, but unattributed, information overseas?

Mr. PATTERSON. You are assuming, then, that they pay to get it printed or broadcast.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

Mr. PATTERSON. And therefore I go back to my belief that the USIA should be the informational organization for our government.

Mr. JOHNSON. Any other comments?

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. I don't like to see anybody going out and promoting propaganda, whether it is truthful or not. I think reporting the news should be straight.

Mr. JOHNSON. Your judgments are, of course, very important because of the influence you have over your papers and how that

influence impinges upon other people. It would seem to me that you would want the best information possible, because good judgments are based on good information.

Would it be tempting, therefore, or might you succumb to a temptation of the CIA coming to you and saying, "How about undergoing a security clearance because then we can give you classified information which you can use for your own background to make sure that stories you are printing in your paper are on the right track." Would it be useful to you to have that access to information?

Mr. PATTERSON. I do not know that I require a security clearance to call up the CIA.

Mr. JOHNSON. But to get classified information you would. I am talking about the CIA giving editors classified information for their background, just so they will have a rough idea of what is going on in the world from the CIA point of view—not to print the information, of course, but just to have that background.

Mr. PATTERSON. I react very poorly to that.

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. I don't think I would want it if you cannot use it.

Mr. MYERS. It would seem to be a means for them to try to control somebody. It would seem to me dangerous.

Mr. CRANBERG. There is an ethical obligation to whenever possible disclose a source of information. And I gather the kind of arrangement you are discussing, you could not disclose the source. And I think there would be real problems setting up that kind of an arrangement on a continuing basis.

Mr. JOHNSON. These charts we have, of course, represent a spectrum of different kinds of activities. I think the whole panel agrees that when it comes to paid relationships between the CIA and American reporters, that is forbidden by the new Turner directive.

On the other end of the spectrum, I hear some sentiment that there ought to be pretty healthy exchange of information and ideas between reporters and the CIA on a voluntary basis.

But I wonder if there is not some middle ground that we have brushed over too quickly. Let me give you a classic case, and let me phrase it in a hypothetical way, and let me direct the question to Mr. Patterson.

Let's say you have a reporter overseas, a foreign correspondent affiliated with your newspaper, and let's say that this correspondent is approached by the CIA agent and the agent asks him strictly on a voluntary basis to open a post office box for him because it is a bit awkward for a spy to be doing that on his own behalf. This is strictly voluntary.

One could argue it might be rather a minor, innocuous activity for a journalist to perform for the CIA, out of a sense of patriotism and strictly on a voluntary basis.

It seems to me that that example would be acceptable to you based on what you have said today. Am I right?

Mr. PATTERSON. I would prefer that he not do it on the grounds that he should maintain an arms-length relationship with government agencies, specifically with the CIA. It is a little like a police reporter who is asked by a policeman he covers to join him in assisting the police in the investigation of a story. This can lead

you into deep trouble. We should report it. We should not participate in the making of the news.

And so if I had a written policy on it, it would be if a CIA agent approaches you and asks you to open up a post office box, thereby giving him cover, I would say don't do it.

Mr. JOHNSON. Do you think it is worthwhile for independent media outlets to refine an ethics code to the point where it would cover the kind of support activities that are on this chart, as well as the example I just gave? In other words, should it say that information swapping is fine, because this is part of the reporting business; but, even on a voluntary basis let's stay away from support activities and agent work?

Mr. PATTERSON. No; in my judgment that tightens it down too fine, to attempt to get into something that close, because not all editors have the same feeling toward these matters. And it is a free country. And I wouldn't want to impose my own particular ethic in the case you mentioned on Kirkpatrick. He might have a different answer.

But the basic development of the arms-length ethic is very strong now in the American press quite generally.

Mr. JOHNSON. Would others of you in my hypothetical case permit your reporter to open a post office box for a CIA agent?

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. I would not. I would suggest that the CIA agent get hold of the international representative of Exxon.

Mr. MYERS. I would certainly advise against it. That can get you into a lot of trouble.

Mr. CRANBERG. Right. In connection with what the ethics codes say about this, the ASNE code of ethics, under article 3, "Independence," might be applicable to this situation. It says:

Journalists must avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety as well as any conflict of interest or the appearance of conflict. They should neither accept anything nor pursue any activity that might compromise or seem to compromise their integrity.¹

I think being involved with the CIA and assisting the CIA in that manner would be an activity that might compromise or seem to compromise their integrity.

Mr. JOHNSON. My last question: A number of historians, notably Spengler, have written books and made reputations by talking about the cyclical nature of history. Do you think this current sunburst of ethics that we are experiencing now might vanish rather quickly in the winter of a deepening cold war? In other words, is what we are talking about right now apt to be irrelevant in another 10 years were we to face a national crisis?

Mr. PATTERSON. No; I don't see that happening. I think that we are coming out of a long winter into a sunnier time, and that the press and the Nation are healthier as a result. I believe this evolution has been progressive, with some dips, some cycles, but that we won't go back now to times like they were 20 years ago.

Mr. KIRKPATRICK. I think that is true. When I started in this business some 40 years ago, I used to cover police courts and the judge who liked headlines would sometimes offer to have me stand behind him on the bench and he would consult me about how he should dispose of a case in order to get the best headlines. We don't

¹See appendix M, p. 479.

do that any more. These things just don't happen. We have made a lot of progress in this business. And I think that that progress is real and that it will continue.

Now, there will be, I am sure, some variations. If we get into a war, I think that the answers to a lot of the questions that we have been giving you today would be modified.

I think that the American press is patriotic. I think it does recognize its responsibilities and that it is sensitive to them. But it also, I think, recognizes that the way it serves best, the way it serves this country best, is to be independent, to be free, to be challenging to any approaches from the government. That's the way it is.

Mr. CRANBERG. There has been a lot of consciousness-raising. The activities that individual journalists engaged in were individual actions of individuals. This wasn't a subject that was discussed in any kind of journalistic forum or any kind of public forum. The consciousness-raising has come about as a result of revelations. Things went on that we didn't know about. We now know about them. These things are now the subject of debate, they are the subject of resolutions. And I think now the journalists who had engaged in activities in the past that they regarded as acceptable realize that they are not acceptable, and I hope that that attitude will continue and there is a good chance that it will.

Mr. MYERS. Change is a big fact of life. I think this is a little like the attitude toward tax loopholes.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you all very much for coming. It has been a very interesting morning.

[Whereupon at 12:30 p.m. the hearing was adjourned to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]

THE CIA AND THE MEDIA

THURSDAY, APRIL 20, 1978

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF THE
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:04 a.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Les Aspin (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Aspin (presiding), Boland (chairman of the full committee), Zablocki, Fowler, Wilson, Ashbrook, McClory and Robinson.

Also present: Thomas K. Latimer, staff director; Michael J. O'Neil, chief counsel; Patrick G. Long, associate counsel; Jeannie McNally, clerk of the committee; and Loch Johnson, Herbert Romerstein, Richard H. Giza, professional staff members, and Catherine Wilson, secretary.

Mr. ASPIN. The Oversight Subcommittee of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has been holding a series of hearings on the relationship between the CIA and the media. We had a series of meetings in December and January in which journalists, people who were in the management of the media, ambassadors, and former CIA officials testified. Today we are finishing up at least the open hearings on this subject by inviting the Director of the CIA, Adm. Stansfield Turner, to come and talk to us about the subject.

And we welcome you here this morning, Admiral Turner. Why don't you start with an opening statement.

STATEMENT OF ADM. STANSFIELD TURNER, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, ACCOMPANIED BY MR. HERBERT HETU, ASSISTANT FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE; AND MR. ANTHONY LAPHAM, GENERAL COUNSEL, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Admiral TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Perhaps two of the greatest changes affecting the foreign intelligence process that have taken place in recent years are our policy of greater openness and a well defined system of congressional oversight. I think that this hearing epitomizes both of these changes in a very dramatic way.

Hence, I am delighted to have this opportunity to discuss CIA's relationships with the U.S. media, and to describe the new regulation which I issued on November 30, 1977¹ in this regard.

I would like first, however, to pay special tribute to my predecessor George Bush, who on February 11, 1976 issued the first CIA regulation in this entire area.² His trailblazing piece of work was very important to this entire process, and set us off on the right track.

One of my early actions as Director of Central Intelligence was to initiate a review of how this regulation and all of our associations with the U.S. media were working. That review indicated that Agency policies and operations in this area had actually, through the process of trial and error, been further refined. And therefore, I found it desirable to issue this amplifying regulation.

This new regulation recognizes and reflects in an integral way the important new philosophy of openness which we have instituted during the past year. This philosophy takes as a basic premise the right of the media and of the U.S. public to know as much about the intelligence process and product as is consistent with our national security. The clarification of CIA relationships with the U.S. media was designed to leave no doubt in anyone's mind of the extent of any relationship which CIA might properly have with U.S. media representatives. It is within this spirit that the regulation was issued, and it is within this spirit that I appear here before you today.

In this statement I will address some of the points about the regulation that might be of special interest to you. But first it is necessary that I make clear a distinction between the Agency's relationship with the U.S. media in an operational sense, that is, in collecting intelligence which is the primary thrust of this regulation, and our collateral responsibility to maintain regular liaison with the U.S. media to provide timely information about the Agency, its product, and the intelligence process.

Concerning the former responsibility, the regulation unequivocally bars any relationship with full- or part-time journalists, including so-called stringers, accredited by a U.S. news service, newspaper, periodical, radio or television network, or station, for the purpose of conducting intelligence activities. The parallel clause in the 1976 regulation had prohibited, "paid or contractual relationships." This regulation raised the possibility that an unpaid relationship or quid pro quo arrangement might be condoned. The new clause flatly prohibits a relationship of any kind for the purpose of collecting intelligence or conducting an intelligence operation.

At the same time, the new regulation explicitly protects the right of any citizen, journalist or otherwise, to impart information voluntarily to an Agency official, at home or abroad, which that citizen believes is important to the U.S. Government. We believe that it is absolutely essential to preserve their rights as U.S. citizens to voluntarily perform a patriotic service to their country. At the same time, I would emphasize that the regulation does strictly prohibit CIA's tasking a U.S. journalist with performing any oper-

¹ See appendix B, p. 333.

² See appendix A, p. 331.

ational assignment. In short, while the CIA cannot actively task or dispatch even a willing journalist to seek out or furnish particular information or assistance, it may accept whatever information a journalist elects to transmit voluntarily.

We believe it is fair to require that a journalist be duly accredited in order to be covered by this regulation. There are numerous part-time journalists, freelancers, who are not accredited by any U.S. media organization but who occasionally, and sometimes frequently, write for publications. Many of us here today fit into that category in our interpretation of the term. A freelancer is a free agent, not accredited by or under contract to any media organization. To limit the Agency's relationships to such a general, ill-defined group would indeed seriously hamper our ability to carry out our responsibility to collect foreign intelligence.

Mr. Chairman, I probably even couldn't hold my own job under such a definition.

I am aware that there has been concern expressed in some quarters that the restrictions imposed by the regulation could be overturned at my discretion. I refer to paragraph 3 of the regulation which states that "no exception to the policies and prohibitions stated above may be made except with the express approval of the Director of Central Intelligence." I would like to assure the subcommittee that the most careful deliberations went into the inclusion of this clause. It allows for those extremely infrequent but extraordinary situations when a member of the U.S. media organization is in a position to provide unique and otherwise unavailable information to the U.S. Government. Such a situation might arise, hypothetically, if a foreigner accredited to a U.S. media organization informs a CIA official of a planned terrorist activity, such as a planned assassination of an ambassador or the planned bombing of an airliner or so on, and the foreigner is related, perhaps, to a member of a terrorist group who trusts him and no one else, so only he can serve as an intermediary to the terrorists.

Without the discretionary provision, the CIA official would be unable to employ the services of the foreigner, to possibly assist in deterring a major terrorist activity. I would hasten to add that including this provision does no violence to the special status afforded the press under the Constitution of the United States. I extend to you the strongest reassurance that the exception would be used only under the most extraordinary circumstances. I would also point out that even under such extraordinary circumstances, the normal safeguards come into play. That is, the oversight congressional committees would be in a position to inquire into such exceptions as a part of their oversight responsibilities.

In addition, any member of the intelligence community, feeling that he saw something going on improper in this regard, has recourse to the Intelligence Oversight Board to report such an activity.

The November 30, 1977 regulation also goes beyond the previous statement by barring without the specific, express approval of senior management of the organization concerned, any relationships with nonjournalist staff employees of any U.S. media organization for the purpose of conducting intelligence activities.

This provision applies to those employees who are in no way involved in writing or editing news information. It is CIA policy not to enter into any relationship with nonjournalists such as printers, circulation personnel and salesmen, without the specific knowledge and authorization of senior management of the U.S. news media organization concerned. Finally, the new regulation explicitly prohibits the use of the name or facility of any U.S. news media organization to provide cover for any Agency employees or activities.

Mr. Chairman, the Agency is in full compliance with this self-imposed limitation. While the severity of the restrictions might on occasion hamper our capability to discharge my responsibilities in the field of foreign intelligence collection, we have chosen to appear under these limitations out of respect for the special status afforded the press by our Constitution. Moreover, the recognition and appreciation of the need to protect the integrity and the independence of the press has been balanced carefully and cautiously against my responsibilities to collect foreign intelligence. Experience to date has confirmed that appropriate balance has been found, and that the regulation is appropriately formulated. We do not see a need for revision at this time.

And now, Mr. Chairman, I will turn my attention to our liaison with the media to provide as much unclassified information about the CIA, the intelligence product, and the intelligence process as is legitimately possible.

As part of this program we arrange, only on request of a newsperson, unclassified substantive briefings on areas of their interest. The briefings are designed to provide background information to the newsperson. We provide these briefings on an unattributable basis. This is done to preserve the conversational tone of such briefings and to insure the anonymity preferred by the briefers. In this way they differ from an attributable interview, which we also provide on request on a variety of subjects.

The briefings, normally some 3 or 4 a week, are provided by analysts from the overt side of our Agency. There have been 172 such briefings since March of 1977, 111 different representatives of the media were included in these briefings.

There are many other aspects to our public affairs program. I myself undertake a very active public program in support of our desires to inform the press and the public about intelligence. In my first 12 months as Director, I have made 41 addresses, including 11 to college audiences, submitted to some 41 interviews by individual journalists, and participated in 11 press conferences.

Through the Public Affairs Office, we respond to telephone inquiries from the media in a positive, forthright, but unclassified way. We receive some 60 such phone inquiries from the media weekly. The Public Affairs Office also disseminates to the press and the public as much of our research as can be reasonably declassified.

Since March of last year we have distributed approximately two unclassified reports per week. I am convinced that we owe the public as much of our product as can be legitimately disseminated as a return on their tax dollars. With these same objectives in

mind, we sponsor group visits to the Agency and respond to some 60 to 70 letter inquiries from the public each week.

This openness program has been well received by the public and the media and continues to expand. I believe you are aware that I have requested five additional positions for the Public Affairs Office to carry on this work. Personally I am convinced that it is of the utmost importance in helping to restore the public's confidence in their intelligence services. I also require the additional support to enable me to perform adequately as the intelligence community's spokesperson to the Congress, the media, and the public, a new responsibility assigned to the Director of Central Intelligence by the President's Executive Order 12036 of January 24 of this year.

Mr. Chairman, we are determined to provide the media and the public as much information as possible. At the same time we are dedicated to keeping all of our relations with the U.S. media completely proper and in full keeping with the Constitution of the United States.

I would be happy to respond to your questions, sir.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you, Admiral Turner, for your helpful and interesting statement.

Let me turn the questions over to others.

Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Chairman, I just want to compliment Admiral Turner on the openness program that has been installed so well in the brief period of time which he has been sitting in the chair as the DCI. It is a very heavy responsibility. With reference to openness to the public and the media, that program has been going on well. But beyond that, I also want to pay my respects to the intelligence community, not alone the CIA, but across the clear spectrum of the intelligence community for the cooperation it has given to this committee since it was put in place back in August of last year. In every instance in which this staff has sought briefings, whether it has been members of the full committee or whether it has been members of the staff, the intelligence community has willingly and readily supplied that information, a lot of it, of course, which is secret.

And with that, I want to assure you that insofar as I am concerned, and I know I speak for other members of the committee, you have won our respect for the manner in which you have handled your job.

Admiral TURNER. Thank you, sir.

Mr. BOLAND. And I notice that in the first 12 months as DCI you have made 41 addresses, including 11 to college audiences, submitted to some 41 interviews by individual journalists, and participated in 11 press conferences, and I just wondered who was keeping score.

Admiral TURNER. I think I am going to cut back on that, Mr. Chairman. I think, you know, it was an effort to begin to get this policy started. I do find it rewarding in many ways, though, to get out of Washington, get off the eastern seaboard, and to get the feel for what other people are thinking and asking about us. It is useful.

Mr. BOLAND. In your opening statement, you indicate that since March of 1977 you have conducted 172 briefings, some attributable and some unattributable.

Do you have that broken down between attributable and unattributable?

Mr. ASPIN. Perhaps you could identify yourselves for the record.

Admiral TURNER. On my right, Mr. Herbert Hetu, who is Director of Public Affairs, and on my left Mr. Anthony Lapham, who is General Counsel.

Herb, all 172 were unattributable, and on top of that----

Mr. HETU. About 100 were attributable.

Mr. BOLAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Wilson?

Mr. WILSON. I don't have a question. I would just like to echo what the chairman said. I think you have had a very rough reorganization job, and while you have had some darts and arrows shot at you, you seem to have withstood it very well, and I have every confidence that the intelligence function of the Government is going to be continued and enhanced under your leadership.

Admiral TURNER. Thank you very much, sir.

If I may say for a second, yes, we have had a lot of publicity in the reorganization and the so-called struggle and so on, but it is behind us and it is just going very smoothly, and we are getting tremendous cooperation out of all the other agencies, those in Defense and State and Treasury and everywhere else, and I feel since with the team pulling together now that the Executive order has been issued.

Mr. ASPIN. Admiral, let me maybe start off with a few questions about the directive, now called the Turner directive.

In the hearings that we had, a number of people raised questions, mostly in terms of what ambiguities that they perceived, or, what was your interpretation of such and such a term. I would like to go through the directive, if I might, and just ask you about some of the areas, some of which you have covered, I think, in your statement, others of which have not been covered.

First of all, the directive says: "Accordingly, the CIA will not enter into any relationships with full-time or part-time journalists."

"Enter into any relationships", I think, is a very important statement, and you clarified that in your opening statement. One of the questions that came up in our earlier hearings, raised mainly by people who used to work for the CIA, namely, Mr. Colby and Mr. Dave Phillips, suggested any relationship was perhaps going too far, and that you have prohibited any relationship with the exception on the next page of "voluntary information."

But it is your intention, then, to really eliminate even a kind of voluntary association when it extends to things other than just voluntary giving of information?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

I read paragraph a. to say "enter into any relationships" and that to be qualified by the last part of that same sentence, after the comma after the word "station," so I think it reads "enter into any relationships for the purpose of conducting intelligence activities," is the way I read that sentence.

Mr. ASPIN. Right. Yes.

Admiral TURNER. It doesn't leave the exchange of information totally aside. This is activities only.

Mr. ASPIN. All right.

Let me ask then about the second point where it says with full-time or part-time journalists. The term "journalists" there, does that extend to other forms of journalists such as columnists, editorial writers, managers, publishers, commentators, people like that? The question was raised in the earlier hearings. I think most of the journalists thought that the term "journalist" included those people, but they were wondering whether in fact in your terminology journalist does include columnist, editorial writers, commentators, media policymakers, and management.

Admiral TURNER. Yes; it certainly does. The closest we have come to defining that again is to say anybody accredited, and then go to radio, television and so on. But it is intended, as opposed to the paragraph b. where we talk about nonjournalistic staff, and draw the line between those who write or influence the writing content—maybe writing is the wrong word, but the message content, whether it is oral or written.

Mr. ASPIN. OK.

Let me raise the question that you also raised in your opening statement, and that is about freelancers.

It was a dividing point, but I think an awful lot of the witnesses thought that perhaps freelancers ought to be included. I recognize the issue that you raised, the problem of the definition of freelancers, and I don't suppose there is ever any way to define freelancers in a clear way in which there isn't going to be some problem; but I am raising the issue because I am wondering whether we ought not try to define and include freelancers.

There have been several definitions offered for freelancers in the hearings that we have had, but one of them which seemed as good a working definition as any was that a freelancer is anybody, first of all, who calls himself a freelancer, or second, anyone who receives a majority of his income or spends a majority of his time writing as a freelancer.

And I throw that out as a possible definition, not suggesting the definition isn't going to cause perhaps some problems somewhere else; but basically my impression is that freelancers usually call themselves freelancers, and a person who writes an occasional article for a magazine doesn't call himself a freelancer, and in fact is not what we would want to include in the term freelancer.

Admiral TURNER. There is no question, we could try further to define this. I will defer to my General Counsel, but we really are getting into a spot nowadays where we are going to have to take all of our agents and put them through law courses in order to conduct their business, and I really have some reluctance to keep drawing finer and finer lines unless there is a major equity involved.

I mean, accreditation is pretty simple, clear cut. You start getting beyond that, and we begin to get fuzzy, and it really is quite a burden on our people. All these other—I am not talking in this area only, but you know, so many of the legal prohibitions which we support, but they do put a tremendous burden on our people in

the field. You pick up a message, it has got a U.S. name in it, you go get a match right away. But there are so many of these issues that I am reluctant, unless there is some indication they are really going to make a big difference here, to keep tweaking definitions that cause our operational people problems.

Mr. ASPIN. I agree, and I think basically we want to be very careful that we are not writing regulations which create more problems than they are trying to correct.

And, as I say, freelancers are a debatable point in the hearings that we had before. I was just trying to get your reaction to it. I don't think it is all that impossible to define. I think that you could get a working definition of freelancer, and the question then becomes one of whether it is important.

And let me make the point for why it might be important to cover freelancers. Essentially what we are talking about, or what came through all these hearings, is not so much the objectivity of the press but the credibility of the press. The objectivity is something which is internal, and you can even be paying a person to be working for us in some CIA capacity, and he or she might maintain their objectivity as a journalist. It is an internal thing, and people can maintain their objectivity even though they are on the payroll.

On the other hand, some people lose their objectivity when they are not on the payroll, and they become very one-sided in their reporting.

So really, this question about paying reporters or not paying reporters really comes back down to their credibility rather than their objectivity. I mean, it is the credibility from the standpoint of the American public, that they then at least feel what they read is not tainted by being written by somebody who is being paid by the Agency, not to write that story, necessarily, but to bias their reporting.

So essentially all of this, whether we pay people or don't pay people, seems to come down to the question of credibility rather than the question of objectivity, and I think at least an arguable case can be made there are enough freelancers around writing in American publications of one kind or another (more often magazines, to be sure, than newspaper or television) that, to maintain the credibility of the American press, freelancers could be included.

I can see your point, but I make the opposite point just because it was made in our hearings.

Admiral TURNER. Well, that is reasonable enough. I would like to say that as a general point that in all of these regulations, whether it is in this area or electronic surveillance or anywhere else, I do think that we all have to put some confidence in the oversight process. Clearly, for us to pay and influence a freelancer who, you know, really is a significant journalist is against the spirit of this regulations, and I have some confidence that there are so many checks built in already to our process that if any of us start really violating the spirit, somebody is going to report it to the Intelligence Oversight Board, and/or you in your oversight process will be asking us about this, and I would hope and expect that with some periodicity, you will come to me or to Herb Hetu here and say, well, tell us about the exceptions the DCI made this last year, tell us about the nonmedia associated people, freelancers that you

have had any dealings with this year, give us an example or two, and get a flavor of the thing, and I think that if we try to put all the regulations that are going to go into the charter this next year and so on, into very precise detail, we may get ourselves tied in knots. I don't want to have total freedom, but I do think we have to trust the oversight process to do a good bit of checking.

It certainly has me worried enough that I don't feel that, you know, I have any freedom here to go out and contravene the spirit of what I have written without a high probability of somebody calling me up here before you to account for it.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me hit just a couple more of the points that were raised at the hearings and then I will turn it back to others to ask questions.

Further on down, you say that "CIA will not enter any relationship with full- or part-time journalists, including so-called stringers accredited by a U.S. news service, newspaper, periodical, radio or television network, or station for the purpose of conducting any intelligence activities." The question was raised about whether "any intelligence activities" included all forms of CIA activities or just intelligence collection. In other words, does it mean any intelligence activities, in the phrase used in the National Security Act of 1947 which allows the Agency to conduct covert operations or other intelligence activities, as the National Security Council will direct?

Is it that term of intelligence activities, or do you mean just intelligence collection?

Admiral TURNER. I would include any covert action as well, yes.

Mr. ASPIN. I am just trying to clarify it for the record. It would include all forms of the covert activities, and what we are not really talking about is simply intelligence collection. To the Agency, intelligence activities means a whole range of things, and not just intelligence collection.

But you mean the broader definition of intelligence activities and not the narrow definition?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, indeed.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me then raise a couple of more points.

The last of that first page says: "Use the name or facilities of any U.S. news media organization to provide cover for any Agency employees or activities."

The argument was raised that perhaps the prohibition ought to include using any bogus U.S. news media organization. In other words, not only would it be important that somebody would not be able to use an existing newspaper, say the Washington Post, but also would not say they were a representative of the Washington Sun when there is no such thing as the Washington Sun. And it was suggested this section perhaps ought to be expanded to include anything that is supposedly a U.S. news organization, but in fact is a phony one, one that does not exist.

Admiral TURNER. No question, that could close another small possible loophole. I only say it is certainly against the spirit of the regulation to create a news organization for the purpose of doing this.

Mr. ASPIN. So that was not left out purposely because it is something very important or vital to the way you conduct operations.

Admiral TURNER. No; it is not.

I don't really wish to preclude that option.

Mr. ASPIN. Lastly, let me go to the exceptions clause on the back page: "No exceptions to the policies and prohibitions stated above may be made except with the specific approval of the DCI." You address that very well in your statement. My own inclination, I guess, would be to have no exceptions at all; but you make the case that there ought to be some exceptions, such as in the case of terrorists.

What about the suggestion Bill Colby made which would require that if there were any exceptions, the appropriate committees of Congress be notified?

Admiral TURNER. I have no objection in principle to that. It is a question of how much paperwork, how much micromanagement you want to get into. In this case I think it would be small because I don't intend to make exceptions very often.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me ask this. I take it there have been no exceptions since you issued the directive on November 30, 1977?

Admiral TURNER. That's correct. I mean, I am sure. I don't remember any. So, you know, I think that is just a matter of style, whether you want to again count on the oversight process that once in a while you would in a review of our actions ask me about this kind of activity, or whether you really want to start a paperwork routine here that requires us to report in. Again, it is going to be a big issue in the whole charter legislation, how many reports do we have to turn in. The draft the Senate has done has something like 96 reports?

Mr. LAPHAM. Very large.

Mr. ASPIN. And one more statement, and let me turn it over to Bob McClory because I guess he has got to go. But let me make a case for the argument that I am trying to make for no exceptions at all.

If the possibility of your ever using the exceptions clause is so small and so remote and so slight, I would argue, then, it ought not be in the Turner directive at all on the grounds this one loophole does, of course, open up the possibility that all of this is being circumvented, and at least opens the argument—if somebody wants to maliciously make it—that all of the directive is being circumvented, that all of it is so much eyewash, and that in fact it doesn't mean anything because, of course, there are exceptions being made and, of course, you are coming up to tell us and we are going along with the gag, and it is just a big hoax. The whole thing is a hoax.

That being the case and the chances of you using it are as remote as that, I would argue perhaps it ought to come out altogether.

Admiral TURNER. I would argue strongly in the other direction because first, it is primarily intended for what might be an emergency situation where you just can't go get a law changed in time to help, a life and death situation, and second, I would like to suggest that even the most important editor or columnist or somebody else, if he really was going to be able to find out for us whether war was going to start tomorrow or, you know, something very important happened, you know, I think you and I ought to condone an exception if it is really in the interest of the country.

You know, you are taking a very, very small chance of a very small lessening of the credibility of the U.S. media. I think the country would be ill advised to absolutely by law preclude that. I would rather have lots of checks on me that I don't abuse that, but preserve that opportunity for the country to do something of great importance which could come along.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you.

Let me turn it over to Bob McClory.

Mr. McCLORY. Thank you. I appreciate your recognizing me at this time, and I have one question, or one statement.

I have been very impressed by your public appearances before this and other committees, and the prestige and the confidence that you have provided for the entire intelligence community, and I want to commend you publicly for that.

I also want to observe that in your testimony here this morning you have indicated the possible overreaction of the Congress which neglected the intelligence community almost entirely for a period of almost 30 years, and then suddenly we are interested in enacting a great deal of legislation. For example, you mentioned the charter legislation, and you mentioned the electronic surveillance legislation. I myself feel that in regard to foreign intelligence surveillance, particularly of foreign powers and foreign agents, subjecting you and the intelligence community to a requirement to get a court ordered warrant is excessive, and I think it can hamstring you, and I think it can make great difficulties.

On the other hand, there are questions now raised with regard to the guidelines concerning CIA relationships with the media. It is the fourth amendment that is involved, the search and seizure fourth amendment that is involved in electronic surveillance. With regard to this subject it is the first amendment.

Do you feel that perhaps it would be better in order to work under these guidelines that we submit this to a court, a specialized court to determine whether or not you are interfering with the exercise of freedom of the press, that you may be interfering with the free flow of information or the freedom of news persons to report the news freely to the American public?

Would it bother you to have, in addition to congressional oversight and Presidential oversight and so on, to also have a court order to decide whether or not you are adhering to the constitutional restrictions?

Admiral TURNER. Well, I think it is another fine line like whether we have utterly no escape clause in here whatsoever, that it just puts one more level of control on. It could be operated that way. The emergency clause that I mentioned is of course largely intended to be used in emergencies when maybe timing would be of an essence here and you would hate to have to be slowed down while you went to get a court order if it was a matter of a terrorist activity and life and death. So I would not be included to support that in this case.

Mr. McCLORY. You have the responsibility, you have the accountability, we have the right of oversight. Isn't that adequate?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, I think it is in this case.

Mr. McCLORY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Wyche Fowler.

Mr. FOWLER. I have no questions at this time, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Ashbrook?

Mr. ASHBROOK. Yes.

Admiral Turner, I would like to get some information regarding the use of journalists and the news media by the other side. I certainly don't suggest that if they do it we have to do it, but I think we recognize that intelligence doesn't operate in a vacuum.

Do the Soviet KGB and other Communist bloc intelligence services use journalists for their own purposes?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. ASHBROOK. No doubt about that, is there?

Admiral TURNER. There's no doubt in my mind.

Mr. ASHBROOK. I wouldn't think it would take very long to answer that one.

Do they use their own news agencies such as Tass, Novosti, the East German ADN, and so forth, as a cover for intelligence officers?

Admiral TURNER. Yes; very definitely.

Mr. ASHBROOK. No question about that.

Are legitimate newsmen from the Soviet bloc coopted or tasked by their intelligence services?

Admiral TURNER. Oh, yes.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Do the Soviet bloc intelligence services use newsmen from non-Communist countries as sources, witting or unwitting, agents of information, disinformation, or agents of influence?

Admiral TURNER. We certainly suspect that highly. I am not sure that I have concrete evidence.

Mr. ASHBROOK. This is an open hearing, so I don't know that I want you to provide specific examples at this time, but I wonder if you could provide our committee in the near future, with either a classified or unclassified report—I suppose if we want to print it in the record, it should be an unclassified report—on these activities by hostile intelligence services?

It would seem to me that we should put it in the record as a matter of balance.¹

Admiral TURNER. Fine. We would be happy to do that.

Mr. ASHBROOK. It is funny, we always seem to be pointing a finger at you and yet we don't note as we should that you do operate worldwide. You operate against adversaries who do not use the same standards, do not have the same Constitution. To repeat what I said in the beginning, I don't suggest and I don't think any of us believe that simply because they do it we should do it, but I think we should at least legislate with the understanding that we are going by one set of rules, the Turner memorandum, and as near as I can tell, there is no set of rules for the other side.

Admiral TURNER. A U.S. media representative quite legally could work for the KGB, but under these regulations, not for me.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Yes; it is always interesting. Could you imagine if we had someone on our side, like Wilfred Burchett, that he would be able to tour Russia? This is a good example of the differences. It may be the Achilles heel that we have. I am not one that regrets or begrudges our Constitution. Quite frankly, I am glad it is there, but

¹See appendix R, p. 529.

I think we have to recognize that it does place disabilities on us in the real world of intelligence. I commend you for trying to operate within our constitutional system against an adversary that doesn't have one, and I recognize that most of the time you have one hand tied behind you, and that is the way it probably always will be in our system.

But if you could supply an unclassified report on activities by hostile intelligence services using the media, I would be most appreciative.

Admiral TURNER. I would be happy to do that.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you.

Mr. Zablocki.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Perhaps this has already been asked, and Admiral Turner has referred to it, but does this memorandum for the media on CIA regulations on the relationship with the U.S. news media also apply to all intelligence gathering agencies of our country, such as DIA and some of the other agencies, or just CIA?

Admiral TURNER. This one actually applies only to the CIA.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Is there a corresponding one for the DIA?

I am not encouraging that it be applied to the DIA because I feel that we are tying our hands too much in reacting to some of the, if there were abuses in the past.

I have no further questions.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Robinson, do you have any questions?

Mr. ROBINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, in your opening statement you are discussing the difficulty of limiting the scope of your memorandum with regard to relationship with the media or your regulations, rather, and talking about relationship with those who are not accrediteds, and you say to limit the Agency's relationship to such a general, ill-defined group would indeed seriously hamper its ability to carry out its responsibility to collect foreign intelligence. You close the paragraph by saying, I probably couldn't even hold my job.

And I wonder what the impact of this group is upon this situation to the degree that you make that rather strong statement with respect to it.

Admiral TURNER. Well, I think I am saying, Mr. Robinson, that there are a lot of people who contribute occasionally to various journals or newspapers or magazines, and that if we get into a situation where we have to debate on each one of those, unless there is some clearly defined line of demarcation below the one we have already drawn in accreditation that more than just that you would maybe be denied some specific individuals. It comes to the fact that you people finally just say, well, it is too complex to try, if he is anywhere near this shady area, and you lose opportunities of getting information or assistance from Americans who could be of considerable value to you because I think you have to appreciate by the time a regulation like this gets down to a GS-9 out in the field, he begins to get sort of uptight about whether he is going to get put on report or be taken to task for violating this. So he shades the thing a little bit further, and pretty soon you get where people just drop important and interesting contacts.

Mr. ROBINSON. Well, you are making exactly the point that I hoped that you would, because I feel that the inference might be drawn otherwise, that this group represents such a wealth of information that you are dependent upon them and that you can't get along without them, and that is not what you are saying at all.

Admiral TURNER. No; I don't think so. Yes; that's correct.

Mr. ROBINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you.

Bob, do you have anything?

Mr. WILSON. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, previous Directors of the CIA have often made the statement that one of the problems of the CIA is it is not able to defend itself, because by either admitting to the charges or denying the charges, they are furnishing information to those who should not have it.

In your opinion, should the CIA be able, either openly or through devious means, be able to answer the false charges against the Agency or the United States, some of which are knowingly promoted by hostile foreign intelligence services?

Admiral TURNER. I think it is a cross we have to bear, Mr. Wilson, on the one hand to protect our classified information; on the other hand not to put out false information which has tremendous implications and dangers for our society, and we just have to grit our teeth sometimes when we know there is a good explanation for something we are being accused of. And it is particularly tough when it is a negative situation because if you deny it when you didn't do it, then you are in a position of not being able to deny it when you did do it, and therefore you have confirmed the accusation on the other side.

Mr. WILSON. Now, about the publication of books and information. Sometimes classified information is leaked to the media by employees or former employees of the various intelligence agencies. Do you feel that our laws are strict enough in that regard or we should have stricter laws?

Admiral TURNER. Well, we are testing that at the moment, as you know, with Mr. Snepp in the courts right next door here in Virginia, to see whether the secrecy agreement we have will hold up and will give us good protection. So I am hesitant until that is resolved, to know.

Certainly if the courts strike down the secrecy agreement, and say it is not valid, we don't have a case against Mr. Snepp. I think we are going to have to come to you and ask for some kind of help here.

Mr. WILSON. Some kind of legislation.

Admiral TURNER. To substitute for that. Beyond that, whether we should have tougher teeth in the laws, is a very difficult question and one I am sure we are going to be debating between ourselves in the charter business when it comes up.

Mr. WILSON. In our previous media event, along this line we, as you know, called in some of the former ambassadors and some of the critical writers and media people who had made their feelings about CIA known. I wasn't able, because of scheduling problems, to make all of those meetings, but everytime we had somebody there who had some experience with the CIA, I tried to ask the question:

"How do you rate the CIA along with other intelligence services of our allies and our adversaries"? I was very pleased that despite all of the problems that have been reported in the press, that generally—in fact, I don't know of any exception—the attitude by those witnesses was that our intelligence service is the best in the world.

I hope it is going to be even better under your guidance, and I certainly wish you well.

Admiral TURNER. Thank you, sir.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Bob, would you yield?

Following up on your first question regarding the ability or lack of ability to defend yourself against charges, real, imagined, true, untrue, what if false charges are prompted by a hostile foreign intelligence service, and you know in fact that they are, do you feel the same reluctance to embark on a campaign to straighten it out?

Admiral TURNER. I certainly don't want to indicate that we have a policy of total passivity here because I think one of the things we have done in our greater openness in this last year has been to answer more questions, to answer them more forthrightly. It is just that you do get into some positions where you are very cornered. We have made some exceptions in this past year. For instance, we were accused of bugging the Blue House in Korea. We did not do that. We came out and said that. But of course, it could put me in a difficult position if I were asked in some other instance, why don't you answer this time.

We have said that Mr. Scharansky in the Soviet Union did not work for us because we thought there was such a human rights value at stake here, you know, the man was being falsely accused and so on, that we did that. It puts us in a very difficult position in the future because generally our answer to that kind of question has got to be no, or they keep asking it until they pin one of our true contacts down. I haven't come across the case you specifically cited, in fact, and, you know, I would have to weigh the equities in each instance if we were having a disinformation program put out against us here. Other things you have to do then is consider how you retaliate to that and turn them off from taking advantage of you in this way. And there are ways to do that.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Well, you are giving the answer that I at least hoped to get. If such a thing happened, you wouldn't feel an inability to in some way retaliate. If it were across the board, if, for example, the Soviet Union were all of a sudden to put as No. 3 on their agenda discrediting the CIA, using all the contact sources, groups, et cetera, at their disposal——

Mr. WILSON. How do you know they haven't done it already?

Mr. ASHBROOK. I don't know that. I am just saying if.

That would include using newsmen, all the things we are talking about here. Obviously it would put you in an interesting, difficult position. But I wouldn't like to think that you would be sitting back and say we can't do this because we are nice guys. We have to play the rules this way.

Admiral TURNER. Oh, no, it is not a matter of being nice guys in that circumstance. It is a matter of in each instance weighing the short-term and the long-term equities of what we do. Do we lose more in the long haul by attacking or revealing, and I think

sometimes we don't as I have cited these two instances where we thought the equities were very big and made the exception.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Thank you.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you.

Admiral Turner, let me probe a little bit more on the whole issue of the Turner directive, what it covers and doesn't cover, and the whole relationship with the media.

We have been using in the hearing three charts¹ which you may not be familiar with; but I guess some of the other people on your staff may be familiar. Essentially what they refer to is the kinds of associations that could exist. The first chart distinguishes between the voluntary association and the salaried association between the media and the CIA. One is based on voluntary, the other is based on some kind of paid relationship.

The second chart covers the different kinds of classifications of people in the media that we are talking about, and a third chart covers the various kinds of activities that newspaper or media people might actually do in connection with the CIA.

Now, let me just try to figure out where the Turner directive does draw the line on these things. We have already discussed, as you say, the phrase "any relationship," so the Turner directive covers both voluntary associations and salaried associations. You have already talked about that in your opening statement. The people that the statement clearly covers include full- and part-time accredited journalists and stringers. That you say. It also covers nonjournalist staff employees with the notification of management, as you say. Editors and media policymakers, we ascertained in the question and answer are covered; and you made the eloquent statement about why we shouldn't cover freelancers.

For the record, could you just state your views on foreign media, because I think it is one of the things that was also a matter of great debate during the hearings we had? People said we ought to apply the same directive to the foreign press as to the domestic press, and others argued to the contrary. I wanted to get your views on the record on that subject.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Chairman, if you would yield, among the people on the chart there—the American media—were the governmental media such as the USIS, and Radio Free Europe intentionally omitted? Radio Free Europe, by the way, is quasi-governmental.

But with Radio Free Europe, Radio Free Asia, to what extent is there any coordination with the activities of the CIA or with the directive now? Is the directive found to be applicable to these agencies or to these media as well as it relates to the CIA?

Admiral TURNER. Well, we have not considered them under the rubric of this directive, Mr. Zablocki, as not being—they are not U.S. media organizations, and we don't have relationships with them to influence their product, and I would assume that they would have regulations that would prohibit their being influenced by us or by the National Association of Manufacturers or any other types of organization.

¹ See appendixes C, D, and E, pp. 335, 336, and 337.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. It is not my intention to further tie our hands in the gathering of information or using certain media for obtaining such information, but just to get the record straight, I just wondered to what extent the CIA had any coordination with those activities.

Admiral TURNER. I think the answer is none. Does anybody—

Mr. ZABLOCKI. You have no input as far as, for example, Radio Free Europe or the Board of International Broadcasting?

Admiral TURNER. No, no, sir.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you.

Mr. ASPIN. Could you, just for the record, give us your views on whether the Turner directive applies to foreign media?

Admiral TURNER. Well, there are two basic purposes to all these exercises, it seems to me. The one is to prevent the American public from receiving information that is biased or influenced, and as you pointed out very clearly, also to maintain the credibility of the U.S. media.

Certainly the credibility factor is not there in dealing with foreign media. On the question of whether any relations we have with foreign media might end up with the U.S. public receiving some erroneous information or distorted information, I would only say that so much of the foreign media are not free, that any U.S. media who take it from a foreign media without a good deal of checking of the sources and the authenticity, are doing the public a very poor service to begin with, whether anybody has influenced the foreign media—I mean whether we have influenced the foreign media or not.

So I don't think there is a danger, great danger here to the U.S. public if we have a relationship with foreign media people.

Mr. ASPIN. So it is basically your view that this ought to be continued because, essentially, we are not dealing with a credibility problem, as you say. As for the blowback effect, you say American media ought to check the stories before they accept something that is published in a foreign paper.

Admiral TURNER. Particularly Pravda and some of those. I am sure our people don't just accept that on face value.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me go back to that again, but just to finish up the charts, let's turn to the activities column over in the final chart there. When you say that the CIA will not enter into any relationship for the purpose of conducting any intelligence activities, I am wondering what is permissible and what isn't, and with the caveat on this side.

I take it that some of those things are permissible and some are not. In other words, with story confirmation, if somebody calls up, clearly we start with the most innocuous form of association between the media and the CIA. If somebody calls up and wants to confirm a story, you will talk to them.

Admiral TURNER. Yes.

Mr. ASPIN. OK.

If some information swapping is of the kind where you have one of the people out in the field, perhaps, in some foreign capital, talking to a reporter from an American paper, they sit down and they talk to each other, that is a permissible form of contact?

Admiral TURNER. I think the necessary caveats here are open and voluntary.

Mr. ASPIN. Open and voluntary, right.

Prebriefing, you have already covered because you say that is one of the things you do.

Now, debriefing. What are your ground rules on that? If somebody comes back from a trip abroad and might have some information that is useful to you, what are your operating procedures?

Admiral TURNER. Again, open and voluntary. We won't solicit them, and there would be no quid pro quo for the prebriefing and so on.

Mr. ASPIN. Would it be the kind of thing that you might call them, or do you wait for them to contact you?

Admiral TURNER. Voluntary is on their side and—

Mr. ASPIN. And so they would have to initiate the contact on debriefing.

You wouldn't call and ask them to come in and talk to you about what they saw?

Admiral TURNER. Maybe I broke my own rules. The other night I was talking to a journalist who we prebriefed for a trip to China, and I said gee, I would sure like to sit down and hear about your experiences, and the answer was, that would be contaminating. And so I thought that was a one-sided arrangement where they will take our information but they won't even sit down and talk to us about what they had for dinner in China.

But no, we don't have any kind of a program of asking people to—I mean, I think you have to be very careful here because, I want to be perfectly forthright, there are times when I call up friends in the media and say look, I would like to just sit down and have a chat with you, not because I think they have got some particular information, but I want to bounce ideas off somebody who is knowledgeable. And that is why this is a delicate area.

I have found in my whole career that when you are in this kind of international affairs business, other than academics, the people who have the broadest grasp of the kind of thing you are doing and you want to get outside your own environment and exchange ideas with people who see it differently than your own employees are the media, and it is very valuable to all of us to be challenged by them.

Mr. ASPIN. I just wondered what the ground rules are. I see no reason why you shouldn't call up somebody and ask them if they want to come in and talk to you about it; but I just wondered whether under your guidelines, where you say that we will not enter into any relationships, how you are interpreting that in the case of calling up somebody and saying, "Look, we would like to hear about your trip."

Admiral TURNER. Let me say this. I think that the way the regulation is written, it doesn't prohibit that.

Mr. ASPIN. OK.

Admiral TURNER. We, as a policy today, are not doing that, but I point out a couple of times where I have done it, sort of inadvertently, maybe. But I don't think in a dangerous way.

Mr. ASPIN. I understand.

Now, I take it that the rest are the kind of things in the prohibited category. You already said that you do no prior tasking of

intelligence collection. Asking for access to files and outtakes, even on a voluntary basis, this directive would prohibit, and the rest of the kinds of things, doing any kind of support or agent work. These are not what you ask staff people to do under this directive.

Admiral TURNER. Is that correct, Herb, those are all prohibited? I believe so, yes.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question with respect to the prior tasking of intelligence collection?

Your statement says you would emphasize that the regulation does strictly prohibit the CIA's tasking the U.S. journalist with performing any operational assignment. While CIA cannot actively task or dispatch even a willing journalist to seek out and furnish particular information or assistance, it may accept whatever information a journalist elects to transmit voluntarily.

Is that too restrictive an interpretation?

When Bill Colby testified before this committee, he raised some concern about your interpretation of the regulation as put in place and how you would handle it. What is your response to that?

What if a willing journalist said: "I am willing to be tasked for this particular matter?"

Admiral TURNER. I think that should only be done, Mr. Boland, under the paragraph 3, escape clause, where I can make an exception. If I determined in that instance that his being tasked by us was of such importance to the country, to risk some diminution of the credibility of the U.S. media, then I think it is worthwhile, but it is better to put it under that exception where, you know, it gets spotlight attention.

Mr. BOLAND. Well, you have stated in your statement today that that exception would be used only in extraordinary circumstances.

Admiral TURNER. Yes.

Mr. BOLAND. Is it so extraordinary that a U.S. reporter might willingly agree to be tasked and indicate to you that he was willing to be tasked for a particular intelligence mission?

Why would you put that in the realm of extraordinary? I take it that the exception would be used under unusual and, to use your word again, extraordinary circumstances.

I have, incidentally, no disagreement with the exception myself, but I think discretionary power ought to remain in specific heads of agencies and departments. As a matter of fact, on the committee that I chair, the Appropriations Subcommittee, with some 11 agencies, I don't know of anyone, whether it is a Cabinet officer or an administrator, that doesn't have some discretionary power to waive some rule or regulation practically in all of them. I think that probably cuts across the whole Government, so I have no particular problem with that.

You obviously don't agree with Bill Colby that your interpretation is too restrictive.

Admiral TURNER. Yes; I do not——

Mr. BOLAND. That CIA will not willingly task——

Admiral TURNER. Will not task a willing——

Mr. BOLAND. A U.S. reporter; but if he is anxious to come in and voluntarily disclose information which is helpful to you, you would accept that, of course.

Admiral TURNER. Yes. It is a matter of weighing the equities here.

I think I am with Bill Colby in the sense that the more freedom I have, the better I can do that job, but at the same time, we are all here talking today about protecting the American citizen, and I think if you start opening that up, it becomes a point of danger.

Mr. BOLAND. I am not sure that that is so. I don't really quite follow that. I think that if some U.S. reporter or member of the media comes in and says, "I am willing to be tasked, I am in a good position to be tasked for this particular assignment and some particular intelligence that would be helpful to CIA," then I don't think there is any abuse of any inherent constitutional power in this instance.

Admiral TURNER. Wouldn't that reduce the credibility the chairman is talking about, though, because some of our media would be tasked by us and some would not.

Mr. FOWLER. Would the gentleman yield?

I thank the chairman for yielding.

The incredible thing about this directive—and I am commending the work of Mr. Aspin and his committee, regardless of what side you are on, I think the directive goes further in protecting the professional status of journalists than it does in helping with the work of the CIA or even the credibility of the CIA.

What Admiral Turner and the CIA have done is say that even, as you were saying, even when you have a willing journalist, willing to be tasked, that you are not going to do it, and by not doing it, what you are doing is protecting the worldwide reputation of journalism as a profession. As we all know, except for Washington, most journalists are hungry. [Laughter.]

Up here, you know, they have to loosen their belts after lunch, but I can see over and over again, throughout the country, some young journalist who would be delighted to supplement his income and his reputation for verve by willingly soliciting a relationship for the best and most patriotic of reasons with the CIA. But what this directive is doing is saying look, we are going to protect your own flank against your members who would like to play both sides, and in that, I think that you have done an extraordinary job through your directive in trying to protect an institution that it is certainly not your job as the chief intelligence officer of our Nation to protect.

Mr. ASPIN. If I may comment for a second, I think what we are talking about is that, essentially, all of this comes down to a very heavy burden on the journalistic community. I don't think there is any way you can write a regulation that maintains the integrity of the journalists, nor should we try and write a regulation that maintains the integrity. And even with this one, there are subtle ways in which somebody could be tasked. I just commend Admiral Turner for writing a directive like this which, in effect, says it is not the policy of the Agency to do these things. But essentially, even if it were, if the Agency had no policy like this, it would be bad journalism to allow yourself to be prior-tasked by the Agency. I mean, it is just a classic conflict of interest.

Mr. FOWLER. That is why they are protected, the journalists.

Mr. ASPIN. How could somebody be doing some work for the Agency while at the same time reporting on the Agency's activities? The reporter will eventually find himself in a conflict. But I am just happy to see that the Admiral has a regulation which in effect says it is not our policy to do these things.

Now, still, to protect against that, you need the integrity of journalists, and you need the integrity of the Agency and the people out in the field; but if it is a statement of policy, it is a good statement of policy, and I commend him for it.

Mr. BOLAND. I am happy, too, but I am amazed that the CIA has interpreted that relationship that way at all.

Mr. ASPIN. That's good. It's all right. Don't complain about it. [General laughter.]

Let me just talk a second, Admiral, if I could, about this whole relationship because we raised some very interesting issues in these hearings, and you have to have sat through these crazy hearings to really get the flavor of the relationship between these two ant hills, the media and the intelligence community.

In a sense, the Agency is like other agencies of the Government. It is like the State Department, it is like the Defense Department, in the sense that everybody in town is trying to influence the media. It is a game everybody plays in this town: trying to influence the media, getting favorable stories about them in, getting unfavorable stories out.

Admiral TURNER. Some of us just aren't very good at it.

Mr. ASPIN. But when you talk to journalists, what really kind of frightens them about the Agency, essentially, which doesn't frighten them about the State Department and doesn't frighten them about the Defense Department, is that the Agency speaks about assets and control and handling, and they have a lot of secrecy connected with it. It is a kind of a moth-in-the-flame relationship where they are fascinated by what the Agency does. But they are very fearful of getting sucked in because, after all, Agency people are professionals at dealing with these kinds of things. That is a part of their trade.

And it is a peculiar relationship because in some sense they are in the same business. Both the Agency and the journalists are out looking for information and both of them have something that the other one wants. You would love to use those journalists for cover and that kind of thing. And to do your line, you think, "If they would only be patriotic and only do what they are supposed to." And the journalists think, "If those guys would just give me the information and let me get my Pulitzer Prize." You have got great information that they need. They have got a sort of access and kind of ability to influence events that you would like. So, it surprises you that they don't want to come and be debriefed; but it doesn't surprise them at all. They take information, not give it. They are in the information-taking business; and, what they give, they give through their outlet, their publication.

So it is a weird thing. Journalists and Agency people like each other; in a sense, they are kind of fascinated by each other. And in lots of ways they are similar kinds of people. Each of them has what the other one wants. Each of them is trying to use the other, in a way, and each of them is wary of being used by the other. It is

the most amazing kind of relationship I think I have ever followed, and I just uncovered it in these hearings. As I say, you have to sit through the whole hearings to get the flavor of this kind of complex interrelationship.

Admiral TURNER. If I may?

Mr. ASPIN. Yes.

Admiral TURNER. Our openness policy, we have gotten into some ridiculous situations now where we had a journalist call up the other day and say you briefed me in January on such and such. In March it changed and you didn't call me and tell me. I mean, they want me to be the press bureau for the whole American media, and the effrontery to think that we are going to pick up the phone when somebody gets a change of policy in some foreign country because we gave a briefing on it once. We can't guarantee that briefing for a lifetime.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me go, if I may, back to the questions.

On the media, we are talking about the whole issue of what we cover in the American media, and the question about flowback. Let me raise a couple of issues that have come up in the hearings concerning foreign media and the concern that what is in the foreign press might get back into the American press. Let me ask specifically, for example, about the case of Reuters.

Now under the Turner directive, Reuters would not be covered. It is a British news service.

Admiral TURNER. That is correct.

Mr. ASPIN. So it would not be prohibited; yet Reuters has, I don't know, what, some 16 newspapers in the United States which get its service?

What do we say about the case of Reuters? It is a British news service, and it may be unique in the sense that I don't know of any other news service which is so extensively reported in the United States; but it is a British news service so it is a case where the Turner directive does not apply. It is, however, a case where information could easily flow back into the United States or articles could appear in the United States press written by people who were involved with the CIA.

Admiral TURNER. It seems to me you have to hypothesize a chain in which our relationship with a foreign correspondent results in his distorting his press coverage, results in it being then replayed by the editor of a U.S. journal who reprints it and therefore giving some bad information to the American public. I think it is a fairly tenuous chain, first that our relationship is going to lead to something being very distorted in the first place, you know, but no maliciousness in us, yes, but again, there are checks that I mentioned before. And the problem other than putting in this regulation the names of Reuters and London Times or other agencies we know are free and open, is you then cut us off from all kinds of media opportunities—and I have described to you how valuable I think the outlook of media people is, from areas that are just not free anyway, and that the editor would look with great skepticism before the Prague Gazette or something was replayed in the U.S. media.

So yes, there is a risk. I am not trying to minimize that.

Mr. ASPIN. I guess what I am pointing out, then, by this line of questioning is that there is some area which is still not in a sense covered and the only way to cover it would be to go to the foreign media, which you made the argument against and others have made the argument against. But there is a chance of direct play-back into the United States on something directly written, Reuters being a case. But there is a number of feature services, too. I guess the Observer, the Guardian, the Times of London have got feature services. There is that Toronto Globe and Mail correspondent in Peking for many years who American newspapers were playing because we had no access into Peking. He was reporting from Peking for a number of years. So there are these cases where you have foreign press operations coming right back in, and it is not simply a case of the U.S. editor checking the story before he plays it in our paper because these are wire service stories that they are inclined often to take and put right into the papers.

Admiral TURNER. But on the other hand, because they are free press, I think you have some reasonable check that the Reuters correspondent is not going to take orders from Herb as to what to put in his paper. He is going to—because he has his credibility at stake. The Pravda correspondent doesn't have his credibility at stake.

Mr. ASPIN. Yes.

Admiral TURNER. Now we can buy people from—I have got to be careful here.

No; you have a much better chance of buying and directing influencing a fellow who is in a nonfree press.

Mr. ASPIN. Yes.

Admiral TURNER. Which would be treated with skepticism when it comes back to the United States just because it comes from a nonfree press. Your ability to take somebody from the Reuters or Guardian or whatever services and dictate to them what to put in their newspaper or their copy is fairly low.

Mr. ASPIN. Actually, isn't the chance to dictate copy fairly low at both ends of the spectrum? It is hard to dictate to the British press, but it also would be awfully hard to dictate to Pravda and Tass to get a story in there.

What you are really talking about is the middle-level people where the press is kind of up for sale, and there you can have some influence about what they publish.

Mr. FOWLER. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. ASPIN. I would be happy to yield.

Mr. FOWLER. Admiral Turner, you mentioned, to slip into the vernacular that I abhor, the question of disinformation, whether it be perpetrated through journalists or anybody else. I thought you were mentioning, in answering the chairman's question, that we have some checks against apparently what you call this blowback effect, the blowback effect coming from disinformation.

What are those checks?

Admiral TURNER. Well, first of all, let's make sure we make a distinction here.

If there is a deliberate effort on the part of the CIA to buy a foreign journalist, to get him to print a deliberate story, that is not

intelligence; that's covert action and you all have to approve—approve, I'm sorry, you all have to be informed.

Mr. FOWLER. I was just going to say, I was delighted that you would yield to the Fowler effect.

We get the Fowler effect with the Turner directive, and it makes a lot of progress. [General laughter.]

Admiral TURNER. Bad slip, but you all are informed of the covert action thing. So what we have just been talking about by inference is really a covert action. Now, if it comes to using a member of a controlled foreign media to target and get us information, you know, I go to him and say I want you to ask so and so or, you know, find out so and so, that is intelligence collection, but that really has very little blowback possibility other than the fellow maybe is more friendly because he is on our payroll or something, some sort of effect.

Mr. FOWLER. I understand that, but let's just say we have recruited, however we do it, we end up with a story, a false story in the foreign press. That story, depending on its magnitude or its timing, is going to be reported on the 6 o'clock television news, that so and so press reports this. Therefore, that information, though false, will be reported to the American public. In other words, you can't control, once the false facts are out there, for whatever reasons, however laudatory from my perspective, those false facts cannot be controlled as to who the audience, as to what audience, to which audience will be the ultimate recipient.

Is that not correct?

Admiral TURNER. That's correct.

Mr. FOWLER. Now, if that is correct, is there anything that we can do about that?

Admiral TURNER. I don't think so without unduly tying our hands. On the one hand you do have the control of the covert action notification procedures. You do have the fact that when this country wants to put information out, we really want to put out true information. I mean, our motive for putting out false information is so much less than the rest of the world. I mean, we just don't need that technique as a general matter. And third, you do have the check that even the 6 o'clock news isn't going to put out something from a news agency that is just totally—that is not credible. You know, sometimes what you are talking about would just not get a hearing in many cases because it wouldn't be believable.

But yes, I can't guarantee you that there won't be some blowback. I am simply saying I think it is all second- and third-order effects, and that there are clear checks against our starting a, sorry, a disinformation campaign or a false information campaign into the foreign media that comes back here.

Mr. FOWLER. I appreciate your recognition and assessment of the difficulties of controlling that source.

That's all that I think it is important for us to recognize that, I don't know what the circumstances are and we certainly can't explore it right now, for using disinformation, but it just seems to me that what you have said is that there are no—that if that disinformation is seeded, there are no checks as to which audience it ends up influencing.

Admiral TURNER. I wouldn't want to go quite that far, sir. I think there are checks. I think the integrity of the U.S. media is a check.

Mr. FOWLER. There are no checks; the CIA can have no checks.

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, there is no guarantee, but I think the system has its built-in check, your check on me that I am not starting big disinformation campaigns without deliberate or proper oversight, and the checks of our own media process that it doesn't want to get taken into a false story. That is, I think the standard of any good reporter is to try to be sure he is only putting out good information and not bad.

Mr. FOWLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ASPIN. One final area that the Turner directive does not cover which came to light in the hearings, besides the Reuters News Service and related cases, was the relationship between the Agency and foreign media outlets. I am thinking of subsidized English language newspapers in other countries, such as the Rome Daily American; or actually having a proprietary in the way of a feature service of some kind abroad. That is another way in which Americans might get influenced in unfortunate ways by some relationship which the Agency might have with foreign—and particularly English-language—newspapers abroad. This seemed to many of the witnesses—and I must say, it seems to me, too—to be a peculiar kind of way of influencing foreign opinion, as we are more likely to influence American journalists in that country who don't speak the language very well, or American tourists who happen to be going through rather than influencing the opinion in the foreign country.

And I wondered if you had any comment about the whole relationship between the Agency and subsidizing foreign English-language press abroad, or news services of one kind or another.

Admiral TURNER. That all gets into the covert action field. So to the extent that any of that were contemplated, it is subject to the whole set of oversights that we have been talking about there. I think that is the check against our doing something in that category that isn't worth the danger.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me ask, then, just to finish up on this directive, what is the status of the directive? Is it now a formal regulation? What is the legal status of the directive?

Admiral TURNER. It is a printed regulation of the Central Intelligence Agency and binding on everybody there.

Mr. ASPIN. Does that mean it has been sent out to the field and everything has been conveyed?

Admiral TURNER. Yes.

Mr. ASPIN. So it is a formal regulation.

[Admiral Turner, nods in the affirmative.]

Mr. ASPIN. Admiral, if you were going to make any changes in that directive, would you make them public?

Admiral TURNER. Oh, yes. This is an unclassified directive.

Mr. ASPIN. But what I am saying is, it being a directive and nothing which has been approved or disapproved by Congress, if you were to make any changes in this directive or the directive were to be changed in any way, would you do it publicly?

Admiral TURNER. I not only would because it would—it is unclassified and it would end up being public, but if I tried to sneak something in here, the media would be in here on top of me in nothing flat, and I think there is nothing better than to have a forward policy on this because it is going to come out anyway. So why get beaten over the head for trying to sneak it out.

Mr. ASPIN. So it would be made public if the thing gets changed?

Admiral TURNER. Yes.

Mr. ASPIN. Are there any supplementing directives or any implementing directives? Very often a policy comes out and then a little bit later there are telegrams going out that implement it and that say, "All right, here is what it really means." Sometimes it is not quite clear that they jibe.

Are there any supplementing instructions or anything to go with this?

Admiral TURNER. No; there are none.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you very much.

Mr. ROBINSON. Mr. Chairman before you leave that general area, may I ask a final question?

Mr. ASPIN. Surely.

Mr. ROBINSON. Admiral, in your statement you mentioned that you give two types of interviews, unattributable and attributable, and the unattributable interviews are made on request by news people. The attributable ones are made as a general rule three or four times a week, but the ones that are made on request have also a requirement that the person receiving the interview would protect the anonymity of the briefer.

Does the protection go further than just protecting the anonymity of the briefer, in other words, for example, is there any request to protect the confidentiality of the material involved?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir, we do not brief on anything that is classified, so any information we give them is theirs to do what they want with.

We are concerned if our analysts start getting too much publicity, they then get phone calls at home, they get phone calls at their private number at the office, and you know, it begins to get out of our control, as a matter of fact.

We have a very fine procedure, I believe. We set up recently a special office, and if we give one of these unattributable briefings, it is under Herb's general—it is in his office area, and that is where the media man comes, that is where our man goes, and it is under his general oversight, because you know, when you take a young analyst who hasn't much experience in dealing with the media, we have got to protect him as well as service the media. And so that is why we try to keep this anonymity. We don't hide all of our lights under bushes, but certainly some of that is useful.

Mr. ROBINSON. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ASPIN. Admiral, let me just follow up on that question because it did arise in one of the cases that one of the people who came before us to testify raised. One of the issues they raised was the possibility of briefings being given by the operations people, as opposed to the analysts. And the case that was cited was the case now in dispute of the Time magazine article about Allende. Let me just briefly go into the testimony to explain the situation.

What we were talking about in the testimony was a case brought forth by Dr. Morton Halperin. He brought forth a case where Time magazine was going to do a cover story about Allende. Reportedly—and Time disputes the report, I should say for the record—Time was going to give the cover story a certain slant. The Time people who were writing the story went over to receive a briefing at the Agency. They went to the operations people, and they got a different slant on the thing; and then they wrote their story in a different way, or so it was claimed. The Church committee uncovered some documents and claimed that it was different. Time magazine says nothing doing: We consulted a lot of different people and a lot of different sources.

Never mind the controversy; the point is that the analysts will do the briefing for the Agency now for the news media under your policy, as opposed to the operations people?

Admiral TURNER. That is correct.

Some of the operations people, both overseas and here, there used to be a lot of contact overseas. The media was quite unhappy in some instances with it, but we found that that was desirable and necessary, particularly if we are losing our cover overseas because a journalist would establish a relationship in Paris with our man and then he would go tell somebody when the man got transferred to some other station, hey, if you want to find something out in that country, go see Joe, and pretty soon we had no control over who knew who was who. And I don't have any enthusiasm, I mean, I just don't want the operations people dealing with media. They are in such sensitive areas that they should eschew that kind of relationship.

Mr. ASPIN. So it is your policy now that if somebody calls up and wants a briefing on such-and-such a subject and they don't specify who they want to see, you send them to the analyst.

Admiral TURNER. And if they do specify who they want to see, we still send them to the analyst.

Mr. ASPIN. And you try to apply that abroad, even where there are no analysts?

Admiral TURNER. That's right.

Mr. ASPIN. What do you do abroad? You just don't try?

Admiral TURNER. We don't give background briefings and things like that abroad.

Now, I don't—I have got to correct something for the record, Mr. Chairman. there is a directive that went out from the Operations Directorate amplifying or telling about this directive.

Mr. HETU. It doesn't change it.

Admiral TURNER. It doesn't change it. We will provide you a copy of their message to reassure you on that, but one of the things here is that if you say there is to be no relationship and they have had this traditionally abroad with our station chief and the leading U.S. media people, we have had them come in with cables, well, I have known Joe all my life. Can I not invite him over for dinner, or if he invites me to dinner, or we go to a cocktail party. I mean, I just can't emphasize that to you too much, people in the field don't want to break either the law or the regulations and so they come in with all of these detailed questions as to what is the borderline here, and that is what this directive is about.

Mr. ASPIN. Is it unclassified?

Admiral TURNER. I am not sure whether it is or not, the Operations Directorate hardly ever puts out anything unclassified.

Mr. ASPIN. But you will provide it?

Admiral TURNER. I will provide it to you, if it is classified in its full form, and I will try to provide you an unclassified version of it for the record.

Mr. ASPIN. Fine, thank you. Let me then go into another subject, which gets us to the point that the implementing directives sometimes don't sound the same as the public directives. An issue arose in the hearings when we talked to the former Ambassadors; namely, the relationship between the ambassadors and the CIA, and particularly the station chief in the countries in which they were assigned. There was an article in the New York Times recently on this subject, and I would like to ask unanimous consent to put it in the record.¹

In essence, what had happened was that the President issued a directive saying the Ambassador was in charge of the people in his operation in a country. The charge in the article was that, in fact, there were supplementary CIA directives sent out afterwards which in effect began to hedge on that and say, "Well, there are certain things that the Ambassador ought not see, and certain matters that he should not be informed of, and certain message traffic that he should not have," whereas the original Carter letter had said the Ambassador was in charge of all personnel and was entitled to see all messages. This is an issue which, of course, has been around a long time. President Kennedy and President Nixon sent out similar letters to their Ambassadors, and, similarly, things which were given in the first instance by the President were taken away in the subsequent instance by the bureaucracy.

And I would like, if I could, to get your views about this on the record. Is there anything that the Ambassador should not see?

Admiral TURNER. Yes.

Mr. ASPIN. OK. What kinds of things?

Admiral TURNER. Sources, names of agents, in some cases he should see them, but in most cases not.

Mr. ASPIN. On what grounds should he not? Why shouldn't the Ambassador be allowed, if he wants to know, even the sources, the most critical kind of case to the Agency?

Why shouldn't the Ambassador know the sources?

Admiral TURNER. Not because we don't trust the Ambassadors, but for two reasons. Leaks of information, in my opinion, are geometrical with the number of people who know the information, regardless of who they are.

Second, in order to protect very secretive information, you must sometimes dissimulate. If you are shaking hands at a cocktail party with a man who is supposedly in the cabinet of the country to which you are accredited, and yet you know he is on our payroll, if you are not trained and skilled in this, and there is a counterintelligence agent from the KGB at the party, you may inadvertently give this away. And we have had instances of this kind of thing. It takes training to keep secrets.

¹See appendix P, p. 521.

There are sources I do not want to know personally. I am not that trained at it, even though I am becoming very conscious of it from my exposure. And I don't think Ambassadors would want to assume some of that responsibility when lives are at stake.

Further, we can't get some of these people to do the work for us if they know the Ambassadors are going to know this because they understand the mechanism I have just talked to you about. They will trust the Central Intelligence Agency because we are professionals; that is our business. And it is a real problem.

If they know—if they thought we were going to tell you their names, and you have never asked for that in any of the committees of the Congress, you know, we wouldn't be able to recruit some of these people.

So yes, there—and there has been never any intent by the Secretary of State or myself—we put out a directive that the President approved which set these guidelines, to make it a total disclosure to the Ambassador. What I have done, this new agreement I signed with the Secretary of State last spring was to draw that line where we stop telling the Ambassador further over in his favor. I have tried to be more open, more forthcoming because close teamwork between intelligence and the State Department is just very critical in my opinion, and therefore I wanted to lean over as far as I thought I possibly could to share with the Ambassador and make sure that we are all on the same team.

It is working well, and despite that erroneous story, the relationships have improved and are working smoothly. I know of only one or two Ambassadors who have had any complaints whatsoever with this. The vast majority of them—and I really had to check it since this story—are very pleased with the new program, and we did not put out any supplementary instructions that in any way contradicted the basic State-CIA agreement. I have not had anybody come to me and say here is a paragraph—but we did have to put out supplementary instructions, not because we were undermining it; because the onus of change was on us. I mean, we were opening up more. We were pushing the boundary line toward the Ambassador. The Ambassador didn't have to do anything different except understand he was going to get more information. But you don't get an organization, particularly in an area like this, which is vital to our operations, to make a substantial change without impressing on them how you are going to do it, and that you are going to do it.

I personally wrote a long cable to all my chiefs of station and said, now, this is what we have done, this is why we did it, and this is—politely—I want you to carry this out. That was one of the cables that Binder says was intended to do the opposite. And the last line in my cable was, you will show my cable to the Ambassador.

So I think it is a total canard.

Mr. ASPIN. OK.

Let me just press the issue a little further because I see almost no time in which a congressional committee would need to know the sources. I can see, however, some cases where the Ambassador might need to know the sources, and, indeed, it would be very appropriate for the Ambassador to know the sources.

Admiral TURNER. I agree.

Mr. ASPIN. Where would it be important that the Ambassador know?

How do you decide when the Ambassador should know and when the Ambassador shouldn't know?

Admiral TURNER. There is no prohibition on the Ambassador knowing anything. There is no, you know, express rule that says this kind of thing he will never be told. That is a matter of negotiation between the Ambassador and the chief of station. Only the chief of station is going to know everything that goes on in his station, so clearly he is the one who has got to make the first judgment.

But the rule that I laid out clearly is I don't want Ambassadors surprised about our activities.

Mr. ASPIN. Correct.

Admiral TURNER. So if an Ambassador, he is going to know there is an activity going on. He may not know the name of the person, if there is an agent involved in it. Well, once he knows about the activity, he has got some clue that maybe he wants to know the name. So it isn't totally dependent on the chief of station volunteering is what I am trying to say.

So there is an interplay in the field. The chief of station either volunteers or doesn't volunteer; the Ambassador has some information about the activity. He either asks or doesn't ask. If in that process there is a difference, it comes to Secretary Vance and myself to resolve. And that is all clearly laid out.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me just quote a couple of paragraphs from the Binder article, because here is the case of Frank Carlucci in Portugal, now your deputy over at the CIA. The article states:

On learning that the Agency station chief was maintaining a covert relationship with several members of the 1974 Portuguese government, the official continued, Mr. Carlucci demanded that the connections be terminated.

He is talking about Frank Carlucci's activities.

The CIA officials and a knowledgeable State Department official agreed that under the new guidelines such a controversy would probably not arise because the CIA station chief would probably not feel obliged to identify all of his covert relationships by name. Under the directive, the Agency official went on, the Ambassador would be made aware of covert operations, but would not be involved in them.

In other words, what the article says was that when the situation became a little more vague, Frank Carlucci was able to get a lot of information, I guess by force of his personality and the unusual circumstances that existed. He was able to do things which an Ambassador now in that circumstance, even with the thing more delineated, would not be able to do.

Admiral TURNER. I say to you, sir, that's balderdash.

Mr. ASPIN. All right.

Admiral TURNER. There is nothing taken away from the Ambassador by these new regulations. His access to information is enhanced, absolutely.

Mr. ASPIN. Yes. I tend to think that you are right, that on balance the information is enhanced to the noncontroversial cases and, indeed, probably in 99 cases out of 100. I have talked to Ambassadors, too, and can confirm what you said, which is essentially that they are pleased with the information they are getting and, in fact, do not want any more or see any need for any more. I

am just wondering about the exceptional cases where you do have an Ambassador who really does want to get into it, or some kind of a crisis situation where the Ambassador really is the operation officer in that country, and now that we have delineated this thing so finely, whether in fact we would be prohibiting him from getting information. But you say that is not so.

Admiral TURNER. Well, you are saying delineated finely, and I am saying that all the new delineation is in favor of more information to the Ambassador.

Mr. ASPIN. Except that when it was vague, an Ambassador who really wanted to know, and really knew how to maneuver, could get an awful lot of information about what was happening just in terms of insisting upon it.

I don't know. It perhaps is not a situation that is going to arise.

Admiral TURNER. If there is any circumscribing here, it is all caveated with the provision that if there is a difference, it comes back to Vance and Turner.

Mr. ASPIN. Have you had a chance, or has there ever been a request for you and Vance to arbitrate any situations yet?

Admiral TURNER. Not thus far, but not too much time goes by that I don't talk to Secretary Vance about something like this. It is not because they have come to a head in the field and—well, there are differences. It is mainly over the degree of reporting that we do, and how much we work to find out what is going on in the local scene, and you know, some Ambassadors are very possessive and don't want anybody else reporting about political intelligence in their country. They are the head man. And I make it very clear to Secretary Vance I can't accept that because the President of the United States is entitled to intelligence reporting from anywhere in the world from people who are not associated with the policy process, and that is my people. And, therefore, I want and demand from them their assessments regularly of what is going on in that country, even though it may duplicate what the Ambassador does.

But I tell them I want you particularly, if you disagree with the Ambassador, you know, the country government is going to fall, no it is not going to fall, I want you to let the Ambassador know that you are sending me your opinion, and let me know that he would have disagreed with that.

Generally speaking, what is being worked out is they run the cable through the Embassy who then even maybe puts a paragraph on and say the following reason—that's fine with me, because I don't want to take just my chief of station's opinion if it is quite opposed by the Ambassador. I want to be able in my own mind to balance the two.

Mr. ASPIN. Is it a regular process, then, in the cases where there isn't a controversy, that the assessment cables—without sources now, I am not talking about the sources—are in fact shown to the Ambassador?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, yes. And the new provision, there is no way we can legally withhold that kind of a cable from the Ambassador.

Now, in each station, you know, I don't know how much the Ambassador wants to read.

Mr. ASPIN. Yes.

Let me press a little further because I am a little puzzled on when you think it would be proper for an Ambassador to know the names of the sources and the times when it wouldn't be proper for them to know the names of the sources.

Admiral TURNER. Well, we feel that if the Ambassador is going to have regular contact with this person, that there may be times when he should.

Now, I have told you the other side of the story regarding whether he can keep the secret, so you know, there is a difference in each case, and I think in that kind of a case, you would approach the Ambassador and say look, there is somebody you are seeing every week. This is what he is doing for us.

Now, do you think you want to have the responsibility on your shoulders of not inadvertently disclosing that relationship? The risks of your doing business with him without knowing that he works for us are the following. I mean, you know, you might make an agreement on so and so which we have to come to you and tell you you really can't follow through on that. I am scratching here, but I think that has got to be worked out in each case. But, yes, we don't want an Ambassador to get totally trapped.

Mr. ASPIN. Would you think it proper to talk to the Ambassador before you approach a source if it might be a particularly risky source, and get his opinion?

Admiral TURNER. That is part of not being surprised.

I mean, we don't want to make a pitch to the foreign minister of some small country to come and be on our side, and then he goes and complains to the Ambassador, I was attempted to be recruited by your CIA man.

Mr. ASPIN. And the Ambassador is caught off guard.

Admiral TURNER. That would be being surprised.

Mr. ASPIN. Is there any other area where you think it would not be appropriate to tell the Ambassador?

Admiral TURNER. Oh, yes; yes.

Mr. ASPIN. What else, what other kinds of things?

Admiral TURNER. Well, sometimes the physical activity of collecting information, like some technical means, planting sensors or that kind of thing, is a very delicate, risky process, and you wouldn't want all the details. You know, you wouldn't want it to be known because of my geometrical leak rule, Turner's law of geometry, that—you wouldn't want the details, you know, the place, the time, the hour, the operational details to be known by anybody more than absolutely has to.

Mr. ASPIN. Yes.

Admiral TURNER. Somebody's life may be at stake if it ever got out, but again, you don't want the Ambassador surprised if it fails. So he has got to know enough about it but not every detail. That is the kind of line we are attempting to draw, and it just can't be written out in express rules. It has got to be negotiated in every instance.

Mr. ASPIN. OK.

Any thing else that comes to mind?

Admiral TURNER. I think those are the two principal categories of activities.

Mr. ASPIN. Because what has happened is that various Presidents have tried, in effect, to write kind of all-encompassing letters saying, "The Ambassador is in charge of everything," and, in fact, we wrote a law in Congress to that effect at one time which never had any implementing directives put out about it.¹

Basically, you are saying that really it is not the right way to go, that there is a small percentage of situations which should not be disclosed to the Ambassador.

Admiral TURNER. It doesn't mean he is not in charge. It means he doesn't need all of the details to be in charge.

Mr. ASPIN. Right, right.

So what you are saying, essentially, is that on some of these kind of things, we ought to be looking at this thing from a different angle, and Congress and the Presidents really ought to be doing this differently.

Obviously you are not the only director to think that, because we have had this kind of back and forth for all these years. It has always been a peculiar thing, because Congress thinks it is right that the Ambassador ought to be in charge and ought to have every piece of information.

Admiral TURNER. I happen to be a military man, and what we are saying is that we are interested in giving our Ambassadors more complete authority over their activities than we even do our military people. You know, a military commander today isn't totally possessed of all the facts or all the control over his operations. He gets orders from Washington every couple of hours, and one thing or another, and neither are Ambassadors going to be—this old image of I am in charge, total access, total control, it just isn't practical in our modern society.

I think we have got it to where they are not surprised by our activities. They will have adequate control that we aren't doing things that they really don't think should be done.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me ask about one other area before we quit, and the House will probably be calling and we should probably let you go.

Let me ask about a case that came up in our hearings, and the reason I raise it is because it occurred since you have become the DCI, and that is the whole problem of the Demetracopoulos case, and the whole question of files.

Leave aside Demetracopoulos himself; I am not all that concerned about the particulars or going into the truth or falsehood of the statements, but only the questions about the CIA's use of files and what the ground rules are on using files about people.

First of all I guess the question is on the keeping of the files.

What kinds of people does the CIA have files on?

Let me go into the background of this case again.

There have been articles, printed in the papers about this fellow Demetracopoulos, which attribute CIA sources with information which Demetracopoulos himself says is false. In any case, the question that it raises is not the validity of the information so much, but the use of files and the use of information to discredit people. This is the fundamental issue that we are talking about, and the

¹ 22 U.S. 2680a (Aug. 1, 1956).

questions are: to what extent does the Privacy Act apply to the CIA, to what extent does the CIA have files about people, what are the ground rules on which the CIA grants access to files to people who are outside of the Agency, say, in the media?

Admiral TURNER. It is a real problem because the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act both apply to us. We have no exemptions from that. We do not just provide files on people to anybody who asks. I find no evidence we have provided files on Demetracopoulos to anybody. On the other hand, we have to be very circumspect because any file we have can be asked for under the Freedom of Information Act; whether it is releasable or not is another issue, and there is a Freedom of Information and Privacy Act procedure going on with respect to the Demetracopoulos right now, and I hesitate to get into it too much before that is resolved and maybe gone to court and whatever else it takes.

Mr. ASPIN. I understand.

Mr. LAPHAM. Mr. Aspin, let me add to the Director's answer on that. It is true that the Privacy Act as well as the Freedom of Information Act applies to CIA. However, the Privacy Act contains a provision that allows CIA to exempt itself from certain of the requirements of that statute, and we have partially, although not fully, exercised that authority.

However, we are not permitted under that statute to exempt ourselves from the provisions that have to do with conditions on disclosure of information, that is conditions under which we can disseminate information. Those requirements of the statute are fully applicable to CIA as they are to any other agency.

Mr. ASPIN. And what is the case when you have, as with Demetracopoulos, a permanent resident alien? What is his status under this classification?

Mr. LAPHAM. His status is the same under both statutes as a U.S. citizen.

Mr. ASPIN. So he has the same access and has the same status as a U.S. citizen.

Mr. LAPHAM. Precisely. He is of equal status with a U.S. citizen under both acts.

Mr. ASPIN. And tell me again, what is the CIA exemption or how does that work in the act?

Mr. LAPHAM. The act gives the CIA power to exempt itself from certain limited requirements of the statute but does not, however, give the CIA any power to exempt itself from the requirements that relate to the disclosure outside the Agency of information in its files, private information in its files.

Mr. ASPIN. How does that apply if you are not making it public but making the information available to other agencies of the Government?

Mr. LAPHAM. It applies whether you are making it available to other persons who happen to be nongovernmental or to other government agencies.

Mr. ASPIN. The same thing.

May I ask, what is the basis on which the Agency would open a file on somebody?

What kinds of people do they have files on and how does the file system work?

Mr. LAPHAM. That is an enormous question. I can't begin to cover all of the ground on that, but I will try to get at it this way.

If you are talking about U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens, then the basic ground rules are set forth in most recently the new executive order that the President has issued,¹ and before that was set forth in somewhat different form in the Executive order issued by President Ford,² that those orders enumerate categories of information which we are allowed to collect and to retain and to disseminate about U.S. persons, and those are the basic provisions that govern those activities where U.S. persons are involved.

Obviously there are an enormous number of circumstances in which we open files on persons, and they range all the way up from applicants for employment.

Mr. ASPIN. Admiral, you said that there is no record that anything was made available on Demetracopoulos himself.

Admiral TURNER. That's right.

Mr. ASPIN. There are some pretty good controls on that, on the use of those files? You keep very close control or access to those files?

Mr. LAPHAM. Well, again, the procedures are written to conform to the guidelines that appear in the Executive order, so that what gets into the files and what can come out of the files and be disseminated to other persons is essentially governed by those enumerated categories of information.

Mr. ASPIN. But is access to those kinds of files fairly limited and kept to a number of people, because there are a couple of ways in which the information on Demetracopoulos could have been made public? One is, of course, the newspaper reporter is given access to the files; but you said that apparently was not the case. The other way is that somebody had access to the files and looked at it and remembered what was in there, and then went and talked to somebody. And I was just wondering about what kind of access there is to files like this by people.

Admiral TURNER. Well, as a general rule, of course, we are quite compartmented in the Agency, for good cause. So I think the normal procedures provide a set of barriers, you know, the Southeast Asia people don't just let the European people into their files because they don't have cause for it under normal circumstances.

But I probably cannot give you a specific guarantee any more than the old need to know phrase, which we do take quite seriously. But I can't erect either a physical barrier or a specific regulation on this because, for example the European deskman does occasionally have need for a file on an Asian case.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me just tell you what the concern is, and that is a general concern. The specifics of this case are, God knows, very complex and murky; but the general concern is over the use of Agency information or maybe the use of Agency cachet to do a number on somebody. When one claims that CIA files exist which state such-and-such information, this gives it a certain kind of credence that wouldn't ordinarily exist. To say, "I heard that so

¹E.O. 12036 (January 26, 1978).

²E.O. 11905 (February 18, 1976).

and so claims he got medals in the war but he really didn't," is one thing; but if someone can say, "The CIA has investigated and found that he claims that he got medals and he didn't," that is a different story.

And there is a certain amount of evidence that Demetracopoulos is but one case of this kind of CIA cachet being used to really do in people; and very often the target may be critics of the CIA who have written books that are unpopular, that attack the CIA. I am just concerned about this whole area, and I don't know how to get a handle on it. If indeed, as you say in this case, the file was not made available to the press, and in fact the Privacy Act does for the most part apply to the CIA, those are the obvious legislative ways to get at the problem. Do you understand the problem that I am worried about? The case of maybe the CIA doing in Mark Lane as a person or doing in, maybe, Agee. Maybe Agee deserves to be done in; but it is a concern about the use of this kind of information. Maybe it isn't even information that is in the CIA files; but the use of information to attack critics or to attack people who are unpopular for one reason or another.

And I don't know how to get at the thing except that the Demetracopoulos case is an interesting example.

Admiral TURNER. I am not sure how to get at it either. We are bound by the several laws that put some restraints on it. The point that was made a while ago, do we ever defend ourselves against the false accusation that our file said so and so is one way we could be brought into trouble, too. And here again we have that some problem. Sometimes we can defend ourselves, sometimes we can't, even if we are falsely accused. And it is very tough to lay down some specific law or rule or regulation as to how you control the release of data from these files.

I mean, for instance, I have quoted in the press, and I will stand up and say any time that Mr. Snapp came to me and told me eyeball to eyeball that he would clear his book with me, and there is a memo to that in my file and I am sure it is in some file labeled Snapp down there.

So I have released information from a file there which, you know, clearly is intended to question the credibility in some sense of an individual, in part because I have been falsely accused in the media about my relationships in this case.

So we do release information, and there are cases where I have released information that was in the files, but it was also in my head from personal experience.

Let me give some more thought to this because it is a tough one.

Mr. ASPIN. It is a tough issue.

Let me see if anybody has any more questions.

Loch, do you have a couple of questions?

Mr. JOHNSON. I just have two brief questions.

May I refer you to your opening statement where you talk about briefings by the CIA for press people, and you mentioned that in any instances where you provide briefings on an unattributable basis, this is done to preserve the conversational tone of such briefings and to insure the anonymity preferred by the briefers.

I can fully understand why you would want to preserve the anonymity of your briefers, but I am not sure that preserving the

conversational tone is a good reason for having a cloak of anonymity.

My question is why don't you simply attribute your briefings to the CIA, not to a specific individual?

Admiral TURNER. Herb?

Mr. HETU. They are not attributed to CIA or to intelligence sources. This is just to further protect the anonymity of the briefer. I would emphasize again that we do these only on a request basis. Our ground rules are well known to the press and we have never had a complaint.

Admiral TURNER. Take another case. Now, Mr. Aspin just pointed out, the CIA imprimatur on something gives it added credibility. I am going to get very skittish if every time we have one of the unattributable briefings and it becomes attributable and therefore it can be quoted in the press as the CIA says so and so, because then I am going to want to assure that I have approved what that fellow says. In other words, I don't want him giving bad information, but the borderline between opinion and fact, between an Agency opinion and an analyst's opinion that could probably be made an Agency opinion but hasn't been officially endorsed is very fine.

Mr. JOHNSON. But one could simply attribute it to an analyst without naming the analyst.

Admiral TURNER. But then it becomes a CIA opinion no matter how you caveat it. They won't say a CIA analyst. They will say sources in the CIA said, and everybody—nobody in the public is going to feel that is attributed to a GS-13 and not to Stan Turner.

Mr. JOHNSON. I suppose the other side of the argument one can make is that the public has a right to know or an interest in knowing where the information is obtained by a journalist, and if it is obtained from the CIA, the people should be told.

Admiral TURNER. I endorse that 100 percent, if you really push that rule and make the journalists reveal their sources, I would be delighted, but I don't think you will get very far with that.

Mr. JOHNSON. I don't mean reveal sources in terms of individual people, but I mean agencies.

Admiral TURNER. They won't reveal where they got things, let alone the names of individuals, and I would be delighted if they would because we would close a lot of leaks if we could get the sources of journalists.

Mr. JOHNSON. You also say in your statement that your briefings are unclassified.

Do you ever give classified briefings to journalists?

Admiral TURNER. Absolutely not. They are not cleared for classified information. That would be breaking the law.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, if you give only unclassified briefings, then, why according to the record have you given background security checks on certain journalists before briefings?

Admiral TURNER. That is all in history when these rules didn't apply and we were talking about using them and we wanted to know if the fellow was reliable. If we were going to use him as a source of information or to go out and gather information for us, you know, you don't want a fellow who is also working for the KGB.

We don't do that now.

Mr. JOHNSON. Would you under your tenure conduct a background clearance check on a U.S. person who was a journalist?

Admiral TURNER. No; I would have no reason to.

Mr. JOHNSON. I suppose if that person applied to become an employee of the Agency——

Admiral TURNER. Well, then we are talking about doing it with his knowledge, and there is nothing wrong with that.

Mr. LAPHAM. There is a possibility, I would have to say, on that. If he came to us not in his capacity as a journalist but in his capacity, let's say, as a historical researcher and he wanted access to classified files, where there is a provision in the Executive order relating to classification the allows that kind of thing to be done, but that is going to involve historical research and access to classified materials under close safeguards, under those circumstances we might conduct a background investigation. That, of course, would be done, however, with his consent.

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, may we have for the record the document he is talking about that allows a journalist to have access to classified information?¹

Mr. LAPHAM. No, I didn't say a journalist. I said it allows historical researchers, and I suppose a circumstance could occur in which a journalist happened also to be the researcher.

Mr. JOHNSON. Because indeed sometimes journalists are also historical scholars.

Mr. LAPHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. JOHNSON. That's all I have.

Mr. ASPIN. Any more?

Admiral, thank you very much for a very informative and interesting morning.

Admiral TURNER. Thank you. I enjoyed it.

[Whereupon, at 11:20 a.m., the subcommittee recessed subject to the call of the Chair.]

¹ See appendix Q, p. 522.

APPENDIX A



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

11 February 1976

Office of the Assistant to the Director

STATEMENT

Over the years, the CIA has had relationships with individuals in many walks of American life. These relationships, many of a voluntary and unpaid nature, have reflected the desire of Americans to help their country. Such relationships have been conducted by the Agency with the clear intent of furthering its foreign intelligence mission and have not been aimed at influencing or improperly acting on any American institution.

Genuine concern has recently been expressed about CIA relations with newsmen and churchmen. The Agency does not believe there has been any impropriety on its part in the limited use made of persons connected in some way with American media, church and missionary organizations. Nonetheless, CIA recognizes the special status afforded these institutions under our Constitution and in order to avoid any appearance of improper use by the Agency, the

-2-

DCI has decided on a revised policy to govern Agency relations with these groups:

-- Effective immediately, CIA will not enter into any paid or contractual relationship with any full-time or part-time news correspondent accredited by any U.S. news service, newspaper, periodical, radio or television network or station.

-- As soon as feasible, the Agency will bring existing relationships with individuals in these groups into conformity with this new policy.

-- CIA has no secret paid or contractual relationship with any American clergyman or missionary. This practice will be continued as a matter of policy.

CIA recognizes that members of these groups may wish to provide information to the CIA on matters of foreign intelligence of interest to the U.S. Government. The CIA will continue to welcome information volunteered by such individuals.

It is Agency policy not to divulge the names of cooperating Americans. In this regard CIA will not make public, now or in the future, the names of any cooperating journalists or churchmen.

APPENDIX B

NEW REGULATIONS APPROVED ON CIA RELATIONS WITH U.S. NEWS MEDIA

The Director of Central Intelligence, Admiral Stansfield Turner, ordered implementation of the following regulations on 30 November 1977:

1. Policy. The special status afforded the press under the Constitution necessitates a careful policy of self-restraint on the part of the Agency in regard to its relations with U.S. news media organizations and personnel. Accordingly, CIA will not:

a. enter into any relationships with full-time or part-time journalists (including so-called "stringers") accredited by a U.S. news service, newspaper, periodical, radio, or television network or station, for the purpose of conducting any intelligence activities. The term "accredited" means any full- or part-time employee of U.S. or foreign nationality who is formally authorized by contract or by the issuance of press credentials to represent himself or herself either in the U.S. or abroad as a correspondent for a U.S. news media organization or who is officially recognized by a foreign government to represent a U.S. news media organization;

b. without the specific, express approval of senior management of the organization concerned, enter into any relationships with non-journalist staff employees of any U.S. news media organization for the purpose of conducting any intelligence activities;

c. use the name or facilities of any U.S. news media organization to provide cover for any Agency employees or activities.

-more-

2. Limitations

a. The policies set forth above are not designed to inhibit open relationships with journalists (as for example contracts to perform translating services or to lecture at Agency training courses) which are entered into for reasons unrelated to such persons' affiliation with a particular news media organization. Willingness on both sides to acknowledge the fact and nature of the relationship is the essential characteristic of the open relationships into which CIA will enter with journalists under this provision.

b. In addition, CIA will not deny any person including full-time or part-time accredited journalists and stringers regardless of profession, the opportunity to furnish information which may be useful to his or her Government. Therefore, CIA will continue to permit unpaid relationships with journalists or other members of U.S. news media organizations who voluntarily maintain contact for the purpose of providing information on matters of foreign intelligence or foreign counterintelligence interest to the U.S. Government.

c. Likewise, the Agency, through the Office of the Assistant for Public Affairs to the Director, will continue to maintain regular liaison with representatives of the news media to provide public information, answers to inquiries, and assistance in obtaining unclassified briefings on substantive matters.

3. Exceptions. No exceptions to the policies and prohibitions stated above may be made except with the specific approval of the DCI.

-END-

APPENDIX C

PEOPLEAmerican Media

- full and part-time accredited journalists
- stringers
- non-journalist staff employees
- editors, media policy makers
- free lancers

Foreign Media

APPENDIX D

ACTIVITIESInformation

- story confirmation
- information swapping
- pre-briefing
- debriefing
- access to files/outtakes
- prior tasking of intelligence collection

Support

- host parties
- provide safehouses
- act as courier

Agent work

- spotting
- assessing
- recruiting
- handling

Propaganda

APPENDIX E

BONDS OF ASSOCIATIONVoluntary association ("contact"), based on:

- patriotism
- friendship ties
- career advancement (getting a scoop)

Salaried association ("assets") based on:

- gifts
- reimbursement for expenses
- regular financial payment

APPENDIX F

WASHINGTON POST
October 11, 1977

Charles B. Seib

The Press/Spy Affair: Cozy and Still Murky

The press has emerged from still another exposure of its escapades in the spy business with nothing more than a few scratches. Unlike scandals involving public officials, those involving the press are self-healing. There is a flurry of superficial attention followed by benign neglect.

The latest examination of contact between the CIA and the press was, as usual, but in the "serious" hard-news press. It appeared in *Rolling Stone*, a magazine devoted mostly to rock music.

The author was Carl Bernstein of *Watergate* fame, no longer a Washington Post reporter but a freelancer. It was a long article about 12,000 words, and it contained an attentive gelling estimate of the number of journalists who have played ball and more with the CIA. Many of the specifics had been reported before, but the article conveyed, as no previous one had, the depth of CIA involvement with the press and its sanction in the executive suites.

Probably the most serious injury was done *The New York Times*. Bernstein identified the *Times* as one of the CIA's most valuable news-business connections. He quoted an unnamed CIA source as saying that between 1950 and 1960 *The Times* provided cover for about 10 CIA people as part of a top-level agreement to cooperate with the agency. Among the journalists he singled out as having close CIA ties was C. E. Seltzer, foreign affairs columnist of *The Times*.

When Bernstein and *Rolling Stone* distributed copies of the article a few weeks before its publication, *The Times* carried a column-long news story and, a

day later, a longer story containing largely of denials, including strong ones from *The Times* and Seltzer.

With the second article, *The Times* published a letter to the CIA pleading for information on any past or current relationships with the newspaper or its employees.

Noting the allegations in the Bernstein article, *The Times* told the CIA that its refusal to disclose its dealings with the media "has placed *The Times* and its employees in an untenable position." It stated a much broader problem than its own when it said: "The American public is confused and some foreign

ones marked by an entertaining bit of infighting between the author and his old employer *The Washington Post*."

After the text of the article was made available to the press, but several weeks before its publication, *The Post* carried a long article on CIA and the press in general and the Bernstein article in particular.

This article, by Richard Harwood, deputy managing editor of *The Post*, and Walter Pincus, a *Post* reporter, was mostly rehash. But it contained an allegation of a serious flaw in the Bernstein piece, tucked discreetly between parentheses. A Senate source was quoted as saying that at least half of the 400 CIA newspapers of operations involving journalists received by Senate investigators concerned foreign, not American, journalists.

A telling blow if true, but Bernstein got in the last kick. When his article appeared in *Rolling Stone* it contained a paragraph that hadn't been in the earlier version. It said that a "relatively small number of the summaries described the activities of foreign journalists." And in a dig at *The Post* for relying on a Senate source rather than on CIA sources, Bernstein added: "Those officials most knowledgeable about the subject say that a figure of 400 American journalists is on the low side of the actual number who maintained covert relationships and undertook clandestine tasks."

Something more should be said about that last figure. First of all, just how deeply involved were these journalists? That's a little murky. Bernstein said at one point that the figure "refers only to

those who were 'holed' in their undercover assignments or had a mutual understanding that they would help the agency or were subject to some form of CIA contractual control." It does not, he said, include the journalists who occasionally traded favors or information with the CIA. It is a pretty broad definition, and it is not helped by Bernstein's tortured efforts to make his lead-off case, a 1953 trip columnist Joseph Alsop made to the Philippines, qualify as a CIA "assignment."

In any case, the estimate that 400 journalists worked for or with the CIA over 25 years is less startling when one remembers that early last year, after much prying by the agency, a Senate report found that the CIA still had covert relationships with 50 American journalists and other employees of American media organizations.

Bernstein's article was interesting and useful. It clearly did a lot of dogged legwork. But its value is mostly as history.

The give-and-take that goes on between journalists and sources undoubtedly will continue with CIA sources, who often can be extremely valuable. But the systematic use of the American press for intelligence purposes seems to be a thing of the past.

One problem area does remain, however. That is the CIA's use of the foreign press. The agency has refused to renounce this activity, even though it smacks of hypocrisy and is bound to be an international irritant. Congress could ban it in the CIA charter now being drafted, but it is too early to predict that it will.

The News Business

governments are using this situation as a weapon against the press. . . . The work of correspondents has been hindered and, because we have been denied access to our only source of authoritative information, we are unable to present all the facts to the public."

The CIA was unmoved. It said that it would not provide the information and, furthermore, that by its refusal it was not admitting such information existed.

The *Times*'s frustration is understandable, and yet one must wonder what would happen if it unleashed a team of its own top reporters on the story. Bernstein seems to have been able to find talkative CIA sources, despite the official stone walling.

Publication of the Bernstein article

APPENDIX G



BY STANLEY KARNOW

NEWSWEEK
October 10, 1977

ASSOCIATING WITH THE AGENCY

Every time some muckraker alleges that American journalists surreptitiously served the Central Intelligence Agency, I anticipate personal complications. For even though I am not now nor ever have been on the CIA payroll, I have dealt with the organization so extensively over the years that, given the prevailing mood these days, I fully expect my name to appear in a sensational disclosure of the kind just published by Carl Bernstein of Watergate fame. I can imagine, should that occur, the futility of denying the unprovable. What all this suggests to me is that, in style if not substance, we are returning to the witch-hunts of the McCarthy era, when any unconventional behavior aroused suspicion of wrongdoing. The difference in the present atmosphere of righteous non-conformism is that it is dangerous to have been conventional.

This is in no way to argue that the CIA did not recruit members of the press for various purposes. Back in the early 1950s, in fact, a senior agency official made me an offer that, happily, I was able to refuse—not out of ethical motives but because, I recall, a double life would have confused my existence. I remember a colleague, however, who must have worked for the CIA. He suddenly left our bureau and was afterward revealed to have directed a covert operation in Latin America. Oddly enough, he was rehired by our publication after the operation ended—as if he had merely taken a leave of absence to write a book. During that period, in short, the CIA had not yet become a dirty acronym.

MAKING CONTACTS

But while I rejected a secret CIA assignment, I certainly made a point of cultivating agency representatives around the world during my two decades as a reporter abroad. Some of these operatives were dreadful, many were mediocre and several were superb, as any assortment of officials are. But they all had information. It was my job to obtain what I could of that information and then judge its validity by checking with other sources. Thus, to use Bernstein's sinister-sounding words, I was one of those "foreign correspondents who found that their association with the agency helped their work." What the present-day muckrakers fail to understand, however, is that

association did not necessarily mean ~~complicity~~

It was easy enough for a conscientious journalist to detect when CIA agents in particular countries were promoting a special line, as they did for example in Laos, where the agency functioned at times with almost unbridled autonomy. No reporter worth his salt was going to fall for the claim that Gen. Phoumi Nosavan, the so-called "pro-American strongman," represented the hope of Southeast Asia, as his CIA mentors would assert. Nor was the agency very successful in persuading anyone that client dictators like Chiang Kai-shek or Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat of Thailand were "firm friends of freedom" in the cold war against Communism. I still wonder, in retrospect, whether the CIA apologists for the Greek colonels really believed their own arguments or were cynically carrying out orders to bumsh the image of their protégés.

FALSE INFORMATION

It was also not very difficult for a normally skeptical journalist to discern when a CIA man was engaged in a "disinformation" effort designed to tarnish adversaries of the United States. When I began covering China from Hong Kong in 1959, for instance, the agency chief there went out of his way to divulge to me that the Communist Chinese would explode their first atomic bomb on Oct. 1, their national day. I asked what assurances he could give me that the test would take place. "None," he replied. "But if it doesn't, you can file a follow-up dispatch reporting that it was a failure." I declined the story, so we played tennis instead and I survived to report the first Chinese nuclear explosion when it actually happened five years later.

But looking back, I would say that on balance the CIA analysts I have encountered overseas were valuable—and often invaluable—contacts for a correspondent, and a few have remained good friends. It is well known by now that of all the American groups in Vietnam, the agency was the most realistic in its gloomy assessments of the war, even to the extent of incurring Lyndon Johnson's wrath by warning him that bombing the North would not deter Hanoi. In Laos, along with promoters of the Tsinhorn Tyrants, there were sensitive CIA types

who recognized the destructive pressures being put on that benighted land by U.S. policy and they may have suffered professionally from speaking out, both within bureaucratic channels and to journalists.

HELPFUL ASSISTANCE

If I had to single out the most useful bit of assistance I received from the CIA, I suppose it would concern the whereabouts of Mao Tse-tung during the spring of 1966. Mao had dropped out of sight the previous winter and his long absence from public view was prompting tales that he had died. A CIA man in Hong Kong, however, urged me to resist the rumors. Mao was alive and well and preparing a gigantic new campaign, he told me. And, of course, the advice was accurate: Mao surfaced not long afterward to launch the Cultural Revolution. Years later, reminiscing about the episode, I congratulated the CIA man on the efficiency of his intelligence network inside China. "It was just an educated guess," he countered modestly—or perhaps deceptively.

Among the accusations being leveled at journalists who associated with the CIA is the charge that they "cooperated" with the agency. That suggests, as I understand it, that any give-and-take between correspondents and CIA officials made the journalist an accomplice of the agency. But avoiding this practice, which Bernstein denounces, would have rendered it impossible for him and his Washington Post colleague, Bob Woodward, to root out the Watergate scandal. For as they themselves have described it, they bounced details off their celebrated source, "Deep Throat," and he guided them on that basis. As every correspondent knows, information is the best leverage for acquiring more information. To withhold it in dealing with the CIA or any other government department is to give up the task of reporting.

Despite all this, I would agree with the muckrakers that journalists had no business signing contracts to serve the Central Intelligence Agency and that those who did should be exposed. The primary responsibility of the journalist is to report and to interpret current events for his readers. But for that very reason, a relationship of mutual respect with the agency is indispensable.

APPENDIX H

Allegations of General Cushman's Complicity in Efforts to Steal Ellsberg's Psychiatric Records

A number of press stories have created an impression that Marine Corps Commandant General Robert E. Cushman, Jr., while Deputy Director of CIA in 1971, knowingly authorized the use of Central Intelligence Agency facilities in the attempted theft of the psychiatric records of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg by Mr. E. Howard Hunt and Mr. G. Gordon Liddy from the Beverly Hills office of Dr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist. For example:

a. New York Times, 7 May 1973, Page 1: "Gen.

Robert E. Cushman Jr., the Marine Corps commandant who in 1971 was Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, authorized the use of Central Intelligence Agency material and research in the burglary of the office of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg's former psychiatrist, sources close to the Watergate case said today."

b. New York Times, 8 May 1973, Page 26: "The

Central Intelligence Agency and at least one Congressional committee are investigating a report that General Robert E. Cushman Jr., the Marine Corps commandant who, while serving as the C.I.A.'s Deputy Director, authorized the use of the agency's facilities and equipment by a group of burglars allegedly directed from the White House."

c. The Washington Post, 8 May 1973, Page 1: "Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi (D., Mich.), chairman of an Armed Services subcommittee on the CIA, disclosed that the agency's director, James R. Schlesinger, confirmed to him yesterday that Marine Corps Commandant Robert E. Cushman Jr. authorized use of CIA equipment in the Ellsberg burglary case."

d. Washington Star, 8 May 1973, Editorial: "And someone at the White House, possibly John Ehrlichman, induced someone high at CIA, probably General Robert E. Cushman, to authorize the use of the agency's clandestine services in the burglary of the office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist."

e. The Washington Post, 9 May 1973, Page 1: "...Gen. Robert Cushman, then CIA deputy director and now Marine Corps commandant, met with and agreed to help Hunt in the scheme to steal psychiatric records of Daniel Ellsberg from his psychiatrist's office in Beverly Hills."

In the interest of factual accuracy regarding this important matter, and in fairness to General Cushman personally, I wish to point out that this Agency's investigation to date has produced no evidence whatsoever that either General Cushman, or any other CIA official, had any knowledge

or suspicion that the equipment and assistance requested on behalf of Mr. Hunt was for use in burglarizing the offices of Dr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist, or for any other illegal purpose. On the contrary, CIA had no detailed knowledge of Mr. Hunt's activities but CIA officials apparently were under the impression that Mr. Hunt was engaged in investigating security leaks that were a major concern of the Government at that particular time. When Mr. Hunt's continued requests for assistance aroused the suspicions of Agency officers that he might be engaged in some improper or illegal activity, or activity beyond the Agency's authority or charter, it appears that General Cushman immediately terminated relations with Mr. Hunt and thereafter the Agency refused his requests for further assistance.

DRAFT

19 July 1972

DRAFT:JMM:19 July 1972 #3

Briefing Paper:CIA and Illicit Drugs

We are increasingly troubled by a series of allegations to the effect that this Agency either actively participates, or knowingly acquiesces, in the illicit drug traffic abroad, particularly in Southeast Asia. For example:

a. An item in the New Yorker magazine of 11 April 1970 identifies Professor John T. McAlister, Jr., of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton, as authority for the allegation that in Laos the CIA had committed the U.S. to supporting a faction of Meo tribesmen led by General Vang Pao whose sole objective was to dominate the opium producing areas of northern Laos. From this, it was concluded that the U.S. could thus be aiding and abetting heroin traffic at home.

b. An article in Ramparts magazine of May 1971 entitled "The New Opium War" alleges that:

1. "The ubiquitous CIA, whose role in getting the U.S. into Vietnam is well known but whose pivotal position in the opium trade is not" is one of the "principals of this new opium war."

2. "The CIA not only protects the opium in Long Cheng and various other pick-up points, but also gives clearance and protection to opium-laden aircraft flying out."

3. "CIA protege General Vang Pao... uses his U.S. supplied helicopters and STOL (short-take-off-and-landing) aircraft to collect the opium from the surrounding area."

c. An article by Flora Lewis in Newsday magazine of 7 May 1971 refers to the Ramparts allegations and quotes the poet, Allen Ginsberg, as claiming to have "on the tip of his tongue a lot of precise names and places and figures" regarding "CIA support of the dope trade."

d. On 5 May 1971, Jack Anderson alleges in his column in the Washington Post that "a congressional investigation has confirmed our earlier allegations that the Central Intelligence Agency is involved in the Laotian heroin operations."

e. The March 1972 issue of Earth magazine contains an article on heroin traffic which among other things alleges that "Americans exercising the authority of CIA" are "involved in narcotics."

f. A story in the New York Times of 17 May 1972 by Hans J. Spielmann, identified as "an expert on the opium traffic" throughout Southeast Asia, charges that "large-scale traffickers" in the Laos, Burma, Thailand areas "were even given the use of C. I. A. planes."

g. In an appearance before the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee on 2 June 1972, Alfred W. McCoy, a student in Southeast Asian history at Yale University who is preparing a book on "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia" testified that:

1. "Most of the opium traffic in northeastern Laos is controlled by Vang Pao, the Laotian general who commands the CIA's mercenary army."

2. "And in Thailand the CIA has worked closely with nationalist Chinese paramilitary units which control 80-90% of northern Burma's vast opium exports...."

3. "In northern Laos, Air America aircraft and helicopters chartered by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and USAID have been transporting opium harvested by the agency's tribal mercenaries on a regular basis."

h. Writing in the July 1972 issue of Harper's Magazine, Mr. McCoy expands on the above charges to make the following points:

1. General Vang Pao "has become an increasingly notorious entrepreneur in the Laotian drug trade."
2. The CIA assurances of food supplies to the Laotian Meo tribesmen allowed the Meo to "allot more land to the growing of opium."

3. When Air America became the only air transport available, "it began flying Meo opium to markets in Long Cheng and Vientiane."

4. After the North Vietnamese offensive in northeastern Laos, "Vang Pao was able to continue his role in Lao's narcotics trade by opening a heroin laboratory at Long Cheng, the CIA headquarters town."

5. "CIA contract airlines have reportedly carried opium, and individual CIA men have abetted the opium traffic."


1. The lead editorial of the St. Louis Post Dispatch of 27 June 1972 contains the flat statement that "the connection of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency with the dope traffic in Laos has long been notorious."

J. On 10 July 1972 Representative Charles Rangel issued a public statement accusing the Agency of a "paranoid quest for secrecy" in keeping vital information about the drug traffic from the American public, and of "covering up for the international merchants of death."

Intensive investigation has revealed that each of the above, and similar, allegations which have come to our attention are unfounded. We have sought specific details as to the who, what, when and where underlying these accusations but the accusers have failed to produce evidence supporting their charges. However, accusation, rumor and suspicion based on these allegations continue to circulate and, unless refuted, will no doubt do grave damage to the reputation for integrity and credibility of not only this Agency but of the entire American presence in important overseas areas.

As part of our effort to set the record straight, our Executive Director, Mr. W. E. Colby, has recently written to the editors of certain publications which have lent credibility to some of the allegations of concern to us. In these letters Mr. Colby has emphasized that the charges in question "have been most carefully investigated and found to be unsubstantiated." He has cited the report by Mr. Roland Paul, Investigator for the Foreign Relations Committee in the April 1971 issue of Foreign Affairs which states that "due to the long association with the CIA, the Meo tribesmen in Laos were shifting from opium to rice and other crops." He has quoted from a

letter from Mr. John E. Ingersoll, Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, to Representative Charles Gubser of California, which was printed in the Congressional Record of 2 June 1971 and which states "actually, CIA has for some time been this Bureau's strongest partner in identifying foreign sources and routes of illegal trade in narcotics...much of the progress we are now making in identifying overseas narcotics traffic can, in fact, be attributed to CIA." And he has refuted, point by point, Mr. McCoy's above-quoted allegations in Harper's magazine.


John M. Maury
Legislative Counsel

NEW YORK TIMES

18 SEP 1969

U.S.-Backed Laos Troops Capture Two Rebel Areas

Thai Force Also Used

By T. D. ALLMAN
Special to The New York Times

VIENTIANE, Laos, Sept. 17 — In a series of secret military operations in the last three weeks, American-backed troops have seized two strategic areas of Laos long held by pro-Communist forces.

In northeast Laos, rightist forces, stiffened by Thai soldiers and officers, have seized the Plaine des Jarres, a strategic area 105 miles north of here. The plain had been held by the Communists since 1964. In central Laos, similar forces have pushed east along Route 9. Integrated Planning Reported

Reliable sources confirmed today that Laotian Government troops, with heavy United States air and logistic support, had taken Khang Khai, until recently the site of a Chinese Communist diplomatic mission, and Sepone.

In addition, Laotian troops have seized the town of Muong Phine, also in central Laos, and the towns of Muong Phanhi, Xieng Khouangville, Ban Ban, Ban Lat Sene and Phong Savan — all in the Plaine des Jarres area.

Well-informed sources today said that the successes were the result of fully integrated American-Laotian military planning and the most intense American bombing ever seen in Laos. So far, the advances

have met little resistance, leading military observers to believe that the offensives caught the Communist-led Pathet Lao and their North Vietnamese allies by surprise.

The sources said Laotian units, some made up largely of Royal Thai soldiers in Laotian uniforms, had moved onto the

plain and west along Route 9 after round-the-clock bombing had leveled several towns and scattered small defending forces.

The offensives, planned late last month at conferences in Long Cheng in northeast Laos and at Savannakhet in central Laos, appear designed to deal the Communists a serious blow



as United States troops are withdrawn from Vietnam.

The thrust into northeast Laos — where during the last years the Government position had steadily deteriorated — counteracts rebel military victories that seemed to discredit the neutralist Laotian Premier, Prince Souvanna Phouma.

In June, North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao troops seized Muong Soui, a neutralist base northwest of the plain.

Goal is Ho Chi Minh Trail

The thrust across central Laos, according to well-informed sources, is an attempt to use Laotian and Thai troops to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail and reduce North Vietnamese infiltration into South Vietnam.

"In a very real sense, the war in Vietnam is now being

fought in Laos," said one diplomatic source today. He said the American-Laotian thrust toward the South Vietnamese border might provide the Nixon Administration with reduction in infiltration to justify large-scale troop withdrawals from South Vietnam.

United States B-52 strikes along the Laotian sections of the trail have increased greatly in the last two weeks, the sources said. They said as many as 500 sorties a day were being flown over Laos, and that the increase in bombing in Laos was part of the reason for the lull in the air war in South Vietnam.

American participation in both the Plaine des Jarres and Ho Chi Minh Trail campaigns now extends to the field level, the sources said. They confirmed that United States planes — of Air America, Continental Air Services and the United States Air Force — were flying reinforcements, supplies and arms to advanced areas, while American Army officers and agents of the Central Intelligence Agency were advising local commanders. So far there has been at least one confirmed American battle death in Laos. It occurred last week when an American CIA agent was killed by gunfire at an advanced post.

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SUBJ: NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN LAOS
 -T.D. ALLMAN

REF: STATE 159248 SEPT 18

WE HAVE NOT BOTHERED TO COMMENT ON ALL THE INACCURACIES IN THE ARTICLE QUOTED REFTEL. IMMEDIATELY UPON ITS RECEIPT, HOWEVER, I INSTITUTED APPROPRIATE INQUIRES RE THE LAST TWO SENTENCES. ALL RESPONSES WERE NEGATIVE. YESTERDAY IN FRONT OF OTHER JOURNALISTS ALLMAN REAFFIRMED THE TRUTH OF HIS STATEMENT. HE SUBSEQUENTLY GAVE US THE NAME OF THE "AMERICAN CIA AGENT" WHO WAS KILLED BY GUNFIRE A WEEK BEFORE THE ARTICLE WAS WRITTEN -- S. EDON CURTIS. FURTHER INVESTIGATION AGAIN REVEALED NO INFORMATION ABOUT SUCH A MAN. HOWEVER, LAST EVENING WE WERE INFORMED BY A JOURNALIST THAT ALLMAN HAD AFFIRMED TO HIM THAT HE SAW A REPORT OF DEATH ON THE CIA AGENT THAT HAD BEEN KILLED. THIS GAVE US A NEW AREA FOR INQUIRY AND WE ASCERTAINED THAT ON SEPTEMBER 8 WE PREPARED A CONSULAR REPORT OF DEATH ON CURTIS SHELTON RATHBONE II, WHO DIED IN VIENTIANE ON SEPTEMBER 4, AGE FIVE DAYS, A PREMATURE BABY WHOSE LUNGS WERE STILL COLLAPSED.

Department of State

TELEGRAM

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THE GRANDFATHER OF THE BABY IS EMPLOYED BY AIR AMERICA AND BOTH HIS AND THE MOTHER'S ADDRESS IS INDICATED ON THE REPORT OF DEATH AS C/O AIR AMERICAN VIENTIANE. FURTHER INVESTIGATION REVEALS THAT ALLMAN WAS IN OUR CONSULAR OFFICE SHORTLY BEFORE HE FILED THE STORY AND WAS PERMITTED TO USE THE TYPEWRITER AT THE DESK OF A LOCAL EMPLOYEE TO PREPARE HIS APPLICATION FOR A NEW US PASSPORT.

GODLEY
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The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Monday, Oct. 8, 1973 C33

CIA Teaches Terrorism to Friends

By Jack Anderson

Bomb and booby trap experts from the Central Intelligence Agency have been quietly training foreign police to make explosive devices at an isolated federal school in Texas. The tutelage is so devious that the Pentagon has refused to have anything to do with it.

The clock-and-dagger professors are on loan from the CIA to the Agency for International Development, which runs the school at the Border Patrol Academy in Los Fresnos.

The existence of the school was first depicted in the movie "State of Siege," where foreign police were shown being trained to use bombs and booby traps against political opponents. But because the film was propagandistic, few took seriously the reality of the "terror school."

Dubious but curious Sen. James Abourezk (D-S.D.) began a quiet investigation. His confidential findings raise disquieting questions about America's police aid to military juntas.

In one memo wrung from AID by Abourezk, Assistant Administrator Matthew Harvey concedes that the Defense Depart-

ment refused to teach the bomb course when it was set up in 1969. Therefore, "the Central Intelligence Agency agreed to provide guest lecturers for this portion of the training program."

At the secret school, he says, demonstrations are given of "the construction, use and counter-measures against homemade bombs and explosive devices used by criminal terrorists." The foreign police also get graphic lectures on booby traps, "incendiaries" and other lethal devices. To defuse and dispose of bombs, Harvey explained, a police officer first has to learn all about them.

The documents obtained by Abourezk show that most of the 163 policemen trained at the school come from military-backed regimes such as those in Brazil, Guatemala, Thailand, Uruguay, Panama and El Salvador. Only a thin blue line of cops are trained for the democracies.

AID officials explained to us that they have had fewer requests for the "Technical Investigations Course" from democracies. The bomb-building course, they add, is only part of

the curriculum at the Texas hideaway. The visiting police are also taught bomb squad organization, record keeping and a course called "Press Releases and Press Relations."

At the CIA, a spokesman said the decision to help with the anti-bomb courses was associated with terrorist attacks on American personnel and facilities in foreign land. The courses are now being reviewed.

SILENT TREATMENT—Last year, the four footbready Cubans on the Watergate squad were willing to follow their ring-leader, E. Howard Hunt, blindly. Now they hold him in silent contempt.

They had planned to plead not guilty and appeal to the jury for understanding. But at that time, the White House wanted to avoid a public trial. Hunt advised them to plead guilty, and overnight they changed their plan.

The Cubans sometimes quarreled among themselves, but all four swore by Hunt. They wept with him when his wife was killed in an airliner crash. They would have died for him. Then the sordid Watergate story was spread across the

front pages. They found out that Hunt had collected tens of thousands of dollars in behalf of the Watergate defendants. But only a few pittance payments ever reached them. He used most of the money to pay his own legal expenses.

He is now prepared to testify against the Cubans, whom he recruited to break into Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office, in return for immunity for himself.

But perhaps the last straw was the deal he wangled from the Senate Watergate committee. In return for his cooperation, the committee arranged for him to be removed from jail into spacious, comfortable quarters at Ft. Holabird, Md. Our sources say he occupies his time playing checkers and chess.

The four Cubans, meanwhile, are still behind bars. They saw him as he was cashing a \$100 money order just before checking out of jail. As a gesture of contempt, Eugenio Martinez pulled his empty pockets inside out. Then they watched in silence as the sheepish Hunt was led away.

WASHINGTON STATE 6/9/76

CIA Goal: Drug, Not Kill, Anderson

By Vernon A. Guidry Jr.
Washington Star Staff Writer

The Senate Intelligence Committee staff says it hasn't found any evidence that the Nixon White House ordered Jack Anderson assassinated, but it does appear that there was discussion of drugging the columnist to discredit him.

"The White House effort was made in consultation with a former CIA physician to explore means of drugging Anderson to discredit him by rendering him incoherent before a public appearance. This effort apparently never proceeded beyond the planning stage," said the report

which was released yesterday.

The chief figure in the planning was Watergate conspirator and former CIA agent E. Howard Hunt.

"HOWARD HUNT testified that somewhere in late 1971 or early 1972 special counsel to the president Charles Colson called Hunt into his office and asked him to find a means of discrediting newspaper columnist Jack Anderson," the report said.

"Hunt testified that neither Colson or anyone else ever mentioned him the possibility of assassinating Anderson even in the sense

of contingency planning," the report continued.

Colson did not go along with Hunt's version. The former White House insider told the committee that he recalled "Hunt on a couple of occasions coming to me with some hair-brained schemes, something to do with drugging involving Jack Anderson."

COLSON TOLD the committee the only serious discussion of the effect of drugs on a specific target involved a plan to disorient Daniel Ellsberg, which Colson said "never received a very sympathetic reaction."

The committee investigated the issue after a September 1975 Washington Post report that Hunt told associates he had been ordered to assassinate Anderson but that the plan was canceled at the last minute.



John Maury
...speaker

Benefits From CIA Rated Low

A recent retired top Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and State Dept. official said in Buffalo Thursday that "very little good" has come from the probe into the CIA by recent congressional panels.

John M. Maury, former chief of the CIA Russia Div., and assistant secretary of defense for legislative affairs under Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford, made the statement in a press interview.

He was in Buffalo to speak before a dinner meeting of the Saturn Club at 977 Delaware Ave.

Spying Ordered

Maury said the most controversial activities of the CIA such as domestic spying, were done at the direction of Presidents Johnson or Nixon or their top assistants.

If the public is concerned about the CIA's activities, he said, it should be careful about who it elects as president.

Maury said the top professionals in the CIA would much rather gather foreign information which can be done secretly by spies and scientific means than become involved in political activities.



The CIA's biggest job, he said, is to make sure the president is adequately informed on the strength and intentions of foreign powers.

Secrecy Vital

Maury said it is important that much of the CIA's activities remain secret because "it is a business where you have to rely on confidentiality."



He indicated he believes it is unfair to have a law which makes it illegal for Internal Revenue Service employees to give out information on tax forms, but to have no law forbidding any ex-CIA agent from divulging information which could cost the lives of people.

WASHINGTON POST APRIL 29, 1976



Illustrating CIA growth, top photo shows Washington headquarters building in 1960.

At bottom, a view of one of agency's new buildings at Langley, Va., in 1976.



Washington Post - 4/19/76

U.S. Opponent of CIA Charges Slain Agent Had Lebanese Role

Manchester Guardian

ATHENS, April 18—Richard S. Welch, the CIA station chief here who was murdered Dec. 23, spent much of his time activating the Lebanese Phalangists and rightist Palestinian groups, according to Winslow Peck, a self-described former U.S. intelligence officer.

"In other words," Peck says in an interview published here this weekend by the magazine *Anti*, part of Welch's job was "to kindle the war" in Lebanon.

Peck, who says he worked for the National Security Agency in Istanbul, Vietnam and Paris as well as in the United States, said in the interview that most of the CIA station in Athens is now working on the situation in Lebanon and that the agency uses American banks in Athens to finance the Phalangists.

The U.S. embassy here re-

fused to comment on Peck's claims.

Peck said he has "defected" to the anti-CIA lobby and described the agency as a "secret criminal police force" responsible for 25 coups between 1964 and 1973.

The Athens CIA station, Peck said, now has a staff of 170 and has taken over the role played earlier by stations in Cyprus, Beirut and Tel Aviv to become the agency's command post in the eastern Mediterranean.

The CIA faces no danger from the present Greek government, Peck says, claiming that police services in Greece "were always controlled by the CIA."

Police investigations into Welch's murder have produced no leads so far. Intelligence sources here express doubt that a leftist organization that sought publicity through its claim of responsibility for the murder had any connection with it, and some sources doubt that the organization even exists.

Rather, the sources say, rightist extremists who had dealings with the Greek junta and the CIA may have taken revenge out of a feeling that they had been betrayed.

Stephen S. Rosenfeld

An Ex-Moscow Correspondent's CIA Footnote

Permit a former Moscow correspondent to add a footnote to one short paragraph in the 651-page final report of the Senate Intelligence committee—the paragraph recounting the particular covert operation of the CIA that got me kicked out of Moscow.

"Another CIA book, *The Penkovskii Papers*, was published in the United States 'for operational reasons,' but actually became commercially viable," the Senate report says. "The book was prepared and written by witting Agency assets who drew on actual case materials. Publication rights to the manuscript were sold to a publisher through a trust fund established for the purpose. The publisher was unaware of any U.S. Government interest."

Oleg Penkovsky (the common spelling, you may recall, was a Russian officer who spied for the West 15 years ago. He was caught and killed. His "papers" were published here in late 1955. The Post and 29 other papers serialized excerpts. The Russians, failing to get The Post to halt publication, retaliated by closing its Moscow bureau for two years.

There are several layers of shabbiness and deceit that need to be pulled off the Penkovsky book now that it has been officially acknowledged as the propaganda action it was.

First, it was precisely the "coarse fraud, a mixture of provocative invention and anti-Soviet slander" that So-

viet authorities—true, the pot calling the kettle black—claimed it was at the time. This does not mean it did not include some of Penkovsky's own words and thoughts, as well as material provided by the CIA "assets." This much was granted by the various writers who challenged its overall authenticity. These included first Victor Zorza, working from internal evidence, who was calumniated by the CIA for his pains, and two years later David Wise and Thomas Ross, working from external sources.

The point remains that the book was a CIA fraud published for what the Senate report terms "operational reasons"—presumably to embarrass the Russians in some way. This the book did do, to judge by the Russians' screams at the time. Was there some larger point in making the Russians scream? I wonder if the CIA took the screams as proof that the operation was a success. Perhaps someone who knows will tell.

It would also be interesting to know, in view of "editor" Frank Gibney's pledge in the book that "the bulk of the proceeds" would go to a fund "to further the cause of genuine peace and friendship between the American and Russian peoples," just how the profits were spent. (I took these various queries to both the Senate and the CIA and got nowhere.)

Secondly, the real victims of this op-

eration were American citizens. Their government gave them to believe that a fraud was a reality: the fraud of the book and the fraud of the particular picture of the Soviet Union drawn in the book—a picture describing Soviet leaders and intentions in terms (high livers, nuclear first-strikers) likely to sober any American who thought it might be worth trying to get along a bit better with the Kremlin.

Unavoidably this raises the question of whether among those "operational reasons" was somebody's conscious desire to deflect the American public from detente. This project was planned, after all, in the years shadowed by Kennedy's pre-Vietnam, American University overture (October 1963) for improved Soviet-American relations. Were there some unreconstructed bureaucrats who didn't go along? True or not, this is the sort of corrosive suspicion invited by continuing CIA manipulation of our institutions at home.

Victor Zorza suggested at the time that intelligence agencies in democracies "suffer from the grave disadvantage that in attempting to damage the adversary they must also deceive their own public." Quite so. But was that deception a byproduct or part of the intent?

Let us assume the book was only meant to smear the Russians, or to spite the Soviet "disinformation" branch or

whatever. Publication had yet another unforeseen domestic consequence. It deprived American readers of the reports that this newspaper was contributing to the relatively thin stream of American-produced news coming out of Moscow.

I hope no one will think it unbecoming of me to point out that the book put into the hands of the American public what Prof. Samuel Sharp correctly termed "drivel," and took out the work product of an earnest correspondent. For professional as well as personal reasons, I trust no one will feel it was a fair exchange. In any event the public was not offered a choice.

But finally you may say, why did The Washington Post publish the book excerpts? How did we let ourselves be deceived? The Post made a good faith effort—before, during and after publication—to see if there was a U.S. government hand in the book. It approached the CIA. But no reason was found to overrule the news judgment that the book was a hot item. So the paper went ahead.

You can conclude that newspapers in the 1960s were naive, inadequately alert to the need to challenge the uses of secret power. Our plea must be: guilty as charged. Only a few of us journalists are immune to the temptations and vulnerabilities of the larger society. But which of us?

WASHINGTON POST 17 APRIL 1977, Pg 16 (18)

CIA Is Said to Aid Recruiting Of U.S. Mercenaries for Zaire

By Ernest Volkman
New York

The Central Intelligence Agency is covertly supporting efforts to recruit several hundred mercenaries in the United States and Great Britain to fight on behalf of Zaire President Mobutu Sese Seko against Katangese fighters, intelligence sources say.

The agency has strong links with a California man who is in charge of the American recruitment, the sources say, and has backed his operation with funds.

It also has passed word quietly to the Justice Department that it will not cooperate in a pending investigation of the American recruiter's activities.

The man, David Bufkin, of Karman, Calif., was involved in the recruitment of American mercenaries for fighting in Angola last year. Three of those mercenaries were killed in action, and another was captured and executed after a trial.

Despite statements by the Justice

Department that Bufkin would be prosecuted for violating the neutrality laws, no prosecution ever took place. Further, the sources say, the CIA refused to provide any information to the Justice Department.

The move against Mobutu by the Katangese, supported by Angola, is believed to stem from Angola's anger against Mobutu for allowing the use of Zaire for anti-Communist guerrillas last year.

The mercenary operation in Angola, the sources say, was run by the CIA to fight on behalf of those guerrillas.

The Angola mercenary operation was directed by Bufkin, with help-wanted ads placed in the Fresno Bee. Last month, new ads appeared asking for resumes from people with "military backgrounds" for high-risk work in Africa at up to \$2,000 a month.

Bufkin has admitted placing the ads, saying he was seeking 100 mercenaries for combat in Zaire. He refused to say who was providing the money.

NEW YORK TIMES 18 APRIL 1977, Pg 2

C.I.A. Denies Aiding Recruitment Of Mercenaries to Fight in Zaire

By GRAHAM HOVEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 17—The Central Intelligence Agency categorically denied today that it was involved in recruiting mercenary soldiers to help Zaire resist an invasion by Katangan exiles from Angola.

"We are not recruiting mercenaries anywhere to fight anywhere," said Herbert Hetu, assistant for public affairs to the Director for Central Intelligence, Admiral Stanfield Turner. "Nor are we assisting with any such recruitment," he added.

Mr. Hetu was commenting on a report in *Newsday*, the Long Island newspaper, that the C.I.A. was secretly supporting efforts to recruit several hundred mercenaries in the United States and Britain to serve alongside Zaire's army in resisting the Katangan incursion.

The *Newsday* article said that the C.I.A. had "strong links" with David Bufkin of Karman, Calif., who describes himself as an experienced mercenary and who has been placing advertisements in California newspapers for other mercenaries to serve in Zaire.

Denies Financing Recruitment

Mr. Hetu denied that the C.I.A. was providing funds for recruitment of mercenaries for Zaire "here or in Britain or anywhere else." He also denied an allegation in the *Newsday* story that the C.I.A.

had told the Justice Department it would not cooperate in any investigation of Mr. Bufkin.

"I am absolutely sure that is not correct," he said.

Zairian Government officials in Kinshasa denied 10 days ago that Zaire was recruiting American and British mercenaries. One official told the Government press agency that Mr. Bufkin, who had said he hoped to recruit 80 to 100 mercenaries, "belongs in an asylum."

The official agency said that Zaire's ambassador to Washington had been ordered to make a formal protest about Mr. Bufkin's activity.

Diplomats in Washington said they understood that President Mobutu Sese Seko had indicated several weeks ago that Zaire might have to recruit mercenaries to repel the incursion, which he asserts was launched with the participation of Soviet and Cuban military advisers.

Since that time, however, Morocco has responded to President Mobutu's appeal for help from African countries by supplying 1,500 troops, which were airlifted to Zaire in French planes.

Diplomats here said that the sending of the Moroccan regulars, the presence of French officers as advisers in the invasion area, the material assistance furnished by Belgium and the nonmilitary aid provided by the United States and promised by Egypt and China might have caused President Mobutu to abandon any earlier idea of recruiting mercenaries.

Dirty Tricks Under Law

How Long - Vance
1 - 26 - 77

So many different and normally clashing interests coalesced in the riptide that defeated the nomination of Theodore C. Sorensen to be Director of Central Intelligence that there are few clear lessons to be gleaned from the episode. But if anything seemed clear, it was that since the rule of law has still not been established with sufficient force over the darker aspects of the C.I.A., the attention given to the identity of the director is inordinate. As President Carter moves to make his second selection for the Directorship, he should bear in mind the yet more urgent need: to regularize covert activities and place them under the law. The nation needs greater protection than the good instincts of whichever person finally lands in the director's chair.

Several of the things to be said are interesting observations about the black arts of the intelligence business during his recent confirmation hearings. With the shocking revelations of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence obviously still much on his mind, Mr. Vance outlined how to achieve substantially tighter control over such programs.

For openers, Mr. Vance would limit covert activities to what he termed "the most extraordinary circumstances." Then he would construct a tight chain of responsibility for such operations—that they be approved by a committee composed of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General and the President's National Security Adviser. On top of that, Mr. Vance would add clear Presidential responsibility: "I think that the President of the United States himself should sign off in writing, saying that he believes this vital to the national security." Finally, the Vance plan would require that the appropriate Congressional committee be notified of the plan in advance so that members of Congress could make their views known to the President before any action is taken.

Mr. Vance's proposal represents a substantial movement toward governmental responsibility, though it

falls short of the demand by some critics that covert action be abolished entirely. The problem, in the critics' eyes, is that covert operators and Presidents alike have been able to wield major—and unaccountable—power. The result has been a two-tiered foreign policy: one that was understood and generally approved by the Congress and the people and a second, unknown, unapproved, conducted out of sight and sometimes with grotesque ends in mind—overthrowing governments, conspiring with mobsters to assassinate a foreign chief of state, trying to poison all the pigs in Cuba.

Cuba's pigs, as a matter of fact, provide an excellent example of what the critics despise about covert action. Newsday not long ago reported that in 1971, C.I.A. introduced African swine virus—which neither kills nor affects only pigs—into Cuba. Some 50,000 pigs had to be slaughtered to prevent a nationwide pig epidemic. If true, the story raises a host of prototypical questions. Whose nutty idea was this? Who approved it? Did anyone, or was it simply the work of operatives foraging in a never-never land in which neither law nor morality is clear?

There should be a national judgment, in the form of legislative action by Congress, to determine whether the United States should continue to indulge in dirty tricks, and within what boundaries. We conclude with Mr. Vance, that however bad a name covert actions may have achieved over the past few years, the world is still dangerous enough and untidy enough to justify them in "the most extraordinary circumstances." But the "tight controls" that Mr. Vance has recommended should be specified by Congress.

The legislation should clarify the legality of covert operations, detail the steps necessary for their initiation and approval, and provide criminal sanctions for violations. That should solve many of the most difficult problems. It is hard to imagine a President or even a Cabinet committee member actually signing his name to documents approving a Cuban pig episode.

Philip Agee . . . CIA's first defector

Best in Globe . Monday March 14 1977

ROWLAND EVANS and ROBERT NOVAK

WASHINGTON—Evidence that ex-CIA agent Philip Agee has cooperated with the DGI, Cuba's Soviet-bossed intelligence service, was the unannounced cause for the highly unusual deportation order served on him last November by British Home Secretary Merlyn Rees.

That means Agee, far from being just another kiss-and-tell alumnus of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), is probably its first bona-fide defector. Although there is no indication that cooperation started until after his resignation in 1969, Agee appears to be the first CIA official known to have cooperated with an adversary government.

For what it's worth, then, any untold secrets of CIA operations known by Agee are assumed to be known to Soviet intelligence via the Cuban connection.

Agee, author of the anti-CIA "Inside the Company," resigned after 12 years of service, much of it in Mexico City. Well-informed sources in the intelligence world believe Agee began to collaborate with Cuba's Directorate of General Intelligence (DGI) soon after his resignation.

The relationship between DGI and the KGB is intimate. The top Cuban KGB officer had an office right next to the head of the DGI in Havana's Miramar section. The links between the two services are such that DGI has been known as a "subsidiary" intelligence service of the KGB.

After seven weeks in Cuba in the summer of 1971, Agee went to Paris where western counter-intelligence agents began to track his cooperation with DGI. Those contacts increased after Agee moved to London in late 1972.

During the three years ending in August, 1974, Agee made five separate trips to Cuba. MI-6, the British domestic intelligence service, developed its incontrovertible evidence that Agee

was trafficking with Cuban intelligence sometime last year. This followed verifiable Agee contacts with agents of Cuba in Algiers and throughout Europe, particularly in Spain and Italy. Although not announced, that was the entire basis for Rees's action against Agee.

A footnote: Instead of complying with the expulsion decree, Agee went to Scotland, where he is bringing suit under an obscure Scottish law in an effort to escape deportation. That is not expected to work, according to legal and intelligence experts here.

WARNKE LOBBYIST: One major reason the embarrassing 40-vote total against Senate confirmation of Paul Warnke as chief disarmament negotiator was not even higher was President Carter's lobbying success with southern conservative Democrats such as Sen. James O. Eastland of Mississippi.

When pressed to oppose Warnke on ideological grounds, Eastland snapped back angrily that he had given his word to Carter. Besides, said Eastland, the President had assured him that Jimmy Carter, not Paul Warnke, would be running arms negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Other southern senators inclined against Warnke's views on disarmament but reluctant to oppose the new President included Robert Morgan of North Carolina, Russell Long and Bennett Johnston of Louisiana, John McClellan of Arkansas and Lloyd Bentsen of Texas.

Nevertheless, 40 votes against Warnke amounted to a dismal administration performance considering that only two weeks ago there were probably fewer than 10 negative votes. Mississippi's other senator, chairman

John Stennis of the Armed Services Committee, originally argued against his committee (which lacked jurisdiction) even holding hearings on Warnke; he ended up voting no.

A footnote: Two southerners who decided their concern about Warnke outweighed loyalty to the President were from Carter's own state of Georgia, Herman Talmadge and Sam Nunn. Nunn's opposition generated talk among Carterites about trying to purge him in next year's Georgia Democratic primary, but neither the President nor his top political advisers want to go down that dreary road.

McGOVERN ON RIGHTS: Sen. George S. McGovern, who seldom lowered his voice when denouncing violation of civil liberties in wartime South Vietnam, last week privately indicated concern over President Carter's public call for human rights in Communist Cuba.

At a Washington social gathering attended by several liberal politicians, McGovern expressed this view in conversation with a Cuban diplomat assigned to the United Nations. McGovern said he felt quiet diplomacy always accomplished more in moving foreign governments toward a liberal rights policy than noisy denunciations. Furthermore, he added, attacking a government with which the US does not even maintain diplomatic relations seemed particularly inappropriate.

Considering his public denunciation of rightist regimes, this may seem a double standard. But it reflects the attitude of many liberal advocates of "human rights," who have always had far more criticism of right-wing regimes than of Communist states and who did not expect Carter's equal treatment of both forms of tyranny.

Part II--Main Edition--28 February 1977

WASHINGTON POST 28 February 1977

F.Y.I.

IN THE WAKE of the uproar over the CIA/Hussein affair, President Carter has committed himself, both publicly and privately, to the proposition that a much better effort must be made by the government to keep its secrets—especially the CIA's secrets. This strikes us as fair enough. It is only after the government has lost control of its secrets (or abused its right to create them), after all, that you get into these wrangles over whether it is right or wrong to publish "secrets" once they have escaped the government's reach. Mr. Carter, we are advised by an Associated Press dispatch in this newspaper on Saturday, has also committed himself, in private meetings with his Cabinet and with congressional leaders of both parties, to the proposition that it was "irresponsible" for this newspaper to publish 10 days ago the first account of the CIA's multi-million-dollar, under-the-table subsidies to Jordan's King Hussein over the past 20 years. And this, you will not be surprised to hear, seems to us to be not only not quite fair, but also unrealistic and unwarranted by the facts.

The President, of course, is entitled to his view. And we would have to admit that it appears to be a popular one, judging from a representative sampling of letters to the editor on the subject elsewhere on this page. "Unpatriotic . . . irresponsible journalism of the most dangerous sort . . . in the vilest taste"—those are strong and sobering words. But we cannot help wondering, nevertheless, whether this outburst would have been quite as loud, or as nearly unanimous in its condemnation, if this newspaper—and here we find a certain irony—had not promised to keep a secret at the President's request. It is a relatively small secret, and we remain bound to honor it. But the White House has publicly confirmed some parts of it, according to a report transmitted by the United Press International. Yes, Deputy White House Press Secretary Rex Granum apparently told Helen Thomas of UPI and others on Saturday, "there was a communication" between the administration and The Washington Post prior to publication of the CIA/Hussein story. And yes, "there was no doubt what our preferences were . . . at least that the story not run while (Secretary of State) Vance was in the Middle East."

But no, the President "did not try to stop the story. . . . It was simply an attempt to provide the context and the setting, to explain to them what the impact of the story might (be)."

And again: "It was no request."

We bring this up today, *For Your Information*, because it strikes us as a classic example of the way government officials so often try to have it both ways when their own security breaks down and a secret escapes—and also of the problem that this presents to a newspaper. We will let you decide whether the President was, or wasn't, trying "to stop the story." Whatever the case, he had perfectly reasonable "preferences"; the story was embarrassing, even potentially disruptive, as many news stories are. But the President did not make the case against publication on grounds that the national security would actually be endangered—presumably because he did not have a case. He did not use, in that "communication" that Mr. Granum speaks of, the sort of language he apparently felt a need to use, after the fact, to convey his sense of outrage and his determination to tighten secrecy controls.

Other presidents have made the case for self-censorship on national security grounds—we can't offhand remember one that hasn't. Some have even been heeded, and one, John F. Kennedy, went so far as to indicate his regret that he had successfully persuaded the New York Times to delay a story that would have revealed in advance the preparations for the Bay of Pigs. Other such requests have been ignored—and, come to think of it, in those cases we also can't recall offhand an instance when there has been anything like the damage that the government had grimly predicted would result.

So this newspaper follows a firm rule, in all but the most extreme cases, and so do most others that we know of: the safest, soundest practice is to publish a story as quickly as possible after it is ready to be published. To do otherwise is to fall captive to the government's whims or wishes—or to one's own. The point is not, as so many suppose, that newspaper publishing is necessarily a fiercely competitive business—a free enterprise. The real point is that newspapers cannot be true to their trust if they allow themselves to get in the position of managing the news, of picking and choosing—publishing or withholding—on the basis of anybody's hopes or fears of real (or fancied) consequences. "No newspaper, we suppose, would have kept the lid on" the CIA payments to Hussein, our colleagues at the Washington Star said in an editorial on Saturday. We agree.

While CIA Cuts Back HUMAN EVENTS 31 DECEMBER 1977(30)

Soviets Intensify Espionage Operations

It hasn't been noticed much by the press, but during the past few months a number of Soviet spy rings have been broken in Western Europe. In most cases, no announcement has been made for fear of endangering "detente," with the offending Soviet "diplomats" permitted to quietly leave.

Last March, the French government arrested four persons who were part of an espionage operation by the Soviet military intelligence, the GRU. Like its sister organization, the KGB, the GRU operates in Western countries, both under diplomatic cover, using so-called legal agents, and without legal cover (the "illegals").

Western intelligence services estimate that well over 100 "legal" KGB and GRU operatives function in France. Many of them are assigned to spying within France, but others have assignments relating to West Germany and other NATO countries. When the GRU ring was broken, the French quickly asked a number of Soviet spies with diplomatic cover to leave.

Hardly had this episode faded away, when the French, on October 18, arrested five more spies employed by the Russians, including some retired French army officers. Again, Soviet "diplomats" implicated in the affair were quietly asked to leave. The principal GRU agents that ran the group, however, were acting as Soviet newsmen, and thus had no diplomatic cover. The Soviets continue to make extensive use of both Russian and foreign reporters as espionage agents.

Officials believe that the two recently broken Soviet spy rings in France had been in operation be-

tween 15 and 20 years before they were identified and neutralized.

Danish authorities also broke a spy ring last October operated by the GRU. Like the French, to avoid embarrassing the Soviet Union, Soviet diplomats involved were asked to leave. They were Nikolai Stankevich, a high-ranking GRU officer, who served as the embassy chauffeur, and Alexander Pachukov, a Soviet air force major, assigned to the GRU.

Ironically, while the Soviets continue their intensive Cold War spy operations, President Carter's new Central Intelligence Agency director, Stansfield Turner, has been dismantling the agency's espionage and counter-espionage operations.

At Turner's instigation, some 816 employees will be forced to leave the agency by 1979—a decision that even the *Washington Post* acknowledges has "deeply shaken" the agency (see HUMAN EVENTS, November 26, page 3).

While Turner and Co. initially suggested that the cuts were largely due to a surplus of agents from Indochina, it turns out that a number of CIA station chiefs in both Western Europe and Japan have gotten their pink slips. Among those to be dispatched are the top field officers in West Germany, Norway, Canada, Austria, Switzerland, Spain, Sweden, Japan, Australia and Luxembourg.

"You'd have to be blind looking at that list," a senior CIA official told the *Post*, "not to understand the effect this is going to have on intelligence gathering."

Glomar Roots Go Back to 1962 Scheme

By Thomas O'Toole
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Hughes Glomar Explorer, which recovered parts of a sunken Soviet submarine for the Central Intelligence Agency three years ago, had its origins in a scheme to raise fallen Soviet missiles from the ocean floor as long as 15 years ago.

The company given a contract by the Air Force to lift Soviet missiles from the bottom of the Pacific is the same company that operated the Glomar Explorer for the CIA. The company is the Global Marine Co. of Los Angeles, which as far back as September, 1962, went to the Air Force with a proposal to recover Soviet missiles using a recovery vessel half the size of the Glomar Explorer.

Under cover of a project that started out with the code name of Sand Dollar, the Air Force scheme to retrieve Soviet missiles was every bit as secret as the CIA's plan to raise the sunken submarine. How long Sand Dollar lasted and how many Soviet missiles it recovered is not known, but sources said it was so successful that it encouraged the CIA to go ahead with its plan to raise the sub.

The missile recovery operation centered on a part of the Central Pacific southwest of Palmyra Atoll in the Line Islands, which lie east of the Marshall Islands and south of the Hawaiian Islands and where the surrounding waters are as deep as 15,000 feet. This is where Soviet nose cones containing their missile guidance systems and dummy warheads ended their 6,000-mile test flights that began in Soviet Asia.

Some of these details are revealed in documents on file with the U.S. Court of Claims, where a secret trial involving a \$100 million suit against the federal government for patent infringement and the theft of trade secrets ended almost three weeks ago.

Still other details are in documents that Claims Court Trial Judge Francis Browne kept out of the public record but which were seen by The

See GLOMAR, 28 Col. 1

*Washington
Post*

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Glomar Roots Go Back to '62 Scheme

GLOMAR, From A1

Washington Post. A few others were filled in by sources familiar with the Glomar Explorer and its attempts in the summer of 1974 to raise a Soviet submarine that sank in the Pacific with all its crew in 1907.

The suit was brought against the government two years ago by Willard N. Bascom, an oceanographer who had directed for the National Science Foundation the aborted Mohole Project to drill through the earth's crust to recover rock and sediment samples dating back to the earth's formation.

Bascom claimed that the Glomar Explorer salvaged the Russian submarine using techniques he patented in 1963. Bascom also claimed that he and a company he formed called Ocean Science and Engineering proposed to the Air Force and the CIA in April, 1962, a method to raise sunken Soviet missiles.

The Air Force and CIA rejected Bascom's proposal, saying they did not think it would work and saying they did not have the money to finance his trial. In September of the same year, Global Marine proposed a scheme to raise the missiles and apparently was awarded a contract to do so before the year ended.

Bascom's case was tried starting April 19 before the Court of Claims, where all cases of patent infringement against the federal government are tried. The trial, ended May 2, is described as the most secret case ever heard by the Court of Claims.

The trial was held in a closed courtroom whose location was not posted on the court's bulletin board. Dates and times of the trial were not posted either. Witnesses came to the trial one at a time, leaving by a different door so they would not be seen by the next witness.

There was no bailiff in the case. The stenographer tape-recorded the

testimony. The only people outside of Judge Browne and the lawyers for each side who heard the whole case were two "observers," believed to be employees of the CIA.

Two groups of witnesses testified. One group included people who knew Bascom, his work and his proposals to raise the missiles back in 1962. This group is identified in documents in the court's public record. The second witness group was made up of people involved in the Glomar Explorer project to recover the submarine. Their names are nowhere in the public record.

Judge Browne played a gag order on all prospective witnesses in the case more than a year ago. He later included in the gag order (called a "protective" order) secretaries, stenographers and typists with access to trial testimony and all the documents introduced in the trial.

The documents seen by The Washington Post tell a fascinating tale all their own.

Bascom's 1962 proposal to the Air Force and CIA to raise sunken Soviet missiles describes the use of a ship that sounds remarkably like the Glomar Explorer, which lifted pieces of a Russian submarine that sank in 16,000 feet of water by being able to stay in the same position on the surface for days at a time.

Bascom tells of positioning an unanchored drill ship in the Pacific in 1961 for one month "in spite of high winds and currents" without moving the ship out of position.

Bascom also suggested in his 1962 proposal a "cover story" to disguise the mission of recovering sunken Soviet missiles. He suggested the recovery ship be given the scientific mission of drilling into deep ocean sediment. The cover for the Glomar Explorer was that it was involved in

mining manganese and nickel from the ocean floor.

"The search will look like a drilling ship to the public and the outside world," Bascom told the Air Force and CIA. "If at each site visited the ship drills one core hole completely through the soft sediments the results would be enormously valuable scientifically, the cover story would be fulfilled, additional money could be raised and a future for the ship assured."

When the Air Force and CIA turned down Bascom's proposal, he went two years later to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration with a proposal to recover space ships falling into the ocean. Bascom made the proposal after the Mercury spacecraft carrying astronaut Virgil (Gus) Grissom almost sank on splashing down in the Atlantic Ocean.

"Some day a capsule with some immensely valuable object aboard will return from space and be lost in the ocean," Bascom said. "It may be a sample of the moon; it may have irreplaceable records aboard or even the body of a astronaut. Public pressure will require that it be recovered."

Bascom's proposals for recovering heavy objects lost on the ocean floor are intriguing. He proposed building a ship that could drag four miles of drill pipe just above the ocean floor at speeds no faster than 2 m.p.h. He proposed attaching sonar and television cameras to the end of the pipe to find the lost object.

Bascom's ship had water jets and approved propellers in the bow and stern to maintain the same position in the ocean for days. It had an alarm system that would stop the ship when it located a large object on the ocean bottom. He said that at depths of 10,000 feet and greater it would not be hard to find a lost object because at

those depths the ocean floor is so smooth and free of rubbish and marine life that a man-made object would stand out.

The way Bascom proposed to recover the lost object was to attach a giant steel "clamshell" to the end of the drill pipe with grappling hooks fixed to the shell. He proposed pumping water into ballast tanks built into the shell to sink the shell straight down in the water.

Once the clamshell is "tied on" the lost object, air would be pumped into the ballast tanks and the water forced out. This would make the entire recovery device buoyant and it would rise to the surface carrying the object it had found. Bascom's proposal said this was the only feasible way of retrieving heavy objects from the deep ocean floor.

Judge Browne is due to make his ruling in the case this week. Reports have it that when he makes his ruling the Justice Department will move to put under seal the entire record of the case, even though Bascom probably will appeal the decision if it goes against him.

Meanwhile, the 640-foot Glomar Explorer is sitting in mothballs in California's Suisun Bay, where the Sacramento and San Joaquin rivers come together. The derrick that held its drill pipe has been removed, and its four miles of drill pipe given to the National Science Foundation to use on its next drilling ship, the Glomar Challenger.

The ship has been painted Navy gray and been positioned by itself at the end of a line of 165 tankers and freighters in the custody of the Maritime Administration. The general Services Administration tried to lease the ship to anybody who could use it, but its upkeep cost scared everybody away. The Glomar Explorer cost \$20,000 a day to operate.

U.S. Tapped Top Russians' Car Phones

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer

The U.S. government systematically monitored the limousine radios of top Soviet officials in Moscow for several years ending in 1971, according to former intelligence sources familiar with the operation.

The project, code-named Gamma Guppy, was terminated in late 1971 after some of its operation were disclosed by columnist Jack Anderson.

A former intelligence official who had access to the transcripts of the monitored conversations in Moscow described the system as one of the most valuable intelligence pipelines the United States had in the Soviet Union.

Among the Soviet officials who were tapped by the Gamma Guppy system were Soviet Party General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, President Nikolai Podgorny and Premier Alexei Kosygin.

The top-secret operation was conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency in collaboration with the National Security Agency — the government's chief gatherer of intelligence by electronic means.

A former intelligence official who monitored the Gamma Guppy interception traffic said that the conversations revealed few major strategic secrets but "gave us extremely valuable information on the personalities and health of top Soviet leaders. But we didn't find out about, say, the invasion of Czechoslo-

Otherwise, he insisted, he would not have written the column. Anderson said he agreed not to mention details of the system and specifically promised Helms not to allude to the operation in his book, *The Anderson Papers*.

A CIA spokesman said yesterday the CIA had no comment on any aspect of the matter.

"There was only one other published reference in the Moscow press to a 'leak' in the system in *The Wall Street Journal* of May 8, 1973 to the fact that the CIA was busy monitoring the radiotelephones in Mr. Brezhnev's limousine as he sped around Moscow and out to the country for weekends."

A former intelligence official who had access to the Gamma Guppy traffic characterized the original 1971 leak as "completely gratuitous; it served no purpose and blew our best intelligence source in the Soviet Union."

There has been widespread conjecture that the White House Special Investigations Unit, known as the Plumbers, was investigating a news leak in the fall of 1971 that compromised an important intelligence source in the Soviet Union.

White House special counsel J. Fred Buzhardt had been seeking to discourage the indictment of John D. Ehrlichman, Charles W. Colson and Egil (Bud) Krogh, all former presidential aides, on grounds that the prosecution of their cases would jeopardize national security.

Ehrlichman, testifying last June in his California trial, said the responsibilities assigned the Plumbers included the Pentagon tap on the SALT talk leak and the "Q" tap which had to do with the disclosure of a CIA source in a foreign country and then the "P" tap, which I am not at liberty to discuss."

The nature of the third and fourth news leaks has never been officially identified.

vakia. It was very gossipy—Brezhnev's health and maybe Podgorny's sex life."

The CIA had built a facility a few miles from its Langley, Va., headquarters, where incoming traffic from the super-secret Moscow tap was monitored, according to knowledgeable sources.

Anderson's column, which appeared on Sept. 16, 1971, did not specify the means by which the conversations of top Kremlin officials was transmitted to Washington.

Intelligence sources here said the Soviet limousine telephone traffic was susceptible to interception because the phones were not sufficiently "scrambled"—a technique for making spoken words snoop-proof.

See GAMMA, A16, Col. 1

The name of the telephone tap operation is reportedly an NSA code classification indicating the priority and secrecy of the mission.)

Anderson said yesterday that after his column appeared he was invited to lunch with then CIA Director William F. Friedman and asked by Helms not to divulge the means by which the interception was made. Helms also, reported, Anderson said, that the project not be referred to again.

The columnist said his original source on the Soviet tap told him the Russians had already realized their phone traffic was being monitored.

of a Beirut slum devastated by last month's street fighting or MORGAN will be killed.

In a tape recorded message sent today to the U. S. Embassy in Beirut, MORGAN pleaded that the United States not abandon him because of "my color and race."

Commentary by Eric Severeid

MUDD: Each of the three investigations of the CIA had had to deal with the delicate question "What's the proper balance between secrecy and security?"

ERIC SEVEREID comments on that question.

ERIC SEVEREID: Free governments have never known how to handle the problem of secret information, and obviously a free press in a free society in peacetime does not know where to draw lines between secrets that damage the society by remaining secret and those that damage the nation by becoming public.

Representative HARRINGTON of Massachusetts has been penalized by the Armed Services Committee for leaking CIA information that the committee received under the secrecy commitment. Mr. HARRINGTON now proposes law by which every member of Congress would be not only free, but obliged to leak secret information that he regards in his wisdom as evidence of illegal actions by the government.

This would mean, of course, that every secret that could possibly be withheld from Congress by administration people would be withheld. It would become harder than ever for a citizen to find out about illegal, injurious government actions.

While Mr. HARRINGTON would make the congressional leak obligatory, the proposed new criminal code would make leaking of any classified information by any civil servant a crime. Those who receive such information, including reporters, would also be guilty of [a] crime.

If there's any formal solution between these two wild extremes, nobody has come up with it. Quite probably none exists. And this country will simply continue at a grave disadvantage where security secrets are concerned with the Soviet Union.

Secret and illegal activities that do not seriously involve national security are something else, and much of this has been quite properly exposed. But we stand now with a government troubled by some of its own be-

havior and a press both pleased and troubled with some of its behavior. The fact that American agents with long-distance electronics were able to overhear the conversations of Soviet leaders in their Moscow limousines was published here. That was the end of that source of information. The fact that U. S. submarines have been able to penetrate Soviet harbors and pick up their communications was published. The practice, both ways, had been going on for years. Publication has ended that source of information.

Were these two stories information the people had a right to know and benefitted by knowing? Only a rather exotic cult of editorial thinkers would say yes.

Illegal intelligence operations damaging to the liberties of Americans have to be exposed. But we're now at the point where the mere act of publishing makes any kind of CIA practice appear to be injurious and wrong. And the CIA itself is at the point that the diplomatic service reached during the wild days of Senator McCARTHY: good men quit; new men are hard to recruit; present employees, including agents, have become super-cautious, self-censoring nearly everything put on paper.

It may be years before the CIA's bad men are separated from the good men, its bad practices from the good practices. It'll also be years before even the good men will conduct the good practices with vigor and competence and pride in their work.

THE TODAY SHOW NBC TV 7:00 AM
JULY 10

No News of Relevance to DOD

CBS MORNING NEWS CBS TV 7:00 AM
JULY 10

No News of Relevance to DOD

Please note: the following transcripts are available.

Commentary on the proposed closing of military facilities in New Jersey, WINS Radio, July 9, 1975, 8:38 AM [New York].

Agronsky & Company, WTOP TV, June 28, 1975, 7:00 PM.

"Eyewitness Report from Cambodian Re-

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Memories: Media Shifts

By C. L. Sulzberger

PARIS—One extraordinary change during my working years has been in the role and techniques of news reporting. Before World War II, television existed only as a concept, radio was just starting to gain great influence and the daily press numbered many times more papers than today.

When I was young the goal of aspiring reporters was to be a foreign correspondent and dozens of American journals maintained bureaus abroad. Merely a fraction now exist. The focus of interest has shifted to Washington.

Television everywhere increases its importance. Presidents use it to proclaim policies and this habit has moved overseas. Egypt's Anwar el-Sadat has recently improved on Henry Kissinger's art of secret diplomacy openly arrived at by massive use of U.S. television. Marshall McLuhan's forecast of the written word's diminishing significance is coming true.

The American press has a freer, more self-assertive and influential position than in any other country but even this has altered in my time. The old theory that editorials should express opinions and news should seek objectivity is progressively discarded. Exposés are encouraged by what is called "investigative reporting."

In my youth all reporters were assumed to be "investigative" and, as C.I.A. chief Stansfield Turner recently wrote, "investigative reporting does imply some measure of investigation." Yet this is not always the case as I discovered when Carl Bernstein called me in Greece last September, told me he was preparing a piece "for an organ of the Columbia University School of Journalism" and asked me several questions about my alleged connection with the C.I.A.—a connection which never existed.

In his subsequent article he distorted my answers to his questions, wrongly suggesting that I had "signed a secrecy agreement" with the agency. Among my denials, he carefully avoided mentioning that I had told him that during the decade I ran The New York Times foreign service, I even refused a job to a close friend (an excellent reporter) until he disassociated himself from U.S. intelligence connections.

Another magazine called More picked up some of this garbage, which I can only imagine originated in someone's malice. The prompt result was a series of attacks on me in the Turkish press and Parliament. In that corner of the world a man can be shot for less.

It would have been possible for these "investigative reporters"—starting with the representative of Columbia University's new acquisition, Rolling Stone (like saying Mad represents Harvard Law School)—to ascertain that there is no document signed by me in the C.I.A., and never was. I simply remembered when Mr. Bernstein called me, that I had been asked to sign such a paper about 25 years earlier and had refused.

Nowadays "investigative reporting" picks and chooses according to prejudice. It was not hard to find manure in Richard Nixon's manure pile but I have yet to see similar studies of John Kennedy's frivolous peccadilloes; or, for that matter, of the sources of Lyndon Johnson's impressive personal fortune. The technique employed seems to be: Get the results you want and make up the supporting data if required.

Also, in my youth, what is now called "investigative reporting" was called "muckraking" and was symbolized by the energetic probes of Lincoln Steffens. Yet, as I have said, all reporters "investigated." In 1943 my own analyses of the Yugoslav Partisan movement altered United States policy toward Tito; my exposure (despite a blanket of Allied and Turkish censorship) of Turkey's *varlık vergisi*, a law directed against non-Muslim minorities, forced its swift repeal and saved that country's Christians and Jews from persecution.

Such things are property in the world's public domain. But I do not see what right the press has to publish

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

military secrets endangering their country's survival, merely because Xerox machines make documents available to informers. (Nor have governments the right to withhold vital truths on nonsecurity matters by over-classifying them.)

Another thing: Why does my insistent moral profession never seriously "investigate" itself? How many publishers, editors or reporters intent on public exposure have been treated for psychological or mental disorders?

At the same time, in the obverse, why do papers and magazines have to pay increasingly heavy, penalizing mail rates while United States Congressmen can send handouts around the world with a free postal frank?

Questions, questions, questions. All these problems, both favoring and disfavoring the profession to which I have devoted my life, have been altered or magnified during that time. To a degree they existed when I began almost 44 years ago. They are still with us; only more perplexing and more dangerous.

JOHN M. MAURY
3022 DUMBARTON AVENUE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20007
(202) 333-3788

20 January 1978

The Honorable Edward P. Boland
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence
U.S. House of Representatives
Room H-405, US Capitol
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

My attention has been called to a portion of the testimony of Mr. Morton Halperin before your Committee on January 11 wherein Mr. Halperin says: "The Welch Assassination case is the only episode that I am aware of where there is clear evidence of CIA manipulation of the American press for the purpose of influencing events in the United States."

Since Mr. Halperin appears to attach considerable significance to this case, and since it is one with which I am personally familiar, I should like to offer this letter for the record to supplement material I have previously submitted in support of my testimony before the Committee of December 27.

In support of his allegations Mr. Halperin contends that CIA spokesmen failed to announce to the press that Welch had been warned not to live in the house in front of which he was assassinated, and argues that Welch's death resulted from his failure to heed such warning, rather than from the publicity given his CIA association by the Greek press, replaying stories from the anti-CIA publication Counter-Spy in the U.S.

The facts do not support Mr. Halperin's contention.

Up until Welch's death, neither the identity of the CIA station chief in Athens nor the location of his home had been much of a secret. They were generally known throughout the American community, the diplomatic corps, the foreign, military and security ministries of the Greek Government, and the press corps, both domestic and foreign.

The point is that whether Mr. Welch lived in the old CIA house on Queen Frederika Street or moved around the corner to the only other house which the Embassy then had available, his CIA identity would have followed him. I happened to visit Mr. Welch in the Queen Frederika Street house, which had been my home during my six years as CIA station chief in Athens, just before his death. I remember he spoke of the sensational stories which had just appeared in the Athens press identifying him as CIA station chief, and he commented that he was now a marked man. He mentioned the possibility of moving to other quarters, but pointed out that wherever he lived in Athens he could be easily tracked down by any would-be malefactor, and a move would serve no useful purpose.

There can be no doubt that the stories in the Athens press identifying Mr. Welch were based on information previously published by Counter-Spy. Indeed, Mr. John Horn, publisher of the Athens News which featured the revelations about Welch's CIA role on November 25, 1975, stated that he did not run the story until he had "checked it out" against the list of CIA personnel compiled by the publishers of Counter-Spy.

The fact is that Welch was an attractive target for assassination not because of where he lived, but because the Greek press, following the lead of Counter-Spy, had dramatically pinpointed his CIA identity. As students of terrorism agree, the main objective of terrorist organizations usually is not punishment or elimination of an adversary, but publicity for a cause--in this case the anti-CIA cause.


In sum, Mr. Welch's death was a logical outgrowth of the work of a handful of defectors or disgruntled former intelligence employees who, in violation of their oath of office and with full knowledge of the likely consequences, have sought to destroy the CIA by jeopardizing the careers, the safety and the lives of their former colleagues.

In view of Mr. Halperin's anti-CIA activities and attitudes, it is not surprising that he should seek to obscure this fact by

implying that Welch's death was due to Welch's own indiscretion, and charging the Agency with deceiving the public as to the circumstances.

The simple truth is that, as the Washington Post editorialized at the time, Welch's death "was the entirely predictable result of the disclosure tactics chosen by certain American critics of the Agency."

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "John M. Maury". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, sweeping initial "J".

John M. Maury

APPENDIX I

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND EXCHANGES OF MATERIALS

22 USC 2422.

Presidential
report to
Congress.50 USC 1541
note.

Sec. 32. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by adding at the end of part III the following new sections:

"Sec. 662. Limitation on Intelligence Activities.—(a) No funds appropriated under the authority of this or any other Act may be expended by or on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency for operations in foreign countries, other than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence, unless and until the President finds that each such operation is important to the national security of the United States and reports, in a timely fashion, a description and scope of such operation to the appropriate committees of the Congress, including the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States House of Representatives.

"(b) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply during military operations initiated by the United States under a declaration of war approved by the Congress or an exercise of powers by the President under the War Powers Resolution.

APPENDIX J

18 September 1970

Following is additional data on PCCH maneuvers to control Chilean mass communications media.

During 15-17 September the Chilean Communist Party (PCCH) Media Operations Chief and Congressional Deputy Jorge Inzunza continued his successful maneuvers to bring Chilean mass communications media under UP control.

In key radio/TV medium, PCCH gave orders to PCCH controlled state technical university (UTE) which is financed by the Chilean Government to drop all pretences of being cultural and educational station and to concentrate on propagation UP and PCCH news and political commentaries. Communist student and channel workers have taken over full editorial control of Catholic University Channel 9 which is broadcasting news commentary and political interviews of apparent communist rather than socialist or UP origin. The Government and the PDC have made a semi-official disclosure of the UTE and Channel 7 takeovers by PCCH through presidential palace-paid journalist and TV newscaster Luis Hernandez Parker. In a lead article published by the PDC oriented weekly news magazine "Ercilla" on talks between PDC Commission and UP re guarantees for future Democratic Government under Allende presidential news leader Hernandez Parker wrote: "La comision que converse con Allende le lleve una carpeta con documentos que, a su juicio, demuestran esta

actitud permanente del PC. Según la Comisión de la DC la política comunista en la Uf6, en el canal 9 de TV; su iniciativa para que fueran aceptados voceros suyos en la TV nacional un en las principales emisoras, no son los únicos ejemplos. Por los demás, agrega la DC, tales impetus no son originales de la PC Chilena. Forman parte de su estrategia y de su experiencia histórica en Europa, Asia y América Latina"

Note charges leaked through Hernandez Parker are directed at PCH alone and not at PS or UP as a whole.

PCH/UP pressures on radio stations to hire UP pressroom personnel and announcers and ^{to} ~~to~~ give ^{up} ~~up~~ personnel key news commentary space have resulted in a number of surrenders by frightened station managements. At the same time these stations have been forced to dismiss veteran staffers both to make room for up incumbents and cover increasing losses in advertising revenue. GOC/PDC has taken note this situation in government daily "La Nacion" 15 September article headline "Periodistas Denuncian Persecucion En Radios". The article replays a complaint by national trade union of radio newsmen (sindicato de periodistas radiales) against increasing censorship of information being imposed on various radio stations in Santiago. It also denounces the campaign of terror and pressure against radio newsmen which includes arbitrary dismissals despite national law forbidden dismissals of newsmen during election period.

The PCCH-originated "organization of mass communications media workers" (OMCMW) is now making spot announcements of a political commentary nature on top audience radio Portales, Radio Nuevo Mundo and Radio Minería. The leftist press section of the conservative-owned radio agricultura is issuing bulletins of OMCMW statements as though they are bone fide news items. Stations in Valparaiso, La Serena and Concepcion are following suit in an attempt to placate the UP.

The PCCH is still not attempting to cow independent small provincial newspapers, but has struck at "Sopesur" chain of papers in major southern cities. In lastditch attempt to keep provincial chain out of PCCH hands Sopesur directors and main stockholders are reliably reported to be negotiating a sale of controlling shares to a PDC front group. In the meantime an editor of one of the leading Sopesur papers reports that unless PDC moves rapidly the following Sopesur papers will have to stop presses: "Diario Austral" in Temuco, "Correo de Valdivia", "La Prensa de Osorno", "La Prensa" of Concepcion and the conservative daily "Diario Ilustrado" in Santiago should the Sopesur Southern Press Chain and "El Mercurio" northern chain either stop presses or come under PCCH control this will mean end of significant free press in Chilean provinces and force rural population to turn for information to national chain and provincial radio stations which, as previously reported, are falling under PCCH and UP control.

"El Mercurio" . . . Allende persists in all editorial attacks on UP. Blue collar workers union at Mercurio still claims it will physically eject any strangers hired at Mercurio under UP pressures, but the majority of Mercurio staff is losing courage at spite of rumors reporting imminent departure for Brazil, Argentina and U.S. of leading managerial personnel at Mercurio. These rumors being generated by Hector Precht Banados, Mercurio staffer who is one of heads of new "United Front" movement.

Just prior to elections MAPU and PCCH directed student leaders and teachers in Catholic University Journalism School forced ejection of all professors and assistants associated with non-leftist newspapers. PCCH and MAPU have now rammed through new university law reorganizing structure of Journalism school and in process are relieving all non UP personnel of their jobs through legal action. University of Chile Journalism School, already under ~~GZRA~~ UP control has already excluded non-Marxists from school administrative and teaching positions.

In its eagerness to pressure PDC congressmen to vote for Allende with minimum guarantees the PCCH has surfaced one of its top assets, PDC Deputy Luis Maira. Deputy Maira was the key "Non-Marxist" whip in the illegal house of deputies commission rigged by PCCH to investigate and try to prosecute anti-UP persons and organizations allegedly engaged in conducting election propaganda on behalf of foreign governments. Writing under his well-known pseudonym "Castor" in the 17 September issue of the violently anti-rightist Tabloid "Clarín".

appeal to his fellow PDC congressmen to forget about seeking guarantees from the UP in return for voting for Allende in the run-off election. "What can be gained with 20 pages or more of guarantees to preserve Chilean democracy?". He insists that the PDC's primary task is to prevent the election of Alessandri and strive to guarantee democracy through PDC strength in the coalition government with the UP after the electi

Developments During the Week of 20 September

Efforts of Chilean democratic leaders to deny Allende the votes he needs to win the 24 October run-off election in Congress have not prospered. President Frei had been encouraging the maneuver to line up PDC votes for Alessandri, but Frei has apparently now realized that he no longer controls his party's Congressional votes. One reason for this lack of control, in addition to the neglect and indecision of Frei himself, is the animosity of Bernardo Leighton, once a close collaborator of Frei and certainly not a Marxist, who harbors a grudge against Frei for having ignominiously removed him from his post as Minister of Interior two years ago. Allende needs only 21 PDC votes to win, and Leighton, who as PDC Vice-President controls at least that number, has warned Frei that he intends to deliver them to Allende. The Union Popular, sensing confusion in the opposition camp, has also been wooing the Alessandri conservatives by offering to use their technical knowledge and managerial talents in the new government. On 23 September the PD presented to Allende the democratic "guarantees" which, if met, would induce it to cast the votes of all of its 75 parliamentary members to Allende. The points, which the PDC National Convention is to approve early next week, are: respect for a pluralistic state; nonestablishment of a socialist state; freedom to exist and coexist for all political parties which reflect national sentiments; freedom of information; respect for the professionalism of the armed forces and their present separation from political matters, which involves their being forbidden to vote or form political committees in military quarters or ships; freedom for unions; administrative guarantees, including respect for public careers; and strict application of the constitutional reforms advocated by the U. P. On the same day Allende, after a three-hour talk with Senator Benjamin Prado and members of the PDC Political Committee, announced that he accepted the points in general, would submit them for consideration by the U. P. and would reply officially on 25 September. It appears certain that the U. P. will concede to almost all the PDC demands. Communist leaders are not at all concerned about making "guarantees", but they do want as big a margin as possible in the congressional vote in order to propagandize outside Chile that Allende has the support of the whole country and that there is virtually no opposition to his government. The attached 24 September interview with Allende is indicative of the extent to which Allende is prepared to go in "guaranteeing" free elections, private property and the like.

Meanwhile the Allende forces have been treating Chilean military leaders with kid gloves, and have floated rumors that Allende intends to retain the present Commanders in Chief of the Armed Forces in office at least during the first year of his government. Frei reportedly has told military leaders that he now considers that parliamentary action to defeat Allende is impossible, blaming his loss of control over the PDC on Radomiro Tomic and Bernardo Leighton, who are determined to reach an agreement with Allende and the U. P. Military leaders have privately expressed surprise and consternation at Frei's lack of leadership. Meanwhile the Communists are moving quietly ahead with their plans to assume early control of the Carabineros (national police force) and other civilian security services. For example they have already called on Luis Jaspard Fonseca, Director-General of Investigaciones, demanding that he accept a "liaison" representative and make available his files. Jaspard refused, but later discovered the Communists interrogating members of his staff. A high-ranking official of the Carabineros has learned that Allende plans to increase the force by 8,000 men of pro Allende tendency immediately upon his inauguration, thus obviously reducing the ability of the Carabineros to support any future anti-Allende uprising. Although the U. P. intends to deal gently with the regular military until its control of the intelligence services is fully established they have already evaluated each military officer in terms of his individual reliability and singled out specific officers for removal or isolation.

Economic distortions since the election were discussed by Finance Minister Zaldívar on 23 September. Attached are a lengthy synopsis of the Zaldívar speech and a 21 September National Industrial Survey situation report.

Former Ambassador Dungan's article was widely played in Chile and reportedly has further demoralized conservative and PDC leaders who are still trying to stave off an Allende victory in Congress. One encouraging sign, however, has been the rapid growth of an organization called "Patria y Libertad", which is led by Pablo Rodríguez Grez, a well known Santiago lawyer. The organization held its second public meeting on the night of 23 September, and a 24 September article in *Diario Ilustrado* said that more than 20,000 people were turned away from the Estadio de Chile. The rally, which had been announced by air dropped leaflets calling upon Chileans to save the country from Marxism, was addressed by Rodríguez and by representatives from labor, student, women and political groups. Rodríguez told his audience not to be taken in by Allende's "guarantees" and not to believe that Allende's government could be both Communist and democratic. He concluded by saying that "Patria" would continue to defend democracy through legal means, but "si estallara la guerra civil... aquí nos encontrarán de pie."

#6

Salvador ~~ALLIENOR~~ ~~Christens~~ was born on 26 July 1908 in Santiago, Chile. Born into a family of prominent physicians, his name is an honored one in Chile. He received a medical degree from the University of Chile in 1933, but limited his medical activities to those of a research pathologist. He became a political activist during his school days and was prominent in anti-government activities. Despite his family's close association with the Radical Party, he was influenced by Marxist writings and chose to assist in the establishment of the Socialist Party in 1933, signifying a merger of various Chilean Marxist groups. He launched his political career by becoming the head of the Socialist movement in Valparaiso and, in 1937, he was elected to the Chamber of Deputies. In 1939, he was appointed Minister of Public Health. Four years later, he was named Secretary General of the Socialist Party, and in 1945 was elected Senator from Valdivia Province.

In 1949, Senator Allende was persuaded by the Communists to become a member of the Executive Committee of the Committee for World Peace which had been organized by the Chilean Communist Party prior to a peace conference which was to be held in Mexico.

In August 1951, the Spanish Communist newspapers in Chile, Venceremos and Independencia, were subsidized by Allende and other prominent Chilean Communists and sympathizers.

In October 1951, the Socialist Party proclaimed Allende as its candidate for president. The Communists joined the Socialist Party in a coalition labeled the People's Front, whose platform advocated the nationalization of mines and trade with the Soviet Bloc. In the elections held in September 1952, Allende finished last among four candidates, with approximately 52,000 votes out of a total of more than 900,000.

Since 1952, when the Communists gained the ideological domination of his People's Front, Allende has enjoyed the wholehearted support of the Chilean Communist Party. Despite Allende's modest showing, there is historical significance in the Front's existence. It was Chile's first genuinely leftist electoral front, and it was the beginning of a Socialist-Communist alliance which was to be the heart of the far left's electoral thrust in subsequent years.

Re-elected to the Senate in March 1953, Allende continuously pushed for the repeal of the Law for the Permanent Defense of Democracy, which prevented Communists from voting and holding public office, and strongly urged free commerce between Chile and the Soviet Bloc, giving

great emphasis to the sale of copper to the USSR.

It was not until 1954, however, that Allende openly manifested Communist sympathies. This occurred when Allende, then vice president of the World Peace Council, headed a delegation invited by the Chilean-Soviet Cultural Institute to tour the USSR and Czechoslovakia. At that time, Allende also was vice president of the Communist front, Agrupacion Chilena de Ayuda a la Democracia Espanola.

Also in 1954, Allende identified himself with the pro-Communist Guatemalan government and attacked U. S. action there. Allende spent six months in Communist China, and served as President of the Chilean Chinese Cultural Institute from 1957 to 1959.

In the 1958 elections, Allende was the presidential candidate of the Popular Action Front, FRAP, which consisted of the Partido Socialista, the Chilean Communist Party, and some minor leftist groups. He ran a good race, but lost by 33,000 votes in a field of five candidates.

In 1958, Allende was still a member of the World Peace Council, and in 1960 was elected an honorary member of the Chilean-Cuban Cultural Institute. He travelled to Peiping again in 1960, and three years later, sent his wife and daughter there.

In 1962, Allende visited the Soviet Union to attend the World Peace Council Congress. From 1959 to 1962, he was an annual visitor to Cuba, conferring with Fidel Castro, whom he described as a "true political genius". He has been a consistent and firm supporter of Castro, and after his 1969 visit to Havana, it was rumored that he was planning to launch a Castro-type revolution in Chile. He abandoned this approach, however, in favor of the Chilean Communists' traditional "via pacifica".

The Socialists later espoused the Havana Tricontinental Congress' call for revolution, an act which the Moscow-lining Communist found objectionable and thus began a series of public Socialist-Communist differences which lasted through 1968. These differences highlighted the Socialists' Castro-revolutionary road as opposed to the Communists' approach to power by way of the "via pacifica".

The Communists and the Socialists resolved their difference and, in concert with the Radical Party and a few splinter groups, produced a document called the Basic Program of Popular Unity. Allende eventually emerged as the Popular Unity candidate for president in 1970.

Allende is an extremely ambitious, very vain man. Despite his claim that he is a man of the masses, he is a symbol of sartorial splendor and capitalist amenities. His well-stocked wardrobe of fancy suits, his yacht, his beautiful summer home at the beach resort of Algarrobo, all belie his "common-man" public posture.

It is interesting to note that Allende has always been to the left of the Communists, more papist than the Pope, and that he espoused the violent way to revolution modeled on the Castro/Guevara plan and did not accede to the electoral way for revolution until Castro fell under substantial Soviet influence and himself opted for the peaceful way to revolution in certain circumstances, such as those that existed in Chile. But violence as a desirable and necessary political factor has not disappeared as a matter of Socialist Party policy or as a part of Salvador Allende's makeup. In March of this year Socialist Party Senator Carlos Altamirano said, "We will put up a 'paredon' (execution wall) in our people's government as in Cuba, for those who have illegally profited by turning over the country's basic wealth to imperialism." The following month, on

April 7, 1970, Socialist Party Deputy Mario Palestro, speaking of the murder of the West German Ambassador in Guatemala, was quoted by the Santiago press as saying, "We (Socialists) lament the death of the West German Ambassador, but consider it justifiable." Speaking before a disappointingly small rally in Santiago on September 13, Allende told the audience that he and the Unidad Popular would paralyze the country if anyone tried to steal the "people's victory". The rally had obviously been called to intimidate those who might be thinking of blocking Allende's accession to the presidency, and his message of terror got through despite the small audience.

Washington Post, 2/5/77, p. A2

Critics of Warren Report Objects of CIA Campaign

Associated Press

The Central Intelligence Agency directed its offices around the world in 1967 "to employ propaganda assets" to counter doubts raised by critics of the Warren Commission's investigation into the assassination of President Kennedy.

The propaganda campaign was to be waged in part by passing unclassified information about the assassination to CIA "assets" who could use the material in writing "book reviews and feature articles" that would "answer and refute the attacks of the critics," according to a newly released CIA document.

The document said the aim was "to provide material for countering and discrediting the claims of the conspiracy theorists, so as to inhibit the circulation of such claims in other countries."

The document was among some 850 pages of material released yesterday by the CIA under the Freedom of Information Act.

The documents show that the CIA examined copies of almost all books about the November, 1963, assassination, including one by then-Congressman Gerald R. Ford. A CIA officer called Ford's book "a re-hash of the Oswald case" and criticized its "loose" writing.

Ford was a member of the Warren Commission which concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald was solely responsible for the assassination. Ford quoted extensively from secret sessions of the commission in his book, "Portrait of an Assassin," which agreed with the commission's finding.

The 1967 dispatch to "chiefs, certain stations and bases" says that the rash

of books and articles criticizing the Warren Commission's finding "is a matter of concern to the U.S. government, including our organization."

"Efforts to impugn [the] rectitude and wisdom [of commission members and staff] tend to cast doubt on the whole leadership of American society," the memo said.

"Moreover, there seems to be an increasing tendency to hint that President Johnson, himself, as the one person who might be said to have benefited, was in some way responsible for the assassination.

"Innuendo of such seriousness affects not only the individual concerned, but also the whole reputation of the American government."

In using propaganda assets to refute these charges, the dispatch said, "our play should point out, as applicable, that the critics are (1) wedded to theories adopted before the evidence was in, (2) politically interested, (3) financially interested, (4) hasty and inaccurate in their research, or (5) infatuated with their own theories."

25 August 1966.

MEMORANDUM FOR : Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : New Book: Rush to Judgment by Mark Lane

1. This memorandum is for information only to invite your attention to the recently published book Rush to Judgment by Mark Lane (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1966). Mr. Lane is a New York lawyer and former member of the New York State Legislature. He can best be described as a stormy, publicity-seeking character who has attempted to make a recent "career" of the Kennedy tragedy both independently and as "counsel" for Mrs. Marguerite Oswald, mother of the assassin. As such, he has loaned himself to various left-wing groups, both here and abroad, who have sought to exploit the assassination.

2. Mark Lane appeared before the Warren Commission and asked that he be permitted, at the request of Mrs. Oswald, to represent her son's interest, to have access to the material to which the Commission had access, and to present witnesses. The Commission denied this request on several occasions on the basis that Lee Harvey Oswald's widow was his legal heir and was represented by counsel (Hearings, Vol. II, pp. 56-57). Lane's testimony before the Commission was of such a nature as to cause the Chief Justice to state that "... we have every reason to doubt the truthfulness of what you have heretofore told us. ... you have done nothing but handicap us." (Hearings, Vol. V, p. 553)."

3. Mr. Lane's book is being made into a 150 minute documentary film called Rush to Judgment. It is directed by Emile de Antonio who also directed the documentary film Point of Order on the McCarthy hearings. It is scheduled for release in September (see clipping, Tab B).

4. Mr. Lane's book contains an introduction by the well-known British historian Hugh Trevor-Roper. Trevor-Roper was in the forefront of those who attacked the Warren Commission Report when issued, and he continues his attack in the introduction. Trevor-Roper believes that the

Document Number: 1029-935 A

for FOIA Review on SEP 1976

... it is based on a position which the Commission refused to emerge from. Truly selected evidence; that this person having emerged, the evidence was not submitted to it; and that the still evidence in the case does not point to the Report's conclusions. He therefore feels it to be vulnerable that Mark Lane has not only re-examined the evidence before the Commission but has quite rightly gone beyond it in searching for more information; and that Lane should have been permitted to contest the evidence before the Commission. While the *For-Roger* "assumes" that all of the Commission's members were conscientiously looking for the truth, he feels that they were advocates for one point of view; that they were faced with such a quantity of evidence and such a pressure of time that this "precluded objective re-examination." "We have to admit," says *For-Roger*, "that we lack confidence in the evidence submitted to the Commission and the Commission's handling of it." (p. 15).

5. It seems unnecessary for this reviewer to go into the specific argumentation which Lane presents in *Back to Judgment*. It includes questions about the gun, where the shot came from, the marksmanship, the wounds it caused, the role of Jack Ruby, and the handling of Oswald's wife and mother. He charges omission of witnesses, the changing of testimony, and notes that the Commission did not call certain witnesses and did not ask certain questions or follow certain leads.

6. The index to *Back to Judgment* does not include the CIA, but it does include the names of Richard Helms and John McCone. Nevertheless, the book does refer to CIA on several occasions, among others in connection with a request to Mr. Helms, then DDP, for information regarding Jack Ruby; in connection with the photograph from Mexico City; in connection with the CIA file on Oswald; and in connection with Jonathan Joesten. Lane's comments contain misstatements of fact and innuendo which place CIA in a rather poor light. A more detailed analysis of these references is attached as Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A and B

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 w/book - Addressee

1 - DDIC

1 - DDP

1 - DDI

1 - DDS

1 -

1 - Spec. Asst. to DCI

1 -

1 -

1 -

2 -

w/book

Tab A

In Rush to Judgment (pp. 302-304), Mark Lane discusses a Memorandum to Richard Helms, Deputy Director for Plans, dated February 24, 1964, from Leon D. Hubert and Burt W. Griffin, staff members of the Warren Commission, subject: Jack Ruby - Background, Friends and other Pertinent Information (Commission Exhibit No. 2980 set forth in Hearings, Vol. XXVI, pp. 467-473). Lane quotes the Commission Memorandum as stating that:

"It is possible that Ruby could have been utilized by a politically motivated group either upon the promise of money or because of the influential character of the individual approaching Ruby."

Lane designates this Memorandum as a "preliminary report" and lists in numerical order ten phrases from the Memorandum which he claims the Commission counsel asserted as fact. Actually, the Memorandum does not list these assertions in numerical order and Lane has simply extracted partial statements from the Memorandum to suit his purpose.

Lane then states that this Commission Memorandum "suggested that the CIA consider the existence of ties between Ruby and others who might have been interested in the assassination of President Kennedy". Actually, the Memorandum merely contained a compendium of information which the Commission then knew about Jack Ruby and contained no suggestion as to what CIA was to consider. The actual request to CIA for information concerning Jack Ruby came at a meeting between CIA representatives and Commission staff on 12 March 1964 at which the Memorandum was handed to the CIA representatives. The correct facts concerning this request and meeting were contained in a letter from the Commission General Counsel Rankin to Mr. Helms dated May 19, 1964 (Hearings, Vol. XXVI, p. 466, Exhibit No. 2980), as Lane knows, for he quotes from the Rankin letter and then adds that "The Commission waited patiently for a response from the CIA for more than two months. Then Rankin wrote to Helms" (p. 303).

Lane continues (pp. 303-304)

"Almost four months later, the CIA responded to Rankin's letter. Then, in a communication dated September 15, 1964, the CIA simply said that 'an

examination of Central Intelligence agency files has produced no information on Jack Ruby or his activities. The Central Intelligence Agency has no indication that Ruby and Lee Harvey Oswald ever knew each other, were associated, or might have been connected in any manner.'" (This reply of 15 September was prepared by the Acting DDP, Mr. Karamessines, and is contained in Hearings, Vol. XXVI, p. 466, Commission Exhibit No. 2980).

Lane continues:

"The CIA's reply was deficient in two respects. It was prepared just nine days before the Report was presented to the President, . . . One may confidently assume that by September 15 the Commission had concluded its deliberations." (p. 304).

This statement is again misleading, because CIA had at an earlier date communicated its negative findings regarding Ruby to the Commission. Mr. Karamessines' memorandum of 15 September states that "This memorandum will confirm our earlier statement to the Commission . . ."

Mr. Lane continues:

"The date of the reply appears to be less than material in any event, for the CIA never grappled with the many serious questions posed in the preliminary report [i. e., Memorandum] and asserted instead, quite gratuitously, that a search of its own files revealed no evidence that Ruby and Oswald were associated, although that question had not been among those submitted to it.

"The suggestion that a conspiracy may have taken the life of President Kennedy has been ridiculed by the American media as the invention of Europeans, who are portrayed as being conspiracy-minded, and of political radicals. That suggestion, however, was developed by the Warren Commission's own legal staff, and the CIA's tardy non sequitur cannot be said to have been dispositive." (p. 304).

In Rush to Judgment, Mark Lane discusses the photograph of an unknown individual which was obtained by CIA in Mexico City and forwarded to the FBI in Dallas following the President's assassination. Lane falls into many of the errors regarding this photograph which characterized its description in Edward Epstein's book Inquest published in June 1966. Lane notes that this photograph was shown to the senior Mrs. Oswald on 23 November by FBI Agent Odum, and that Mrs. Oswald was unable to recognize the person photographed. However, after Lee Harvey Oswald was killed, she saw a picture of Ruby in a newspaper and stated that this was the man whose photograph Agent Odum had shown her. Mrs. Oswald testified to this before the Commission. Lane states that

"Mrs. Oswald may have been mistaken; the man in the picture published by the Commission certainly does not closely resemble Ruby. But why was the picture shown to her in the first place? Certain information known to although not published by the Commission may provide a clue." (p. 351).

Lane then states that much of the information regarding Oswald's trip to Mexico was supplied by CIA and adds

"That agency, which keeps watch on the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, evidently photographed a man leaving the Embassy on September 27 and said that the man was Oswald." (p. 351).

Here Lane falls into the same error as Epstein, because the photograph was not obtained by surveillance of the Cuban Embassy. Furthermore, CIA did not tell the Bureau "that the man was Oswald." CIA merely said that it might have been Oswald, because at the time of the assassination neither the CIA or the FBI in Mexico City knew what Oswald looked like.

Lane continues "... the photograph was given to the Bureau on the morning of November 22" and cites the Warren Commission Report as his source. Actually, the Warren Commission Report states that CIA provided the FBI with the photograph on November 22, which is correct. However, it was not furnished on the morning of 22 November as Lane says but was delivered on that date by courier from Mexico City following

page 4 - Tab A

the assassination. Furthermore, Lane states that the delivery of the photograph

"was evidently a matter of routine and unrelated to other events that day. The picture almost certainly caused consternation in Dallas, for the man in the photograph was not Oswald; the CIA had made a mistake." (pp. 351-352).

With regard to the cropping of this photograph, as shown to Mrs. Oswald and the Commission, Lane states that

"The CIA refused to permit the picture to be shown to the President's Commission unless it had 'all background eliminated', ... Not until the FBI had complied with that directive was the picture shown to the Commission." (p. 352).

Lane's statement is stronger than that of FBI Agent Malley whose affidavit he cites as his source. Malley's affidavit actually states that CIA "had no objection to this Bureau furnishing a copy of this photograph to the President's Commission with all background eliminated." (Hearings, Vol. XI, p. 469).

Lane takes note of Mr. Helms' affidavit to the Commission which stated that the picture was taken "... outside of the continental United States sometime during the period July 1, 1963 to November 23, 1963." Lane then adds

"Indeed the object of this accumulation of evidence was simply to enable the Commission to rebut Marguerite Oswald's assertion that the man in the picture shown to her was Ruby." (p. 352).

Lane notes that the Commission, the FBI and the CIA were unable to locate the man in the photograph and concludes: "Was the CIA misled on purpose? Was someone posing as Oswald? If so, it is unfortunate that the full resources of the United States intelligence agencies were unable to locate the man whose picture had been taken by the CIA." (p. 35)

The New York Times
23 August 1965

"Rush to Judgment" Assails Warren Group Findings

A 150-minute documentary film called "Rush to Judgment," dealing with the assassination of President Kennedy and the findings of the Warren Commission, is in the final stages of preparation here.

The movie is being co-produced by Mark Lane, the New York lawyer and author of the new book of the same title, and Emilio de Antonio, who also directed the film. The book by Mr. Lane, a former New York assemblyman who was hired by Mrs. Margaret Oswald as her legal aide before the Warren Commission's investigation involving her son, was published Aug. 15 by Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Mr. de Antonio was last represented on the local screen by "Point of Order," the successful documentary on the McCarthy hearings in Washington.

The director describes the forthcoming movie as a "strictly visual microcosm" of Mr. Lane's lengthy book, which "questions the investigational procedures of the commission under Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, with cross-examination as the cornerstone."

Oswald's Guilt Left Open

The film, he said, asserts neither the guilt or innocence of Lee Harvey Oswald as the killer of the late President.

"But we attempt to illustrate that certain key witnesses and pertinent areas were bypassed," he added.

Eighty per cent of the film was photographed last March and April in and around Dallas, with Mr. Lane and Mr. de Antonio supervising a camera unit recruited from San Francisco. The remainder of "Rush to Judgment" utilizes stock footage on the assassination and its aftermath. That part was bought from station WFAA-TV in Dallas.

According to the director, one major and one major independent American movie company have already expressed interest in exhibiting the black-and-white documentary, whose budget was \$30,000, he said.

"Unrelated" bids have come from the three major television outlets in England, headed by the British Broadcasting Corporation, and nearly half our entire budget."

16 Hours of Film Shot

The original footage, totaling nearly 18 hours of running time, was shot in 16-millimeter "to allow greater freedom of movement." A final, 35-millimeter print, as edited into two and a half hours of playing time, is expected in three weeks.

The format of "Rush to Judgment" is that of a courtroom investigation, with Mr. Lane speaking a prologue and a resume. Among the persons interviewed for the documentary were 15 witnesses to the shooting.

"Six of them," Mr. de Antonio said, "were railroad workers standing on the overpass who were never even interviewed by the commission and who claim to have heard one addition, shot from behind a wooden fence."

Key subsidiary roles are taken by five Dallas people, never summoned for testimony, who had vital evidence about Jack Ruby. Another person prominent in our film is Penn Jones Jr., the outspoke editor and publisher of the *Microlithian* (Tex.) Mirror.

1 March 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Helms

SUBJECT:

^o Congressman Ford's Book
on the Kennedy Assassination - Critique
by "

1. This is for your information. I was informed by of your concern.
2. On or about 11 February, I forwarded me a... copy of a re-hash of the Oswald case prepared by Congressman Ford and Stiles, an individual who sat with Ford during much of the hearing period. I read the thing summarily -- turning each page and running down the copy -- for references to the Agency. I did not regard any of the treatment of CIA, which is minimal in amount, to be objectionable. I felt very strongly however about the first chapter, which I read in detail. It is entitled, "The Commission Gets Its First Shock", and it shocked me because of its implications for the Bureau's image in the light of the charge that Oswald was an FBI agent. That charge, made by Texas law enforcement officers, was the Commission's "first shock". Neither the chapter nor the rest of the testimony sustain it, as Ford himself points out, but the writing is just loose enough to permit quotation out of context. Ford and his co-author really don't nail down the charge as an absolute and utter canard. I felt, therefore, that the chapter, as written, could be used by the Lefties (Mark Lane et al) to continue the campaign of which you are already aware.

1 Mar 65

3. I called this to _____ attention early in the week of the 15th and he authorized me to take up the matter directly with the Bureau liaison, _____. I did so later in the week (on or about 18 February). Because the copy had to be returned to _____ on the 19th, I was unable to lend the Bureau the material. _____ however, took notes on my observations and, of course, guaranteed that the confidence which I had to ask be observed.

4. Chapter 1 contains a quotation of AWD from the hearing records which is truncated and might give him umbrage. I took no action on this because, in general, my feeling is that the less we touch in this manuscript the better. And more so, because my run through the book had not turned up any references to the Agency that had raised my hackles.

cc:

ONLY COPY

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT: Review of Book--Rush to Judgment by Mark LANE

1. I reviewed the attached proof copy of the above book per your request. It represents a recapitulation of Lane's theories regarding the assassination of President Kennedy, and alleged shortcomings of the Warren Commission, which he has expressed publicly over the past few years. Like J. Epstein, author of Inquest, Lane is guilty of the same fault he charges to the Warren Commission--a rush to judgment.

2. CIA first comes into focus on page 302. Lane imputes something sinister to the fact that this Agency received a copious requirement regarding Jack Ruby from the Commission on 24 February 1964 and seemingly never got around to answering it until 15 September 1964 (the Commission's 13-page memorandum, a follow-up query by J. Lee Rankin and this Agency's reply, appear in volume XXVI of the Commission Report, pages 466-467). Lane conveniently ignores paragraph two of the CIA reply which specifically directs the Commission's attention to an "earlier" answer. In addition, almost the entire memorandum was clearly outside our jurisdiction. I discussed this matter with [redacted] who was involved intimately in making the necessary name checks and providing an answer. I also remember the situation quite well. Within two weeks of the original request, Mr. Rankin's office was advised telephonically that the major tracing had been completed and that we had no "information on Jack Ruby or his activities"; furthermore, that the CIA had "no indication that Ruby and Lee Harvey Oswald ever knew each other, were associated, or might have been connected in any manner." According to [redacted] this is the exact wording used during the telephone conversation and later reported in paragraph two of the formal reply. The Commission also was advised at that time

Document Number 1023-1320
 CIA Review on 7/17/76

RECORD COPY

completion of the task. This was a large undertaking, particularly since this Staff was being pressed for other types of assistance by the Commission. Mr. Rankin's follow-up letter also was answered by phone. We reiterated the above conclusions and added that we had just completed the rest of the name tracing in depth and were in the process of preparing an answer. Because of the complexity of the task, several drafts were attempted and rejected before the final version was sent to the Commission.

3. On pages 351 and 352, Lane discusses the photograph of the unknown individual which was taken by the CIA in Mexico City. The photograph was furnished by this Agency to the FBI after the assassination of President Kennedy. The FBI then showed it to Mrs. Marguerite Oswald who later claimed the photograph to be that of Jack Ruby. A discussion of the incident, the photograph itself, and related affidavits, all appear in the Commission's Report (Vol. XI, p. 469; Vol. XVI, p. 633.) Lane asserts that the photograph was evidently taken in front of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on 27 September 1963, and that it was furnished to the FBI on the morning of 22 November. As in the case of Epstein, Lane is incorrect regarding the date and place the photograph was taken, and the date it was furnished to the FBI (Epstein says we gave it to the FBI on 18 November). Lane acknowledges that the picture is not that of Jack Ruby or Lee Harvey Oswald. He says that the CIA originally thought the man was Oswald, but was mistaken. He then twits the Commission, the FBI, and the CIA for being unable to locate the unknown individual, asserting that "it is unfortunate that the full resources of the United States intelligence agencies were unable to locate the man whose picture had been taken by the CIA."

4. On page 373, Lane takes exception to the Commission's statement that "it had access to the full CIA file on Oswald." Lane states, that at least on one occasion, the CIA refused to permit one of its photographs to be displayed to the Commission unless the background had been removed. Lane was referring to the aforementioned photograph of the unknown individual which was cropped to protect the source and to delete the background.

Distribution:

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CLASS.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
Operational		MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL		
<p>1. A correspondent told me he had the assignment from his home office to try to track down the manuscript of the Manchester book on Kennedy's assassination. He hoped that it was now in the hands of a French publisher for translation, and that he would be able to get hold of it at least temporarily, because he understands that Jacqueline Kennedy was withdrawing the book, at least temporarily, perhaps to insist on certain cuts.</p> <p>2. I checked locally and learned that the book's French rights had been sold by a London literary agent, Gornall of Intercontinental Literary Agency (phone Covent Garden 3131), jointly to two French publishers, Editions Robert Laffont and Editions Stock, who were going to publish it. But they do not have a text, and only one person, Jean Rosenthal of Editions Laffont, has had a significant amount of text in his hands. Andre Bay of Editions Stock said he felt that the Kennedy family was going to withdraw the book for serious cuts for political reasons.</p> <p>3. I works for Editions Arthaud, which will soon publish Mark Lane's <u>Rush to Judgment</u>. Lane will be in Paris (probably very shortly) to appear on a long French television program dealing with the Kennedy assassination. The French publisher thinks Lane's book (which describes the 14 persons who had died violently since the assassination, all of whom were key witnesses) is quite factual. Lane is also reportedly involved in the Bertrand Russell mock trial, but the French publisher does not think the television appearance will deal with this.</p>		
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for FOIA Review on <u>SEP 1976</u>		
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		9 November 1966
	CLASSIFICATION	FILE NUMBER

For FOIA Review on SEP 1975

1. Conveying Criticism of the Warren Report

FOR OSWALD
FILE 1
CROSS

THIS WAS PUT TOGETHER BY
INCL. IN CONSTRUCTION WITH
OF THE SOURCE MATERIAL, WHICH FORMER FOR THE
AND PROVIDING GENERAL "EXPERTISE" OF THE CASE. THIS
SPECIFIC ARTICLE WAS WRITTEN

1. Our Concern. From the day of President Kennedy's assassination on, there has been speculation about the responsibility for his murder. Although this was stemmed for a time by the Warren Commission report (which appeared at the end of September 1964), various writers have now had time to scan the Commission's published report and documents for new pretexts for questioning, and there has been a new wave of books and articles criticizing the Commission's findings. In most cases the critics have speculated as to the existence of some kind of conspiracy, and often they have implied that the Commission itself was involved. Presumably as a result of the increasing challenge to the Warren Commission's Report, a public opinion poll recently indicated that 46% of the American public did not think that Oswald acted alone, while more than half of those polled thought that the Commission had left some questions unresolved. Doubtless polls abroad would show similar, or possibly more adverse, results.

2. This trend of opinion is a matter of concern to the U.S. government, including our organization. The members of the Warren Commission were naturally chosen for their integrity, experience, and prominence. They represented both major parties, and they and their staff were deliberately drawn from all sections of the country. Just because of the standing of the Commissioners, efforts to impugn their rectitude and wisdom tend to cast doubt on the whole leadership of American society. Moreover, there seems to be an increasing tendency to hint that President Johnson himself, as the one person who might be said to have benefited, was in some way responsible for the assassination. Insinuations of such seriousness affects not only the individual concerned, but also the whole reputation of the American government. Our organization itself is directly involved: among other facts, we contributed information to the investigation. Conspiracy theories have frequently thrown suspicion on our organization, for example by falsely alleging that Lee Harvey Oswald worked for us. The aim of this dispatch is to provide material for countering and discrediting the claims of the conspiracy theorists, so as to inhibit the circulation of such claims in other countries. Background information is supplied in a classified section and in a number of unclassified attachments.

3. Action. We do not recommend that discussion of the assassination question be initiated where it is not already taking place. Where discussion is however addressees are requested:

9 attachments h/v

1 - *Balt.*
8 - Unclassified

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DESTROY WHEN NO LONGER
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urge them to use their influence to discourage unproductive and unproductive speculation.

b. To employ propaganda assets to answer and refute the attacks of the critics. Book reviews and feature articles are particularly appropriate for this purpose. The unclassified attachments to this guidance should provide useful background material for passage to assets. Our play should point out, as applicable, that the critics are (i) wedded to theories adopted before the evidence was in, (ii) politically interested, (iii) financially interested, (iv) hasty and inaccurate in their research, or (v) infatuated with their own theories. In the course of discussions of the whole phenomenon of criticism, a useful strategy may be to single out Epstein's theory for attack, using the attached Fletcher Knebel article and Spectator piece for background. (Although Mark Lane's book is much less convincing than Epstein's and comes off badly where contested by knowledgeable critics, it is also much more difficult to answer as a whole, as one becomes lost in a morass of unrelated details.)

4. In private or media discussion not directed at any particular writer, or attacking publications which may be yet forthcoming, the following arguments could be useful:

a. No significant new evidence has emerged which the Commission did not consider. The assassination is sometimes compared (e.g., by Joachim Joesten and Bertrand Russell) with the Dreyfus case; however, unlike that case, the attacks on the Warren Commission have produced no new evidence, no new culprits have been convincingly identified, and there is no agreement among the critics. (A better parallel, though an imperfect one, might be with the Reichstag fire of 1933, which some competent historians (Fritz Tobias, A.J.P. Taylor, D.C. Watt) now believe was set by Van der Lubbe on his own initiative, without acting for either Nazis or Communists; the Nazis tried to pin the blame on the Communists, but the latter have been much more successful in convincing the world that the Nazis were to blame.)

b. Critics usually overvalue particular items and ignore others. They tend to place more emphasis on the recollections of individual eyewitnesses (which are less reliable and more divergent -- and hence offer more hand-holds for criticism) and less on ballistic, autopsy, and photographic evidence. A close examination of the Commission's records will usually show that the conflicting eyewitness accounts are quoted out of context, or were discarded by the Commission for good and sufficient reason.

c. Conspiracy on the large scale often suggested would be impossible to conceal in the United States, esp. since informants could expect to receive large royalties, etc. Note that Robert Kennedy, Attorney General at the time and John F. Kennedy's brother, would be the last man to overlook or conceal any conspiracy. And as one reviewer pointed out, Congressman Gerald R. Ford would hardly have held his tongue for the sake of the Democratic administration, and Senator Russell would have had every political interest in exposing any misdeeds on the part of Chief Justice Warren. A conspirator moreover would hardly choose a location for a shooting where so much depended on conditions beyond his control: the route, the speed of the cars, the moving target, the risk that the assassin would be discovered. A group of wealthy conspirators could have arranged much more secure conditions.

d. Critics have often been enticed by a form of intellectual pride: they light on some theory and fall in love with it; they also scoff at the Commission because it did not always answer every question with a flat decision one way or the other. Actually, the make-up of the Commission and its staff was an excellent safeguard against over-commitment to any one theory, or against

~~any one theory, or against~~

... in the case of a "rush-up," or questionable reliability and an unknown quantity to any professional intelligence service.

3. As to charges that the Commission's report was a rush job, it emerged three months after the deadline originally set. But to the degree that the Commission tried to speed up its reporting, this was largely due to the pressure of irresponsible speculation already appearing, in some cases coming from the same critics who, refusing to admit their errors, are now putting out new criticisms.

4. Such vague accusations as that "more than ten people have died mysteriously" can always be explained in some more natural way: e.g., the individuals concerned have for the most part died of natural causes; the Commission staff questioned 418 witnesses (the FBI interviewed far more people, conducting 25,000 interviews and reinterviews), and in such a large group, a certain number of deaths are to be expected. (When Penn Jones, one of the originators of the "ten mysterious deaths" line, appeared on television, it emerged that two of the deaths on his list were from heart attacks, one from cancer, one was from a head-on collision on a bridge, and one occurred when a driver drifted into a bridge abutment.)

5. Where possible, counter speculation by encouraging reference to the Commission's Report itself. Open-minded foreign readers should still be impressed by the care, thoroughness, objectivity and speed with which the Commission worked. Reviewers of other books might be encouraged to add to their account the idea that, checking back with the Report itself, they found it far superior to the work of its critics.

Background Survey of Books Concerning
the Assassination of President Kennedy

1. (Except where otherwise indicated, the factual data given in paragraphs 1-9 is unclassified.) Some of the authors of recent books on the assassination of President Kennedy (e.g., Joachim Joesten, Oswald: Assassin on Fall Guy; Mark Lane, Rush to Judgment; Leo Sauvage, The Oswald Affair: An Examination of the Contradictions and Opinions of the Warren Report) had publicly asserted that a conspiracy existed before the Warren Commission finished its investigation. Not surprisingly, they immediately testified themselves to show that they were right and that the Commission was wrong. Thanks to the mountain of material published by the Commission, some of it conflicting or misleading when read out of context, they have had little difficulty in uncovering items to substantiate their own theories. They have also in some cases obtained new and divergent testimony from witnesses. And they have usually failed to discuss the refutations of their early claims in the Commission's Report, Appendix XII ("Speculations and Rumors"). This Appendix is still a good place to look for material countering the theorists.

2. Some writers appear to have been predisposed to criticism by anti-American, far-left, or Communist sympathies. The British "Who Killed Kennedy Committee" includes some of the most persistent and vocal English critics of the United States, e.g., Michael Foot, Kingsley Martin, Kenneth Tynan, and Bertrand Russell. Joachim Joesten has been publicly revealed as a onetime member of the German Communist Party (KPD); a Gestapo document of 8 November 1937 among the German Foreign Ministry files microfilmed in England and now returned to West German custody shows that his party book was numbered 532315 and dated 12 May 1932. (The originals of these files are now available at the West German Foreign Ministry in Bonn; the copy in the U.S. National Archives may be found under the reference T-120, Serial 4918, frames E256482-4. The British Public Records Office should also have a copy.) Joesten's American publisher, Carl Marzani, was once sentenced to jail by a federal jury for concealing his Communist Party (CPUSA) membership in order to hold a government job. Available information indicates that Mark Lane was elected Vice Chairman of the New York Council to Abolish the House Un-American Activities Committee on 28 May 1963; he also attended the 6th Congress of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (an international Communist front organization) in Budapest from 31 March to 5 April 1964, where he expounded his (pre-Report) views on the Kennedy assassination. In his acknowledgments in his book, Lane expresses special thanks to Ralph Schoenman of London "who participated in and supported the work"; Schoenman is of course the expatriate American who has been influencing the aged Bertrand Russell in recent years. (See also para. 10 below on Communist efforts to replay speculation on the assassination.)

3. Another factor has been the financial reward obtainable for sensational books. Mark Lane's Rush to Judgment, published on 13 August 1966, had sold 60,000 copies by early November and the publishers had printed

4 Jan 67

110,000 copies by that date, in anticipation of sales to come. The 1 January 1967 New York Times Book Review reported the book as at the top of the General category of the best seller list, having been in top position for seven weeks and on the list for 17 weeks. Lane has reportedly appeared on about 175 television and radio programs, and has also given numerous public lectures, all of which serves for advertisement. He has also put together a TV film, and is peddling it to European telecasters; the BBC has purchased rights for a record \$45,000. While neither Abraham Zapruder nor William Manchester should be classed with the critics of the Commission we are discussing here, sums paid for the Zapruder film of the assassination (\$25,000) and for magazine rights to Manchester's Death of a President (\$665,000) indicate the money available for material related to the assassination. Some newspapermen (e.g., Sylvan Fox, The Unanswered Questions About President Kennedy's Assassination; Leo Sauvage, The Oswald Affair) have published accounts cashing in on their journalistic expertise.

4. Aside from political and financial motives, some people have apparently published accounts simply because they were burning to give the world their theory, e.g., Harold Weisberg, in his Whitewash II, Penn Jones, Jr., in Forgive My Crime, and George C. Thomson in The Quest for Truth. Weisberg's book was first published privately, though it is now finally attaining the dignity of commercial publication. Jones' volume was published by the small-town Texas newspaper of which he is the editor, and Thomson's booklet by his own engineering firm. The impact of these books will probably be relatively slight, since their writers will appear to readers to be hysterical or paranoid.

5. A common technique among many of the writers is to raise as many questions as possible, while not bothering to work out all the consequences. Herbert Mitgang has written a parody of this approach (his questions actually refer to Lincoln's assassination) in "A New Inquiry is Needed," New York Times Magazine, 25 December 1966. Mark Lane in particular (who represents himself as Oswald's lawyer) adopts the classic defense attorney's approach of throwing in unrelated details so as to create in the jury's mind a sum of "reasonable doubt." His tendency to wander off into minor details led one observer to comment that whereas a good trial lawyer should have a sure instinct for the jugular vein, Lane's instinct was for the capillaries. His tactics and also his nerve were typified on the occasion when, after getting the Commission to pay his travel expenses back from England, he recounted to that body a sensational (and incredible) story of a Ruby plot, while refusing to name his source. Chief Justice Warren told Lane, "We have every reason to doubt the truthfulness of what you have heretofore told us" -- by the standards of legal etiquette, a very stiff rebuke for an attorney.

6. It should be recognized, however, that another kind of criticism has recently emerged, represented by Edward Jay Epstein's Inquest. Epstein adopts a scholarly tone, and to the casual reader, he presents what appears to be a more coherent, reasoned case than the writers described above.

Epstein has caused people like Richard Rovere and Lord Devlin, previously members of the Commission's Report, to change their minds. The New York Times daily book reviewer has said that Epstein's work is a "watershed book" which has made it respectable to doubt the Commission's findings. This respectability effect has been enhanced by Life magazine's 25 November 1966 issue, which contains an assertion that there is a "reasonable doubt," as well as a republication of frames from the Zapruder film (owned by Life), and an interview with Governor Connally, who repeats his belief that he was not struck by the same bullet that struck President Kennedy. (Connally does not, however, agree that there should be another investigation.) Epstein himself has published a new article in the December 1966 issue of Esquire, in which he explains away objections to his book. A copy of an early critique of Epstein's views by Fletcher Knebel, published in Look, 12 July 1966, and an unclassified, unofficial analysis (by "Spectator") are attached to this dispatch, dealing with specific questions raised by Epstein.

7. Here it should be pointed out that Epstein's competence in research has been greatly exaggerated. Some illustrations are given in the Fletcher Knebel article. As a further specimen, Epstein's book refers (pp. 93-5) to a cropped-down picture of a heavy-set man taken in Mexico City, saying that the Central Intelligence Agency gave it to the Federal Bureau of Investigation on 18 November 1963, and that the Bureau in turn forwarded it to its Dallas office. Actually, affidavits in the published Warren material (vol. XI, pp. 469-70) show that CIA turned the picture over to the FBI on 22 November 1963. (As a matter of interest, Mark Lane's Rush to Judgment claims that the photo was furnished by CIA on the morning of 22 November;

the fact is that the FBI flew the photo directly from Mexico City to Dallas immediately after Oswald's arrest, before Oswald's picture had been published, on the chance it might be Oswald. The reason the photo was cropped was that the background revealed the place where it was taken.) Another example: where Epstein reports (p. 41) that a Secret Service interview report was even withheld from the National Archives, this is untrue: an Archives staff member told one of our officers that Epstein came there and asked for the memorandum. He was told that it was there, but was classified. Indeed, the Archives then notified the Secret Service that there had been a request for the document, and the Secret Service declassified it. But by that time, Epstein (whose preface gives the impression of prolonged archival research) had chosen to finish his searches in the Archives, which had only lasted two days, and had left town. Yet Epstein charges that the Commission was over-hasty in its work.

8. Aside from such failures in research, Epstein and other intellectual critics show symptoms of some of the love of theorizing and lack of common sense and experience displayed by Richard H. Popkin, the author of The Second Oswald. Because Oswald was reported to have been seen in different places at the same time, a phenomenon not surprising in a sensational case where thousands of real or alleged witnesses were interviewed, Popkin, a professor of philosophy, theorizes that there actually were two Oswalds. At this point, theorizing becomes sort of logical-mathematical game; an exercise in permutations

and combinations; as Commission attorney Arlen Specter remarked, "Why not make it three Oswalds? Why stop at two?" Nevertheless, aside from his book, Popkin has been able to publish a summary of his views in The New York Review of Books, and there has been replay in the French Nouvel Observateur, in Moscow's New Times, and in Baku's Vyzhka. Popkin makes a rhetorical accusation indirectly, saying that "Western European critics" see Kennedy's assassination as part of a subtle conspiracy attributable to "perhaps even (in rumors I have heard) Kennedy's successor." One Barbara Carson has made the same point in another way by her parody of Shakespeare's "Macbeth" entitled "MacBird," with what is obviously President Kennedy (Ken O Bird) in the role of Duncan, and President Johnson (MacBird) in the role of Macbeth. Miss Carson makes no effort to prove her point; she merely insinuates it. Probably the indirect form of accusation is due to fear of a libel suit.

9. Other books are yet to appear. William Manchester's not-yet-published The Death of a President is at this writing being purged of material personally objectionable to Mrs. Kennedy. There are hopeful signs: Jacob Cohen is writing a book which will appear in 1967 under the title Honest Verdict, defending the Commission report, and one of the Commission attorneys, Wesley J. Liebeler, is also reportedly writing a book, setting forth both sides. But further criticism will no doubt appear; as the Washington Post has pointed out editorially, the recent death of Jack Ruby will probably lead to speculation that he was "silenced" by a conspiracy.

10. The likelihood of further criticism is enhanced by the circumstance that Communist propagandists seem recently to have stepped up their own campaign to discredit the Warren Commission. As already noted, Moscow's New Times reprinted parts of an article by Richard Popkin (21 and 28 September 1966 issues), and it also gave the Swiss edition of Joesten's latest work an extended, laudatory review in its number for 26 October. Izvestiya has also publicized Joesten's book in articles of 18 and 21 October. (In view of this publicity and the Communist background of Joesten and his American publisher, together with Joesten's insistence on pinning the blame on such favorite Communist targets as H. L. Hunt, the FBI and CIA, there seems reason to suspect that Joesten's book and its exploitation are part of a planned Soviet propaganda operation.) Tass, reporting on 5 November on the deposit of autopsy photographs in the National Archives, said that the refusal to give wide public access to them, the disappearance of a number of documents, and the mysterious death of more than 10 people, all make many Americans believe Kennedy was killed as the result of a conspiracy. The radio transmitters of Prague and Warsaw used the anniversary of the assassination to attack the Warren report. The Bulgarian press conducted a campaign on the subject in the second half of October; a Greek Communist newspaper, Avgi, placed the blame on CIA on 20 November. Significantly, the start of this stepped-up campaign coincided with a Soviet

... that the U.S. Embassy in Moscow stop distributing the Russian-language edition of the Warren report; Newsweek commented (12 September) that the Soviets apparently "did not want these facts to get in their way."

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

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	:	
MORTON H. HALPERIN,	:	
	:	
Plaintiff,	:	
	:	
v	:	No. 76-1082
	:	
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE	:	
AGENCY, ET AL.,	:	p. 18
	:	
Defendants.	:	
-----	X	

Washington, D. C.
Tuesday, June 21, 1977

Deposition of CHARLES A. BRIGGS, taken on behalf of the plaintiff in the above-entitled action, at the office of Mark H. Lynch, Esq., 600 Pennsylvania Avenue, S. E., Washington, D. C. 20003, pursuant to notice, beginning at 10:05 a.m., before Sandra S. Morgan, a notary public in and for the District of Columbia.

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff:

MARK H. LYNCH, Esq.
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
600 Pennsylvania Avenue, S. E.
Suite 301
Washington, D. C. 20003

For the Defendants:

PAUL FIGLEY, Esq.
Information and Privacy Section
Civil Division
Department of Justice
Room 6336
Washington, D. C. 20530

JOHN LAVERY, Esq.
General Counsel's Office
Central Intelligence Agency

Also present:

Morton H. Halperin
Kenneth Taymor

CONTENTS**EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR****WITNESS:****PLAINTIFF: DEFENDANTS:**

CHARLES A. BRIGGS

3

--

(No exhibits.)

P R O C E E D I N G S

Whereupon,

CHARLES A. BRIGGS

was called as a witness and having been first duly sworn
was examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF

BY MR. LYNCH:

Q Mr. Briggs, would you identify yourself for the
record?

A Yes. My name is Charles A. Briggs. I am a senior
officer of the Central Intelligence Agency, 25 years with
the organization.

Q Could you tell us your current position in the
agency?

A I am the information review officer for the deputy
director of operations.

Q I believe in one of your earlier affidavits or
denial letter you were identified as chief, services staff,
and then Freedom of Information review officer.

Could you explain the difference between those two
titles?

A Yes. I had my previous title, which was chief of
services staff, at that time. I no longer do. It's in

another component of the clandestine service.

Q Have your duties with respect to Freedom of Information matters and particularly with respect to the request which is the subject of this lawsuit been the same in both positions?

A Yes, I carried that function with me.

Q Could you explain, please, the role you have play in responding to Mr. Halperin's request, which is the subject of this lawsuit?

A All right.

Procedurally, when requests come into the agency, they go to the appropriate components for file search; and when documents are found that were originated in the clandestine service, they go through a lower review process and subsequently come to me; and I am the final release and review authority in the clandestine service.

The accurate organizational title is DDO, Deputy Director for Operations.

Q Now, with respect to the two documents which are still in controversy in this case, document number 6 and document number 7, were you the officer that classified these documents?

A No.

Q Can you identify the officer?

A Not by name.

Q By function?

A He is the chief of the unit in DDO which is the funnel for all -- the focal point for all the documentation found in Freedom of Information-Privacy Act cases. His number appears on the classified version of the documents in question.

Q What is the reason for your refusal to identify this individual by name?

A Because he is undercover, under the CIA Act of 1949 the director is, I guess, precluded or does not have to, or whatever the phrase is, reveal the names of individuals in the agency.

Q In the initial denial letter in this case, April 1967 -- if you would like to refer to it -- you have your file there, don't you?

MR. FIGLEY: Yes.

BY MR. LYNCH:

Q Two documents were located in response to the request.

Could you now tell us which one of these two documents -- relate these two documents to the subsequent

numbering of all seven documents? Which were the first two that were located?

A I don't know whether I can do that. I am familiar with document number 6 and document number 7. I know what they are.

Q Can you recall whether documents 6 and 7 were the first two that were located among the other five?

A I don't know the order in which they were located.

Q Now, did you personally review the classification determination which was reached by the unidentified officer?

A Yes, I did.

Q And did you make a de novo review of his determination, or was it a more cursory review?

A De novo. Do you mean did I determine on my own that it was a valid classification? Yes, I did that.

Q Now, if I could direct your attention to your first affidavit filed in this case, and if I could particularly direct your attention to paragraphs 8 and 9 of that affidavit, are the individuals whose identities --

MR. FIGLEY: Is this the January 21, 1977 affidavit?

MR. LYNCH: Yes, this is the first Briggs affidavit executed January 21, 1977.

BY MR. LYNCH:

Q And I would like to particularly direct your attention to paragraphs 8 and 9 in which you lay out justification for claiming exemption 6.

I would like to clarify if these claims are still being made, that the information which is still in controversy, are these claims still being made for that information or have they been muted out?

MR. FIGLEY: I think that's more appropriate for me to respond to.

These paragraphs went only towards the names of those people who you no longer are contesting and do not relate to the material withheld from documents 6 and 7.

BY MR. LYNCH:

Q Similarly, in paragraph number 10 of that affidavit you say, "In the instant case, the right to privacy is not the sole consideration, however. At issue is the ability of the CIA to maintain and protect confidential relationships."

Is that still the issue raised by the withholding of documents 6 and 7, or has that been muted by the plaintiff's withdrawal?

A I am not sure that I understand exactly what you are asking. My focus on documents 6 and 7 is in terms of

the sources and methods of protection and the classification of the file copy of the document.

It was my understanding that the other aspects had been muted.

Q I am trying to determine which of your testimony is still applicable to the documents that are in issue and which of your testimony relates to matters that are now mute.

A I guess I really don't know how to answer that. Maybe I am not tracking you.

MR. FIGLEY: Is the question whether or not paragraph 10 has any further application in this case?

Perhaps you could ask him whether the confidential concerns are applicable to continue withholding. We get into a problem to tie him to the phrasing of paragraph 10.

Generally, I would say yes, it is. The lawsuit is much narrower now than it was at the time this affidavit was filed.

BY MR. LYNCH:

Q Let me back up a bit.

Did your statement in paragraph 10 that the issue in this case is the ability of the CIA to maintain and protect confidential relationships, was that intended to extend to

individuals other than those who might be considered intelligence sources who had a professional relationship with the CIA?

A Yes.

Q It was intended to extend to individuals beyond that category?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Thank you.

Now, if I could direct your attention to your second affidavit in this lawsuit, which was executed on April 28, 1977, and if I can direct your attention to paragraph 10 of that affidavit in which you state, "The documents were prepared in 1970 in response to a request for a limited press background briefing on the political situation in Chile."

Could you explain whether that phrase "limited press background briefing" has some meaning? What is a limited press background briefing?

A It wasn't the press in general. It was, in that instance, I believe -- I am not sure physically how many people were present. It was a limited number. It may have only been one.

Q On what basis are you able to make that statement?

A My discussion with individuals and reading of the files. I wasn't physically present so I don't know for certain.

In other words, it was, as I understand it, a special circumstance. There had been a request for information; and, in the case of documents 6 and 7, to the best of my knowledge, a single individual was involved.

Q How have you acquired the knowledge as to which you testify in this case?

A Agonizingly.

Through considerable review and discussions with the involved or knowledgeable persons, I should say. Actually, I don't know if there is anybody left who was physically involved at the time.

Q What has happened to individuals --

A They have retired, to the best of my knowledge.

Q How many individuals were involved in these transactions in 1970?

A I don't know the answer to that. I am only certain of one individual who was physically involved. There were others, I'm sure, who assisted in the background preparation; but I don't know the numbers.

Q Do I understand you to say there was one individual

who handled the briefing?

A That's my understanding.

Q Is that individual now retired?

A Yes.

Q Will you identify that individual?

A Sorry.

Q Could you answer yes or no?

A No.

Q Will you state why?

A Same CIA Act of 1949.

Q Are you referring to 50 U.S.C. 403(g)?

A I guess. The one that gives --

MR. FIGLEY: I think that's what he is referring to.

THE WITNESS: Names, titles, organizational affiliation.

MR. LYNCH: Counsel, are you directing the witness not to answer that question?

MR. FIGLEY: He has indicated himself that he can't answer. This is a high official from the Central Intelligence Agency. He knows better than I do.

I think, though, that clearly this is information which is beyond the scope of disclosure and Freedom of

Information discovery cases.

MR. LYNCH: Despite the fact that this individual is retired?

MR. FIGLEY: He may be retired now --

THE WITNESS: Can I say something about that?

This is a constant issue. The fact that an individual has retired does not negate or change the previous fact that he had associations with individuals who were sensitive sources in the past, perhaps still living and still actively supporting the agency.

For official acknowledgement of a relationship with the agency to be made a matter of public record could conceivably impact with very negative consequences for an individual.

I know sometimes it is hard for the public to understand why somebody who is no longer affiliated cannot be acknowledged, but probably in the past he was overseas somewhere and probably dealing with foreigners; and we neither can acknowledge the fact of the location of a station overseas nor the names of sources.

BY MR. LYNCH:

Q This individual was a senior official in the operations directorate, was he not?

A Yes.

Q And did this official ever have an overt assignment with the Central Intelligence Agency?

A I don't know the answer to that. Not to my knowledge. I believe not, but I can't say.

Q What is the basis for your belief?

A To my knowledge, he was never assigned but to the operations directorate.

Q Have you talked to this individual with respect to this lawsuit?

A No.

Q Have you attempted to contact the individual?

A No.

Q On what basis have you formed the conclusions that you have reached as to these transactions that took place in 1970?

A On the basis of the record and conversations with people who were in the component in which he served.

Q What kind of record are you referring to? Are there files you have reviewed to reach these conclusions?

A Essentially on the basis of asking who the individual was who made the documents in question available.

Q Are there any collateral documents that you have

reviewed that have contributed to your understanding of these transactions in 1970?

A. Nothing else relevant to this particular issue.

I did review all the documents in the case in totality, and I addressed the documents relevant to this issue in the earlier affidavit, the seven documents.

Q. When you say you reviewed all the documents relevant to this case in its totality, do you mean there are more documents than the seven documents that have been identified in response to this document?

MR. FIGLEY: Are you asking whether or not there were other documents pertaining to the briefing of journalists or other documents pertaining to Chile in 1970?

BY MR. LYNCH:

Q. Are you talking about this particular briefing, relations with the press in general, or the entire Chilean issue?

A. I have had occasion to read an awful lot of documents on Chile.

Q. In paragraph 10 of your second affidavit, you state that, "The documents were prepared with the explicit understanding and agreement that the information contained therein, while factually accurate, would not be attributed

to the U. S. Government or the CIA."

What is the basis for your statement there was an explicit understanding and agreement?

A The information that I received through discussions with the involved organization indicated specifically that that was the nature of the agreement, that it was a confidential arrangement. The understanding was that the briefing materials would be given if the agency was not identified.

Q How many individuals have you had conversations with in forming these conclusions as to which you have testified?

A I don't know the answer to that. I can think of half a dozen at least.

Q Half a dozen. Are any of these individuals -- were any of these individuals principally helpful to you, one or two or three that were particularly informative; or were all half dozen equally informative?

A I would have to say that one or two of them are more knowledgeable than the others, not because they were physically present but in the interim they had to involve themselves so deeply in the documentary analysis of the Chilean situation.

Q Did either one of these two people have personal

knowledge of this press briefing which is the subject of the lawsuit?

A Were they physically present at the time?

Q Right.

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Were they involved in the decision at the time to make this information available to the press?

A No, I don't believe so.

Q Is there anyone left at the agency who was involved in the decision-making process?

A Not to my knowledge.

Early retirement is becoming a way of life.

Q Also in paragraph 10 you state, "An affirmative decision was made by a senior CIA official that classification markings would not be used on the released documents."

That statement is based on the same kind of conversations; is that right?

A Right.

Q Not with the senior official?

A No. It is my understanding it was the same individual.

Q Based on your conversations with people who were familiar with this transaction, is this practice often

followed at the CIA, where classified information is made available to members of the press on the understanding --

MR. FIGLEY: Let me object to that on the grounds you assume it was classified information, and I don't think Mr. Briggs has said that, nor have defendants.

THE WITNESS: The information itself was not classified, but it was the link between the information, documents and the agency that is classified.

BY MR. LYNCH:

Q Well, has it been -- does the CIA, on occasion, make available similar information to members of the press on the understanding that the link between the CIA and the information will not be made public?

A I am not aware of circumstances like this occurring with any frequency. At the moment, I can't say I am aware of any other circumstances like this.

~~The agency has had -- has provided information to~~
~~journalists over time. I think we stated that earlier.~~
~~But in no case would it be classified information.~~

Q But the linkage of the information to the CIA would be a classified fact, in your view?

A It would depend on the information.

For example, here, what I have done, in today's

world, given the Freedom of Information Act and my desire to adhere to two laws -- Freedom of Information and the director's responsibility to protect sources and methods -- is to release as much of it that posed no problem.

Q To the best of your knowledge, under what authority did the senior official release a fact which is classified?

A He didn't. The information released, the information itself, was not classified.

Q Would you agree that he made public disclosure, disclosure outside of the CIA, of the fact that the CIA had this information?

A Well, he certainly did that to the individual. But the arrangement was a confidential arrangement. He passed that information to that individual on the condition that his source of the information, i.e., the agency, would not be revealed.

The connection of the information to the CIA was made to him, and the person had had a security clearance. He, like anybody else on whom we get a clearance, passed the procedural standards by receiving classified information if we chose to give it to him.

Q Did the individual know he had been cleared?

A I don't know the answer to that.

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Q Would the answer to that be retrievable from the files of the agency?

A No, because all of the relevant documents -- well, I don't think so. We would have the record of the fact of a security clearance being granted. They don't necessarily know the individual knew himself he had been cleared.

Q Had this individual signed a secrecy agreement?

A Not to my knowledge. A secrecy agreement isn't necessarily signed by everyone on whom we get clearance to discuss either a project or an activity or information.

It is signed by an employee or an agent or staff employee.

In other words, if I -- you are familiar with the fact that we have contact with U. S. business or academia or whatever for the purpose of acquiring information from them. We will run a security clearance to try to get a feel whether there is any potential problem.

In that kind of a situation, the individual does not sign a secrecy agreement.

Q When you released the classified fact to this person, the linkage of the information to the agency, on the condition that he not make public disclosure of this linkage, did you have any way to enforce that agreement and understanding

with the individual?

A No.

We have little way of enforcing a secrecy agreement except in good faith.

Q You have pretty potent ways of enforcing secrecy agreements with people who sign them.

A Forgive my levity.

Q That last exchange shouldn't have been on the record, I guess.

Was the individual cleared for the specific purpose of making this information available to him?

A No.

Q How long before the information was made available had he been cleared?

A I don't recall the exact date. It was, in time, before 1970; but I don't recall the exact date.

Q Do you have a rough idea? One year? Five years?

A I have no idea.

Q How was the information actually transmitted to this individual?

A It is my understanding that the documents themselves actually were physically passed.

Q He was given copies of the documents?

A That's right.

Q Was this information made available to any other media representatives?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Were there other limited press background briefings on the political situation in Chile given to other members of the press in the fall of 1970?

A Well, the other documents that aren't at issue this morning were given to other newsmen.

Q Were those other documents documents that have been at issue in this case and the request for which has been withdrawn, or were they documents that were construed not to be within the scope of the original request?

A It's my understanding I am only addressing documents 6 and 7 this morning.

MR. FIGLEY: That's what the notice of deposition provides, but insofar as you can do so, you can answer this.

THE WITNESS: I think I have indicated, with respect to the affidavits, that there were a total of four documents relevant to the background briefings; and the other two involved, I am not sure whether this individual was also a recipient of those documents.

But I am sure that there were other individuals

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involved with the other two documents.

BY MR. LYNCH:

Q Could you clarify that?

A There were four documents that figured in background briefings.

Q Numbers 1, 2, 6 and 7?

A Right.

1 and 2 is not the subject of this deposition.

It is my understanding that documents 1 and 2 were given to an individual or individuals other than the individual that we are discussing in connection with 6 and 7. Whether he was also the recipient of 1 and 2, I am not sure.

Q 6 and 7 were given only to one individual?

A To the best of my knowledge.

Q 1 and 2 may have been given to more than one individual?

A That's possible.

Q Did the individual who received documents 6 and 7 request background briefing, or was it offered to him?

A My understanding is that he requested it.

Q Did this individual work for Time Magazine?

A I can't answer that.

Q If I could direct your attention to paragraph 7 of

your second affidavit, you say that, "Two of the human intelligence sources involved in acquiring the information described above are currently residing abroad and may be expected to continue to provide information of value to this Government's foreign intelligence mission provided their identities are protected."

Were both sources involved in furnishing all three sets of information, the three different sets of deletions?

A Try that again?

A Let me explain. I will talk about three sets of deletions. There is one block in document 6 of the first 15 lines. There is the second block of 6 lines, and 35 lines making up the totality of document 7.

Were these two sources sources of all that information, or did one source furnish some of the blocks and not other of the blocks?

Could you relate source one and two to the information that has been withheld?

A I am going to have to think about how to avoid telling you who they were.

I think it would be correct to say that -- well, I actually don't really know the answer to that. It's my understanding that one of the sources furnished information

in one document but did not furnish any of the information in another document.

I can't say that with absolute certainty.

In other words, the first document which, as you know, is four pages long, consists of a chronological sequence of information. It is possible, I suppose. I just don't know.

Q All right.

If I could direct your attention to document 6.

MR. FIGLEY: Has that been filed?

MR. LYNCH: Attachment 1 to the second Briggs affidavit.

BY MR. LYNCH:

Q And if I could direct your attention to the 6 lines deleted from page 3, third paragraph, of document 6, you state in your affidavit, in paragraph 5, that these lines consist of personal details concerning a foreign personality.

Was this personality Salvador Allende?

MR. FIGLEY: Let me object to that on the grounds it goes to the subject matter of the lawsuit.

MR. LYNCH: This entire page and the previous page, in fact, the previous two pages, are biographical material on Allende. It would seem quite likely that the

third paragraph on page 3 also pertains to Allende.

If it doesn't, it could make a big difference in the weight that might be attributed to the claim of exemption.

MR. FIGLEY: How is that?

MR. LYNCH: You have a document that talks almost totally about Allende, and you say this information pertains to a foreign personality.

It seems that it's fairly -- most likely this paragraph refers to Allende. If it doesn't, I would like testimony on that fact and we may avoid a whole line of dispute.

THE WITNESS: I can say that it does refer to Allende, but I can't say any more about it.

MR. LYNCH: All right.

BY MR. LYNCH:

Q Now, with respect to the first 15 lines which are deleted from paragraph 6 -- I'm sorry, from document 6, which you describe in paragraph 4 of your second affidavit, you say this consists of foreign intelligence information concerning specific secret political arrangements between foreign government officials and the identities of individuals who played significant roles in these secret activities.

Is Allende one of the individuals whose identities

has been withheld here?

A I think I can answer that affirmatively, but again, I can't say any more than that.

Q With respect to document number 7, which you describe in paragraph number 6 of your second affidavit, you state that the document concerns secret communications between foreign government officials.

Is Allende one of those officials?

A Yes.

Q I would like to go back to the status of the individual to whom documents 6 and 7 were made available.

Is it correct that your testimony is that this individual was cleared for receipt of classified information?

A The clearance had been run on him, yes.

Q Was the information made available to him -- was the individual -- did the individual have any professional relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency?

A No, not to my knowledge.

Q Was the information made available to him because he was considered reliable and trustworthy, that he would be considered reliable and trustworthy in keeping the agreement under which he received the information?

A Well, he asked for the information in the first

instance, and it would be my assumption that it was given to him because he was trustworthy because we had determined, through the clearance process that, according to the procedures, he was -- could receive information.

Q Could you explain the nature of the understanding that you had -- that the agency had with this individual with respect to how he could use the information?

A I don't think I found anything in the record or in anything I heard that put any qualifiers on it except for not attributing it to the agency.

Q He was free to report this information so long as he did not identify that it came from the agency?

A Yes.

Q Was the nature of this understanding such that he could make the agency connection known to his editor or publisher, or was he prohibited from making that disclosure as well?

A Well, I don't know that he was specifically prohibited, but it would be atypical. The arrangement was between the individual and the agency, and I would assume he would not make it available to his publisher or anyone else.

MR. BYRCH: Okay. I don't think I have any more

questions unless the plaintiff has one.

Can we take a brief recess and then come back?

MR. FIGLEY: Certainly.

(Recess.)

MR. LYNCH: Back on the record.

Just a few quick further questions.

BY MR. LYNCH:

Q Could you elaborate the basis for your refusal to answer whether the person to whom this briefing was given was a Time Magazine employee?

A Well, as a basic part of the National Security Act of '47, the director is enjoined from identifying sources and methods as a part of the intelligence trade craft process who engage in confidential relationships which we have to honor or people won't be helpful.

I guess most recently and most specifically, Mr. Bush, when he was DCI, issued a press statement, because of all the public concern about the CIA and the press; and he explained what the circumstances had been and he laid down some new rules for the future.

And in that document, he stated that although we won't engage, as we had, with members of the U. S. press as actual sources in the future, he still would not identify any

individual who we had had contact with.

Q So this individual, then, is considered an intelligence source?

MR. FIGLEY: I think you are putting words in his mouth. He didn't say that.

MR. LYNCH: He said he wouldn't identify intelligence sources.

MR. FIGLEY: I think he said the director issued a statement stating that the CIA would not identify individuals who are members of the press who had relationships with the CIA.

MR. LYNCH: Could you read that answer back?

(The reporter read the pending answer.)

MR. LYNCH: So your position is that this information falls within 403(d)(3), exemption 3?

MR. FIGLEY: No, I don't think it's being withheld on that basis at all. It is being withheld on the basis it has not been publicly disclosed and that the CIA has entered a confidential agreement with this individual not to identify him.

We have not withheld this information on the basis of exemption 3. It was withheld on the basis of exemption 6.

The fact that plaintiff has waived or dropped that

portion of the lawsuit doesn't mean that we are now obligated to disclose it in discovery.

MR. LYNCH: Do I understand you to say the CIA has an explicit agreement with this person not to identify him?

MR. FIGLEY: I don't have personal knowledge of that. Perhaps Mr. Briggs does.

THE WITNESS: What I know is that we had an agreement that he wouldn't identify us at the time. I don't have personal knowledge of our having said, "We won't identify him," but that's agency practice, the director's charge to us.

MR. LYNCH: I am seeking this person's identity not because it's within the scope of the request but because he could provide highly relevant testimony.

THE WITNESS: I understand that, and I feel bound, then, to return to exemption 6 because I can't, without his permission, identify him.

BY MR. LYNCH:

Q In view of the fact that the Senate committee report identified Time Magazine as being one of the recipients of these briefings, can you acknowledge that the individual was a Time Magazine employee?

A No, I can't.

Q Was this information given to the recipient in connection with his official duties?

MR. FIGLEY: Let me object to the question on the ground it is unclear. Official duties as a reporter and employee of some publication, or if a free-lance reporter, his official duties as a free-lance reporter?

MR. LYNCH: I am referring to the provision which provides that classified information can only be provided in connection with official duties. I am trying to determine if this information was given in compliance with that executive order, Executive Order 11652.

MR. FIGLEY: Will you restate your question with that in mind?

BY MR. LYNCH:

Q Having referred to Executive Order 11652, was this information given to the individual in compliance with that requirement of the executive order?

A As I have indicated before, the information itself was not classified.

Q I am referring to the fact of the agency's connection with this information. I thought we had come to an understanding that the fact, the crux of this case, is the agency's connection with this information and that connection

was made available to this person.

A I don't quite know how to do this.

The record indicates that he or the institution he works for asked for background information on Chile. So, in that sense, he was asking for the information in conformance with his position, not as an individual or private citizen.

The information that was given to him is -- was unclassified.

I would have to assume that the agency felt free to give him the information because of the fact that we had run a clearance on him previously and we knew, when we said to him, "We will give you the information on the condition that you don't reveal the affiliation," that he would honor that commitment.

Q Was this information cleared because he was a reporter?

A I don't know the answer to that.

It could well have been because of his access to information or his travel at the point in time at which the clearance was sought. I don't know whether he was a reporter at the time the clearance was taken.

Q Are there any agency regulations which govern the disclosure of classified facts to individuals who are outside

the agency's employment?

A. Sure. There are regulations implementing Executive Order 11652, which does address recipients both in and out of the government.

Q. In addition to the executive order, does the agency have any regulations that would cover this kind of transaction?

A. In addition to the implementing instructions of 11652?

Q. I misunderstood you. You have the Executive Order 11652, and then you have implementing instructions in addition to that?

A. Right.

Q. Do any of those implementing instructions cover the situation which was the genesis of this lawsuit, where a classified fact was made available to this reporter?

MR. FIGLEY: You said classified facts made available to a reporter. Mr. Briggs has repeatedly said that the documents given over were not classified documents.

I know what you are saying is the fact of the CIA connection was disclosed to him, but in reading selected excerpts from this deposition, that may not be clear.

I would appreciate it if you could be more explicit.

MR. LYNCH: I think we are very clear on the

record that we understand that the deleted information is not itself classified but the fact that the CIA had possession of that information in 1970 is classified and that fact was made available to the recipient of this information.

My pending question is whether the agency has a regulation that deals with making available classified facts, which we have at issue here, a classified fact at issue here, making such facts available to people who were not employed by the agency.

THE WITNESS: I think that the best way to answer that is to say that the clearance process is the guaranty, is the control; and there are, yes, regulations on the procedures for getting a clearance for someone.

BY MR. LYNCH:

Q Are there regulations that deal with reporters being cleared because they are reporters?

A I am not aware of anything in that context.

I am aware of regulations, subsequent to all the near-current hoopla, which laid down conditions for not dealing with reporters.

Q In 1970, are you aware of any regulations?

A I don't recall that the regulations were so specific as to identify reporters or doctors or categories

of people that way.

MR. LYNCH: Okay. I don't have any more questions.

MR. FIGLEY: We have no questions.

Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the taking of the deposition was ended.)

CERTIFICATE OF DEPONENT

I have read the foregoing 35 pages which contain a correct transcript of the answers made by me to the questions therein recorded.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this _____ day
of _____.

Notary Public

My commission expires _____.

CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Sandra S. Morgan, the officer before whom the foregoing deposition was taken, do hereby certify that the witness whose testimony appears in the foregoing deposition was duly sworn by me; that the testimony of said witness was taken by me stenographically and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me; that said deposition is a true record of the testimony given by said witness; that I am neither counsel for, related to nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which this deposition was taken; and, further, that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.

Sandra S. Morgan
Notary Public in and for
the District of Columbia

My commission expires October 14, 1981.

Washington Post, 12/29/75, p. A16

Richard S. Welch

THE MURDER OF Richard S. Welch, CIA station chief in Athens, was the entirely predictable result of the disclosure tactics chosen by certain American critics of the agency as part of their effort to destroy it. His was one of the names published in a periodical called *Counter-Spy*; in a book, former CIA officer Philip Agee has also named names. Precisely because those using these tactics include experienced former CIA men, they would be in a position to know that public identification of Richard Welch was tantamount to an open invitation to kill him. The surprise is not that this happened to him, but rather that it had not happened previously to others. That none of the critics pulled the trigger is meaningless. There are enough potential killers at large around the world to spare the critics that chore.

"If anyone is to blame for Mr. Welch's death, it is the CIA," explained Tim Butz of Fifth Estate, the group here that publishes *Counter-Spy*. "We don't want to see anyone shot." One can understand why Mr. Butz does not wish to acknowledge that his group set Mr. Welch up for the hit. He no doubt believes every word he says. To blame the victim for the murder, however, is simply to flee one's own responsibility for contributing to it. What other result than killing did Mr. Butz and his colleagues

expect when they fingered Mr. Welch? The ironies are overwhelming. Here are some American foes of the CIA, adopting the morality and even abetting the technique—indirect assassination—which they have so often described as characteristic of the agency itself. Here are critics of the CIA employing a disclosure tactic virtually certain to lead to assassination, just as the rest of the country comes to the view, which the government has already formally embraced, that assassination is an unacceptable abuse of power.

Institutionally the CIA has a good deal to account for over the years. It is, however, currently making an accounting in the only way acceptable in a democratic society: according to internal and congressional processes of review. That review must, of course, go on—with due vigilance against such perils to individuals as have been freshly dramatized in Athens. To think that any of the CIA's past excesses constitute a moral license for extra-legal punishment of its employees is just wrong. Richard Welch, after all, was not the agent of a hostile power. He was an American citizen serving his government, and he had been accused of no crime. We mourn his death.

The Washington Post
January 23, 1977
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CIA News Management

By Morton H. Halperin

WHEN Richard Welch arrived in Athens in June, 1975, to become the CIA station chief, his superiors at the Agency's Langley, Va., headquarters were concerned about his safety. Their anxiety did not stem from the fact that some months earlier an American publication called Counter-Spy had identified him as former station chief in Peru. Rather, the concern was based on Welch's choice of residence.

The house in an Athens suburb had been the residence of a succession of station chiefs over many years and was widely known in the Greek capital as such. The officials at CIA headquarters, aware of these facts, also knew that anti-Americanism was at a fever pitch in Greece, with much of the antagonism directed at the CIA.

It was decided to warn Welch. In keeping with the deference traditionally accorded a field representative by CIA headquarters, Welch was given no clear, unequivocal order not to move into the old residence. However, sources who have seen the pertinent CIA cable — it has never been released but was referred to briefly in the Senate Intelligence Committee report — say it all but instructed Welch to find another home.

The combined judgment of the people at headquarters, the cable said, was that it would be wisest for him to live elsewhere. Welch was advised in the strongest possible terms that there would be concern for his safety should he move into the traditional residence. Reportedly, there was specific reference to the danger of assassination.

Welch was unpersuaded. Back to Langley went a cable saying that, for administrative convenience and other reasons, Welch would take the chance.

All of this was well known at CIA headquarters when news arrived that Welch had been shot to death as he and his wife returned home late at night from a Christmas party at the American ambassador's home. But none of this pertinent information was made public at the time. Instead, the CIA swung into action with a classic "disinformation" campaign directed not at some hostile intelligence agency or enemy nation but at the American public.

The CIA's then press spokesman, Angus Thuermer, began calling the reporters who normally cover the intelligence agencies. Thuermer, as was his habit, spoke on deep background; the newsmen could use the information but not attribute it to any source.

What Thuermer said was that Welch had been identified as a CIA agent in Counter-Spy, the magazine published by an anti-CIA group called the Fifth Estate. He did not tell the reporters that the CIA had warned Welch not to live in the house in front of which he was killed or that the house was known in Athens as the home of the CIA station chief.

Accepted Line

THE POINT here is not whether the assassins learned of Welch's identity because of the Counter-Spy article or his choice of residence — it is well known that in most capitals, particularly in Western countries, anyone who really wants to learn the CIA chief's name can do so. The point is rather that the CIA engaged in news management immediately after his death to make a political point.

The "disinformation campaign" was a success. The sta-



Richard Welch: warned.

ries filed out of Washington on Welch's death that night all noted that he had been listed in Counter-Spy. None mentioned the CIA warnings to Welch as to his place of residence.

The message was underlined when a CIA official, permitting himself to be identified as a "U.S. intelligence source," told the Associated Press that "we've had an American gunned down by other Americans fingering him — right or wrong — as a CIA agent." A few days later the White House press spokesman said Welch's death had come at least in part as a result of publication of his name. The Washington Post reflected typical journalistic acceptance of the CIA line when it said editorially that Welch's murder "was the entirely predictable result of the disclosure tactics chosen by certain American critics of the Agency."

Thus, the Welch murder has become part of CIA mythology. The assassination was, of course, tragic and inexcusable, but the aftermath points to the dangers of permitting an intelligence agency to use the flow of information to distort public debate on vital issues.

Halperin works at the Center for National Security Studies, where he recently co-authored "The Lawless State."

How CIA managed news after agent's murder in '75

By Morton H. Halperin

Special from the Washington Post

WASHINGTON — When Richard S. Welch arrived in Athens in June, 1975, to become the CIA station chief, his superiors at the agency's Langley (Va.) headquarters were concerned about his safety.

Their anxiety did not stem from the fact that some months earlier an American publication called Counter-Spy had identified him as former station chief in Peru. Rather, the concern was based on Welch's choice of residence. The house in a suburb of Athens had been the residence of a succession of station chiefs over many years and was widely known in the Greek capital as such. The officials at CIA headquarters were aware of these facts, and also knew that anti-Americanism was at a fever pitch in Greece, with much of the antagonism directed at the CIA.



RICHARD S. WELCH

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dence. However, sources who have seen the pertinent CIA cable — it has never been released but was referred to briefly in the Senate intelligence committee report — say it all but instructed Welch to find another home.

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The "disinformation campaign" was a success. The stories filed out of Washington that night on Welch's death all noted that he had been listed in Counter-Spy. None mentioned the CIA warnings to Welch as to his place of residence.

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Morton H. Halperin works at the Center for National Security Studies, where he recently co-authored "The Lawless State."

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

29 March 1977

Mark H. Lynch, Esq.
John H. F. Shattuck, Esq.
Project on National Security
and Civil Liberties
122 Maryland Avenue, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002

Gentlemen:

The Director of Central Intelligence has asked me to reply to your letter of 17 March 1977 in which you expressed concern over the possibility of CIA activity involving the forthcoming book of your client, Mark Lane, on the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., entitled Code Name Zorro. I do not foresee that CIA would have any reason to take any action designed to interfere in the publication, promotion, distribution, reviewing or public discussion of Mr. Lane's forthcoming book, and CIA has no intention of taking any such action.

As concerns your request for the promulgation of a new regulation of the nature you suggest, in my opinion the issuance of such a regulation is unnecessary. The delineation of CIA's functions and authorities is set forth in the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. §403, et seq.; the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. §403a, et seq.; Executive Order 11905 (41 Fed. Reg. 7701, 19 February 1976); pertinent National Security Council Directives and appropriate CIA regulations.

Sincerely,

Anthony A. Lapham

Anthony A. Lapham
General Counsel



FOEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION NATIONAL SECURITY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

122 Maryland Avenue, N.E.

Washington, D.C. 20002

(202) 544-5380

Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

March 17, 1977.

Dear Admiral Turner:

This letter is written on behalf of Mr. Mark Lane and the American Civil Liberties Union. For the reasons set forth below, we request (1) a commitment from you in writing within ten days that the Central Intelligence Agency will not interfere in any way with the publication, promotion, distribution, reviewing, or public discussion of Mr. Lane's forthcoming book on the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., entitled Code Name Zorro; and (2) the prompt promulgation of a regulation prohibiting the CIA from interfering in any way with the publication, promotion, distribution, reviewing or public discussion of any book.

We make these requests because information recently released to Mr. Lane by the Agency has revealed that the Agency undertook a covert campaign to counter and discredit certain books concerning the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, including Mr. Lane's book, Rush to Judgment. Because these activities exceed the Agency's statutory charter, 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) and violate the First and Fifth Amendment rights of the authors and the First Amendment rights of the public at large, including the membership of the ACLU, they should not be repeated.

A CIA dispatch to "Chiefs, Certain Stations and Bases," dated January 4, 1967 states: "The aim of this dispatch is to provide material for countering and discrediting the claims of the conspiracy theorists, so as to inhibit the circulation of such claims in other countries" (Exhibit A, p.1.) This document also contains the following requests for "action":

Approved for release by the CIA on 11/11/2011 pursuant to E.O. 13526, which is hereby revoked.

Morton H. Halperin, Director
Deputy M. Oliver, Administrative Assistant

Charles M. Mawby, Executive Editor
Morton H. Halperin, Counselor

- 2 -

a. To discuss the publicity problem with liaison and friendly elite contacts (especially politicians and editors) Point out also that parts of the conspiracy talk appear to be deliberately generated by Communist propagandists. Urge them to use their influence to discourage unfounded and irresponsible speculation.

b. To employ propaganda assets to answer and refute the attacks of the critics. Book reviews and feature articles are particularly appropriate for this purpose.

Another dispatch to "Chiefs, Certain Stations and Bases", dated July 19, 1968 also instructs that "assets" may be assigned to counter published criticisms of the investigations of the assassinations of President Kennedy and Senator Robert Kennedy. (Exhibit C).

The released documents also reveal that numerous books and authors, in addition to Mr. Lane, were targets of these operations: Joachim Joesten, Oswald: Assassin or Fall Guy; Leo Sauvage, The Oswald Affair: An Examination of Contradictions and Omissions of the Warren Report; Sylvan Fox, The Unanswered Questions About President Kennedy's Assassination; Harold Weisberg, Whitewash II; Penn Jones Jr., Forgive My Grief; George Thompson, The Quest for Truth; Edward Jay Epstein, Inquest; and Richard H. Popkin, The Second Oswald. (Exhibit B).

The CIA's efforts to counter and discredit these books apparently met with some success, for a note on January 4, 1967 dispatch states:

"This was pulled together by [deleted] in close conjunction with [deleted]. We furnished most of the source material, proposed many of the themes, and provided general 'expertise' on the case. The Spectator article was written [deleted]. 23 Jan. 1967."


Although these operations may have been primarily aimed at audiences abroad, including United States citizens abroad, they inevitably had a domestic impact, because magazines such as The Spectator have a significant readership in the United States. Yet another alarming fact disclosed by these documents is that the CIA obtained a proof copy of Rush to Judgment at least two weeks before the book was published. Although the publication date was August 15, 1966, a CIA official submitted a review dated August 2, 1966. (Exhibit D).

- 3 -

These activities of the CIA clearly infringe on the right of authors to freely communicate ideas on public issues and on the right of the public to receive such ideas without government interference. Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumers Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976). Furthermore, action by the Agency which interferes with the circulation of published books violates the authors' Fifth Amendment rights. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959). These rights, of course extend beyond our national boundaries and restrain governmental action abroad as well as at home. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957). Moreover, these activities exceed the CIA's statutory charter, for in enacting 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3), "Congress apparently felt that it had protected the American people from the possibility that the CIA might act in any way that would have an impact upon their rights." Final Report of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. S. Rep. No. 94-755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Book I, 138 (1976) cited with approval in Weissman v. CIA, No. 76-1566 (D.C. Cir., Jan. 6, 1977) (petition for rehearing pending).

In view of these statutory and constitutional violations, we believe that it is necessary for the Agency to promptly promulgate a regulation which will prohibit its employees from engaging in such activities in the future. Mr. Lane, however, requires a more immediate assurance that the CIA will not interfere with his book on the King assassination, which he has written together with Dick Gregory and which is due to be released on April 4, 1977. Consequently, we will deem his request to have been denied if not answered within ten days. While we expect that you will provide the specific assurances we seek, we also wish to make it clear that we will seek judicial relief in the event that the Agency does not comply with our requests.

Very truly yours,



Mark H. Lynch



John H.F. Shattuck

cc: The Hon. Griffin Bell
MHL:MJC

Press Intelligence Inc.
Washington, D. C. 20001

Post Bill Other
Page Page Page

NEW YORK, NEW YORK
TIMES

N - 803,183
S - 1,406,833

DEC 6 1971

Ubiquitous Hand Guides Relations of U.S. and Greece

By DAVID BINDER

WASHINGTON, Dec. 5.—He is a self-styled journalist who shuns accreditation cards and a self-proclaimed lobbyist who, because he finances this activity himself, has never had to register as such with Congress. A well-dressed man with the air of a bon vivant, he neither drinks nor smokes.

For more than 10 years, however, whenever something controversial has happened in relations between Greece and the United States, this P. Dimitracopoulos has almost certainly been in the middle or at the bottom of it in a journalistic or lobbyist capacity—or both.

At the moment he is described by the State Department as the main figure behind a campaign that appears to have destroyed the appointment of a United States Ambassador to Greece. An agency spokesman said the effort "is causing us a lot of problems."

These are the sort of things that the holding man with flashing brown eyes relishes.

Post for Schaufele in Limbo

Top-ranking State Department officials said recently that they had reason to believe Mr. Dimitracopoulos had inspired and fed a vitriolic Greek press campaign lasting last summer against the appointment of William S. Schaufele by the Carter Administration as Ambassador in Greece. Eventually the Government of Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis came out against the appointment.

A State Department official said over the weekend that the Carter Administration was weighing the idea of nominating Mr. Schaufele as Ambassador to Poland and naming Robert J. McCloskey, currently ambassador to the Netherlands, as Ambassador to Greece. Mr. McCloskey earlier served briefly as Ambassador in Cyprus.

Greek Government officials said they were persuaded that Mr. Dimitracopoulos had played a key role in the affair through his connections in the Lambrakis newspaper chain—principally the Athens newspapers Vima and Hra.

In an interview in his Washington hotel Mr. Dimitracopoulos denied he had played a decisive role in the Schaufele affair, although he acknowledged having talked about it with "fence, maybe friends" of Greeks involved in the matter, including the Vima correspondent in New York, Fotis Eustathides.

He also remarked in the interview which he recorded that he had opposed the Schaufele nomination "as a Greek" after the appointee had testified July 12 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The State Department officials and the Greek Government said that Mr. Dimitracopoulos's agitation against the Schaufele nomination through Greek press outlets sufficed to create an atmosphere that made it virtually impossible for the Car-

manis Government to approve the appointment.

Turning to his journalistic career and describing his activity in that field, he said, "When a correspondent in New York or Athens calls and asks for information, I try to help." He said that in the case of the Vima correspondent, "He calls whenever he needs information—sometimes four times a week, sometimes only twice a month." He said this was understandable because "point out, he is in New York and I am in Washington and, point two, I have been dealing with Washington since 1951."

But he added, with a touch of indignation, "If they are trying to find a scapegoat for what the State Department mismanaged and shift the responsibility to my shoulders then they are all wet. I beat over backwards to give the man the benefit of doubt."

Mr. Dimitracopoulos said that in his opinion Mr. Schaufele and the State Department had damaged themselves irreparably during Mr. Schaufele's testimony before the Senate on his nomination, when he described as "unusual" the status of Greek islands just off the coast of Turkey in relation to the Greek-Turkish dispute over oil-drilling rights in the Aegean Sea.

Territorial Integrity Cited

The newspaper Vima, describing Mr. Schaufele as "unacceptable," asserted that his testimony made it appear that the United States was questioning the territorial integrity of Greece.

Mr. Dimitracopoulos was characteristically sensitive to suggestions that he had masterminded the action against Mr. Schaufele. Upon learning that The New York Times was interested in the matter, and five days before the interview, he telephoned Mr. Schaufele to deny that he had done anything against him, even though the diplomat had never raised any accusation against him.

In the interview Mr. Dimitracopoulos, who said he is 48 years old, discussed his career from his beginnings as the son of an Athens tour guide to his present employment as a consultant for a New York stockbroker. His life has been a life of controversy filled with claims and counterclaims by himself, by powerful friends in Congress and the American press and his bitter enemies in the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Greek Government.

Strong Supporters in Congress

His supporters in Congress have included Senator George S. McGovern, Democrat of South Dakota, who calls him "a friend" and an adviser and former Senator V. V. Hartke, Democrat of Indiana, who endorsed him as "a close personal friend and extraordinary Greek patriot." Representative Benjamin S. Rosenthal, Democrat of Queens, who became acquainted with Mr. Dimitracopoulos as a member of the House International Relations Committee, called him "an excellent voice for free Greece."

Mr. Dimitracopoulos is an extraordinarily voluble person who makes it a point to pay generous compliments and to do favors.

He was married in 1952 to a former

United States Information Service officer, Celia Wax, and was divorced a year later. A frequenter of diplomatic receptions, he prides himself on his reputation as a "dependable" extra man at dinner parties. He was voted one of Washington's "10 most perfect gentlemen" in a Washington publication last year.

By his own account he is "a journalist working for Wall Street," "a self-made man," "a one-man operation" and, "a Greek citizen who has devoted 10 years of my life fighting (for) causes I believe in, exposing myself to great risks."

Frequent Traveler to N.Y.

As a consultant for Brimberg & Co., his principal employer since 1968, Mr. Dimitracopoulos advises investors on foreign-policy events that may affect the stock market. He travels to New York two or three times a week on his consultant work, he says.

He gained increasing attention from the fall of 1947 until the summer of 1971 as a leading spokesman in exile against the military dictatorship in Greece. But Mr. Dimitracopoulos had long been involved in Greek United States relations—starting in 1936, according to United States Government records, and starting in 1943, according to him.

He asserts that he was arrested Oct. 15, 1943, when he was 14 by the German secret police—the Gestapo—on suspicion of being an underground resistance worker, and that in the same year he helped escort Allied fliers to freedom from occupied Greece, including "four or five" Americans who had been shot down.

At the request of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Greek intelligence service KYP sought but found no evidence of underground resistance activity by Mr. Dimitracopoulos, a CIA official said.

State Department records show, however, that in 1951, when he was a political correspondent for an Athens newspaper, Kathimerini, Mr. Dimitracopoulos orally denounced two members of the United States Embassy as "homosexuals" and "Communists." The incident was noted in an embassy cable to Washington at the time by Ambassador John G. Peurifoy.

Mr. Dimitracopoulos shrugged off this ancient charge during the interview. "I have never accused of homosexuality because if there were evidence to that effect I would have written it. Mr. Peurifoy tried to destroy me. I fought him, tooth and nail. What Mr. Peurifoy says should be seen in that framework of reference."

Mr. Peurifoy died in a 1955 auto accident in Thailand, where he was then Ambassador.

The Peurifoy incident was the start of a long and often contentious relationship between Mr. Dimitracopoulos and United States Government agencies. For a time in the 1950's and 60's both the United States Embassy in Athens and the Greek Government refused to do business with him.

CIA records show that in 1951 Mr. Dimitracopoulos offered his services to the agency and was turned down. They show that he offered to work for United States Army intelligence in August 1951 and was again turned down. The CIA records further allege that in the 1950's

he was associated with both the Yugoslav and Israeli intelligence services.

Asked about these imputations, Mr. Dimitracopoulos replied, "The C.I.A. is, after my scale, I have offered to work for anybody at any time. Information for pay, never."

Mr. Dimitracopoulos was intimately familiar with many of these allegations at the time of the interview, having obtained hundreds of previously secret United States Government documents about himself through the Freedom of Information Act. Through his attorney he is seeking still more documents.

"I have 4,000 now," he said, either to support a lawsuit against the CIA or to assemble material for a book, or both.

He took obvious comfort in what he described as blatant errors in some of the raw data assembled by the United States Government about him, displaying one intelligence report that plainly confused him with a different P.D. Dimitracopoulos from Greece.

"I can see why the United States is creating blunders in global policy with this information and misinformation," he said. One CIA document acknowledged him "the scoundrel," he related proudly.

Press Intelligence, Inc.
 WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001

Front Page	Editor Page	Other Page
		30

NEW YORK, NEW YORK
 TIMES

M - 803,123
 S - 1,406,833

JAN 4 1978

Of Journalism, Intelligence and a Greek's Record

To the Editor:

The Dec. 6 news story about me by David Binder is so shot through with inaccuracies that I feel constrained to comment, within your space limitations, although plentiful official documentation is available to support my following points:

Binder opens by describing me as a "self-styled journalist." This is untrue. He not only ignores my 20 years of reporting for U.S. and Greek publications but overlooks even your own editorial of Dec. 30, 1970, about the dictatorship then in power in Greece. In that editorial, *The Times* referred to me as "a respected, self-exiled [not self-styled] Greek journalist."

Binder has consistently ignored or distorted my words in a two-hour interview he had with me on Sept. 30. This is shoddy journalism because, with his permission, I taped the interview and sent him a copy of the transcript.

Binder casts doubt on my record as a Greek resistance fighter against the Germans in World War II. He ignores the record:

- Official letters and reports from U.S. Air Force General Leigh Wade, then U.S. air attaché in Athens, in 1950 and 1951, saying that my "war record is most outstanding through my assistance to the Allied cause," and from General William Quinn, chief of the U.S. Army mission in Greece.

- My receipt in 1951 of the Cross of St. Mark at a ceremony attended by Defense Minister (now Premier) Karamanlis, along with the ministers of the navy and air force, and the military, air and naval attachés of the American Embassy and seven other senior U.S. officials. I was cited for having "saved the lives of seven Americans during the occupation."

- The award to me by the Greek Government of the Golden Cross of the Order of King George I in 1955 for "exceptional services" to the Resistance and the Medal of National Resistance reciting my experience of torture

and my having been sentenced to death by the Germans. Binder was given copies of these and other documents on Oct. 3. He ignored them.

Even the C.I.A. acknowledged in 1952 documents I received under the Privacy Act that I was imprisoned and sentenced to death by the Germans for sabotage activities.

Binder cites alleged C.I.A. records that I "was associated with both Yugoslav and Israeli intelligence services." The allegation is refuted by a Feb. 19, 1975, C.I.A. study. This study was furnished to me and, referring to me, admits that "there are no hard facts in the record to show that he has worked for any foreign government against the interests of Greece (or for that matter, the United States), that he is in the pay of any national government, that he has ever been a member of a foreign intelligence service."

Binder cites other alleged C.I.A. records to the effect that in 1951 I offered my services to the C.I.A. but was turned down. The facts are the reverse.

ELIAS P. DEMETRAKOPOULOS
 Washington, Dec. 13, 1977

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001

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WASHINGTON, D.C.

POST

JUN 17 1976

M - 534,400

S - 736,527

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

A Covert Operation That Failed

House Speaker Carl Albert was made the agent of an undercover attempt by the Nixon administration in late 1971 to destroy the effectiveness of a Greek expatriate whose lobbying against the military dictatorship in Athens infuriated the Nixon high command.

This effort failed only because top officials in the State Department found out about it. They ordered withdrawal of a malicious, unsigned memorandum that had been sent to Albert and issued a private apology to the designated victim, Elias Demetracopoulos. The memorandum on plain white paper was drafted by State and Central Intelligence Agency bureaucrats.

The episode, reminiscent of other covert political operations in the 1971-1972 Nixon White House, can now be brought to light because Albert has announced his decision not to run for reelection. Those involved refused to discuss the affair earlier because of possible reprisals from the office of the Speaker, the third highest government official.

The failed effort involved, directly or indirectly, White House legal counsel John Dean, U.S. Ambassador Henry Tasca in Athens, an implacable foe of Demetracopoulos, Nixon fund-raiser and confidant Thomas Pappas, a rich Greek American with intimate ties to the military junta and who was under attack by Demetracopoulos, and lesser figures.

For the Nixon White House, it ended on Dec. 29, 1971, shortly after the memorandum was ordered withdrawn. On that day, a highly unusual, written explanation of the aborted effort, said by White House operatives to have been unsigned, was sent directly to Dean in the White House from the State Department. It reviewed the campaign against

Demetracopoulos and stated that, no matter how controversial he was, no case could be made against him. Moreover, it warned that the intended victim was considering a libel suit against the U.S. government for the anonymous memorandum, which could prove extremely embarrassing.

For Demetracopoulos, however, the affair did not end until he had extracted a grudging letter from Albert fully seven months later. The Speaker told Demetracopoulos that "a routine inquiry (to the State Department) by a member of my staff" had triggered the memorandum. Albert said his office had sought the background information because Albert had been informed "you might be seeking an appointment at some future date."

In fact, Demetracopoulos first met Albert in the mid 1950s. He had seen him many times between then and December 1971, and had brought high ex-parliamentary leaders of Greece, banished from office during the junta's rule, to the Speaker's office to meet Albert.

Thus, Albert was the victim of a set up by the administration, which wanted the most prestigious congressional figure possible to make the request for background information on Demetracopoulos. When he or his staff complied, the memorandum calculated to destroy the effectiveness of Demetracopoulos was quickly sent to Capitol Hill. The clear purpose to have it widely distributed, under the imprimatur of the Speaker.

Two copies of the memorandum were taken to the House, one for Albert, the other for the House International Relations Committee, which had not asked for it but where it was assumed there would be widespread distribution. A committee staffer, shocked by the anonymous document, gave it only to Rep. Benjamin Rosenthal of New York, chairman of the European subcommittee.

Similarly shocked, Rosenthal asked then Congressional Assistant Secretary of State David Abshire why the State Department would lend itself to anonymous charges against Demetracopoulos that were probably libelous and circulate them on Capitol Hill. Abshire, caught unaware, discussed the matter with then Deputy Under Secretary of State William B. Mason and they immediately ordered the two copies of the memorandum retrieved.

On Jan. 31, Atsaur wrote Demetracopoulos what amounted to an unusual official apology. The man who ran congressional affairs for the State Department wrote that he had not "seen, approved or even heard of the paper prior to its very limited distribution" and that the department could not stand behind "a memorandum containing questionable material."

The last chapter in this plot against the man who had come to be regarded as a dangerous gadfly by Mr. Nixon's advisers was the most revealing, the report to John Dean, recipient of so many undercover reports in those days of the White House plumbers, explaining why this particular plot has failed.

The Washington Star

TUESDAY, MARCH 1, 1977

Nixon 'Smear' Crux of Issue

McGovern's Objection Blocks 557 Promotions

By Walter Taylor

Washington Star Staff Writer

An objection by Sen. George McGovern to the promotion of a senior State Department official who allegedly was involved in a Nixon administration smear campaign against a foreign journalist effectively blocked the recommended advancement of 557 other career diplomats.

The effort to discredit the journalist, Greek exile leader Elias Demetracopoulos, has been tied in the past to an effort by the 1972 Nixon re-election campaign to attack McGovern, the Democratic presidential nominee.

The official who is alleged by McGovern to have been involved in the scheme is George T. Churchill, who at the time was head of the State Department's Greek "desk" and who currently is listed in an agency directory as director of the Office of International Securities Operations of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs.

McGOVERN, it was learned, raised objections earlier this year after he discovered Churchill's name on a list of 558 career Foreign Service officers whose promotions had been recommended by former President Gerald R. Ford and later endorsed by the Carter administration.

Last week, at the insistence of the South Dakota Democrat, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee postponed action on all 558 officials until the State Department formally responded to detailed questions about Churchill's past record with the agency.

In a letter to Committee Chairman John J. Sparkman, D-Ala., McGovern tied Churchill to the effort to discredit Demetracopoulos, charging that in 1971 he was "involved directly" in the preparation and circulation of a memorandum "containing defamatory and anonymous accusations" against the Greek expatriate.

McGovern alleged that three years later, Churchill assisted a free-lance writer by providing him with "information identical in certain respects" to that contained in the 1971 memorandum.

CHURCHILL, who was recommended for promotion to the State Department's top career service rank, could not be reached for comment.

McGovern was reportedly away from the city and could not be contacted, but an aide, John Holm, confirmed last night that the South Dakota Democrat, chairman of the Foreign Relations subcommittee on international organizations, had thus far blocked the Churchill promotion.

He added, however, that McGovern had received late yesterday a "fairly straightforward" reply to the 25 questions about Churchill's alleged role in preparing the anti-Demetracopoulos memorandum that were sent last week to the State Department.

Holm said that McGovern had follow-up questions he wished to direct to the department about Churchill, but that rather than hold up the promotions of individuals not involved in the matter, he would permit all 558 names, including Churchill's, to go to the full Senate for debate.

AS A RESULT, an appearance by Churchill at a public hearing on the promotions scheduled for today was canceled, he said.

Holm declined to make available the responses to the 25 prepared questions that had been received from the State Department.

Demetracopoulos, who lives in Washington and has been working against Churchill's advancement, said after a meeting with Holm last night that McGovern's decision to free the promotions was due, at least in part, to pressure from others on the promotion list.

All the officials on the list would stand to receive significant pay raises if their promotions are approved. Many of them currently are stationed with the department here.

McGovern had asked the State Department to submit the Churchill promotion separately, but it had declined to do so, Demetracopoulos said.

The controversy now surrounding the Churchill promotion stems from attempts, beginning in 1971, to discredit Demetracopoulos, who at that time was an outspoken critic of not only the military junta that controlled Greece but of Nixon administration officials who supported the Athens dictatorship.

AMONG OTHER things, Demetracopoulos, who fled Greece in 1967, leaked to reporters a confidential report by the staff of a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee that was critical of the junta and of then-U.S. ambassador to Greece Henry J. Tasca.

Following that disclosure, in November 1971, an anonymous memorandum critical of Demetracopoulos and evidently prepared at the State Department, was circulated on Capitol Hill. After Demetracopoulos complained about the memo, it was ordered withdrawn by David M. Abshire, then assistant secretary of state for congressional relations.

Later, according to Demetracopoulos, information similar to that in the State Department memorandum was given to a free-lance journalist, who used it in a book that is about to be published.

In May 1973, syndicated columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak said they had tied a public attack on Demetracopoulos during the 1972 presidential campaign to an anti-McGovern campaign inspired by John B. Connally's Democrats-for-Nixon organization.

THE ALLEGATION involved a letter from the then-mayor of Savannah, Ga., John P. Rousakis, to McGovern complaining about an interview the Democratic presidential nominee had given Demetracopoulos. In the letter, which Evans and Novak said was given wide circulation by the Greek-American press, the mayor referred to Demetracopoulos as "an obscure Greek Communist journalist."

Although the mayor denied that he was prompted to write the letter, the columnists quoted federal investigators as saying they had discovered that the allegations against the Greek exile originally had been drafted on a Democrats-for-Nixon letterhead and said the material was used in an attempt to discredit McGovern among Greek-American voters.

Churchill has not been linked to the Rousakis letter, and he was not asked about it in the original questionnaire submitted by McGovern to the State Department.

BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL
814 D. STREET, New York

NEW YORK OFFICE:
Room 2172, PLAZA Building
WASHINGTON D.C. 20515
Telephone: (202) 225-2501

CHIEF OF OFFICE:
U.S. POST OFFICE
4115 MAINE STREET
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10017
Telephone: (212) 675-6200

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

May 12, 1976

COMMITTEE:
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
SUBCOMMITTEE:
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL AND
MILITARY AFFAIRS
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEE:
CHAIRMAN—COMMERCE, CONSUMER
AND MONETARY AFFAIRS
LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Honorable George McGovern
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

Dear George:

Thanks for your letter about your subcommittee's interest in U.S. policies toward Greece during the military dictatorship. I am very happy to hear of this interest and will cooperate in any way I can.

Elias Demetracopoulos testified before the Subcommittee on Europe, which I chaired, in our hearings on "Greece, Spain and the Southern NATO Strategy" in July 1971. In November 1971, Mr. Clifford Hackett, the staff director of my subcommittee, was given a copy of an anonymous memorandum by Mr. Roy Bullock, the staff administrator of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. This memorandum contained very serious and unsubstantiated allegations concerning Mr. Demetracopoulos.

According to Mr. Bullock, he had been given the memorandum by a member of the State Department's congressional relations staff. This staff member told Mr. Bullock that the memorandum had been prepared at the request of the Speaker's office.

Mr. Hackett sent me a copy of the memorandum which I judged to be deplorable both in content and in the manner it was distributed. He also determined that the

Honorable George McGovern
Page Number Two

May 12, 1976

memorandum had been prepared in the Bureau of Near East Affairs which, at that time, was responsible for Greece. Although we considered giving Mr. Demetracopoulos an opportunity to reply to the memorandum and then sending the memorandum and response to members of the subcommittee, we did not do so since Mr. David Abshire, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Affairs, visited me the following week to say that the memorandum was unauthorized by him and should be considered withdrawn. Consequently, we have never made any distribution of the memorandum to anyone, including Mr. Demetracopoulos.

If I can help further in this matter or supply any other information pertinent to your subcommittee's study, please let me know or have someone call Mr. Hackett, who is now on the full committee staff, at 225-3042.

Sincerely,



Benjamin S. Rosenthal, M.C.

BSR/ah

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20540

May 7, 1976

Dear Ben:

During your chairmanship of the House Subcommittee on Europe, you held extensive hearings on U. S. policies towards Greece. Among your witnesses was Elias Demetracopoulos, whose important work on behalf of Greek democracy we both know.

I understand that Mr. Demetracopoulos was the subject of an attempt by the State Department to discredit his testimony by an anonymous and defamatory memorandum which the Department prepared and circulated on Capitol Hill.

As chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, which included Greece in its jurisdiction from 1967 to 1974, I am considering a review of U. S. policies toward that country during the period of the Athens military dictatorship. For that purpose, I would like to have some details on the Department of State's efforts to influence congressional study of such policies during that period. The Demetracopoulos memorandum and the circumstances surrounding its creation and distribution are important for my subcommittee's efforts.

I would appreciate any cooperation you can provide me in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

George McGovern.

Honorable Benjamin S. Rosenthal
 U. S. House of Representatives

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON
 AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY
 WASHINGTON, D. C. 20540
 OFFICIAL BUSINESS

George McGovern
 U.S.

Mr. Elias Demetracopoulos
 Fairfax Hotel
 2100 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W.
 Washington, D. C.

Messenger Will Call

ELIAS P. DEMETRAKOPOULOS

FOUNTAI ACRES,
200 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE,
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001
(202) 253-2100

December 3, 1971

Honorable William B. Macomber, Jr.
Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

I would like to bring to your personal and immediate attention a matter of the utmost urgency and importance which I am sure is bound to have very serious repercussions to every one involved in this very ugly affair.

I have heard, and subsequently verified, that the Department of State very recently originated and distributed, in response to a Congressional request, an anonymous memorandum concerning me.

This two page memorandum without documentation or attribution of any kind contains a series of malicious, damaging and untruthful accusations about me, and constitutes, in my opinion and that of my lawyers', a libel.

I could give you more details on this matter but I am sure that, if you are not already aware that this memorandum exists, you can establish easily its existence, its contents and the story of its origin and distribution.

I can assure you that I will take all appropriate and necessary steps to nullify completely the effects of this unprecedented, irresponsible and despicable action.

Awaiting your earliest written reply, I remain,

Sincerely yours,

E/P
Elias P. Demetrapoulos

EFD/mf

ELIAS P. DEMETRAPOULOS

FAIRFAR HOTEL
2100 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE
WASHINGTON D C 20008
(202) 293-2100

December 8, 1971

Honorable Benjamin S. Rosenthal, Chairman
Subcommittee on Europe
Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In view of the fact that you had invited me to testify on Greece last July before your Subcommittee and in reference to a two page anonymous and libelous memorandum concerning me, prepared and distributed recently by the Department of State to Congressional recipients, I would appreciate an early reply to the following questions:
(a) Have you been given a copy of this memorandum, and
(b) has the Department of State subsequently requested a recall of its memorandum?

I ask these questions because the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, Mr. David M. Abshire, has expressed his indignation over this affair and assured me, last Sunday, that he has ordered the immediate recall of this memorandum as "unauthorized."

Sincerely yours,


Elias P. Demetrapoulos

EPD/mf



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 10, 1971

Mr. Elias Demetracopoulos
The Fairfax Hotel
Washington, D. C.

Dear Elias:

Bill Macomber was notified of the receipt of your December 3rd letter overseas and in a telephone conversation with his staff he has asked that I respond to you on his behalf.

As you realize, the Department prepared the paper in question in response to a specific request for information from a Member of Congress, and I am sure you recognize the Department's responsibility to respond to such requests. However, from our conversations last weekend, you know that upon looking into the question of distribution of the paper, I acted to have withdrawn the two copies that had been distributed. In withdrawing the paper, it was explained to the recipients that it had been distributed without my knowledge and that I personally would not have approved the distribution of such information in this form.

As I have already assured you, I regret that this matter was handled in this way.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Dave Abshire".

David M. Abshire
Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

January 31, 1972

Mr. Elias Demetracopoulos
The Fairfax Hotel
Washington, D. C.

Dear Elias:

This is in further reply to my letter to you of December 10, 1971 and our subsequent conversations concerning the paper prepared in response to the request of a member of Congress. I should like to clarify, and to assure you, that in seeking to have withdrawn the paper to which you referred I was concerned, on reflection, that the Department of State not be regarded as standing behind a memorandum containing questionable material. I hasten to reiterate that I had not seen, approved or even heard of the paper prior to its very limited distribution. With this assurance, the paper having been promptly withdrawn and recipients notified of the reasons therefor, I trust that we may consider this matter closed.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "David M. Abshire".

David M. Abshire
Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations

BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL
5TH DISTRICT, NEW YORK
WASHINGTON OFFICE:
Room 2153, Rayburn Building
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20515
Telephone: (202) 225-0001

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

COMMITTEES:
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE
ON EUROPE
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
DISTRICT OFFICE:
U.S. POST OFFICE
41-85 MAIN STREET
PLAZA, NEW YORK 11361
Telephone: (212) 979-8200

February 28, 1972


Mr. Elias P. Demetracopoulos
Fairfax Hotel
2100 Massachusetts Avenue
Washington, D. C. 20008

Dear Mr. Demetracopoulos:

Thanks for writing about the memorandum concerning your activities which was circulated recently on Capitol Hill by the Department of State. Mr. Mackett, Staff Consultant of the Subcommittee on Europe, sent me a copy of that memorandum which he had received through the Committee on Foreign Affairs, from the State Department.

This memorandum, which I judged to be deplorable both in content and in the manner it was distributed by the State Department, was subsequently recalled by the Department. This recall was confirmed to me in person recently by Mr. Abshire.

Sincerely,



BSR/ca

ELIAS P. DEMETRAKOPOULOS

FAIRFAX HOTEL
2100 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE
WASHINGTON D C 20006
(202) 793-2100

April 7, 1972

The Honorable Carl Albert
The Speaker
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Speaker:

First, I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for the very interesting, useful and courteous meeting we had at your office on March 9, 1972 on the occasion of the visit to Washington of the Speaker of the last Greek Parliament, Mr. D. Papaspyrou, and the representative of the Greek National Radical Union Conservative Party and former Minister of Public Order, Mr. G. Rallis.

Second, I deem it necessary to bring to your personal attention a delicate matter of considerable importance which already has had a lot of ramifications. The issue concerns the preparation and distribution by the State Department of a libelous anonymous memorandum concerning me to Congressional recipients and "in response to a specific request for information from a Member of Congress" to quote a December 10, 1971 letter of the Department of State. Your office has been named as the source of this Congressional request by a number of State Department officers. I have already briefed your Legislative Assistant Mr. Michael L. Reed on this matter on March 16, 1972, and presented to him all available documentation which tells a very ugly story.

I am enclosing this documentation for your information, including two letters from the State Department, addressed to me, dated December 10, 1971, and January 31, 1972, plus a letter from Congressman Benjamin S. Rosenthal, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe dated February 28, 1972. In addition, the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, Mr. David M. Abshire on December 5, 1971, personally telephoned me in New York to express his indignation, to inform me of the actions he ordered to be taken, and to apologize for this affair.

The Honorable Carl Albert
April 7, 1972 - p. 2.

This matter raises a number of serious questions and creates, in the opinion of my lawyers and myself, a very dangerous precedent if the State Department officers' account of how the memorandum originated is indeed true.

The proper working relationship between the Executive and Legislative Branches of Government, the protection of individual civil rights and character assassination by unethical Congressional and governmental procedures are involved here.

In this connection I would appreciate receiving, at your earliest convenience, answers to the following questions:

1. Have you personally requested last year from the Department of State any information or data concerning me or has such a request been made by any member of your staff; if so, for what reasons?
2. If such a request was made, was it done in writing?
3. If you received this two page anonymous memorandum concerning me, what was your personal reactions or that of your staff to ... "this memorandum, which I judged to be deplorable both in content and in the manner it was distributed by the State Department," to quote Chairman Rosenthal's letter of February 28, 1972?
4. Can you confirm that this memorandum was recalled and can you state the reasons given to your office for this recall by the Department of State?
5. Have you or your office passed this libelous information in any way or in any form to a third party and could you name that party? Further, have you authorized its distribution by the State Department to other Congressional offices?
6. If the statement of the State Department officers about the role of your office in this matter is not true, then I will be glad to provide you with their names, positions and other relevant data in order to enable you to take all steps you deem necessary.

Sincerely yours,


Elias P. Demetracopoulos

EPD/mf
Enclosures (5)

**The Speaker's Rooms
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515**

July 25, 1972

**Mr. Elias P. Demetracopoulos
Fairfax Hotel
2100 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20008**

Dear Mr. Demetracopoulos:

This is with reference to your letter of April 7 and your subsequent visits and telephone calls concerning preparation and distribution by the Department of State of a memorandum concerning you.

The memorandum in question was prepared by the Department of State in response to a routine inquiry by a member of my staff since the office had been advised you might be seeking an appointment at some future date. I do not recall any of the information in the memorandum and am advised the Department of State has withdrawn it. In accordance with the policy of this office, the memorandum was not distributed or made available to any third party.

Sincerely,


The Speaker

CA/Rckh

LAW OFFICES
WILSON, WOODS & VILLALON

SUITE 1032 PENNSYLVANIA BUILDING
 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE & 13TH STREET N.W.
 WASHINGTON, D. C. 20004

202 628-4600

JAMES E. WILSON
 WARREN WOODS
 EDWARD G. VILLALON
 BETTY SOUTHWARD MURPHY
 JON F. HOLLENGREEN
 LAWRENCE E. LINDEMAN

LEONARD APPEL
 COUNSEL

February 9, 1972

Mr. Elias P. Demetracopoulos
 Fairfax Hotel
 2100 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
 Washington, D. C. 20008

Dear Mr. Demetracopoulos:

I have carefully reviewed your recent exchange of correspondence with the Department of State, including Assistant Secretary of State Abshire's letters of December 10, 1971 and January 31, 1972 on the subject of an anonymous memorandum allegedly prepared within the Department at the request of a member of Congress.

I consider the letter of January 31, 1972, including its statement that the "Department of State not be regarded as standing behind a memorandum containing questionable material" and that the paper has been withdrawn and the "recipients notified of the reasons therefor" a sufficient retraction and apology for the contents of the memorandum as to preclude the need for taking any legal action at this time.

The statute of limitations on defamation actions in the District of Columbia is one year. Should the memorandum surface again during the next ten months, we may want to reconsider the question of legal action in the light of factors mentioned in my letter to you of December 22, 1971.

Very truly yours,



Warren Woods

WW/d

JACK WASSERMAN
COUNSELOR AT LAW
WARNER BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20004
783-8805

February 11, 1972

Mr. Elias P. Demetracopoulos
 2100 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W.
 Washington, D. C. 20008


Dear Elias:

I have reviewed your correspondence with the Department of State relative to the memorandum which was distributed by that office at the request of a member of Congress.

The Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations advised you on December 10, 1971, that he acted to have withdrawn the two copies that had been distributed of the anonymous memorandum relating to you. He stated that it was distributed without his knowledge and that he personally would not have approved the distribution of the information in this form. Subsequently, on January 31, 1972, you were further advised by the Department of State that that Department should not be regarded as standing behind a memorandum containing questionable material.

In my opinion, there has been a sufficient retraction and apology to warrant no further formal steps by you or legal action. I do, however, feel that it would be advisable to obtain a copy of the memorandum and to prepare and submit a rebuttal to the Department of State for its files.

Sincerely yours,


 JACK WASSERMAN

NEW YORK: S.A.C. [REDACTED]

SUBJECT:

DETERMINATIONS, Elias P.
(Kontoropoulos)
77579 C.G.

23 JUN 1952

1. Headquarters has been advised that information indicates that the Subject is

as a result of his imprisonment and death sentence by the Germans in World War II for sabotage activities.

2. The Subject was scheduled to depart Athens on KLM Airlines, 11 June 1952 to arrive New York on 12 June 1952 where he was to stay at the St. Moritz Hotel until 16 June 1952. From New York, he was to go to Washington where he was to stay at the Roger Smith Hotel. While in the United States, he planned to see his fiancée, [REDACTED], among other people. The identity of this person is not known to us.

3. [REDACTED] You will obtain a list of phone numbers and identity of parties called by the Subject from the St. Moritz Hotel using [REDACTED]

4.

5. Headquarters is Office of Origin. This latter should receive EXTRAORDINARY handling and your reports should reach Headquarters not later than 27 June 1952.

9/22/52
[Handwritten initials]

30 July 1952

177579

Subject, a Greek national,
as a result of long imprisonment by the Germans
during World War II, entered this country in June 1952.

Please File
aps i/n

7-31-52

MEMORANDUM FOR:

VIA:

SUBJECT: Elias Dimitrakopoulos

1.

2. The study is forwarded as Attachment A. You may wish to read through it. What emerges from the study is the picture of a Greek best described as a political confidence man with great charm and a rare ability to impress important people in both Greece and the United States. He has been a gadfly reporter for 25 years. There is no record that he has ever held an important position in the Greek Government or been responsible for useful activity in either politics, military affairs, government or business. He is an information entrepreneur who has made a number of enemies, many of them senior American officials, and thrives on being the center of controversy. While he has been an annoyance, there are no hard facts in the record to show that he has worked for any foreign government against the interests of Greece (or for that matter the United States), that he is in the pay of any national government, that he has ever been a member of a foreign intelligence

FOR RELEASE

NO 18 Nov 61

service or has ever been involved in criminal activities.

3. The files do reveal that certain officials, as well as many CIA staff officers and other informants, believe that Dimitrakopoulos has reported in a manner which injured good Greek-American relations and that he has affected a life style which would require funds greater than those he can be expected to have earned as a reporter.

4. In hindsight, the Agency may have over-reacted to the provocations of Dimitrakopoulos. The files reveal

that we have denied--correctly--to a number of institutions and personalities, both American and foreign, that he was ever an employee of the American intelligence service.

5. As far as we can tell we have not taken any action against Dimitrakopoulos which may have contravened American law; the [redacted] is not, however, competent on matters of law. We understand from newspaper reports that Dimitrakopoulos, speaking through Jack Anderson's column, has accused the Agency of harassment.

Since he has been a controversial figure and the subject of many suspicions as well as antagonisms, we inevitably have had a reporting responsibility but do not know at what point this could begin to be considered "harassment."

9/18/60
12/18/60

Attachments:

A. Staff paper on Dimitrakopoulos.

B. P.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

18 November 1974

WILLIAM A. DOBROVIR / ANDRA N. OAKES / JOSEPH D. GEBHARDT / DAVID L. SCULL

2005 L Street, N.W.

Washington, D. C. 20036

(202) 785-8919

December 9, 1977

Mr. Gene F. Wilson
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Re: Elias P. Demetracopoulos

Dear Mr. Wilson:

This is a new request for CIA records on behalf of Elias P. Demetracopoulos, under the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act. His affidavit authorizing us to represent him is on file with you.

We request the documents referred to by New York Times reporter David Binder in his article (attached) of December 6, 1977, in the following quoted passages (underlined by me in the story):

- (1) "At the request of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Greek intelligence service, KYP, sought but found no evidence of underground resistance activities by Mr. Dimitracopoulos, a C.I.A. official said."
- (2) "C.I.A. records show that in 1951 Mr. Dimitracopoulos offered his services to the agency and was turned down. They show that he offered to work for United States Army intelligence in August 1951 and was again turned down. The C.I.A. records further allege that in the 1950's he was associated with both the Yugoslav and Israeli intelligence services."

We also request all records reflecting the delivery or showing of any CIA documents concerning Mr. Demetracopoulos to Mr. Binder, and any records of CIA officials or employees and Mr. Binder having contact, either in person, in writing or on the telephone.

Since the furnishing of these documents may involve violations of the Privacy Act, I hope you can deliver them to me at least

Mr. Gene F. Wilson
December 9, 1977
Page Two

within the ten working days provided in the Freedom of Information Act, if not sooner.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'W. A. Dobrovir', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

William A. Dobrovir

WAD:crk
Attachments

Press Intelligence, Inc.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001

Page 1
NEW YORK, NEW YORK
TIMES

N - 803,123
S - 1,406,833

DEC 6 1971

Ubiquitous Hand Guides Relations of U.S. and Greece

By DAVID BINDER

WASHINGTON, Dec. 5—He is a well-known journalist who shows accreditation cards and a self-proclaimed lobbyist who never has in register as such with Congress. A well-dressed man with the air of a born vivand, he neither drinks nor smokes.

For more than 10 years, however, whenever something controversial has happened in relations between Greece and the United States, this P. Dimitracopoulos has almost certainly been in the middle of it, either as a journalist or as a lobbyist, capacity or both.

At the moment he is described by the State Department as the main figure behind a campaign that appears to have been set in motion by the appointment of a United States Ambassador in Greece. He has also inspired a new investigation of the Central Intelligence Agency by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and he is waging a struggle to extract secret documents from the C.I.A. An agency spokesman said the effort "is causing us a lot of problems."

These are the sort of things that the holding man with flashing brown eyes, rather.

manly Government to approve the appointment.

Turning to his journalistic career and describing his activity in that field, he said: "When a correspondent in New York or Athens calls and asks for information, I try to help." He said that in the case of the Vima correspondent, "He calls whenever he needs information—sometimes four times a week, sometimes only twice a month." He said this was understandable because "point one, he is in New York and I am in Washington and, point two, I have been dealing with Washington since 1951."

But he added with a touch of indignation: "If they are trying to find a scapegoat for what the State Department mismanaged and shift the responsibility to my shoulders, then they are all well. I bent over backwards to give the man the benefit of doubt."

Mr. Dimitracopoulos said that in his opinion Mr. Schaefle and the State Department had damaged themselves irreparably during Mr. Schaefle's testimony before the Senate on his nomination, when he described as "unusual" the status of Greek islands just off the coast of Turkey in relation to the Greek-Turkish dispute over oil-drilling rights in the Aegean Sea.

Territorial Integrity Claim

The newspaper Vima, describing Mr. Schaefle as "unreliable," asserted that his testimony made it appear that the United States was questioning the territorial integrity of Greece.

Mr. Dimitracopoulos was characteristically sensitive to suggestions that he had masterminded the action against Mr. Schaefle. Upon learning that The New York Times was interested in the matter, and five days before the interview, he telephoned Mr. Schaefle to deny that he had done anything against him, even though the diplomat had never raised any accusation against him.

In the interview Mr. Dimitracopoulos, who said he is 48 years old, discussed his career from his beginnings as the son of an Athens tour guide to his present employment as a consultant for a New York stockbroker. His has been a life of controversy filled with claims and counterclaims by himself, by powerful friends in Congress and the American press and by bitter enemies in the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Greek Government.

Strong Supporters in Congress

His supporters in Congress have included Senator George A. McGovern, Democrat of South Dakota, who calls him "a friend and an adviser and former Senator A. W. Maestri, Democrat of Indiana, a decorated war hero, a close personal friend and extraordinary Greek patriot." Representative Benjamin S. Rosenthal, Democrat of Queens, who became acquainted with Mr. Dimitracopoulos as a member of the House International Relations Committee, called him "an excellent friend for free Greece."

Mr. Dimitracopoulos is an extraordinary, colorful person who makes it a point to pay generous compliments to his visitors.

He was married in 1952 to a former

United States Information Service officer, Celia Wax, and was divorced a year later. A frequenter of diplomatic reception, he prides himself on his reputation as a "dependable" extra man at dinner parties. He was voted one of Washington's "10 most perfect gentlemen" in a Washington publication last year.

By his own account he is "a journalist working for Wall Street," "a self-made man," "a one-man operation" and "a Greek citizen who has devoted 10 years of my life fighting [for] causes I believe in, exposing myself to great risks."

Frequent Traveler to N.Y.

As a consultant for Brimberg & Co., principal employer since 1968, Mr. Dimitracopoulos advises investors on foreign-policy events that may affect the stock market. He travels in New York and in three times a week on his consultant work, he says.

He gained increasing attention from the fall of 1967 until the summer of 1971 as a leading spokesman in exile against the military dictatorship in Greece. But Mr. Dimitracopoulos had long been involved in Greek United States relations, starting in 1950, according to United States Government records, and starting in 1943, according to him.

He asserts that he was arrested Oct. 15, 1943, when he was 14, by the German secret police—the Gestapo—on suspicion of being an underground resistance worker, and that in the same year he helped exiled Allied fliers to freedom from occupied Greece, including "four or five" Americans who had been shot down.

At the request of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Greek intelligence service kept Mr. Dimitracopoulos in Greece—New York report had turned him out of Greece—until he was released to the United States in 1951.

State Department records show, however, that in 1951, when he was a political correspondent for an Athens newspaper, Kathimerini, Mr. Dimitracopoulos had denounced two members of the United States Embassy as "homosexuals" and "communists." The incident was noted in an embassy cable to Washington at the time its Ambassador John G. Peurifoy.

Mr. Dimitracopoulos shrugged off the ancient charge during the interview. "I have never accused of homosexuality because if there were evidence to that effect I would have written it. Mr. Peurifoy tried to destroy me. I fought him tooth and nail. What Mr. Peurifoy says should be seen in that framework of reference."

Mr. Peurifoy died in a 1955 suit action in Thailand where he was then Ambassador. The Peurifoy incident was the start of a long and often contentious relationship between Mr. Dimitracopoulos and United States Government agencies. For a time in the 1950s and 60s both the United States Embassy in Athens and the Greek Government refused to do business with him.

C.I.A. records show that in 1951 Mr. Dimitracopoulos offered his services to the agency and was turned down. Two years later he offered to work for the CIA. After his arrest in August 1951, he was again turned down. The C.I.A. records further show that in the 1950s

he was associated with both the Yugoslav and the Turkish intelligence services.

Asked about these "impulsions," Mr. Dimitracopoulos replied: "The C.I.A. after my scale, I have offered to work for nobody at any time. Information for pay, never."

Mr. Dimitracopoulos was intimately familiar with many of these allegations at the time of the interview, having obtained hundreds of previously secret United States Government documents about himself through the Freedom of Information Act. Through his attorney he is seeking still more documents.

"I have 4,000 now," he said, "and I am in support of a lawsuit against the C.I.A. for a reasonable material for a lawyer."

He took obvious comfort in what he described as his latest press triumph. The raw data assembled by the United States Government about him displayed one intelligence report that plainly misled him with a different than Dimitracopoulos from Greece.

"I can see why the United States is creating hundreds in global public. This information and misinformation," he said. One C.I.A. document nicknamed "The Scorpion," he related proudly.

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Quotation of the Day

"We want to make sure everyone in the region understands the initiatives have the full support of the United States and are consistent with the objective of a comprehensive Middle East peace agreement."—Hodding Carter 3d, State Department spokesman, commenting on Secretary of State Vance's forthcoming Middle East trip. (8:51)

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24-353 9/4/72

915 follows

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

JAN 6 REC'D

05 JAN 1978

William A. Dobrovir
2005 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Dear Mr. Dobrovir:

This is in response to your letter of 9 December on behalf of your client, Elias P. Demetracopoulos, requesting the documents referred to by New York Times reporter, David Binder, in his article of 6 December.

As you are aware, we are presently processing all documents pertaining to Mr. Demetracopoulos, which were surfaced in response to his Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts appeal to this agency. We are proceeding with our review methodically on a document-by-document basis. Because of the volume of documents, and with your prior concurrence, we are making releases to you in increments. All information which is releasable under the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts will be provided to you.

You also requested any records reflecting the delivery or showing of any CIA documents concerning your client to Mr. Binder, or any records of contact between CIA officials and Mr. Binder, either in person, in writing, or telephonically. We can find no record of any document or information ever having been provided to Mr. Binder, either in writing or telephonically, pertaining to Mr. Demetracopoulos.

We hope this response satisfies your request.

Sincerely,



Gene F. Wilson
Information and Privacy Coordinator

WILLIAM A. DOBROVIR / ANDRA N. OAKES / JOSEPH D. GEBHARDT / DAVID L. SCULL

2005 L Street, N.W.

Washington, D. C. 20036

(202) 785-8919

January 16, 1978

Mr. Gene F. Wilson
Information & Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Re: Elias P. Demetracopoulos

Dear Mr. Wilson:

This is in reply to your letter of January 5, 1978, in which you write: "We can find no record of any document or information ever having been provided to Mr. Binder, either in writing or telephonically, pertaining to Mr. Demetracopoulos."

Mr. Binder's article stated:

C.I.A. records show that in 1951 Mr. Dimitracopoulos offered his services to the agency and was turned down. They show that he offered to work for United States Army intelligence in August 1951 and was again turned down. The C.I.A. records further allege that in the 1950's he was associated with both the Yugoslav and Israeli intelligence services.

Accordingly, it is evident that CIA records were made available to Mr. Binder. Such disclosure is presumptively unlawful. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). You are aware of CIA's obligation to record and to disclose to the individual each disclosure of a record concerning him "to any person." 5 U.S.C. § 552a(c). If the disclosures made to Mr. Binder were not recorded, then the CIA has violated the law.

I request that CIA ascertain who made the disclosures and failed to record them, so that Mr. Demetracopoulos may, if he wishes, pursue any criminal or civil proceedings that may be appropriate. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g), (i).

Sincerely yours,



William A. Dobrovir

WAD:crk

APPENDIX K

TIME
INCORPORATED

DONALD M. WILSON
VICE PRESIDENT
CORPORATE & PUBLIC AFFAIRS

TIME & LIFE BUILDING
ROCKEFELLER CENTER
NEW YORK 10020
(212) JU 6-1212

January 20, 1978

Mr. Morton H. Halperin
Director
Center for National Security Studies
122 Maryland Avenue N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002

Dear Mr. Halperin:

I would like to take strong exception to a part of your testimony before the House Oversight Subcommittee as reported in the January 5 Washington Post.

In that testimony you strongly imply that TIME ran a story on the Allende regime that was influenced by a false briefing from CIA. That is not true.

We have checked with the editors and correspondents involved in the October 19, 1970 cover story on Allende and they report the following. As is customary, files were requested from many South American capitals, as well as from Washington and other cities around the world. The editors also studied a substantial amount of existing material from other sources such as newspapers and magazines.


As part of this process Jerry Hannifin, a seasoned and distinguished correspondent of Latin American affairs in our Washington Bureau, set up a number of interviews, including one with CIA. Hannifin regarded the CIA as a source worth interviewing, a practice which is commonplace in Washington and throughout the world. Indeed, other correspondents have testified before the House Oversight Subcommittee that it's often useful to approach CIA for information.

Our final story reflected the judgments of our editors and the correspondents who worked on it and had nothing in particular to do with the CIA briefing.

-2-

To enter the realm of conjecture for a moment, it would not surprise me if some CIA official might attempt to take credit for a paragraph or a thought that appeared in the story. It does surprise me that you would assume that just because TIME requested and received a briefing from CIA (false or not), its story would be necessarily colored by that briefing. Like other reputable news organizations we try and weigh the full range of information from many sources and come up with a reasoned and responsible article. That's what we did with the Allende piece.

Sincerely yours,

A large, stylized handwritten signature, likely of David Rockefeller, written in dark ink. The signature is fluid and cursive, with a prominent 'D' and 'R'.

DMW:bc

30 January 1978

Mr. Donald M. Wilson
Vice-President
Time, Incorporated
Time & Life Building
Rockefeller Center
New York, New York 10020

Dear Mr. Wilson:

I write in response to your letter of January 20 regarding my testimony before the House Oversight committee.

As I am sure you know, the Senate Intelligence Committee in its report on the CIA role in Chile stated that: "Briefings requested by Time and provided by the CIA in Washington, resulted in a change in the basic thrust of the Time story on Allende's September 4, victory and in the timing of that story" (Covert action in Chile 1963-1973, Staff report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. p.25).

Since I had seen nothing in the Press to indicate that Time took exception to this interpretation, I assumed that it was correct.

My comment was based on these facts and not simply on an assumption. I will in the future, when referring to this case, make mention of your letter. I would, in this connection, be interested to know if you have ever asked the Church Committee or its successor permanent committee the basis on which the Committee staff reached its conclusion.

Sincerely yours,

Morton Halperin.

MHH/hdd

cc: Hon Les Aspin

APPENDIX L

Reuters and the C.I.A.

To the Editor:

On Dec. 26, The Times published an article on the C.I.A.'s "Worldwide Propaganda Network." The writers of that article quoted "sources familiar with the situation" as saying that the C.I.A. occasionally borrowed "assets" inside Reuters for the planting of news stories and that Reuters "knew" that the stories were being planted by the C.I.A. and that some were bogus.

In the next paragraph there is a reference to a quote by me (although my name was misspelled) that such charges were "old-hat stuff to us."

That quote had nothing to do with the comments about planted and bogus stories, which came as a surprise to us when we read The Times article. The quote was given three months earlier, in September, in response to a question from The Times seeking reaction to the Rolling Stone magazine article about the C.I.A. and alleged cover supplied to its agents by executives of news organizations.

Realizing how much diligent research and checking had gone into the production of The Times article, we were disappointed that nobody sought comment from us before going ahead with publication of the allegations about Reuters.

If we had been contacted we would have dismissed the allegations out of hand and questioned the credibility of your sources. After all, the C.I.A. is a self-acknowledged manipulator of the truth.

But we were not contacted and the net result is a blanket smear of Reuters which we cannot accept. Despite the various C.I.A. sources quoted, nobody has yet produced the name of a Reuters employee or any sort of documentary evidence to establish a link between the agency and Reuters.

We still await such proof.

DIAMOND MARLEY
Managing Editor, North America
New York, Dec. 28, 1977

APPENDIX M

American Society of Newspaper Editors

A Statement of Principles.**PREAMBLE**

The First Amendment, protecting freedom of expression from abridgment by any law, guarantees to the people through their press a constitutional right, and thereby places on newspaper people a particular responsibility.

Thus journalism demands of its practitioners not only industry and knowledge but also the pursuit of a standard of integrity proportionate to the journalist's singular obligation.

To this end the American Society of Newspaper Editors sets forth this Statement of Principles as a standard encouraging the highest ethical and professional performance.

ARTICLE I - Responsibility

The primary purpose of gathering and distributing news and opinion is to serve the general welfare by informing the people and enabling them to make judgments on the issues of the time. Newspapermen and women who abuse the power of their professional role for selfish motives or unworthy purposes are faithless to that public trust.

The American press was made free not just to inform or just to serve as a forum for debate but also to bring an independent scrutiny to bear on the forces of power in the society, including the conduct of official power at all levels of government.

ARTICLE II - Freedom of the Press

Freedom of the press belongs to the people. It must be defended against encroachment or assault from any quarter, public or private.

Journalists must be constantly alert to see that the public's business is conducted in public. They must be vigilant against all who would exploit the press for selfish purposes.

ARTICLE III - Independence

Journalists must avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety as well as any conflict of interest or the appearance of conflict. They should neither accept anything nor pursue any activity that might compromise or seem to compromise their integrity.

ARTICLE IV - Truth and Accuracy

Good faith with the reader is the foundation of good journalism. Every effort must be made to assure that the news content is accurate, free from bias and in context, and that all sides are presented fairly. Editorials, analytical articles and commentary should be held to the same standards of accuracy with respect to facts as news reports.

Significant errors of fact, as well as errors of omission, should be corrected promptly and prominently.

ARTICLE V - Impartiality

To be impartial does not require the press to be unquestioning or to refrain from editorial expression. Sound practice, however, demands a clear distinction for the reader between news reports and opinion. Articles that contain opinion or personal interpretation should be clearly identified.

ARTICLE VI - Fair Play

Journalists should respect the rights of people involved in the news, observe the common standards of decency and stand accountable to the public for the fairness and accuracy of their news reports.

Persons publicly accused should be given the earliest opportunity to respond.

Pledges of confidentiality to news sources must be honored at all costs, and therefore should not be given lightly. Unless there is clear and pressing need to maintain confidences, sources of information should be identified.

These principles are intended to preserve, protect and strengthen the bond of trust and respect between American journalists and the American people, a bond that is essential to sustain the grant of freedom entrusted to both by the nation's founders.

—adopted by the ASNE board of directors, Oct. 23, 1975.

Chicago Sun-Times code of professional standards

The following Code of Professional Standards has been adopted by The Sun-Times as a statement of principle for itself and its employees and as a bench mark by which its readers can judge its performance.

The integrity of The Chicago Sun-Times rests upon its reputation for fairness and accuracy. That integrity is based on keeping our news columns free of bias or opinion. To be professional is to be accurate and fair.

The following guidelines have been prepared for the guidance of the staff and information of the public as to the policies that underlie our professional standards. No guidelines can meet every situation. And no guideline or set of rules can substitute or replace a reputation for integrity built on day-to-day decisions by an editorial staff dedicated to finding the truth and publishing it without fear or favor.

ACCURACY

Accuracy in reporting the news is the mark of a professional. It is a standard of excellence toward which we will always strive.

1. Every effort will be made to avoid errors or inaccuracies.

There is no excuse for failure to check a fact or allegation.

2. Newspaper headlines and pictures should accurately reflect the stories they accompany or represent.

3. Mistakes should be corrected promptly and candidly. It is impossible to avoid all error; it is easy to correct errors. In making the correction, we should not be afraid to admit we have erred.

FAIR PLAY

We should at all times show respect for the rights of those encountered in the course of gathering and presenting news. In this respect:

1. Any person or organization whose reputation is attacked is entitled to simultaneous rebuttal.

2. Every effort should be made to present all sides of controversial issues.

3. The anonymous quote, especially in stories involving controversial issues, is to be avoided except in those cases when the reasons for concealing the identity of a source are manifestly clear to the reader.

4. The newspaper commits itself to protect and defend the identity of confidential news sources providing us with information considered valid for publication.

5. Articles of opinion and analysis shall be properly identified as such and kept distinctive from news coverage.

ETHICS

Our management and staff must remain free of obligation to any special interest and be committed only to the public's right to know.

1. Secondary employment, political involvement, holding public office, and service in community organizations should be avoided if they contain the possibility of conflict

of interest or of compromising the integrity of the newspaper. Acceptance of gifts or services of value is also to be avoided.

2. As a general principle we will continue to pay for all travel. If an exception is required, a decision will be made on the merits of each case, with the understanding that conditions of any free travel are to be fully explained in connection with the subsequent news coverage.

PUBLIC ACCESS

We recognize and respect the right of the public to comment on public issues or material appearing in our pages. It will be our policy to provide a regular department for such commentary or correction, subject only to limitations of relevancy and space.

We want a dialog with our readers, for it is their newspaper as well as ours. It shall be the policy of our editors and their staffs to encourage the maximum amount of public participation in bringing all points of view before our readers.

Finally, we recognize that integrity is our greatest asset. To maintain that integrity, we pledge our best efforts and full resources to keep faith with those to whom we owe ultimate responsibility — our readers.

JOURNALISTIC ETHICS AND YOU

Editorial staff members of The Tribune are expected to avoid any compromises of their journalistic integrity. This must include even the appearance of compromise. The only special interest The Tribune will serve is the public right to know.

The following guidelines are consistent with the professional standards expected of editorial staff members.

1. Gifts of significant value should be returned immediately. Gifts of insignificant value such as pencils, key chains, etc., may be accepted.
2. The Tribune will pay travel and other costs for staff members on assignments. Free or reduced fee travel is acceptable if no practical alternates are available.
3. Press passes are permitted for those staff members on assignment to cover theater, cultural, sports events, and the like. Free tickets or passes may not be accepted for personal use.
4. Food, drink, and cover charges for night club and restaurant assignments should be paid by staff members, with reimbursement by The Tribune.
5. We must avoid involvement in public affairs and other outside activities, particularly political activities, that could jeopardize the independence of the paper and the staff. Those wishing to become active in public service organizations or community groups should discuss the matter with their supervisors.
6. Outside work is permitted if there is no conflict of interest. A staff member should obtain permission from his supervisors before undertaking any free lance projects.

Common sense is the best guideline. This code is purely the expression of high professional standards already practiced by most of the editorial staff. The code applies to management and staff alike.

Clayton Kirkpatrick

CODE OF ETHICS

This code of ethics has been drawn to provide guidance to Register and Tribune staff members and to inform the public of our policies.

All of us as members of the press have operated under our own codes of ethics. In some cases these individual codes may be more stringent than what follows here, but this code at least will give us all the same minimum guidelines.

As statements of general principle in this code of ethics, the following are offered:

That an individual's own good judgment and integrity are the keystones of this code because it would be impossible to spell out every single question that might arise as the result of adopting such a code.

That our management and employees must remain free of obligation to any special interest. That this statement means avoiding all possible conflicts of interest, or even the appearance thereof.

That the public must be assured that our writers, photographers and editors are beholden to no one; that they are devoted only to the truth.

That this code of ethics applies to all editorial employees of The Des Moines Register and Tribune, beginning at the office of editor and going down through every other newsroom employee and members of our news bureaus.

MEALS -- This code of ethics will continue the present company policy of having staff members pay for their own meals. There are times when it may be impossible to pay for the meal beforehand or at the time. In these instances, the staff member shall see that appropriate payment is sent later.

TRAVEL -- The company policy in this area has been clear in the past-- pay our own way. This will continue to be our policy. There are times when staffers ride with sports teams on chartered aircraft, or with public officials on military aircraft, or in chartered private aircraft with a political figure. On such occasions the company will send a check covering our staffer's share of the transportation.

TICKETS -- It will be our policy that no staffer accept any free ticket to any event except working press credentials which give assigned reporters and photographers access to otherwise restricted areas. This detailed breakdown is offered on the matter of tickets:

MOVIES, CONCERTS, PLAYS, CLUB SHOWS, ETC. -- If a reviewer is sent, he will buy a ticket and have the company pay for it. No other staff member will accept either free tickets or passes to shows.

SPORTS TICKETS -- No free sports tickets or passes will be accepted, except for working press credentials which give assigned reporters and photographers access to otherwise restricted areas. If the editors feel other tickets are needed for use by sports desk personnel or for sports writers who want to watch teams in games other than when they are covering them, these tickets will be purchased by the sports department.

GIFTS -- Staff members will not accept gifts or discounts offered because of the employee's connection with the newspaper. Gifts shall either be returned to the donor or turned over to charity.

BOOKS AND RECORDS -- Free books and record albums will not be solicited. Those unsolicited books and albums received will either be given to a reviewer as compensation for the review or be sold at an employee's sale with the proceeds going for charitable purposes.

-3-

OUTSIDE EMPLOYMENT AND ACTIVITIES -- No one shall be active in any group or organization or hold outside employment when such activity may bring the employee into a possible conflict of interest with his job at The Register and Tribune.

This will mean that no employee will hold membership on boards of directors of corporations, or assume leadership or activist roles on boards or organizations about which this employee might be called upon to write stories, take pictures, edit copy or make editorial judgments.

Politics is an area where particular care will be needed. Nothing in this code is intended to prohibit voting or membership in a political party. However, working for a candidate or party would be a clear conflict of interest for almost any staff member, and certainly would give at least the appearance of a conflict of interest.

No employee will produce material--free or for pay--for an individual or an organization if such work puts the employee in conflict of interest with these newspapers.

Free lancing will be allowed as long as the buyer is not in direct competition with The Register and Tribune or if no other conflict of interest exists. If, in the course of free lancing, a person uncovers a significant news angle not previously reported by The Register and Tribune, these newspapers will have first chance to publish this fresh material.

There is a flat rule against any employee producing publicity material for a public official, politician, government agency or sports team.

No one shall accept pay for appearing on a radio or television program if the sponsoring body is an agency or organization that the individual might be covering, or if being paid would constitute a conflict of interest.

-4-

No one shall accept pay for making a personal appearance or a speech before any group when that group is within the staff member's assigned area of coverage, editing, or editorial judgment, or if being paid would constitute a conflict of interest.

Nor shall any staff member make public statements of opinion that will compromise that staff member's creditability on the job.

No staff member shall hold financial interests which can be influenced by his writing or editing. For example, no reporter or editor who regularly handles the writing and editing of the stock market, commodities or real estate shall be the owner of a stock, commodity or real estate which might be so influenced.

Nothing in this code is intended to prohibit the holding of financial interests which do not constitute a conflict of interest.

While acting as a private citizen, no employee shall use his employment at The Register and Tribune as a means to solicit special consideration or treatment.

CONTESTS -- Staff members shall not enter contests sponsored by special interest groups whose philosophies pose a real or apparent conflict with the fairness of the newspaper or of the individual employee. In general, therefore, employees shall avoid contests other than those sponsored and judged by recognized journalism organizations, academic departments of journalism, or photography associations.

ETHICS CODE ADDENDUM

MEALS -- The committee recognizes that questions will arise about the acceptance of such things as a cup of coffee, a hot dog, or a meal in an individual's home. The key to such situations is judgment. We don't want an individual employee or the company embarrassed by having a scuffle with someone over who will pay for coffee, or put in the position of embarrassing a hostess by demanding to pay for a meal served in a home.

In the case of the meal in the home we feel the code's statement "appropriate payment is sent later" means the customary thank-you note sent later.

We think it is logical that when one is invited by an individual or firm to lunch or dinner it would be neither discourteous nor unprofessional to say something to the effect, "Yes, I'd be happy to meet you, but I want to say beforehand that our policy here on such things is that I pay for my own meal."

There are some instances when one cannot pay--places where the meal or drinks are catered and no money changes hands. Examples are private clubs, the "night-before-game" dinners and social hours sponsored by universities, golf socials hosted by universities and political dinners. In each of these examples there is good reason to have a staff member on hand. News is being generated, column items discovered, sometimes tips for future stories uncovered. We want our staffers to attend such functions.

In such cases it will be our policy to pay for these meals later with a company check. This may be handled in the cases of colleges and universities and our sports writers with a lump sum payment prior to the

-2-

season, or after the season. In other cases it will be handled by the staffer talking to his supervisor and agreeing on a payment and then having the company send the check to the sponsor of the meal.

TRAVEL -- In the case where a check needs to be sent to cover transportation of a staffer, it will be the responsibility of the staffer to tell his or her supervisor that the check should be sent.

The question of riding from a hotel to a stadium with a team, or sharing a cab with another, or accepting a ride from an Iowa airport to town with someone will be a matter of judgment. In most cases it will be a matter of convenience to the staffer. Over a period of time the matter of who pays for the cab likely will even out and in the case of taking a ride from an Iowa airport to town, one can offer \$5 for gasoline and put that on the expense account, but if the offer is refused the only way to handle it is with a warm thank you.

TICKETS -- Ticket expense will be put on individual expense forms, or covered by picking up an advance. In the case of the sports department, which may be buying blocs of tickets, the payment may be covered in an advance check, or one at the end of the season. This will be worked out by the various department heads.

GIFTS -- If a gift is received and there seems no easy or routine way to return it, then the gift will be turned over to the department head for eventual disposal through local charity. It might be a good idea to send a note to the donor saying such has been done and that it is because of company policy on gifts.

Some departments or individuals receive gifts which are not necessarily aimed at an individual. For example, the home and family department gets

-3-

cosmetics or new laundry products. These will be stored and periodically distributed through charity. Some companies make mass mailings of calenders, books or some advertising token (ball point pen being one example). These can be kept or thrown away at an individual's judgment.

BOOKS AND RECORDS -- It shall be the staff member's responsibility to turn unsolicited books and records over to a supervisor for a decision on whether the material should be reviewed or sold at the employee sale. (It has been suggested that department heads should have first crack at books to be sold in case any of these books could be used as departmental reference material.)

OUTSIDE EMPLOYMENT AND ACTIVITIES -- Persons holding jobs as stringers or free lancers should make clear to their supervisors what they are stringing, and for whom.

A staff member can accept expenses of travel and lodging from an organization sponsoring a speech or other appearance (provided the company does not provide these expenses) and if the acceptance of such expenses does not pose a conflict of interest and if the arrangement is cleared beforehand with the employee's supervisor.

Examples of stock holdings which might pose conflicts because they are subject to the influence of Register and Tribune stories are over-the-counter stocks and new offerings in Iowa. Not covered would be holdings in such corporations as Quaker Oats or General Motors--in other words national corporations.

Gene Rafferty
Gene Rafferty

Larry Neibergall
Larry Neibergall

David Witke
David Witke

Arlo Jacobson
Arlo Jacobson

John Fryer
John Fryer

Buck Turnbull
Buck Turnbull

APPENDIX N

Chicago Tribune
Dec. 31, 1977

The CIA and the press

The House Intelligence Committee has been hearing some interesting and varied testimony regarding the relations—past, present, and improper—between the Central Intelligence Agency and the journalistic profession. The most startling testimony so far has come from William Colby, former director of the CIA, who opposes a total ban on intelligence dealings with American journalists and thinks it would be foolish to impose any limitation on dealings with newspapermen abroad.

The gist of Mr. Colby's argument is that the mission of the CIA is so important as to justify enlisting help from whoever it thinks can help it best. And for about 1½ seconds, the argument may sound plausible. The CIA does perform an essential mission and must be given a good deal of latitude, perhaps extraordinary latitude, in its operations. And certainly journalists provide an easy bridge between officialdom abroad and the nether world of the CIA.

But from there on, the argument collapses. The CIA exists to protect the freedom of the American people, and one of the most important elements of that freedom is the freedom and independence of the press. If Thomas Jefferson were around today, he would no doubt say that if he had to choose between the freedom of the press and the freedom of the CIA, he would not hesitate to choose the former. And nearly everybody would agree.

That is pretty much the choice that faces us now. Even under the best of conditions—even when the CIA is sticking to its proper job and not engaging in the fabrication of phony stories and the manipulation of public opinion—its manner of operation is different from, and totally incompatible with, that of the press. The CIA thrives on a low profile, a good deal of secrecy, and some cloak-and-dagger work; and it matters little what sort of image its agents have. The press, on the other hand, thrives on openness, candor, and credibility.

Enlisting journalists to work for it therefore, the CIA is undermining the very institution it is supposed to be defending. Look at the volume of evidence that has come to light involving CIA influence on reporters and newspapers, and consider the result. Nearly every reporter abroad is burdened with the suspicion that he may be connected with the CIA, and what he writes is likely to be weighed accordingly. And not just reporters. A young lady of our acquaintance, doing anthropological research in an out-of-the-way spot in the Pacific, has been taken for a CIA agent so often—however jokingly—that she has given up trying to deny it.

The CIA is forbidden to recruit the help of employees of other government agencies such as the Peace Corps and the U. S. Information Agency. It's an absurd inversion of priorities to suggest that the integrity of these agencies is more important than that of the press.

None of this, we repeat, is to belittle the legitimate job of the CIA. We don't share the feeling of our friends on the New York Times that helping the CIA is "running errands for the government," as if it were something demeaning. Our point is simply that the missions of the two are incompatible.

Neither do we want to see Congress pass a law to "protect" the press if it can possibly be avoided. The best solution lies rather with the CIA and the press itself. The CIA should go beyond the qualified rule against the recruitment of American journalists; how can we pose as the champions of a free press while seducing it abroad? And the press, through its own institutions, should disown any notion that it is patriotic to subordinate its own interests to those of the CIA.

It should be clear to every journalist—if it isn't already—that if he sells himself to the CIA, he will end up not only forfeiting his own integrity and that of his paper, but ultimately discrediting the CIA as well.

APPENDIX O

The Director
Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

27 December 1977

Mr. Eugene Patterson
President, American Society of Newspaper Editors
c/o The St. Petersburg Times
Post Office Box 1121
St. Petersburg, Florida 33731

Dear Mr. Patterson:

This is in response to your letter of 5 December 1977 enclosing an October 1976 resolution by the Board of Directors of the American Society of Newspaper Editors and asking for our views concerning CIA policy regarding relationships with foreign journalists working for non-U.S. news media organizations.


As you know, we have recently announced a detailed, expanded policy statement dealing with CIA relationships with journalists and staff of U.S. news media organizations. In relevant part, this statement (which has been incorporated into our internal regulations) bars any CIA relationships with full-time or part-time journalists (including so-called "stringers") accredited by a U.S. news media organization. The term "accredited" is specifically defined to cover a foreign journalist who: 1) has been issued the requisite credentials to represent himself or herself as a correspondent for a U.S. news media organization, or 2) is officially recognized by a foreign government to represent a U.S. news media organization.

Let me attempt to address the issues raised in your letter by sharing with you the major reasons why our announced policies are carefully and specifically delineated to cover journalists and staff of U.S. news media organizations. The underlying rationale for this position, of course, is CIA's abiding recognition and appreciation of the special status afforded the nation's press under the Constitution. Accordingly, in order to do our part to allay the understandable concern expressed in some quarters that unregulated and widespread CIA relationships in this area tend to undermine the integrity and independence of the U.S. press, we have taken special pains

to impose stringent limitations on ourselves in our dealings with U.S. news media organizations themselves and any employees thereof throughout the world, regardless of the nationality of the employees. Although upon occasion the severity of these restrictions and prohibitions will unquestionably present obstacles to our ability to expeditiously and effectively perform our statutory responsibilities in the area of foreign intelligence collection, CIA has chosen to formulate and operate under these limitations in the interests of and out of respect for the separate responsibilities and status of the U.S. press as a free and independent institution in our society. At the same time, it is our considered opinion that any further extension of the scope of the restrictions beyond U.S. media organizations is neither legally required nor otherwise appropriate in light of the potential barriers which such action may pose to this Agency's ability to carry out its critical duties in furtherance of the nation's foreign policy of objectives.

Because of the above considerations, and with all due respect to your organization's concerns in this area, I hope that you will understand the reasons why this Agency cannot support the position taken in the October 1976 resolution of the American Society of Newspaper Editors.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Stansfield Turner", written over a horizontal line.

STANSFIELD TURNER

vance, was adopted quickly with minor "same situation."

drapes. in

ASNE Bulletin, January 1977

ASNE to CIA: Hands off.

The board of directors of the American Society of Newspaper Editors calls on the Central Intelligence Agency to give assurance that it has completed the termination of CIA employment of all correspondents of United States news media. In addition, the ASNE board calls on the President and Congress to require the CIA to extend this hands-off rule worldwide so as to prohibit CIA employment of journalists working for foreign news media as well as for American media.

The power of America's commitment to freedom resides in its example. The CIA should exhibit the American commitment to free press abroad and at home alike. The agency has refused to give assurance that it will not employ foreign newsmen. We urge a reversal of that policy, by law if necessary, because it subverts America's advocacy of a free flow of news for all people and damages the ideals that Americans profess.

Director George Bush on February 11, 1976, directed the CIA not to enter any future contractual relationship with any full-time or part-time correspondents of American news media.

We note Mr. Bush and CIA representatives gave subsequent assurance to the National News Council on June 24, 1976, that this directive prohibits CIA employment of American news executives, stringers for American news organizations, foreign nationals working as newsmen for American news organizations and freelance writers who could be interpreted in any manner as being journalists.

However, CIA spokesmen said it would take time to phase out all past arrangements with such people in an orderly manner. The ASNE is now told they were talking in terms of completing the terminations by the end of this year. This suggests the agency has not completed the severances nine months after they were ordered. We ask that the CIA Director report compliance with his directive of last February promptly and publicly.

We further ask that the President by executive order, or Congress and the President by joint resolution, prohibit the CIA from employing newsmen of any nation.

At the UNESCO conference in Nairobi, American delegates urged all nations to respect humanity's right to news uncontrolled by governments for their own ends. Those words lack force so long as an agency of the American government refuses to give assurance that it will forgo employment of foreign newsmen for its own ends.

The CIA has refused to give the world's people that assurance. We believe the American people through their elected representatives should require it to do so. The interests of the United States are not served if a U.S. agency reserves the right to interfere with other peoples' sources of information. To extend America's own respect for a free and independent press to the efforts of news media abroad would serve the higher purposes of the United States, and stand in telling contrast to the practices of totalitarian systems which Americans expect their government to reject, not emulate.

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS MANAGING EDITORS ASSOCIATION

BARCLAY JAMESON
APME PRESIDENT

The New Mexican, Santa Fe, N. M. 87501

December 12, 1977

Loch Johnson
House Investigations Committee
House of Representatives
Capitol Building H403
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Johnson:

The following resolution was adopted by the membership of APME at its annual convention October 28, 1977, at New Orleans:

CIA Practices

RESOLVED, the Associated Press Managing Editors' Association:

1. Condemns the Central Intelligence Agency's past use of foreign and domestic newsmen to gather information and intelligence.
2. Urges an immediate halt to all such activities, wherever they may exist.
3. Calls upon the CIA to give public assurances that the practice has been halted; and, should CIA officials not respond, urges the Congress or the President to make such prohibitions mandatory.
4. Recognizes that CIA links with newsmen were a two-way street, and equally condemns newsmen who were "used" by the CIA.
5. Reaffirms its belief that the credibility of the nation's free press rests upon its absolute freedom from governmental interference.

If you need further information, feel free to get in touch with me.

Sincerely,

Barclay Jameson
Barclay Jameson



BJ:ee
cc: Executive Committee

THE FUND FOR INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, INC.

1346 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

Tel. 202-462-1844

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BEEKMAN WINTHROP
BOB WOODWARD
CHARLES YOST

January 4, 1978

Mr. Loch Johnson
Subcommittee on Oversight
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Johnson:

This is in response to your request of December 29, 1977, for the views of the Fund for Investigative Journalism on certain questions regarding the use of journalists by the Central Intelligence Agency.

I have enclosed copies of our correspondence with the Agency in 1976; we have had no contact with the Agency on this matter since then. You asked our position regarding "recent CIA directives on this subject." Our only knowledge of these directives comes from newspaper reports.

It appears from these reports that the category of independent or free-lance journalist, under the reported new policy, may still be left open to use by the CIA. If, indeed, this is the case, the Fund's concern expressed in our May 14, 1976, letter to Director Bush remains. We then wrote:

"The Fund has a special concern about free-lancers. Most of the persons who receive grants from the Fund, a private foundation, are free-lance journalists. Their investigations sometimes are carried on abroad. Central Intelligence Agency actual or potential use of some free-lance journalists taints all free-lancers working overseas on legitimate writing projects with the likely result that their freedom to report may be severely restricted by the action of foreign governments or reluctance on the part of sources to assist their reporting efforts.

"Beyond our own institutional concern, however, we believe the entire practice of systematically using accredited journalists, bona fide free-lancers, and foreign nationals who work

for U.S. publications and news media organizations abroad badly serves the American people. By threatening the integrity of the press, the practice encourages the people's distrust of all reporting."


Definitions are important but tricky. Some free-lance writers work at it full-time; their writing is their sole source of income. Others write occasionally, doing other things as well to earn their living. Therefore, these factors are of limited help in defining a free-lance journalist.

Membership in journalistic organizations which are open to free-lancers may be of definitional help. The Overseas Press Club, The Overseas Writers Club, the Society of Magazine Writers and the Washington Independent Writers are among such organizations. (A copy of a resolution passed by the Washington Independent Writers on June 2, 1976, on the matter in question is enclosed.)

A free-lance journalist may work on assignment from a publication or broadcasting outlet, carrying a letter to that effect as a credential that establishes the writer's legitimacy. Such journalists may also be accredited by a foreign government while they are working abroad. In such cases it seems to me the free-lance journalist meets the test for exclusion from CIA use for intelligence purposes. The question is whether this prohibition would bar the agency from using such a journalist for intelligence purposes unrelated, or only incidentally related, to his or her reporting assignment. If the CIA's new policy doesn't rule out the agency's use of such free-lancers, it should for the reasons we stated previously. The designation free-lancer should not connote some category of lesser legitimacy than staff member, correspondent or stringer.

I hope these comments are of help to the Subcommittee. Please let us know if we can be of any other assistance. We would appreciate a copy of the hearings when they are printed.

Sincerely,


Howard Bray

Enc.
HB/skc

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

TEL. 202-462-1844

May 14, 1976

TO OF DIRECTORS:
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 BOB WOODWARD
 ANLES YOST

Honorable George Bush
 Central Intelligence Agency
 Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Bush:

The recent reports of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, as well as the reported findings of the House Select Committee on Intelligence and the Rockefeller commission, verify the clandestine operational use by the Central Intelligence Agency of American journalists, news executives and news organizations. The Board of Directors of the Fund for Investigative Journalism regards such practices as destructive of the fundamental premises of a free press and corrosive of the First Amendment.

The Fund has a special concern about free-lance. Most of the persons who receive grants from the Fund a private foundation, are free-lance journalists. Their investigations sometimes are carried on abroad Central Intelligence Agency actual or potential use of some free-lance journalists taints all free-lancers working overseas on legitimate writing projects with the likely result that their freedom to report may be severely restricted by the action of foreign governments or reluctance on the part of sources to assist their reporting efforts.


Beyond our own institutional concern, however, we believe the entire practice of systematically using accredited journalists, bona fide free-lancers and foreign nationals who work for U.S. publications and news media organizations abroad badly serves the American people. By threatening the integrity of the press, the practice encourages the people's distrust of all reporting.

We call your attention to the requirement of the Congressional press galleries that journalists accredited to the galleries actually be engaged in journalism and have no activities which conflict with that principal function. The galleries established this eminently sound requirement to assure against actual conflict of interest or the public suspicion that fair reporting is being subverted.

We, therefore, urge that you go beyond your previous policy statements on this matter and publicly announce now the termination by the Central Intelligence Agency of all use of journalists, including free-lancers, stringers and part-time reporters and editors, whether or not accredited, for intelligence operations.

We look forward to your early response to our recommendation.

Sincerely,


Milton Viorst
Chairman

MV/skc

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

21 May 1976

Mr. Milton Viorst
Chairman, The Fund for
Investigative Journalism, Inc.
1346 Connecticut Ave., N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

Dear Mr. Viorst,

Thank you for your letter of May 14, 1976.

We have, as you know, considerably changed our practices with respect to the press. Although doubtless you have seen my statement on this matter, I enclose a copy of the full text for your convenience.

Recently, I have addressed myself to this matter at ASNE and Overseas Press Club meetings. I have also talked privately to a number of members of the Fourth Estate. Although not all of them are totally happy with the situation as it is, I have met with considerable quiet understanding. One top figure in the national media told me privately that he thought that after issuance of my statement, no more could properly be demanded of us.

I am alert to the points you make in your letter but feel we must stand on the revised position we have taken.

You are doubtless aware, as are we, that the linking of newspaper men and intelligence in the minds of counter-intelligence services world-wide long antedated the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency. The linkage will remain in the minds of even those most closely



allied to our way of thinking no matter what steps we take or public announcements we make. This is a fact of the world of today and tomorrow.

I understand your concern and I hope you will understand how far we have come in this matter. In a perfect world, we might be able to run the intelligence business in response to the criticisms of each and every point of view but I'm afraid that perfect world is not yet here.

Sincerely,



George Bush
Director

J. ROBERT MOSKIN

949 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, NEW YORK

June 2, 1976

Mr. Howard Bray
 The Fund for Investigative Journalism, Inc.
 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
 Washington, D.C. 20036

Dear Howard:

Thank you for sending me copies of your exchange with George Bush.

I find Mr. Bush's reply totally inadequate and unsatisfactory. I am personally appalled that he cites his appearance before the Overseas Press Club as indicating or presenting an opportunity or certification for acquiescence by professional journalists to his position. I will bring this matter to the attention of the board of the OPC.

I certainly agree with your proposal that the professional organizations take a consolidated stand on this matter. It is important. May I suggest you draw up a simple brief, hopefully one paragraph statement of our mutual position and circulate it to the heads of the various organizations for their signature. And then publish it.

Perhaps the statement should also carry the signature of important editors, reporters etc. I am not sure on this; it depends on how much of a job you want to undertake. Because I know nothing will get done unless one individual follows up on what you have begun - you. I certainly hope you do it and will be ready to help.

I don't think Bush's statement should be allowed to stand as the last word - with the implication that it is acceptable.

In haste.

Best,

Bob

*Matt -
 FYI
 and
 action
 B*

PS: So far, I have not seen Matt Bassity's communication to Bush based on the resolution passed at the last OPC Board meeting.

1348 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20038

TEL. 202-462-1844

July 5, 1976

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Mr. George Bush
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Bush:

Thank you for your letter of May 21, which the Board of Directors of the Fund for Investigative Journalism has carefully reviewed. Our unanimous conclusion is that your letter fails to respond adequately to the points we raised in writing to you on May 14.

You were kind enough to enclose a copy of your February 11, 1976, statement concerning, among other things, the Central Intelligence Agency's use of journalists. Your statement asserts that the agency's relationships "have not been aimed at influencing or improperly acting on any American institution." Whether or not such has been the deliberate aim of the agency, the point we strongly made in our letter was that the C.I.A.'s admitted continued use of journalists for intelligence purposes damages the press, a constitutionally protected institution, and the people it serves. In view of recent reports that the agency has modified the policy you enunciated on February 11, we would welcome clarification of your position.

We found it interesting that you mentioned your appearances before various journalistic organizations to address this problem, naming the Overseas Press Club as one of the organizations. It is our understanding that after your appearance, the Overseas Press Club formally called on the C.I.A. to end the practices we too have condemned. That action by the Club isn't mentioned in your response to us. You also noted that the C.I.A.'s policy with regard to the use of journalists for intelligence purposes has "met with considerable understanding" from a number of journalists -- all of whom you left unnamed. We have met none of our colleagues who share that view.


Your letter of May 21 concludes that since we do not live in a "perfect world," the practices our Board has criticized, perforce, must continue. You may want to consider whether the abuses we and other

Professional journalistic organizations have criticized
only the continued use of certain categories of journalists
for intelligence purposes -- exacerbate international tensions and
warrant distrust of Americans of their institutions.

Quite honestly, we appreciate the burdens you carry and
your efforts to moderate certain questionable agency practices
and policies. We submit that those efforts, with respect to
the use of journalists, fall far short of what can and should
be done in an imperfect world.

We look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,


Milton Viorst

MM/sk2



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508
 OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

19 July 1976

Mr. Milton Viorst
 The Fund for Investigative
 Journalism, Inc.
 1346 Connecticut Ave. NW
 Washington, DC 20036

Dear Mr. Viorst,

I am responding to your letter of July 5 to Mr. George Bush, Director of Central Intelligence.

The statement published on February 11, of which you have a copy, is, of course, in effect, and the Agency is in full compliance with these self-imposed guidelines. The prohibition on further use by the Agency of journalists employed by American news-gathering organizations was, as you are aware, a purely voluntary act on the part of the Agency to eliminate even the appearance of possible impropriety and to meet the constitutional concerns about which all of us feel strongly. On June 24, we had a lengthy meeting with officials of the National News Council, at their request, to provide some clarification and interpretation of the February 11 statement. You may wish to contact the Council if you are interested in their assessment of the discussion and their statement to the press on our meeting.

With reference to your comment on the Overseas Press Club appearance by the Director: the reason that an approach by that organization to the CIA is not mentioned in Mr. Bush's letter is, quite simply, that we have no record of any communication from the Overseas Press Club on this subject and no knowledge of any action such as you describe.




I find it necessary to refer also to the exact language of Mr. Bush's letter to you where he speaks of having "talked privately to a number of members of the Fourth Estate". Mr. Bush considers that it would be improper for him to identify individuals with whom he had spoken in these circumstances; at the same time, please rest assured that we do not impugn the veracity of your own unsourced report on your colleagues' views of the Agency's policies.

Finally, I must respectfully submit that your interpretation of the final paragraph of Mr. Bush's letter as an insistence on the continuation of "abuses" and "practices" that your Board has criticized is at variance with any reasonable reading of the plain language of that paragraph.

We do appreciate your concern and we thank you for sharing your views with us.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Andrew T. Falkiewicz". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large, sweeping "A" and "F".

Andrew T. Falkiewicz
Assistant to the Director
of Central Intelligence

1971

Wm D. Wise

PROPOSED RESOLUTION FOR JUNE 2 GENERAL MEETING OF WIN

WHEREAS, on February 11, 1976, the Central Intelligence Agency announced that it would no longer pay any full-or-part-time correspondent accredited to the United States news media; and

WHEREAS, the Final Report of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities disclosed that less than half of the fifty journalists or news media employees paid by CIA will be affected by the new CIA policy, because it does not apply to "freelance contributors" abroad; and

WHEREAS, all independent, unaffiliated writers are potentially suspect when any are used by CIA for covert activities or espionage;

RESOLVED that the Executive Board of the Washington Independent Writers be directed to write to George Bush, the Director of Central Intelligence, to

(1) Protest the continued use of journalists as spies since, by casting suspicion on all independent journalists and writers, the practice inhibits their ability to report, reduces the flow of information to the public, and constitutes a clear violation of the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States; and

(2) To demand, therefore, that CIA immediately end its use of independent writers, in any way, or conversely, the use of CIA officers posing or acting as journalists or writers.

or journalists for intelligence purposes

WASHINGTON INDEPENDENT WRITERS
SUITE 710

1010 VERMONT AVE. N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005
(202) 347-4973

BARBARA RASKIN,
PRESIDENT
JANE STEIN,
VICE PRESIDENT
PAUL DICKSON,
SECRETARY-TREASURER
JEAN CAMPOS
CHARLES N. CONCOM
MARCELA FREEMAN
JOSEPH C. GOULDEN
HARVEY KAYS
PHYLLIS C. RICHMAN
MILTON VICENT
ROBERT D. WESTGATE
DAVID WISS

January 16, 1978

Mr. Loch Johnson
Subcommittee on Oversight
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Johnson:

Since several members of the board of The Fund for Investigative Journalism also serve on the board of the Washington Independent Writers, it came to my attention that you had solicited a statement from the Fund concerning the use of journalists by the Central Intelligence Agency.

Since I, in my role as president of WIW, had an exchange of correspondence with the CIA regarding this issue I am taking the liberty of sending you my file of these letters. My final letter, dated June 13, 1977, still remains unanswered.

If this exchange of correspondence throws any further light on the issue, perhaps it can be appended to the transcript of the hearings when it is printed.

Thank you for your interest in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

Barbara Raskin

Barbara Raskin
WIW Board Member, Chairwoman
of the Professional Relations
Committee

RESOLUTION PASSED JUNE 2, 1976 AT A GENERAL MEETING
OF THE WASHINGTON INDEPENDENT WRITERS

WHEREAS, on February 11, 1976, the Central Intelligence Agency announced that it would no longer pay any full-or-part-time correspondent accredited to the United States news media; and

WHEREAS, the Final Report of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities disclosed that less than half of the fifty journalists or news media employees working for CIA will be affected by the new CIA policy, because it does not apply to "freelance contributors" abroad; and

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(2) To demand, therefore, that CIA immediately end its use of independent writers or journalists for intelligence purposes or, conversely, the use of CIA officers posing or acting as journalists or writers.



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

July 6, 1976

Miss Barbara Raskin
 President
 Washington Independent Writers
 1057 National Press Building
 Washington, D. C. 20045

Dear Miss Raskin,

I am responding to your letter of June 7 to the Director. Thank you for bringing to our attention the text of the resolution adopted by your organization.

The policy set out in the statement of February 11 represents a voluntary limitations on the part of the Central Intelligence Agency of perfectly legitimate intelligence functions. This action was undertaken because of the constitutional concerns expressed by the representatives of American news media, and because we are determined to avoid even the appearance of any improper use of journalists by the Agency.

We recently had occasion to discuss this matter with representatives of the National News Council. I refer you to a press report of that meeting (attached), and suggest you may wish to consult the Council on their assessment of our position.

Sincerely,

Andrew T. Falkiewicz
 Andrew T. Falkiewicz
 Assistant to the Director
 of Central Intelligence

kss

.. Enc.



WASHINGTON INDEPENDENT WRITERS
SUITE 710
1010 VERMONT AVE. N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005
(202) 347-4973

April 21, 1977

BARBARA RASKIN,
PRESIDENT
TO STEVE,
VICE PRESIDENT
UL DICKSON,
SECRETARY-TREASURER
IN CALIF.
JAMES H. CONNORS
SARA FRIEDMAN
BOB C. GOWLAND
JOHN KAYS
THOMAS C. KIRKMAN
ALTON VIGOR
BOB D. WATSON
VIA WIRE

Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Admiral Turner:

On June 7, 1976, I wrote to Mr. George Bush on behalf of the Washington Independent Writers and enclosed a resolution adopted by our membership. The resolution noted that according to the final report of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities the CIA announcement of February 11, 1976, would not apply to "freelance contributors" abroad. The Washington Independent Writers resolution asked that the CIA immediately end its use of independent writers for intelligence purposes.

Mr. Bush's reply of July 6, 1976, did not contradict the conclusion of the Senate committee. Instead, he referred to a press report of a meeting between the CIA and a private group, the National News Council, and he enclosed an AP account of this meeting. The AP quoted Mr. Bush as having told the council that freelance writers for American news organizations would not be "hired" by the CIA.

Since a wire service story reporting second-hand what may have been said to a private group cannot, of course, be considered a statement of official policy by the United States government or one of its agencies, we would appreciate a direct statement from you as to whether the CIA's current policy is, or is not, to use independent writers in its intelligence activities and operations.

As matters stand now, the only official statement by a government entity remains the Church committee's report stating that the CIA policy against using journalists does not apply to freelance writers.

We would greatly appreciate clarification of this very important matter now that you have assumed directorship of the agency. Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

Barbara Raskin, President
Washington Independent Writers

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

13 May 1977

Ms. Barbara Raskin
Washington Independent Writers
Suite 710, 1010 Vermont Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005

Dear Ms. Raskin,

Thank you for your letter of April 27 on behalf of the Washington Independent Writers. We are hindered in our desire to respond to your request for an official statement on the matter of "freelance writers" by lack of an official or agreed upon definition of that term and would very much appreciate your giving us a definition to which we might respond.


For example, does the fact that an individual might write one or two articles, perhaps quite incidental to his normal profession, make him a "freelancer"? A professional person, a lawyer, for example, might write on gardening, food, travel, etc.

There are people in many professions who write articles as a byproduct of their profession -- a politician writing for Foreign Affairs, or a physician writing for a medical journal, for example.

Or is a "freelancer" a person who earns say, more than half his income from writing?

I hope you can see our problem, and I believe your response will help.

Sincerely,



Herbert E. Hetu
Assistant for Public Affairs
to the Director of Central Intelligence

-2-


operatives. All we ask is that when a person is working for CIA he not present him or herself as an "independent freelance writer." This is a question of true and false faces; it is an issue of misrepresentation which incriminates an entire group of innocent people.

Saying one is a freelance writer often affords a person access to places which would not otherwise be available. Thus the misuse of this claim - and the keeping secret of material meant to be made public - threatens to endanger potential sources for authentic freelance writers. Secondly, as independent writers and journalists, we are all concerned with truthfulness. Writers form a natural association which starts from an assumption of trust in one another. If a person says he or she is an independent writer, other writers trust that person accordingly - giving and sharing information and insights. When the so-called writer is, in fact, a spy, he or she uses that natural association of trust for instrumental purposes which have nothing to do with the actual work of independent research and writing so that our natural association is perverted and our trust destroyed.

Consequently, Mr. Hetu, we see this question in fundamental terms and do not want to engage in a semantic exercise in which the agency, or any of its affiliates, can find a way "around" any ultimate definition of the term "freelance" through linguistic rearrangements. We prefer to keep our attention on the fundamental issue of whether people are what they say they are and whether intelligence agents are brave enough to say what it is they are really doing.

I look forward to your response. We are available to meet with you in person if further clarification of our position is necessary.

Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

Barbara Raskin, President



Overseas Press Club of America, Inc

Hotel Biltmore, 55 East 43rd Street • New York, N.Y. 10017 • (212) 687-2430 • Cable: OVERPRAS

MEMBER: Matthew A. R. Basily

VICE PRESIDENTS: Henry Cellerman
Russell C. Tomabene
Lawrence Stessig
Robin Moore

SECRETARY: Grace Nathaniel

TREASURER: Anita Diamond

Aug. 11, 1976

Honorable George Bush
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Bush:

Back in June the Board of Governors of the Overseas Press Club adopted the attached resolution. Through an oversight it was not forwarded to you.

However, on June 26 the New York Times carried an article which said you had told representatives of the National News Council that the CIA would no longer hire foreign correspondents as agents of the CIA. There seems to be some question among our members as to whether this decision has been implemented. I trust it has but would appreciate confirmation from you.

Sincerely,

Matthew A. R. Basily

CC
Robert Moskine

BOARD OF GOVERNORS: ACTIVE: Joan Barr, Louis J. Calkerm, Marguerite Cartwright, Richard Doughty, Kenneth S. Ginder, Rosalind Maxson, Patrick McCarthy, J. Robert Moskine, Merrill O'Brien, Ralph H. Schulz, John L. Scott, Robert E. Sheridan, Alfred Wall. ACTIVE ALTERNATE: Arthur Kavak, ASSOCIATE: David Anderson, George Burns, Harry Rand. ASSOCIATE ALTERNATE: Morton Frank, Jack Frenner.
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(38)

Resolved

5/20/76

That the Board of Governors of the Overseas Press Club of America wishes to express its concern over the clandestine use of journalists by the Central Intelligence Agency, as reported by the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence and the Rockefeller Commission.

Such covert use of journalists, as well as the use of journalistic "covers" by intelligence operatives, endangers the credibility of a free press and the integrity and safety of all members of the press, and especially those who are working abroad as journalists, whether they are staff members, stringers or freelancers, accredited or not.

Therefore, the Board of Governors directs the President of the Overseas Press Club to communicate these concerns to the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and any other relative intelligence organizations, and to request that such agencies stop, and publicly announce the termination of, the use of all journalists, including stringers and freelancers, whether or not accredited, for intelligence purposes.



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
 OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

August 13, 1976

Mr. Matthew A.R. Bassity
 President
 Overseas Press Club of
 America, Inc.
 Hotel Biltmore
 55 East 43rd Street
 New York, New York 10017

Dear Mr. Bassity,

I am responding to your letter of August 11 to the Director of Central Intelligence. Thank you for bringing to our attention the resolution of your Board of Governors, dated May 20, 1976.

Both the resolution and your reference to the June 26 article in the New York Times apparently overlooked Mr. Bush's statement of February 11 (to which he made reference in his appearance at the Overseas Press Club):

--Effective immediately, CIA will not enter into any paid or contractual relationship with any full-time or part-time news correspondent accredited by any U.S. news service, newspaper, periodical, radio or television network or station.

--As soon as feasible, the Agency will bring existing relationships with individuals in these groups into conformity with this new policy.





Overseas Press Club of America, Inc.

Hotel Biltmore, 55 East 43rd Street • New York, N.Y. 10017 • (212) 687-2430 • Cable: OVERPAC

PRESIDENT: Matthew A. R. Bassily

VICE PRESIDENTS: Henry Gellermann
Russell C. Tornabene
Lawrence Stepp
Robin Moore

SECRETARY: Grace Naluth
TREASURER: Anita Diamond

September 24, 1976

Honorable George Bush
The Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Bush:

"I appreciated the prompt letter of August 13 from Mr. Andrew T. Falkiewicz as your Assistant replying to the resolution of the Board of Governors of this Club. I have waited until the Board could meet and discuss this letter before writing you again.

At the Board's meeting this week, the members reviewed at length the disturbing complexities of the mix between the Central Intelligence Agency and the American press. We realize that there are many problems yet to be solved if both your Agency and the members of the press are to do their separate and independent jobs for the benefit of the American people.

In this discussion, the members' first concern was for the protection of the credibility and safety of working journalists. The consensus was that your statement that the CIA will no longer "enter into any pre or contractual relationship" with members of the press is a major step in that direction. It is particularly valuable because it comes directly from the Office of the Director rather than through third parties.

But the Board passed a motion unanimously expressing its continuing concern over the "other side of the coin." That is that the CIA should not use the "cover" of journalist, newspaperman, reporter, broadcaster, etc. for CIA agents. The Board insists that this practice be stopped, because it clearly endangers not only the credibility but the very lives of American and other journalists working abroad. And we ask that the CIA make public its policy of not using journalistic "covers" so that it is known around the globe.


BOARD OF GOVERNORS: ACTIVE: Jean Rar, Louis J. Calkins, Marguerite Cartwright, Richard Despres, Kenneth S. Gander, Ronald Maslow, Patrick McCurdy, J. Robert Moskin, Merrill O'Brien, Ralph B. Scholz, John C. Scott, Robert F. Sheridan, Albert Weil. ALTERNATE: Arthur Kovach. ASSOCIATE: David Anderson, George Burns, Harry Rand. ASSOCIATE ALTERNATES: Morton Frank, Jack Frenner.
PAST PRESIDENTS: Wylie Wilkins*, Eugene Lyons, Burnett Hersey*, Lowell Thomas, Lucian Kalland*, W. W. Chaphin, Ben Coudreau*, Frank Kelly, Louis P. Luchner*, John Doh, William P. Gray*, J. Clifford Stark, Wayne Richardson, Cecil Brown, Thomas P. Whately, John Wilhelm, John Luter, Richard J. H. Johnston, Will Yolen, Barrett McGuire, Merrill Mueller, Viktor Boud, H. Lehman, Will Owsler, Jack Raymond.

*Deceased

Honorable George Bush
The Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

As working journalists with some responsibility for the continuation of a free and effective press in this country, we hope that you will take our concern seriously and make clear your agency's policy on this additional point.

Sincerely,


Matthew A.R. Bassity
President,
Overseas Press Club

MARB/mn



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

6 October 1976

Mr. Matthew A. R. Bassity
 President, Overseas Press Club
 of America, Inc.
 Hotel Biltmore
 55 East 43rd St.
 New York, N.Y. 10017

Dear Mr. Bassity,

We are pleased to know that the Board of Governors of the Overseas Press Club has now studied the Director's statement of February 11 promulgating the policy of the Central Intelligence Agency regarding its relations with working journalists. Your continuing concern appears to be rooted in a simple misunderstanding which I hope to clarify: Briefly, it is immaterial whether the CIA's "paid or contractual relationship" covered by the Director's statement is construed as involving a CIA employee working as a journalist or a journalist working for the CIA. The language of the statement was intended to, and clearly does, apply to both situations.

As for giving "global" currency to the Director's statement, that, Sir, is surely entirely up to the press. The credibility and the lives of American intelligence officers have been not only endangered but destroyed through the irresponsible sensationalism in some of the media. Any contribution you may make to the "other side of the coin" will be welcome not only by this Agency but, we are certain, by the American public as well.



On behalf of the Director, I hope that the clarification of his February 11 statement will enhance the new understanding of the Agency's position indicated by your letter of September 24.

With good wishes.

Sincerely,



Andrew T. Falkiewicz
Assistant to the Director
of Central Intelligence

APPENDIX P

NEW YORK TIMES - 2/3/78

STATE DEPT. AND C.I.A.
SPLIT ON ENVOY ROLENY TIMES 2/3/78
Interpret Embassies' Control Over
Covert Operations Differently

By DAVID BINDER

WASHINGTON, Feb. 3 — An order by President Carter giving United States ambassadors around the world authority to supervise "all United States Government" officers and personnel in their countries has provoked a sharp split in interpretation by the State Department, Intelligence Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency.

The State Department's interpretation of the Carter order, according to high-ranking administrative officials, says that the Intelligence Agency guidelines on "special exceptions" to what an ambassador might oversee, according to one official, are "beyond similar communications" and of administrative procedures undertaken by C.I.A. station chiefs.

Officials of the State Department and the Intelligence Agency confirmed the disparity between the Carter decree issued in a letter last autumn and the guidelines subsequently issued by the agency to its station chiefs in foreign posts.

The Carter letter, published two months ago in the State Department Newsletter, was described then by the department as going "beyond similar communications" in 1961 by President Kennedy and in 1969 by President Nixon in affirming the "primacy" of ambassadors over all American personnel in their countries.

The issue arose after the abortive 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, sponsored by the C.I.A., when President Kennedy determined that one of the shortcomings of United States diplomacy was that numerous official American activities abroad were undertaken without central coordination and were sometimes contradictory.

The Carter letter, dated Oct. 25, stated that United States ambassadors "have the authority to review message traffic to and from all personnel under your jurisdiction" — presumably including C.I.A. officers.

Several days later, both Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and Adm. Stansfield Turner, Director of Central Intelligence,

State Dept. and C.I.A. Split on Role

(Continued From Page A1)
agency sent out guidelines interpreting the Presidential letter, as Mr. Carter had indicated they would.

But the two sets of guidelines differed and, according to high-ranking Administration officials, the C.I.A. directive tightened restrictions on what agency messages an ambassador might see.

The Vance guideline, these officials said, simply amplified the President's letter, saying that United States ambassadors had the right to require all American Government personnel in their countries to keep the ambassadors "thoroughly and currently informed about all their activities."

The Turner guideline, described by one official as "lightly written and full of caveats," declared, however, that there were special exceptions to what an ambassador might oversee. These exceptions included prohibitions on communicating details of covert operations and of administrative procedures undertaken by C.I.A. station chiefs.

Station chiefs are the agency's overseas clandestine operations supervisors, usually working under diplomatic or military cover in American embassies. They are the agency's equivalent of ambassadors.

A White House spokesman said that President Carter would have no comment on the divergent interpretations.

A State Department official, interpreting the Turner guidelines, said, "In effect they stated that the President's letter and the State Department guidelines do not apply to the C.I.A."

The official said that ambassadors had been free to oversee C.I.A. covert operations under the guidelines that applied before the Carter letter went out.

Affirming this interpretation, a C.I.A. official cited an example from the ambassadorship of Frank C. Carlucci, who is terminating a three-year assignment in Portugal to accept the post of deputy director of the intelligence agency.

The official remarked that after an attempted pro-Communist coup in Lisbon in November 1973, Ambassador Carlucci, acting under then applicable guidelines, was able to insist on being informed of covert C.I.A. activities in Portugal.

Response to a Demand

On learning that the agency station chief was maintaining a covert relationship with several members of the pre-1974 Portuguese Government, the official continued, Mr. Carlucci demanded that the connections be terminated.

The official said that the C.I.A. had decided to let the covert relationships "expire" because it was "not worth the squabble" to have Ambassador Carlucci deciding who should or should not be included among the agency's clandestine "assets" in Portugal.

The C.I.A. official and a knowledgeable State Department official agreed that under the new guidelines such a controversy would probably not arise because the C.I.A. station chief would probably not feel obliged to identify all of his covert relationships by name.

Under the Turner directive, the agency official went on, an ambassador would be made aware of covert operations but would not be involved in them.

Both the Vance and Turner guidelines are classified as secret documents, the officials said. Nominally they are supposed together to constitute a State Department-C.I.A. agreement struck between the agency director and the Secretary of State.

Admiral Turner and Secretary Vance sent identical guidelines respectively to station chiefs and ambassadors. However, it appears that the C.I.A. sent an additional directive to the station chiefs undercutting the jointly agreed text.

As in the past, the current guidelines say that disputes between an ambassador and a station chief are to be referred to Washington for resolution between the Secretary of State and the C.I.A. Director.

It could not be learned whether the new guidelines had created such disputes, although there are indications that several ambassadors have indicated unhappiness with the new arrangement.

APPENDIX Q

MANAGEMENT

HR 7-1c(8)

amended (50 U.S.C. 403h), or in the agreement between the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the CIA dated 10 February 1955. If special circumstances require that a non-U.S. person under sponsorship of CIA enter or leave the United States without using his true identity, the approval of the Immigration and Naturalization Service is required. In addition, other normal liaison relationships may be maintained between CIA and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

(8) PROVISIONS RELATING TO OTHER ACTIVITIES

- (a) **Counterintelligence Activities.** CIA is authorized to engage in counterintelligence activities in conformity with requirements of law and National Security Council directives, including certain services of common concern as specified in NSCID 5, paragraph 3.
 - (1) With respect to counterintelligence activities in the United States, CIA must conform with procedures specified by the Attorney General (see Annex D).
 - (2) With respect to counterintelligence activities conducted abroad, CIA operations directed specifically at United States persons will conform to paragraphs 1c(1)(b) and (c) above and will be coordinated with the FBI and/or with other Federal agencies as appropriate.
- (b) **Polygraphing of United States Persons.** CIA internal polygraphing programs authorize polygraph examinations of U.S. persons and are restricted to CIA applicants, employees, individuals being considered for or holding CIA security clearances or approvals, or other persons involved in CIA operations. Polygraph examinations of other U.S. persons will be conducted only with their consent and only with the prior written approval of the Director.
- (c) **Foreign Economic Activities of U.S. Persons.** Except as provided in this paragraph, no operational or analysis project will be undertaken specifically to collect information regarding the foreign economic activities of a U.S. person. This restriction would not preclude studies of foreign economic activities that include analyses of the roles of U.S. firms, for example: foreign demand for U.S. grain; U.S. technology transfer to the USSR; foreign discrimination against U.S. firms; and studies evaluating the importance of the U.S. in worldwide economic activities, such as shipping and energy. To the extent that information on the economic activities of U.S. persons abroad is incidentally acquired from sources other than electronic surveillance in the course of CIA's normal foreign intelligence activities, and is significant to the other U.S. agencies, it may be forwarded to such agencies with the approval of the Deputy Director concerned. If, however, the information is acquired from electronic surveillance activities, then this information is subject to restrictions contained in Annex B.
- (d) **Cover.** Cover as established, coordinated with, or arranged by the Central Cover Staff is appropriate support for our foreign intelligence objectives. To the degree that cover and proprietary arrangements are required, a clear justification will be developed as to the relationship to and support of CIA's mission.
- (e) **Proprietary Arrangements.** The operations and development of essential proprietary arrangements will be conducted as necessary to perform the functions and duties of the Central Intelligence Agency. CIA proprietary companies shall not operate on a commercially competitive basis with United States businesses, except to the extent necessary to establish commercial credibility or to achieve the clearly defined foreign intelligence objectives outlined in Executive Order 11905, Section 4(b),

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MANAGEMENT

paragraphs (1) through (9). No investments by a proprietary company will be made on the basis of any substantive intelligence obtained from CIA.

- (f) **Cover for Other Agencies.** CIA shall not provide cover for other Government agencies except as approved by the Deputy Director for Operations or his designated representative, Chief, Central Cover Staff, as stipulated in HR 240-1.
- (g) **Identity Documentation.** The Deputy Director for Operations in consultation with the Office of General Counsel shall strictly control the issuance, accountability, and recovering of identity documentation procured or produced by CIA for its operations or in response to requests from other agencies.
- (h) **Domestic Events.** All Deputy Directors shall exhibit particular sensitivity to the possible coincidence between CIA training, testing, operational, or support activities and significant domestic political, or other events which the unwitting observer could interpret as improper Agency activity. This refers particularly to political conventions, the activities of dissident groups, etc., in which cases CIA activities should be terminated, moved away, or suspended temporarily.
- (i) **Support to the White House Office.** Any support requested by or extended to the White House Office, excluding the dissemination of foreign intelligence, must have the prior approval of the Director.
- (j) **Target Watchlists.** No list shall be developed as a target watchlist on American citizens.
- (k) **Foreign Radio Broadcasts.** Monitoring of foreign radio, television, or press which includes statements by, reports activities of, or makes reference to, United States persons is permissible when such activity is an incidental aspect of coverage of foreign radio, television, or press.
- (l) **Journalists and Staff of U.S. News Media Organizations**
 - (1) **Policy.** The special status afforded the press under the Constitution necessitates a careful policy of self-restraint on the part of the Agency in regard to its relations with U.S. news media organizations and personnel. Accordingly, CIA will not:
 - (a) Enter into any relationships with full-time or part-time journalists (including so-called "stringers") accredited by a U.S. news service, newspaper, periodical, radio, or television network or station, for the purpose of conducting any intelligence activities. The term "accredited" means any full- or part-time employee of U.S. or foreign nationality who is formally authorized by contract or by the issuance of press credentials to represent himself or herself either in the U.S. or abroad as a correspondent for a U.S. news media organization or who is officially recognized by a foreign government to represent a U.S. news media organization.
 - (b) Without the specific, express approval of senior management of the organization concerned, enter into any relationships with nonjournalist staff employees of any U.S. news media organization for the purpose of conducting any intelligence activities.
 - (c) Use the name or facilities of any U.S. news media organization to provide cover for any Agency employees or activities.
 - (2) **Limitations**
 - (a) The policies set forth above are not designed to inhibit open relationships with journalists (as for example contracts to perform translating services or to

MANAGEMENT

HR 7-1c(8)(m)

lecture at Agency training courses) which are entered into for reasons unrelated to such persons' affiliation with a particular news media organization. Willingness on both sides to acknowledge the fact and nature of the relationship is the essential characteristic of the open relationships into which CIA will enter with journalists under this provision.

- (b) In addition, CIA will not deny any person, including full-time or part-time accredited journalists and stringers, the opportunity to furnish information which may be useful to the U.S. Government. Therefore, CIA will continue to permit unpaid relationships with journalists or other members of U.S. news media organizations who voluntarily maintain contact for the purpose of providing information on matters of foreign intelligence or foreign counterintelligence interest to the U.S. Government.
- (c) Likewise, the Agency, through the Office of the Assistant for Public Affairs to the Director, will continue to maintain regular liaison with representatives of the news media to provide public information, answers to inquiries, and assistance in obtaining unclassified briefings on substantive matters.
- (3) **Exceptions.** No exceptions to the policies and prohibitions stated above may be made except with the specific approval of the DCI.
- (m) **Clergymen and Missionaries.** In light of the special Constitutional concern with church-state relationships, CIA shall establish no secret, paid or unpaid, contractual relationship with any American clergyman or missionary. This restriction applies to any person whether or not ordained who is sent out by a mission or church organization to preach, teach, heal, or proselyte. In addition, American church groups will not be funded or used as funding cutouts for CIA purposes. It is intended by this paragraph to prohibit, for example, any use by CIA of an American clergyman or missionary who is not made aware of CIA sponsorship of the activity, or any CIA use of a U.S. person's status as a clergyman or missionary to provide a cover for any CIA activity or assignment. It is not intended to prohibit open relationships with clergymen or missionaries, as for example contracts to perform translating services, entered into for reasons unrelated to the religious status or affiliation of such persons. A willingness on both sides to acknowledge the fact and nature of the relationship is the essential characteristic of the open arrangements that are permitted by this regulation. The CIA will continue to welcome information volunteered by American clergymen or missionaries. If, in the determination of a senior Agency official, such individuals might possess important foreign intelligence information, the Agency might initiate contact so as to afford an opportunity for channeling this information to the Government. Such initiatives, however, shall not be taken abroad.
- (n) **Academic Community.** CIA may enter into classified and unclassified contracts and other arrangements with United States academic institutions of higher learning as long as senior management officials of the institution concerned are made aware of CIA's sponsorship. CIA may enter into personal services contracts and other continuing relationships with individual full-time staff and faculty members of such institutions but in each case will suggest that the individual advise an appropriate senior official thereof of his CIA affiliation, unless security considerations preclude such a disclosure or the individual objects to making any third party aware of his relationship with CIA. No operational use will be made either in the United States or abroad of staff and faculty members of United States academic institutions on an unwitting basis. CIA employees will not represent themselves falsely as employees of

HR 7-1c(8)(n)

MANAGEMENT

- United States academic institutions. CIA personnel wishing to teach or lecture at an academic institution as an outside activity must disclose their CIA affiliation to appropriate academic authorities; all such arrangements require approval in advance from the Director of Security. Pursuant to Federal law, CIA will neither solicit nor receive copies of identifiable school records relating to any student (regardless of citizenship) attending a United States academic institution without the express authorization of the student or, if the student is below the age of 18, his parents. For a detailed explanation of the policies and procedures outlined above, see HHB 7-2.

ADMINISTRATIVE—INTERNAL USE ONLY

MANAGEMENT

HR 7-3

3. AGENCY PRESENTATIONS TO NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS. The Agency is frequently requested by non-Governmental organizations to provide Agency representatives to speak on the subject of intelligence or on specialized substantive topics. Although the Agency will not take the initiative in such matters, it is the policy of the Agency to respond positively to such requests in order to increase public understanding of the Agency's role in Government and to foster beneficial relations with the academic and professional communities. This regulation provides guidelines for handling such requests.

a. GENERAL

- (1) All requests from non-Governmental organizations for Agency speakers will normally be referred to the Assistant to the Director for response. If a request is handled directly in a Directorate or Independent Office, the Deputy Director or Head of Independent Office concerned will inform the Assistant to the Director of the request and the proposed response.
 - (a) The Assistant to the Director may approve requests for speakers on the general subject of intelligence in those cases where there are clear precedents for an affirmative response. In those cases where there are no precedents, or unique problems are presented, the Assistant to the Director will submit the request to the DCI for approval.
 - (b) Requests for speakers on specific substantive topics may be approved by the Deputy Director responsible for intelligence production on that topic. The responsible Deputy Director will inform the Assistant to the Director of the proposed response.
- (2) Congressional requests for Agency speakers to address non-Governmental organizations will be handled in accordance with these guidelines, but action will be coordinated with the Office of Legislative Counsel.
- ➔ (3) It is the responsibility of the Deputy Director or Head of Independent Office concerned to ensure that the content of any presentation is unclassified and is consistent with the established policies of the Agency and the U.S. Government.
- (4) The decision to approve or refuse a request will not discriminate among requesters and will be based on the following considerations:
 - (a) The subject matter of the proposed presentation, particularly in terms of the Agency's competence to handle the topic and the propriety of an Agency representative speaking on the topic.
 - (b) The availability of a qualified Agency speaker.
 - (c) The geographic location of the requested presentation, particularly in terms of the financial expense this might present to the Agency.
 - (d) The size and composition of the proposed audience.
 - (e) The extent and nature of any publicity and the likely press coverage attendant to the presentation.
 - (f) The physical environment of the event and the likelihood of circumstances that might put employee safety at risk.
- (5) The participation of Agency officers in briefing programs should be in response to outside requests. Agency personnel should not take the initiative in soliciting or initiating requests for briefings.
- (6) Agency officers who receive requests for briefings directly from their outside contacts should inform the Assistant to the Director and, when appropriate, the DDI

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY**HR 7-3b****MANAGEMENT**

Coordinator for Academic Relations (DDI/CAR). An officer wishing to respond affirmatively to such a request will request approval through command channels from the appropriate authority, as specified in paragraph a(1). The request for approval should have the concurrence of the Director of Security, and when necessary, the Chief, Cover and Commercial Staff. A copy of the request for approval to present substantive briefings will be provided to the DDI/CAR for record keeping purposes.

b. BRIEFINGS ON THE SUBJECT OF INTELLIGENCE

- (1) Briefings or presentations on the general subject of intelligence such as the mission and functions of CIA and its role in providing intelligence to other components of the U.S. Government may be given to non-Governmental organizations on an unclassified basis only.
- (2) It will be the responsibility of the Assistant to the Director to maintain a roster of Agency officials who will participate in these briefings. This list will be composed of officials with the seniority and Agency experience required to ensure familiarity with and understanding of the full scope of the Agency's mission and programs.

c. SUBSTANTIVE BRIEFINGS

- (1) Agency personnel are encouraged to keep abreast of developments in their substantive fields. This may be done by attendance at academic seminars and professional meetings and may include the presentation of unclassified briefings in their substantive fields. These briefings will generally be requested by academic groups. With a view to increasing substantive exchange with the academic community, the Agency will be responsive to requests initiated by academic institutions or professional associations for Agency speakers on substantive topics.
- (2) The Assistant to the Director will be informed of all requests for substantive briefings and the proposed Agency response thereto. The responsibility for responding to such requests and making the necessary arrangements for speakers will be carried out by the DDI/CAR in behalf of the Assistant to the Director.
- (3) Agency representatives chosen to present substantive briefings will be selected from those officers who are actively engaged in or are directly responsible for research and analysis on the topic in question.
- (4) Approval for substantive briefings will be granted only if there is a clear understanding that:
 - (a) The requester must provide a reasonable prior guarantee of minimum publicity before and after the speaker's appearance.
 - (b) The speaker will not be available for ad hoc or unscheduled appearances with other groups.
 - (c) The speaker's presentation will be confined strictly to the substantive topic on which the briefing was requested.
 - (d) The speaker will not be authorized to meet with representatives of the press or to respond to their queries.

d. LOCATION OF BRIEFINGS

- (1) It is preferred that briefings be conducted at headquarters, be restricted to groups of less than 50 persons, and be given to groups seriously motivated to increase their understanding of intelligence or specific substantive matters.

APPENDIX R

The Director
Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

3 July 1978

Honorable Edward P. Boland, Chairman
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am forwarding an unclassified study on Soviet propaganda as a follow-up to the request made by Representative Ashbrook at the 20 April 1978 hearing on CIA and the media. It is my understanding that the Committee wishes to include this study in the hearing transcript.

Because the study is unclassified, it deals only superficially with certain aspects of Soviet propaganda operations, most particularly with the covert activities of the KGB. I believe, however, that it will provide a useful primer on the scope and magnitude of the Soviet propaganda apparatus as well as the cynical disregard for truth which characterizes Soviet propaganda operations.

The study--as its last paragraph indicates--covers Soviet propaganda directed against American interests from abroad, but does not concern itself with Soviet propaganda operations conducted within the United States, as this is outside CIA's purview. You may wish to consider requesting the appropriate agency to prepare such a study. As our paper suggests, there are indications that Soviet propaganda activities against the United States will increase in the future.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Stansfield Turner", written over the typed name.

STANSFIELD TURNER

Enclosure

INTRODUCTION

1. This paper is submitted in response to a request from the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for an unclassified study of Soviet propaganda activities. We are aware that the Committee is principally concerned with Soviet exploitation of the media; but in order to respond comprehensively to this requirement, we shall discuss not only Soviet media operations, but those elements of the Soviet propaganda apparatus which, while not media themselves, are employed by the Soviets largely to stimulate media attention to Soviet propaganda themes. Among these are the pro-Soviet communist parties and the international communist front groups. We shall also deal briefly with other aspects of Soviet propaganda which do not normally involve media exploitation, such as KGB "agent of influence" operations and forgeries, and the use of the Soviet diplomatic corps to disseminate "the line."

2. This study will consider the role propaganda plays in Soviet foreign policy, principal Soviet propaganda themes, and techniques peculiar to Soviet media activities. In this respect, however, we shall largely limit ourselves to Soviet propaganda directed against the interests of other governments, rather than those which publicize the achievements of the Soviet state and society.

3. Because this paper is unclassified and is intended only as a general survey of a highly complex subject, certain aspects of Soviet propaganda are touched on perhaps more lightly than they deserve. We would be happy to provide the committee with additional details on any topic covered in this report on a classified basis.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

4. The Soviets believe that propaganda plays a highly significant role in the execution of foreign policy. Propaganda campaigns are planned and directed at the highest levels of the Soviet regime. The fundamental aims of Soviet propaganda directed abroad are to weaken the opponents of the USSR and to create a favorable environment for the execution of Soviet policy. The primary target of Soviet propaganda abroad is the United States; Soviet propaganda seeks to isolate the

United States from its allies and to create a world-wide image of the United States as aggressively "imperialist" and "racist." Specifically, the Soviets attempt to show that U.S. military spending and weapons development make this country the major threat to world peace. Such anti-American themes are used both to denigrate the United States and to bring pressure to bear on U.S. policymakers. Moreover, they are exploited directly or by implication to justify both aggressive Soviet policies abroad (as being in support of the "anti-imperialist struggle") and heavy Soviet military expenditures.

5. To carry out its propaganda programs, the Soviets have developed a world-wide network of assets second to none, consisting of an extensive short-wave radio system, broadcasting in many languages; two news agencies; the pro-Soviet communist parties; the international communist fronts; bilateral friendship societies and other quasi-official instrumentalities; a large corps of foreign correspondents, many of them Soviet intelligence officers; the foreign clandestine propaganda assets under the control of the KGB; and the intelligence services and assets of Cuba and Moscow's East European allies.

6. Noteworthy aspects of the propaganda activities carried out by this network include:

a. Central coordination: All Soviet media are subordinated to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and their activities are coordinated at the highest levels of the party. The Soviets are able to orchestrate propaganda campaigns on a world-wide basis with relative ease.

b. Intensity: By the same token, the Soviets are able to saturate their media with specific themes to ensure broad international attention on major propaganda issues.

c. Duration: The world-wide campaign against the U.S. development of the "neutron bomb" (clearly evaluated by the Soviets as a major target for anti-U.S. propaganda) began in mid-1977 and continues to this day. It is, however, merely an aspect of the general Soviet campaign against U.S. weapons development which began not long after World War II. Such general themes--U.S. "racism" is another--may be repeated in varied forms, virtually ad infinitum.

d. Disregard for truth: Western propagandists generally believe that propaganda emanating from official sources should be true, in order to establish

source credibility. Clandestine propaganda, it is felt, may occasionally distort or lie, but only in extraordinary circumstances. On the other hand, in Soviet propaganda, whether official or covert, exaggeration, innuendo, and outright falsehood are common. Thus, since mid-March, the Soviets have attempted, by repeated efforts in a variety of media, to establish in the European mind that the kidnapping of Aldo Moro was the work of Western intelligence services or, specifically, the CIA. A summary of the Moro campaign, which epitomizes Soviet deceptive practices, begins our study.

I. THE MORO KIDNAPPING

7. On 16 March Italy's most notorious left wing terrorist organization, the Red Brigades, blocked the path of an automobile carrying Christian Democratic Party President Aldo Moro, shot down his five bodyguards, and kidnapped the veteran political leader. Moro's abduction was universally regarded as a severe setback for moderate elements in Italy, if not the West as a whole. He had played a pivotal role in maintaining the unity of the Christian Democratic Party and in orchestrating the understanding between Christian Democrats and Communists on which Italian political stability depended. Thus it seemed inconceivable that Moro's kidnapping could be interpreted as serving the interests of the United States; but a listener to Radio Moscow might have drawn different conclusions.

8. On 16 March, the very day of the incident, a Radio Moscow short-wave broadcast in English labelled the kidnapping a "crime of reaction," and one of several "attempts by a right wing force to aggravate the situation in Italy." This general statement was apparently intended to lay the groundwork for more specific charges. On 18 March, in a broadcast aimed specifically at the Italian audience, Moscow alleged that the kidnapping was "prepared by internal and international reactionary forces." Another broadcast on the same day stated that the official French Communist Party newspaper "L'Humanite" had reported that "secret services whose activity is connected with the NATO military base in Naples" were involved. On 19 March Moscow rephrased this charge, blaming "a far flung organization with connections far beyond Italy's borders." A 23 March broadcast alleged that the kidnapping of Moro had been too complex an operation to carry out without the assistance of foreign secret services, and quoted "L'Humanite" again: "It is no secret that the Central Intelligence Agency is actively operating in the Appenines Peninsula."

9. Broadcasts on 28 and 31 March again strongly hinted that CIA was involved in the Moro affair. Then, on 2 April the Soviets made a direct charge. On the Moscow Radio International Service, commentator Anatoliy Ovsyannikov stated: "Well, to call a spade a spade, that service behind the kidnapping is called the Central Intelligence Agency and the foreign power that it belongs to is the United States of America."

10. Soviet media thereafter continued to condemn the United States and NATO generally for interfering in Italian internal affairs, as well as blaming CIA for the Moro kidnapping. As late as 7 May, two days before the discovery of Moro's body, TASS was alleging that the aim of the Red Brigades, under a mask of leftism, was to induce a rightward political swing in Italy, that the Red Brigades must have had outside help, and that it was perhaps significant that Western intelligence services, particularly the USA, were actively interfering in Italian political life. (The only "evidence" of CIA involvement Soviet propagandists have offered is that the operation was too complex to be carried out by mere terrorists.) These themes have not only been repeated by pro-Soviet press outlets, like "L'Humanite," but in a whispering campaign by Russian diplomats.

11. It should be noted that the themes introduced by "L'Humanite," undoubtedly at Soviet suggestion, were picked up and rebroadcast by Soviet official media. "Feedback," a problem of great concern to the U.S. Congress as far as the American media is concerned, is normal practice for the Soviets.

II. ROLE OF PROPAGANDA IN THE CONDUCT OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

12. All countries use propaganda to advance their foreign policy goals. The CPSU leadership, however, regards propaganda as a major, indeed, indispensable, adjunct of Soviet foreign policy and military strategy. The Soviets are willing to spend vast sums on propaganda; our rough estimate of 2 billion dollars per year might be on the conservative side. It is believed that the World Youth Festival staged in Moscow in 1957 by the International Union of Students, a communist front group, alone cost in excess of \$200,000,000--and that was only one, albeit the most costly, of many international actions carried out by Soviet front organizations in 1957. The Politburo itself approves the major themes of Soviet propaganda campaigns--and the means which will be used to disseminate them. For example, KGB forgeries and other major covert actions require Politburo concurrence. (Mikhail A. Suslov, a Party Secretary and senior member of the Politburo in point of service, holds the propaganda "portfolio" within the Politburo.)

13. Under the Politburo's general guidance, the various elements of the Soviet party and government bureaucracy play important operational and coordinating roles. Among these are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the KGB; the CPSU's International, Propaganda and Information Departments (see paragraph 14 regarding the Information Department); and the Radio-TV Committee, a ministry-level organization which administers Soviet broadcasting. Of these, one of the more significant, though not well known, is the International Department (ID), which is responsible for: liaison with communist parties outside the Bloc; the international front group apparatus; and national liberation movements. Boris Ponomarev, a Party Secretary and candidate member of the Politburo, oversees the work of the ID.

14. In the spring of 1978 Leonid Zamyatin, director of TASS, was elevated to become director of a new "Information Department" of the CPSU Central Committee. A variety of overt sources have indicated that Zamyatin will be responsible for "directing foreign propaganda." While the scope of his duties remains unclear, his appointment suggests that the Politburo intends to place even greater emphasis on propaganda in the future.

15. There are two other recent indicators that the Soviets intend to place increasing reliance on propaganda, and particularly to intensify their propaganda against the United States:

a. In January 1978 the Presidium of National Presidents of the World Peace Council, the major Soviet front, held meetings in Washington and New York. Participants interviewed such American decision and opinion makers as they could contact, trying to obtain soundings of the mood prevailing among American leaders.

b. Simultaneously, a delegation of members of the Supreme Soviet, the Soviet parliament, arrived on a tour of the United States. This delegation included Ponomarev, Zamyatin, and a number of other Soviets who play a primary role in the development and execution of propaganda policy. This group visited newspapers and radio stations in several American cities. It is apparent that one purpose of their mission was to determine major concerns of American opinion makers, as well as the susceptibility of American mass communications to Soviet media operations.

III. CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA

16. Centralized Control and Orchestration. The foregoing paragraphs underline the point made earlier that Soviet propaganda policy is formulated at the highest levels of the bureaucracy, with its execution tightly coordinated from Moscow. This close coordination and control ensure that the entire Soviet propaganda network is fully responsive to the demands of policymakers, and can be mobilized quickly and efficiently to disseminate whatever specific propaganda themes they desire on a world-wide basis. As in the Moro kidnapping exploitation, it ensures that themes planted in one vehicle can be immediately picked up and re-broadcast by other propaganda assets.

17. Intensity. The main elements of the Soviet international propaganda network were listed in paragraph 5 and are described in detail in Part V. This vast complex of propaganda assets enables the Soviets to bombard the international audience with propaganda material from a broad variety of sources: some official, such as Radio Moscow; some quasi-official, such as the communist press; and some nonattributable to the USSR, such as the covert placements of the KGB. The impact of this diversified network, dwelling on a certain number of pre-determined themes, albeit with variations in content and perspective, is hard to overestimate.

18. To make this point with greater force, we have appended an annex on the Soviet propaganda campaign against deployment of the "neutron bomb" in Europe, which was initiated in July and August of last year, largely through intensive treatment by Soviet shortwave radio. Subsequently the themes established by Soviet media were re-broadcast in Eastern Europe and then picked up by the front groups, which held many public meetings and demonstrations in Europe on the "neutron bomb" issue. The broad attention paid to the subject by non-communist Western and third world media thereafter can be attributed partly to stimulation by this official and semi-official campaign, supplemented by the clandestine activities of the KGB. The "neutron bomb" has by now become a major political issue in virtually every European capital.

19. Duration. The neutron bomb campaign has continued since July of last year. Viewed in the perspective of time, however, it appears not as an independent campaign, but simply another phase of the Soviet propaganda effort against U.S. weapons development and military spending, which has continued without abatement since shortly after World War II. The World Peace Council has campaigned exclusively on this general theme--along with praising alleged Soviet initiatives on disarmament--

since its formation in 1949-50. The theme of American "racism" has at least as long a history in Soviet propaganda, overt and covert.

20. Disregard of the Truth. In Western countries official government media generally adhere to the truth, albeit colored by subjective interpretation, not only for moral reasons, but on the sound practical grounds that reliance on the truth in time establishes credibility. Western governments and public opinion alike prefer that misleading propaganda be disseminated only through secure, nonattributable foreign outlets, in other words, that it be the exclusive province of the secret services. In the United States, Congress has expressed concern over even clandestine dissemination of false information abroad, fearing that such misleading material could be unwittingly picked up by American reporters overseas and pollute the U.S. media.

21. No such inhibitions deter Soviet propagandists. Ethical considerations are subordinated to the demands of the Soviet State. The "big lie," as the Moro kidnapping exploitation demonstrated, is hardly the exclusive province of the KGB. Moscow Radio, TASS and other official media demonstrate little concern for truthfulness. Credibility is seen as being achieved not through accuracy, but by careful blending together of fact, distortion and outright falsehood, enhanced by intensive repetition.

22. Another recent example of misleading Soviet propaganda is the OTRAG case. In 1975 a consortium of German air industry companies combined to create OTRAG (Orbital Launch and Rocket Corporation), a company intended to develop a capability of placing satellites in space for commercial clients. In 1976 OTRAG contracted with the Government of Zaire for a large testing and launch range in the Shaba province. The site was accessible to the public, and technical facilities as of 1977 were observed to be extremely crude. It is clear also that while the sponsors of OTRAG may well have been sincere in their plans eventually to develop a rocket for commercial purposes, as of early 1978 they had acquired no commercial clients; operations were at a standstill.

23. However, in the fall of 1977 TASS began to send its clients stories claiming that OTRAG was a West German rearmament scheme designed to produce cruise missiles and IRBM's. Media in Europe and the Third World, at least in part under KGB encouragement, added bits of information about the new "secret" German military missile development facility in Zaire. By early 1978 a combination of TASS, the Soviet internal press, and KGB covert press placement had created a legend that the United States (specifically the CIA and Department of Defense),

France and West Germany, with Zairean President Mobutu's connivance, were engaged in a conspiracy to help Germany become a major nuclear missile power through development of OTRAG as a cruise missile testing range. As the complex of fabrications has grown, it has been picked up by legitimate journalists throughout the Third World and even in the West.

IV. SOVIET PROPAGANDA OBJECTIVES AND THEMES

24. Soviet propaganda directed abroad may extol the achievements and policies of the Soviet State; praise foreign governments or political groupings with whom the Soviets are attempting to curry favor (e.g., Ethiopia, Southwest Africa Peoples Organization-SWAPO); condemn the enemies of those governments or groupings (e.g., Somalia, South Africa); or attack the adversaries of the USSR, primarily China and the United States. The preponderance of Soviet external propaganda, however, is aimed at the United States, her NATO allies, and other countries with whom the U.S. has friendly relations.

25. The content of Soviet propaganda targeted against the U.S. changes in accordance with the issues of the day, but at all times reflects certain continuing objectives, among which we can list the following:

a. To influence both world and American public opinion against U.S. military and political programs which are perceived as threatening the Soviet Union;

b. To demonstrate that the U.S. is an aggressive, "colonialist" and "imperialist" power;

c. To isolate the United States from its allies and friends;

d. To discredit those who cooperate with the U.S.;

e. To demonstrate that the policies and goals of the United States are incompatible with the ambitions of the underdeveloped world;

f. To discredit and weaken Western intelligence services and expose their personnel;

g. To confuse world public opinion regarding the aggressive nature of certain Soviet policies;

h. To create a favorable environment for the execution of Soviet foreign policy.

26. Among the themes employed to achieve these objectives we can include:

a. *The U.S. is devoting excessive funds to its military budget in general, and to weapons development in particular.* Since World War II the Soviets have campaigned vigorously against virtually every major new U.S. weapon. The atom bomb itself was a target of Soviet propaganda until the moment the Soviets acquired their own atomic capability. As indicated in the annex to this study, the "neutron bomb," though patently a low-yield nuclear weapon intended for defense against a Soviet armored assault, provided the Soviet propaganda machine with superb raw material for a doomsday weapon scare story. Moreover, because this "sinister" weapon was to be stored and used primarily in Europe, its development could be exploited to demonstrate that the Americans were pursuing military policies in total disregard of the interests of their European allies. The clear intention was to isolate the United States from the rest of NATO. To the extent that the "neutron bomb" campaign was expected to reach the United States, we assume it was intended to encourage public hostility towards the American defense establishment. Similarly, the OTRAG story was intended to stimulate European, and American, public opinion against U.S. and German "militarism," and conceivably was specifically targeted against the development of the cruise missile. A sub-theme in this context is alleged U.S. intransigence on SALT and other arms control issues; the USSR, conversely, is portrayed in Soviet propaganda as a champion of disarmament.

b. *Allies and friends of the United States are servants of "imperialism" or henchmen of CIA.* President Anwar Sadat of Egypt has, in particular, been visited with a cascade of vituperation for his efforts to establish a mutually beneficial relationship with the United States. On December 15, 1977, a Moscow Radio broadcast to the Arab world quoted a Baghdad newspaper article, with apparent approval, to the effect that "American imperialists are encouraging /Sadat/ to conduct this course." A "Radio Peace and Progress" broadcast from Moscow on 29 December in Arabic charged that Sadat had obtained about \$1,000,000...since 1960 in return for his services to Washington." During the most recent Indian election campaign, Soviet media condemned the leaders of the Janata Party as "fascists," "reactionaries," and "in the pay of the CIA." Though

Janata leaders are outspoken proponents of non-alignment, the Soviets apparently feared their victory would lead to a shift in Indian foreign policy towards the United States. When Janata won the election, the Soviets were highly embarrassed and their media were forced to alter the themes of their broadcasts to India abruptly. U.S.-West German and U.S.-Israeli ties are frequent targets of extremely hostile Soviet propaganda.

c. *The U.S. is the devoted friend of conservative or right wing regimes.* Propaganda aimed at Latin America frequently alleges U.S. support of certain right wing South American governments, while broadcasts directed at Africa exaggerate U.S.-South African ties. U.S. arms sales (real or imaginary) to "repressive regimes" are frequent targets of Soviet propaganda, thus: TASS, in English, 6 February 1978, "Among the biggest [weapons] clients of the U.S. are the dictatorial regimes in South Korea, Paraguay, Nicaragua and Haiti." Soviet propaganda is particularly aggressive in condemning real or alleged arms sales to regimes which are adversaries of Soviet clients, such as South Africa or Iran. (An exceptionally high volume of current Soviet propaganda is directed at Iran and U.S.-Iranian ties. This can presumably be explained by Iran's position on the Soviet border, her status as an oil producer, and Soviet anticipations of an unsettled political situation following the demise of the Shah.)

d. *The United States, through clandestine intelligence operations or diplomatic pressure, is constantly interfering in the affairs of other countries, including its closest allies, to advance its own interests, to help local right wing groups to prosper, and to bring down "anti-imperialist" regimes.* The Moro kidnapping exploitation is a good example of this sort of propaganda. A forged U.S.I.S. press release, containing a spurious speech by President Carter which implied that the U.S. was exerting heavy pressure on the Greek government with respect to Greece's relationship with NATO, was mailed to various Greek newspapers in September 1977. The official communist daily reprinted the forgery, which is assumed to be of KGB or satellite intelligence service origin. Soviet diplomats in Africa are known to be spreading rumors of alleged U.S. plots to unseat certain African socialist leaders.

e. The United States is by nature unsympathetic to the needs and ambitions of the third world. Alleged American racism is a continuing subject of Soviet propaganda, as in the current media campaign protesting the "rigged" death sentence of the U.S. black "civil rights worker" John Harris (convicted of rape, robbery and murder in Alabama). The American capitalist system is portrayed as of little relevance to the economic requirements of underdeveloped countries.

27. These various propaganda themes, primarily intended to weaken the Soviets' major adversary, fulfill at the same time a corollary purpose: to justify and promote the foreign policy of the USSR. Thus, to the degree the Soviets are successful in projecting the image of the United States as an "imperialist" nation, they justify their efforts to gain influence and control events in the third world as part of the "anti-imperialist struggle." To condemn the "neutron bomb" and American defense spending is at the same time to attempt to deflect criticism of Soviet weapons development, foot-dragging over SALT, and the burgeoning USSR defense budget. Criticism of U.S. weapons sales to "reactionary" regimes legitimizes Soviet "arms transfers" to "freedom fighters" and "national liberation movements" engaged in the "anti-imperialist struggle"--and generally facilitates the Soviets' efforts to expand their influence and role in the third world.

28. In short, propaganda exploiting these themes fulfills objectives a. through f.: It is generally designed to show the United States as the principal threat to world peace and stability. At the same time, it serves objectives g. and h. by obscuring the aggressive intentions of the Soviet Union and creating a favorable environment for the conduct of Soviet policy abroad.

29. These parallel sets of objectives tend to manifest themselves most blatantly in material produced for internal consumption. Thus an "Izvestiya" editorial of 4 February 1978 condemns the "insidious designs of the militarists of the United States" as leading to "an increased threat of a new war," while claiming that "the Soviet Union spares no effort to halt the arms race." Propaganda directed at Third World audiences tends to be weighted in favor of attacks against the West as opposed to self-praise. As far as the West is concerned, although the Soviets do project some of their cruder propaganda to Western audiences over shortwave radio and through other overt media, it is likely that they judge the Western and particularly the American audience too sophisticated to accept such themes as, for example, that the USSR is

the unchallenged champion of peace and disarmament. Moreover, we believe that the Soviets regard Western and American decision-makers as a more important propaganda target than the American mass audience. To reach them, the Soviets are more likely to employ the more subtle means of influencing opinion described in Part V, such as diplomatic channels and third country "agents of influence." In propaganda disseminated through such channels--largely in one-on-one conversational situations--it is difficult to separate "the line" from actual Soviet perceptions of reality. Therefore, our judgments as to the themes the Soviets are attempting to project through these channels remain speculative, although not unsubstantiated by reporting.

30. We assume that these themes are largely intended to fulfill objective "g" and "h" by affecting American policy-makers' perceptions of Soviet intentions. In the May 1978 "Encounter," Lord Gladwyn, a former British foreign minister, suggests that the Soviets are attempting to persuade the West "that Russia is 'just an ordinary Great Power' with certain legitimate interests," that is, to promote the concept that the USSR is in many ways the mirror image of the USA. A variation on this theme which we have noted in certain channels is that the leadership of the USSR, as in the United States, is composed of "moderates" and "hard-liners," Soviet "hawks" and "doves." Brezhnev emerges as a leading "dove," committed to detente and willing to oppose the Soviet military establishment's demands for an expanded share of the budget. Our belief that this theme may at times be deliberate Soviet propaganda is reinforced by the fact that the Soviets could clearly see themselves as gaining diplomatic advantages by American acceptance of such a line. For example, if we grant that Brezhnev is a "dove," then we must accommodate ourselves to his demands in order to encourage the more moderate elements in the Soviet leadership; moreover, we must expect that the deal Brezhnev offers us is the best we can expect to get from the Soviets.

V. SOVIET FOREIGN PROPAGANDA ASSETS

31. In the following paragraphs we describe the foreign propaganda assets of the Soviet Union. Because we are concerned solely with propaganda directed abroad, we have not considered the propaganda role of the Soviet press. The press is, of course, an important vehicle for propagandizing the Soviet people. Additionally, the Soviets frequently use such major prestigious publications as Pravda and Izvestiya as the means of initiating new propaganda themes, or floating new stories related to old themes, so that they may be replayed by Soviet short wave radio, TASS, or other elements of the Soviet foreign propaganda network.

32. Broadcasting. International radio broadcasting plays a conspicuous role in Soviet propaganda. Total output of Soviet broadcasting to foreign listeners doubled in the last 20 years, to approximately 2,000 hours per week. Currently, 13 radio stations in the USSR maintain regular program schedules for foreign listeners around the world. The most famous is Radio Moscow, which is the official voice of the Soviet Union. Radio Moscow uses more than 100 short wave transmitters and beams programs to virtually every country in the world.

33. Also located in Moscow is a smaller, but more aggressive political station, Radio Peace and Progress. It went on the air in November 1964 claiming to be the "Voice of Soviet Public Opinion." The Soviet government disclaims responsibility for this radio's programs, but in fact Radio Peace and Progress uses the technical facilities of Radio Moscow and is under the control of the Soviet government. It broadcasts programs for three general regions--Latin America, Asia and the Arab World--as well as programs specifically for Haiti, Brazil, Paraguay, China, Mongolia, Indonesia, Israel and Germany. Because of its ostensibly "unofficial" status Radio Peace and Progress can take a harder political line with less diplomatic risk than Radio Moscow, and it does so frequently.

34. Strung out across the land mass of the USSR are ten domestic radio stations that also broadcast to foreign countries--Radios Baku, Dushanbe, Kiev, Minsk, Riga, Tallinn, Tashkent, Tbilisi, Vilnius, and Yerevan. For the most part they broadcast to neighboring countries, such as Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, and Sweden, although the stations in Kiev, Vilnius, and Yerevan beam their signals as far as the Western Hemisphere.

35. At this time there is one clandestine radio station operating from Soviet soil, which is a significant, but perhaps temporary, reduction from the six or more that operated in the past. The current station calls itself the "National Voice of Iran to Iran." It does not identify its location or sponsorship, but monitoring indicates it uses Radio Baku's transmitters. It broadcasts pro-communist, anti-Shah news, commentaries and features in Azerbaijani and Persian.

36. Another special radio is "Radio Magallanes," which transmits from Moscow. Formerly the radio station of the Chilean Communist Party, "Radio Magallanes" moved to the USSR in 1974 to continue Spanish-language broadcasts to Chile. It is not a clandestine radio, but acknowledges both its location and its sponsorship by Radio Peace and Progress.

37. There are four other radios that are probably directed by Soviet broadcasters, but are transmitting from Eastern

Europe. They are "Our Radio to Turkey and Cyprus," "Voice of the Turkish Communist Party to Turkey and Europe," "Voice of the Italian Emigrant to West Germany," and "Voice of Greek Democrats Abroad to West Germany." The four radios are clandestine stations, not acknowledging their location or sponsorship. They broadcast news and commentaries, and may feature news bearing upon discontent among their target audiences. Two of the stations broadcast specifically to foreign workers in Western Europe.

38. In recent years the Soviets have expanded their linguistic capabilities and are currently broadcasting in 84 languages. Much of their increased language coverage is in Third World tongues, with African and Indian languages receiving particular Soviet attention. Soviet broadcasts to Africa maintain a regular program schedule in 11 indigenous languages (Amharic, Bambara, Fula, Hausa, Lingala, Malgache, Ndebele, Shona, Somali, Swahili, and Zulu), as well as English, French and Portuguese. The Soviets use 13 languages for broadcasts to India (Assamese, Bengali, English, Gujarati, Hindi, Kannada, Malayalam, Marathi, Oriya, Punjabi, Tamil, Telugu, and Urdu).

39. The Soviet Union also produces television programs for foreign audiences, which are distributed abroad through official bilateral agreements with other countries and through hookups between East European and West European television systems.

40. The Soviets also produce a large number of propaganda films for foreign audiences.

41. News Agencies. The Soviet Union has two major news agencies, which distribute news in print abroad. They are TASS (Telegrafnoye Aгенstvo Sovetskoy Soyuz) and APN (Aгенstvo Pechati Novosti). Their relative positions and roles are much the same as those of Radio Moscow and Radio Peace and Progress. TASS is the official news agency of the Soviet Union. It is the first to carry official government announcements and it is considered more authoritative and reliable than Novosti. Novosti (or APN) on the other hand is ostensibly an "unofficial" Soviet news agency and therefore free to take a hard political line and disregard political niceties.

42. TASS maintains bureaus and correspondents in approximately 100 countries and supplies its service directly to at least 60 countries in Russian, English, Spanish, German and Arabic. The overall volume of TASS transmissions in all languages is believed to be more than 800 hours daily. (The actual volume may be higher, as this figure includes a rather conservative estimate of TASS microwave transmissions.)

43. Novosti claims that it has information exchanges with more than 100 international and national agencies, more than 100 radio and television companies, more than 7,000 of the world's largest newspapers and magazines, and 120 publishing houses. It also claims an annual transmission to foreign media of 60,000 articles and more than 2 million photo prints, as well as correspondents in 80 countries.

44. As impressive as these figures are, it should be recognized that both TASS and Novosti make much of their material available to foreign press outlets free of charge, so that their volume is not an entirely valid measure of their impact.

45. Publications. The Soviet Union publishes a large number of books and magazines for consumption abroad, and Novosti plays a key role in this enterprise. At its own publishing house in the USSR, Novosti publishes books, brochures, guides and booklets in over 50 languages. Combined editions run more than 15 million copies annually.

46. Novosti also publishes in other countries, bringing out more than fifty magazines and over 100 press bulletins as well as a number of newspapers. One of these magazines, Soviet Land, is a bi-monthly, published in India in 12 languages with a print run of more than 500,000 copies. Another is Sputnik, a general interest monthly magazine, that pays particular attention to articles for youth and young adults in foreign countries. It is published in English, French, German, and Urdu. Both TASS and Novosti have large staffs, and Novosti also draws upon freelance writers.

47. Pro-Soviet Communist Parties. There are more than 75 pro-Soviet communist parties outside the USSR and the Communist Bloc with a total estimated membership of over 3,500,000. Over 2,500,000 of this total is in Western Europe. These parties are uniquely valuable to Soviet propaganda. Communist parliamentarians make speeches in support of Soviet interests which are picked up by media of all political colorations. They also acquire membership on international parliamentary and consultative bodies. Party journalists infiltrate left-of-center, moderate and conservative media. Additionally, some parties have major newspapers of their own; and a few of these have truly impressive circulation figures--for example:

Italy	L'Unita (daily)	400,000
	Paese Sera (daily evening)	180,000

France	L'Humanite (daily)	150-180,000
	L'Humanite dimanche (weekend)	450-500,000
Japan	Akahata (daily)	2,200,000
	Zenei (monthly)	100,000

Moreover, party members are always available to swell the ranks in demonstrations called by front groups or other organizations to protest U.S. policies or for other Soviet propaganda purposes. While many Communist Parties, particularly in Europe, are no longer under tight Soviet control, they still generally follow the Soviet line on foreign policy matters.

48. International Communist Front Groups. There are 13 major international communist fronts. A front is an organization which appears to be independent but is in fact funded and controlled by the Soviets. While the size, and membership of fronts may vary, they all employ similar propaganda techniques, such as mass assemblies and international festivals, to gain publicity. Their purpose is to spread Soviet propaganda themes and create a false impression of public support for the foreign policies of the Soviet Union. A list of these organizations follows:

	<u>Claimed Membership*</u>	<u>Headquarters</u>
Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization	No data	Cairo
Afro-Asian Writers' Permanent Bureau	No data	Cairo
International Association of Democratic Lawyers	25,000	Brussels
International Federation of Resistance Fighters	4,000,000	Vienna
International Organization of Journalists	150,000	Prague
International Union of Students	(Affiliates in 90 Countries)	Prague
Women's International Economic Federation	200,000,000	East Berlin

*Many front groups members are citizens of Soviet or Bloc countries. The non-Soviet Bloc membership of the International Organization of Journalists, for example, is estimated at about 15,000.

	<u>Claimed Membership*</u>	<u>Headquarters</u>
World Federation of Democratic Youth	40,000,000	Budapest
World Federation of Scientific Workers	300,000	London
World Federation of Trade Unions	170,000,000	Prague
World Peace Council	(Affiliates in 120 Countries)	Helsinki
International Radio and Television Organization	No data	Prague
Christian Peace Conference	No data	Prague

*See page 15.

49. A major forthcoming front group propaganda activity is the 11th World Youth Festival, scheduled for Havana July-August 1978. This Festival, sponsored by the International Union of Students and the World Federation of Democratic Youth, will be attended by representatives of communist and non-communist youth groups from most countries of the world. A total of 15-20,000 delegates is anticipated. It can be expected that the Soviets and Cubans will closely orchestrate its proceedings, and ensure that the proceedings of the conference, resolutions adopted, and speeches by those permitted access to the rostrum will project an image of international backing for Soviet/Cuban policies in Africa and Latin America.

50. The most important international front is the World Peace Council (WPC), which acts as a major sounding board for Soviet themes on peace and disarmament. The President of the WPC is Romesh Chandra, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of India. It has affiliate national Peace Councils in 120 countries. Because of the strident nature of its propaganda, the WPC was ejected from its original headquarters in France, and later from Vienna. It has maintained headquarters in Helsinki since 1969. In that year, it was recognized by the United Nations as a legitimate non-governing organization, and since then has become active in UN-sponsored disarmament activities. There is unconfirmed reporting that the WPC intends to establish a permanent presence in New York.

51. Front organizations may establish regional as well as national affiliates. For example, FELAP, the Latin American Federation of Journalists, is an extension of the International Organization of Journalists.

52. The international front organizations alone produce 33 monthly and biweekly publications which are mailed to willing and unwilling recipients all over the world. Some fronts also produce special bulletins which are mailed in bulk to addressee lists far exceeding the membership of their affiliates. (An unclassified handbook on the international fronts is attached.)

53. Friendship Societies. Bilateral friendship societies play an important supplementary role to the activities of the international communist fronts. Friendship society activities are carried out under the direction of the "Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries," established by Lenin in 1925. The Union publishes a newspaper, "The Moscow News," in English, French, Spanish and Arabic and a magazine, "Culture and Life," in Russian, English, Spanish, German and French. Local friendship societies, such as the Indo-Soviet Friendship Society, are generally controlled by Communist Party members or other individuals sympathetic to the Soviet Union. They frequently invite Soviet representatives to speak on a wide variety of subjects (e.g., "The Indo-Soviet Commission for Cooperation in the Social Sciences"). Coverage of these cultural gatherings by the local press is an important propaganda spinoff of friendship society activities, through which it is hoped to offset the adverse publicity the USSR has received through the defection of such prominent personalities as Rostropovich and Solzhenitzyn. Friendship societies often maintain reading rooms or libraries, well stocked with Soviet publications and Marxist classics. They also sponsor cultural exchange activities such as film festivals.

54. Soviet Journalists Abroad. There are close to 500 Soviet journalists stationed abroad, most of them employees of TASS, Novosti, Pravda, or Izvestiya. While these journalists claim to be as independent as any Associated Press or New York Times reporter overseas, they are as much employees of the Soviet state as a Soviet Consul or Ambassador, and, indeed, frequently live in official Soviet residences abroad. These journalists perform a variety of functions in addition to their normal role as reporters. Novosti offices abroad publish press bulletins, from which many third world newspapers extract material for publication. Some TASS and Novosti representatives double as intelligence operatives, and may be directed to recruit and handle local media assets. Additionally, Soviet correspondents, because of their ostensible independent journalist status, are able to establish regular professional relationships with their local colleagues with an ease denied to American officials. These relationships frequently enable them to influence local press coverage of international developments.

55. Diplomatic Contacts. The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs is an integral part of the Soviet propaganda apparatus.

The Soviets use their diplomats not only to spread the official, overt Soviet line, but also as a means for passing deliberately misleading information to foreign governments. For example, a recent authoritative report revealed that a Soviet ambassador had advised the Chief of State of a third world country that the U.S. was plotting to overthrow his regime.

56. At times, Soviet diplomats or other officials abroad (e.g., TASS correspondents) are used as "private channels" between Brezhnev and the local Chief of State or government. The Soviets apparently believe that messages passed through these channels have greater impact and credibility than normal diplomatic exchanges. In these messages Brezhnev frequently appears as a moderate "reformist," surrounded by hard-liners. (See paragraph 30.)

57. Propaganda Activities of the KGB. The KGB provides a nonattributable adjunct to the vast overt Soviet propaganda network. It performs certain unique functions, such as the manufacture and distribution of forgeries and running high level influence agents, but its propaganda activities represent only a small fraction of the overall Soviet effort.

58. KGB Covert Media Assets. Much of the Soviet covert propaganda effort is at best only semi-clandestine. Pro-Soviet or anti-American propaganda appearing in the foreign press is often so blatant in nature that its Soviet origin is obvious, even though the source is not admitted. Most of this semi-clandestine activity is believed to be handled by non-intelligence personnel, rather than the KGB. KGB placements, often intended to denigrate local opponents of the Soviets, will normally be far more subtle, and even contain mild criticism of the USSR to conceal their sponsor. Sometimes the purpose of KGB or other Soviet press placements abroad is to propagandize the Soviet people. Recent editorials appearing in African journals which have explained the correctness of Soviet policies in, for example, Ethiopia, have been broadly replayed in the Soviet press and radio news networks. Also, KGB press placements abroad may have a third country as a target. The Soviets might find it difficult at present to float a story in the Cairo press; but they could use a controlled press asset in another country to, let us say, plant an article that the U.S. was plotting against Sadat, in the belief that if the story was sensational enough, it was bound to reach official Egyptian eyes and ears automatically. Otherwise, the Soviets could replay the story in controlled media elsewhere to reach an Egyptian audience.

59. KGB "Agents of Influence." Reporting indicates that the KGB has a number of officers who are accomplished at developing strong personal friendships with political and

economic leaders in both capitalist and third world countries, arriving with them at an understanding that permits the other party to collaborate occasionally with the Soviets on matters of mutual interest while retaining his integrity and loyalty to his country. In return for his services, the KGB may offer such a collaborator support for his undertakings, when they do not conflict with Soviet interests; international publicity for his accomplishments; or special communications channels to the Kremlin leadership. It appears that some "agents of influence" are employed by the Soviets because of their role as senior executives of institutions which comment or publish material on domestic or foreign policy matters.

60. KGB Political Action. The KGB at times assists the CPSU/ID in the clandestine funding of certain political leaders in Africa and Asia. Soviet support of some political groups must, however, be indirect. The KGB may wish to avoid direct contact with certain terrorist or national liberation movements because exposure would have serious consequences for the Soviet image and Soviet foreign relations (as well as for the recipients of Soviet assistance). In such cases the KGB operates through "cut-outs," such as non-Soviet revolutionary support organizations and leftist branches of certain international religious, social or philanthropic organizations. (The Soviets might also use local communist parties as go-betweens with radical groups they wish to support.)

61. Forgeries. Forgeries of apparent Soviet origin have been appearing with increasing frequency in the last year. Most of these recent forgeries have been alleged copies of official U.S. Government documents, which contain demeaning references to friendly governments. The Arab world, and Egypt in particular, appear to have been prime targets of recent Soviet forgery efforts. KGB forgeries are not always intended for media exploitation. For example, last March an envelope containing a microfilm of a bogus letter from U.S. Ambassador Eilts in Cairo turned up at the Sudanese Embassy in Beirut. The letter, addressed to our Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, called for the overthrow of the Numayri Government in the Sudan. In this instance, the intended audience of the forgery was the Sudanese Government; surfacing in the press was not vital. But in other cases, as for example the forgery of President Carter's speech on Greece cited in paragraph 26, d., the intended audience is the general public. In such cases, it is common Soviet practice to mail forgeries anonymously, or under a pseudonym, to local newspapers, in the hopes that one will automatically replay the document because of its sensational nature, or on a prior understanding that the communist press will exploit the forgery. A variation on this technique is to ensure that a prominent Soviet agent of influence receives the forgery and denounces it publicly, with the denunciation, it is hoped, covered by the press.

62. Soviet Satellite Propaganda. The Cuban and European intelligence services conduct propaganda operations parallel to, and in support of, the KGB. It is well known, for example, that the Czechs are particularly adept at the fabrication of forgeries. Three major satellite press agencies: CETEKA (Czech); DNA (East German); and PRENSA LATINA (Cuban); supplement the product of TASS and Novosti. As indicated in paragraph 37, clandestine radio transmitters are located on the soil of certain Bloc countries. Cuban short wave radio broadcasts regularly in Spanish and Indian dialects to Latin America. The Soviets frequently employ personnel of other communist states as front men when they do not wish to appear openly involved in domestic situations. For example, after the Communist Party of India split into pro-Moscow and pro-Peking factions in 1974, East German diplomatic and media representatives frequently contacted members of the pro-Peking group in efforts to induce them to reunite with the pro-Soviet faction.

63. Conclusion. This paper has not dealt with Soviet propaganda activities conducted within the United States, as they do not fall within the responsibilities of this Agency. We believe that some of the evidence presented in this paper suggests that such a study would be worthwhile. The recent visits to the United States of the leading personalities of both the Soviet central propaganda apparatus and the WPC, the major Soviet front group, may well presage, as we have suggested, an intensification of Soviet propaganda intended to influence American public opinion and policymakers. Campaigns initiated abroad against American policies, and particularly new U.S. weapons--such as the "neutron bomb" or the cruise missile--presumably had their U.S.-based counterpart. We have mentioned that certain Soviet themes floated overseas have reached the U.S. press; but the Soviets would be unlikely to rely on mere windfalls such as these as the mainstay of a propaganda assault against their principal adversary. If, as must be assumed, the main objective of Soviet propaganda is to weaken the United States and her allies, operations to further this end are undoubtedly taking place on our home soil.

Attachments:

1. Annex
2. "International Communist Front Organizations" Booklet

ANNEX

SOVIET PROPAGANDA: THE "NEUTRON BOMB"

INTRODUCTION

1. The Soviet Union during July and August 1977 initiated an intensive worldwide campaign against U.S. production of the "neutron bomb" which continues to this day. The Soviets have pursued this issue in every media channel and wherever it was possible to stimulate adverse public discussion. The campaign demonstrates that the Soviets maintain an impressive capability to promote international propaganda on issues they consider important.

BACKGROUND

2. Initiative from Moscow. A study of broadcast commentary of Moscow domestic and international radio services from 4 July through 21 August suggests that the earliest sustained propaganda on the "neutron bomb" originated exclusively from the Soviet Union and that the Soviets escalated this attack in later weeks to support the propaganda campaign as it got underway elsewhere. Of some 3,000 broadcast items examined weekly, the number devoted to the neutron bomb issue rose from an insignificant level during 4-10 July, to dominate Soviet commentary during the three weeks of 25 July to 14 August. The attention given the neutron bomb then began to fade.

<u>Period</u>	<u>Total Items</u>	<u>Neutron Bomb Issue</u>
4-10 July	3,247	--
11-17 July	3,123	2%
18-24 July	3,163	5%
25-31 July	3,118	13%
1-7 August	3,091	13%
8-14 August	3,445	11%
15-21 August	3,331	5%

3. No other topic during the 25 July to 14 August period received so much attention. The campaign was sustained not only by volume but with specially staged, dramatic events. On 30 July, TASS for the first time since December 1974 issued a broad statement on U.S. foreign policy, denouncing the "neutron bomb." During the week of 1-7 August, Soviet media directed attention toward support of the "Week of Action" on

the bomb organized for 6-13 August by the World Peace Council front group. To keep up momentum, Pravda on 9 August published an appeal by 28 communist parties against production of the "neutron bomb."

4. There was nothing elaborate or complex in the themes used in the campaign. The "neutron bomb" was described merely as one more dreadful implement of war in the American arsenal, with the distinction of being the ultimate capitalist weapon, one which killed people but left property intact. The U.S. was portrayed as hypocritical for raising human rights issues while developing the bomb, and endangering the security of its European allies in the interests of its own defense. The bomb was also pictured as a threat to detente.

5. Echoes In Eastern Europe. The campaign in Eastern Europe, which took off in the latter weeks of July, was massive, well-organized and faithfully mirrored the Soviet effort. It employed all channels of public communication: press, radio, television, petitions, public letter-writing and demonstrations.

6. Front Group Action: In declaring 6-13 August an international "Week of Action," the World Peace Council established a focal point for action against the "neutron bomb." The Soviets' own Peace Committee used the occasion to pass a resolution stating the development of the neutron bomb violated the Helsinki CSCE agreement and threatened SALT negotiations. Similar staged incidents followed:

- Peace Councils in various East European states held protest meetings and passed resolutions.
- In Istanbul, a Peace Committee demonstrated in front of the U.S. Consulate General.
- An Accra group, described as completely out of local character, delivered a protest letter to the U.S. Embassy.
- In Stuttgart, Frankfurt and Dusseldorf, front groups delivered notes to U.S. Consulates General. In Bonn, two Soviet journalists were observed at a demonstration at the American Embassy.
- A front group in Lima, Peru, sent a protest to the United Nations.
- In Tanzania, a WPC delegation sought propaganda assistance from President Nyerere.
- Other major international front groups, such as the World Federation of Trade Unions, participated in the "Week of Action."

The purpose of this front group activity was to maintain the campaign's momentum and to draw non-communists into the campaign, particularly in Western Europe. What had begun as manifestly a Soviet effort now appeared to many as a general public reaction to the alleged horrors of the "neutron bomb."

7. Media Pick-Up In Western Europe. There were two types of adverse public attention for the "neutron bomb" which the Soviets hoped to generate in Western Europe and, in fact, did. The first might be called "hack comment" and came from the front groups and from publications of communist parties. Thus there were articles in the Belgian CP newspaper, "Le Drapeau Rouge," (on ten different days), and the Austrian CP paper, "Volksstimme," "L'Unita" in Italy, the Greek CP/Exterior newspaper, "Rhizospastis," and so on. The second type of comment, and the far more important, was that of the non-communist press situated politically in the center or on the left. A segment of this press could be counted on to react almost automatically once the "neutron bomb" received enormous attention in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Others in this group could be expected to respond negatively on the bomb issue for various reasons: anti-Americanism; doubts on NATO's viability; hopes for maintaining good relations with the Soviet Union; or an honest distaste for the development of new weapons of mass destruction.

8. For the Soviets, the real propaganda success lay in the broad, adverse editorial treatment given the "neutron bomb" by this second journalistic sector, a performance judged by NATO Secretary General Luns in a 26 August speech as consisting of half-truths, untruths, and ignorance. This involved even the most objective elements of the media, which felt an obligation to carry both sides of the argument. An Italian source indicated it was impossible to distinguish left from right on the bomb issue, while a Paris report underscored the Soviet propaganda success by commenting that in France anti-bomb themes were appearing in local media totally independent of Soviet influence.

9. Propaganda Elsewhere. While Western Europe was the main target of Soviet propaganda on the "neutron bomb," the campaign, as the following examples illustrate, was of world-wide dimensions.

Libya: Tripoli media for weeks carried bcmb-related propaganda of apparent Soviet origin.

Peru: Lima's most prestigious newspaper, "El Comercio," carried an attack on the bomb by the director of the International Institute for Peace front group, located in Vienna.

India: The Calcutta English language daily, "Amrita Bazar Patrika," carried 13 anti-American stories during the campaign, several related to the bomb.

Pakistan: The Urdu newspaper, "Mashriq," routinely published anti-bomb material.

Mauritius: The Port Louis newspaper, "Le Militant," carried three bomb-related articles.

Mali: "L'Essor," the country's only newspaper, published stories.

Ghana: Major Accra newspapers provided a steady diet of anti-bomb propaganda.

Afghanistan: In Kabul, the Soviet Embassy attacked the U.S. directly in its "News Bulletin."

Japan: For the first time in five years, a Soviet delegation appeared for a conference against nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and used that forum for anti-"neutron bomb" propaganda.

Ethiopia: The English language newspaper, "Ethiopian Herald," carried much Soviet-origin material on the bomb.

10. Phase Two. In September 1977 Secretary of Defense Harold Brown announced that President Carter would not approve production of the "neutron bomb" until America's NATO allies agreed to deploy the weapon. It might have been assumed that this statement would bring an end to the Soviet propaganda campaign. In fact, the Soviets maintained a continuing volume of propaganda on the putative horrors of the "neutron bomb" and encouraged their East European allies to do the same.

11. In late January 1978 every Western government announced that it had received a letter from Leonid Brezhnev warning that the production and deployment of the "neutron bomb" constituted a serious threat to detente. These announcements received heavy media coverage worldwide. Also, Western parliamentarians received similar letters from members of the Supreme Soviet, and Soviet Trade Union officials sent letters to Western union organizations and leaders. It gradually became clear that the Soviets had decided to shift their propaganda attack away from the United States and direct it more at our NATO allies, who would have to make the decision in the immediate future as to whether to accept deployment of the bomb on their soil.

12. Phase Three. Even as Brezhnev's dramatic gesture brought home to West Europeans the weight of the "neutron bomb" issue, the Soviets were planning a series of conferences in Europe which would move the propaganda drive into a third

phase. The target of this new effort was the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD), to be held in New York from 23 May to 28 June.

Three conferences were utilized to provide psychological momentum at the SSOD. The World Peace Council, through one of its sub-fronts, the International Liaison Forum of Peace Forces, organized a symposium in Vienna on "Nuclear Energy and the Arms Race" in collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency, a United Nations body. This meeting, held 6 to 8 February, was attended by delegates from 22 countries and was used by the WPC to raise the 'neutron bomb' issue. The WPC president, Romesh Chandra, was quoted by the East Berlin newspaper, "Neues Deutschland," as stating that the Vienna meeting "was a contribution to the UN Special Session on Disarmament."

13. A much larger meeting was staged in Geneva 27 February to 2 March under the aegis of an organizing group calling itself the "Special Non-Governmental Organizations Committee on Disarmament." In fact, the real organizer was the WPC, aided by the Swiss Peace Movement and East Bloc representatives accredited to the United Nations in Geneva. Chandra presided over this meeting, which was attended by 126 representatives of peace organizations from 50 countries. The final statement condemned the proposed manufacture of neutron weapons and promised support against the "neutron bomb" for the third in this series of meetings, held in Amsterdam.

14. The Dutch Communist Party was the prime organizer of the "International Forum Against the Neutron Bomb," held 18 to 20 March in Amsterdam. The Soviets collaborated with the DCP in this extravaganza. Sympathizers from all over Europe were brought in for the meeting, which culminated on 19 March in a march of some 40,000 persons.

15. While the above conferences were being carried out there were other meetings and regional gatherings--some scheduled long before--which the Soviets adapted to their "neutron bomb" propaganda purposes. For example, the Second Continental Latin American and Caribbean Conference in Peace, Sovereignty and Economic Independence, held in Mexico City 1 to 4 February, and jointly sponsored by the WPC and the allied Mexican Peace Movement, was used to promote propaganda against the "neutron bomb." The WPC International Conference for Peace, Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean, held 9 to 12 February in Athens, also addressed itself to the bomb issue. At the same time, East Bloc allies of the Soviets, particularly the Czechs, Poles and East Germans, maintained heavy propaganda activity against the "neutron bomb."

16. On 4 April 1978, American newspapers announced that President Carter had decided to delay production and deployment of the "neutron bomb." This declaration caused not so much as a break in stride in the Soviet campaign against the bomb. Soviet assets attacked the President's decision as a dodge; it was alleged that "nothing of substance had changed," and that the "protest movement must grow even stronger." In his 26 May 1978 address to the SSOD, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko said that neutron weapons "must be banned once and for all," calling them, "a particularly vicious and cruel means of mass destruction, intended to annihilate all things living."

ANALYSIS

17. We have selected the "neutron bomb" campaign for special consideration because it illustrates the duration and intensity with which the Soviets are capable of conducting an international propaganda campaign, as well as the general difference to the truth which characterizes much Soviet propaganda material. Also, the programmed development of the campaign, the interplay between various types of assets, and the quick shifts in emphasis in response to changing situations suggest the control Moscow enjoys over its international network. Moreover, the scope of the campaign demonstrates graphically the investment the Soviets are willing to make in propaganda.

18. Soviet Objectives. By creating an atmosphere of dread and foreboding about the "neutron bomb," the Soviets hoped to further a number of their basic propaganda objectives and themes. First, by presenting the bomb--a patently defensive, low yield nuclear weapon--as a new and particularly dreadful addition to the American nuclear arsenal, they encouraged criticism of U.S. defense spending and weapons development, and furthered the image of the U.S., rather than the USSR, as an aggressive "imperialist" country and the major threat to world peace. In so doing, they sought to justify, in the eyes of the world public opinion, Soviet military spending and the development of new Soviet weapons. It was natural that the principal geographical target of the Soviet "neutron bomb" campaign was Western Europe. Efforts to portray the bomb as escalating tensions in Europe were intended to create fears among the U.S.'s Western allies of American intentions, and thus to undermine NATO unity, a prime goal of Soviet propaganda activity. In particular, West Germany was portrayed as the sacrificial lamb of an aggressive U.S. military policy. To the extent that the "neutron bomb" campaign reached American eyes and ears, we can speculate that it was intended to stimulate doubts in the U.S. public about our own military establishment, its motives and its policies.

Impact. While an accurate measurement of the impact of any propaganda campaign is difficult, if not impossible, the fact that the "neutron bomb" has become a major political issue in most European parliaments must be attributed in some degree to the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda. The conclusion should not obscure the fact that many informed individuals in Europe sincerely opposed the "neutron bomb" on grounds entirely unrelated to the content of the Soviet propaganda campaign. That campaign, in fact, did not bother to come to grips with the pros and cons raised by military experts with regard to the "neutron bomb." The point is, rather, that by conducting a massive propaganda campaign exaggerating the lethality of this weapon, the Soviets made "neutron bomb" a household scareword in Europe, if not throughout the world.

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INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST FRONT ORGANIZATIONS

I SUMMARY

Soviet-controlled international front groups are among Moscow's major propaganda weapons today. A front organization is a group which appears to be independent but in fact is controlled by Soviet agents. Its objective: to create public support for Soviet policies among the unsuspecting.

Some front groups seek the support of the masses -- students, women and trade unionists. Other fronts aim at smaller targets -- lawyers, journalists and scientific workers. All Communist front groups have a common trait: they consistently push the Soviet line.

There are 13 major Communist international front organizations, most of which were started in the late 1940's. These groups claim millions of members but nearly all of this membership is found in Communist countries. The Soviet Union provides much of the money for these groups, directs their leaders and controls their propaganda -- all in secret.

Front groups employ similar propaganda techniques, including mass assemblies and international festivals, to gain publicity. The fronts fulfill other important purposes. They serve as a base for the development of Communists in countries where a Communist party is banned. They provide Soviet intelligence officers with opportunities to enlist individuals as agents. And they continue to create a false impression of public support for the foreign policies of the Soviet Union.

II BACKGROUND

Nine of the major Soviet-controlled front organizations got their start in the 1945-1948 period following World War II. They were the World Peace Council, the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the International Union of Students, the Women's International Democratic Federation, the International Organization of Journalists, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, the World Federation of Scientific Workers and the International Radio and Television Organization.

This was the period when Stalin was expanding and consolidating Soviet power in Eastern Europe. A Communist coup vanquished Czechoslovakia in February 1948 and the Berlin blockade began two months later. It was the height of the cold war and the rest of the world recognized the fronts as aggressive cold war propaganda agencies.

Other fronts followed, three of them -- the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization, the International Institute for Peace and the Christian Peace Conference -- founded in the wake of the 1956 Hungarian revolution.

In subsequent years the fronts became less strident. They advocated peaceful coexistence, later detente, and switched to more sophisticated programs intended to appeal to well-intentioned but politically naive individuals. The fronts talked of goodwill, peace and understanding, even while continuing activities intended to advance Soviet global policies.

The fronts today, as a result of Soviet organizational efforts and clandestine financial assistance, are effective instruments of Kremlin foreign policy. They are widely accepted in many Third World countries and a number are officially accredited to United Nations agencies.

The fronts, however, remain under Soviet discipline and control, promoting causes which echo the Moscow line -- and shifting whenever Soviet policy changes. A front campaign in late 1977 against development of the neutron bomb was only one, although the most recent, example of this coordination of front activities by Soviet officials, acting through the International Department of the Soviet Communist Party and through the KGB/GRU, the Soviet intelligence agencies.

III THE MAJOR FRONTS

• The World Peace Council (WPC), with its headquarters in Helsinki, is the most important Soviet front organization. It has carried on a major expansion program in recent years, particularly in the Third World. The WPC President, Romesh Chandra (see page 13), a leader of the Communist Party of India, has been closely involved in front activities for more than a quarter of a century, consistently reflecting Soviet goals and policies. The WPC claims to have affiliates in 120 countries. It holds well-advertised international congresses every three or four years -- the last in Warsaw in May 1977. The WPC supports disarmament on Soviet terms (without international inspection) along with various subsidiary campaigns backing Soviet policy on the Middle East, Cyprus, Chile, South Africa and other regional problems.

• The Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), with headquarters in Cairo, is an off-shoot of the WPC and supports WPC programs at its various meetings and in its published material. AAPSO gives the Soviet Union a foothold in the Afro-Asian bloc and also in Latin America, through the related Organization for Solidarity with the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America (AALAPSO). One indication of Soviet influence in AAPSO was the holding of the 12th AAPSO Council in Moscow in 1975.

• The World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), centered in Prague, is the largest and one of the most active front groups. It claims a membership of 170 million in 70 countries. Most members, however, are in Soviet bloc countries, with 100 million in the USSR itself. The two largest non-Communist bloc trade unions in the WFTU are the General Confederation of Labor (CGT) in France and the General Confederation of Italian Labor (CGIL) in Italy, both Communist-dominated. The WFTU claims to be furthering trade unionism, but it attempts to weaken non-Communist labor organizations. WFTU-affiliated labor groups (in the Sudan, for example) have been involved in Communist takeover attempts. Like other fronts, the WFTU distributes large quantities of printed propaganda, including a monthly journal of 30 to 40 pages, printed in 10 languages and distributed in 75 countries. The journal is for labor activists. It outlines ways to promote the Soviet position on most major political events, whether labor related or not.

- The World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), with headquarters in Budapest, claims a membership of 150 million in 100 countries, but membership is concentrated in the Soviet bloc. Though not without some rivalry between them, the WFDY often works closely with the much smaller International Union of Students (IUS), which has its headquarters in Prague. The two groups have jointly sponsored a series of international youth festivals over the past 30 years -- the last in East Berlin in 1973, the next scheduled in Havana in July 1978. Both the WFDY and IUS coordinate their activities with the WPC and other fronts. The terms "youth" and "students" identify the Fronts' target audiences for indoctrination. Control of both Fronts is held by trusted adults.

- The International Organization of Journalists (IOJ), centered in Prague, claims 150,000 members, many of them belonging to affiliated national unions. The IOJ attempts to discredit non-Communist news agencies and publications but remains silent about the absence of press freedoms in bloc countries. It offers training (indoctrination) programs to Third World journalists, offers a news service heavily weighted with propaganda and awards prizes to Communist and leftist media workers.

- The International Institute for Peace (IIP) was organized to provide temporary cover for WPC activities in 1958. IIP headquarters is in Vienna. It claims to provide a forum where scientists of East and West can discuss peace problems, but its membership is centered in bloc countries and IIP hews closely to the Soviet line in all its activities.

- The Christian Peace Conference (CPC), centered in Prague, describes itself as a forum for Christians everywhere to "search for God's will concerning current political, social and economic problems." Its highest organ is the All-Christian Peace Assembly (ACPA), which scheduled its 5th international conference in Prague in 1978. The CPC has been headed by Metropolitan Nikodim of the USSR since 1969. It helped to organize a world conference of religious leaders in Moscow in 1977. Statements issued after CPC meetings always follow the Soviet line.

- The Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF), with headquarters in East Berlin, has claimed a total membership of 200 million from 120 affiliated organizations in more than 100 countries. Most of the membership is in the Soviet bloc. WIDF sponsored a world congress in East Berlin in 1975 as part of a United Nations "women's year" which it helped organize. WIDF meetings and publications -- including a glossy quarterly printed in six languages -- emphasize Soviet bloc propaganda behind a facade of programs

dedicated to women's rights and education, peace and disarmament.

- The International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL), centered in Brussels, claims a membership of 25,000 and considers law a function in the struggle against "imperialism" and "colonialism." The IADL issues periodic statements about legal and human rights abuses in non-Communist countries but never discusses such violations in the bloc area. It has sent observers to trials held in such countries as Chile, Iran, Morocco, Spain and Turkey, but has never attempted to monitor trials held in the Soviet bloc.

- The International Radio and Television Organization (OIRT), with headquarters in Prague, offers full membership only to national broadcasting and television organizations. The avowed aims of OIRT are to facilitate exchanges and cooperative efforts among its members. In practice OIRT has become a tool for coordination of Communist radio and television propaganda. It attempts to influence the development of Third World radio and television organizations through training and other assistance programs. Only European Communist countries, Finland and Cuba were represented at a December 1976 OIRT Council meeting.

- The World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW) has its headquarters in London and a Secretary-General's office in Paris. It claims a membership of 300,000, drawn mainly from Communist countries. Its program follows closely on WPC propaganda initiatives and has included such "abuse of science" themes in the past as allegations of U.S. use of "germ warfare" or "chemical warfare." The WFSW picked up the WPC campaign against the neutron "bomb" in 1977.

- The International Federation of Resistance Fighters (FIR), with its headquarters in Vienna, also maintains close liaison with the WPC, following the WPC line on disarmament. FIR, after World War II, brought together former political prisoners and victims of Nazism and Fascism, including World War II partisans and resistance organizations. It extolled the role of Communist partisans and the Soviet Army and was critical of non-Communist resistance groups. It is of declining significance today, although it continues to sponsor exhibitions and lectures at World Youth festivals and similar gatherings.

IV SOVIET CONTROL

The strongest evidence of Soviet control of the fronts through the years, despite poses of independence and non-alignment, has been their faithful adherence to the Soviet party line.

When the Sino-Soviet feud erupted, the fronts sided with the Soviet Union and elbowed Peking out of their meetings. Front officials suspected of pro-Chinese sympathies were eliminated.

When Tito broke with the Cominform, the front organizations expelled Yugoslav members; they were later welcomed back when Nikita Khrushchev repaired the breach.

Soviet suppression of the Hungarian uprising in 1956 and the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 resulted in public protests from some front officials. It took several years in each case, but Moscow finally replaced all those who disagreed with its policies. Most front activities meanwhile, remained in a state of suspension, until discipline had been restored.

Front groups, similarly, jumped to follow the Kremlin line when the 1973 Arab-Israel conflict erupted. All the fronts denounced Israel within a matter of days, usually in the same phrases. More recently they have echoed Moscow's position on such problems as Angola and Ethiopia. The president of the Ghana Peace Council (a WPC affiliate) was ousted from his post, after questioning the Soviet role in Angola, and accused of being "on the same side as the imperialists."

The various fronts joined in chorus against development of the new neutron radiation weapon in 1977. These same fronts earlier echoed the same line, sometimes using the same phraseology, for Moscow-proposed "general and complete disarmament" and in drumming up signatures for the Stockholm peace appeals.

The fronts coordinate and interact with one another, usually emphasizing the same subjects at the same time. Some who have become disillusioned with the fronts and quit them have publicly confirmed the fact of Soviet control and the undemocratic nature of front organizations, with public meetings stage-managed from start to finish by a leadership hand-picked by Soviet representatives.

Jiri Pelikan, a veteran Czechoslovak Communist who headed the International Union of Students from 1953 to 1953, told the New Left Review in January 1972:

"The Soviet Union was always trying to impose its tactical policy of the moment on the organization ... The Soviet members saw the IUS and similar organizations merely as unofficial instruments of Soviet foreign policy."

Richard K. Ullmann, a former vice president of the Christian Peace Conference, asserted as early as 1963:

"We had better admit that our Eastern brothers are being used for Communist policy and that through them we are being used in the same way."

Dr. Josef L. Hromadka, a Czechoslovak theologian, resigned as chairman of the CPC in 1969 following the Warsaw Pact 1968 takeover of Prague. He indicated in his resignation that although it had been Metropolitan Nikodim of the Russian Orthodox Church (the CPC president) who purged the CPC after the 1968 invasion, the move was in reality ordered by the Soviet government.

"This is not just an internal church decision," Dr. Hromadka said, "there must be pressure from outside." He died of a heart attack shortly thereafter.

Over the years, many rank and file members, as well as some officials, have dropped out of front activities after discovering that things were not as they seemed. Disillusionment over Soviet control has been the main cause of such defections. But front organizers continue to round up new recruits and sometimes boast of the new blood being brought constantly into the organization. Romesh Chandra, head of the World Peace Council, told the 1977 World Assembly in Warsaw, for example, that 60 percent of those in attendance had never participated in a previous WPC international meeting.

Besides offering a mechanism for manipulating public opinion, the fronts also offer the Soviet Union other important benefits.

Front gatherings serve as agent enlisting grounds for Soviet and bloc intelligence services. Front meetings in the USSR and Eastern Europe are ideal for this purpose because bloc intelligence officers can control the circumstances of their meetings with likely recruits, with no fear of surveillance by or interference from non-Communist security services. Most of the agents enlisted by Communist bloc intelligence services over the years were targeted while on visits to the Soviet bloc, some while in attendance at front meetings or on free vacations in the bloc offered in connection with these gatherings.

Fronts also act as cover for Communist parties and organizations in countries where open Communist groups or parties have been outlawed. They serve as propaganda organs in countries where conditions are not ripe for open Communist activities or for the establishment of a Communist party. They have also helped to channel training and arms to insurgents and opposition political groups.

V ROMESH CHANDRA -- NUMBER ONE FRONT MAN

The World Peace Council (WPC), the major Soviet-controlled international front organization, recently honored Romesh Chandra, an Indian Communist, by elevating him from Secretary-General to President at its 1977 meeting in Warsaw.

The honor was well-deserved from the Soviet point of view because Chandra, possibly the best-known of all front officials, has faithfully followed the Moscow line throughout his quarter century in the front movement. Year after year, Chandra has praised Soviet peace initiatives and condemned Western "imperialists." The WPC, Chandra said in Moscow in 1975, "positively reacts to all Soviet initiatives in international affairs." Two years earlier, at a 1973 Moscow peace conference, Chandra asserted that those peace organizations which took an anti-Soviet stance "ceased to be genuine peace organizations." Chandra has never strayed -- even during such periods of stress as the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. He stood up for Moscow then though there were widespread protests from leaders of some other front groups who were subsequently ousted from office.

Chandra, now 58, travels to scores of countries annually as part of his WPC assignment. He speaks at WPC seminars and regional and planning conferences and before United Nations committees. He is cited in countless WPC news releases as an authority on peace.



Romesh Chandra of India has been an organizer and leader of Soviet front groups since at least 1950. He has been a key figure in the World Peace Council (WPC) since becoming a member of its executive committee in 1953. He is now its President. He helped found the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) and has played a role in launching and operating a number of other front groups. Chandra is so loyal to the Soviet Union that he once told a WPC gathering that any peace group which took an anti-Soviet stand was not a genuine peace organization.

He has been with WPC practically from its beginning, active in international front gatherings since at least 1950. He became a member of the WPC executive committee and one of its secretaries in 1953. The following year he helped launch another major Soviet front, the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) -- Moscow's response to being banned from the 1955 Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung. Chandra has helped guide AAPSO since, including its participation in many WPC propaganda campaigns. Chandra is also a founder and former director of the International Institute for Peace, a separate front group which remains under WPC control. He also heads some front subsidiary groups.

Clever, ambitious and vain, Chandra has been known in India for years as the Indian with the Russian contacts. In 1953 Moscow used him as a go-between with the Indian Communist Party, advising the Party to refrain from criticizing Jawaharlal Nehru so as to keep him neutral. In 1963 Chandra made a secret trip to Moscow to uphold India's case in the Sino-Indian dispute. Chandra makes frequent stopovers in Moscow during his travels as WPC spokesman. Those familiar with the workings of the WPC say that the Kremlin uses these visits to keep Chandra posted on the party line.

The Russians, while thus keeping a short rein on Chandra, also exercise other means of control. They keep a representative of the Soviet Communist Party at Chandra's side at WPC headquarters, with authority to overrule Chandra whenever deemed necessary. Igor Belyayev, although listed only as a secretary in the WPC secretariat, is the Soviet representative who currently wields this power in WPC affairs.

VI POSSIBLE COUNTERMEASURES

A number of steps can be taken to regulate and control the activities of Soviet front organizations in non-Communist countries. Some are listed below.

- Records can be kept of local citizens who attend international front gatherings, particularly those held in the USSR or in the bloc countries of Eastern Europe. Most Communist agents have been enlisted while visiting or living in bloc countries. Even travel to Western Europe or elsewhere under front auspices may be suspect. Soviet bloc intelligence officers frequently offer free vacation trips to Eastern Europe to those attending front meetings in non-Communist countries. They may offer to provide special documents, so there will be no record of such a trip in a person's passport.
- Those local citizens permitted to attend international front gatherings can be warned in advance about the likelihood of recruitment efforts by hostile intelligence services. They can also be interrogated after their return to determine if approaches have been made.
- The financial accounts and budgets of national groups associated with Soviet international front organizations can receive close study. Requirements can be imposed on them to submit regular financial statements covering income from dues and local fund-raising activities and to observe national currency import regulations in the case of donations from abroad. The Soviet KGB and other bloc intelligence services have sometimes channeled clandestine funds to dissident groups and opposition political parties through national front groups.
- Some national front organizations have raised funds by the black market sale of vodka, cigarettes, cameras or other luxury goods which may have been smuggled into the country. Customs officials can keep a strict watch on such smuggling attempts and authorities can investigate suspected black market sales.
- Some security services have found that suspicious front activities can be kept under surveillance by encouraging local patriotic citizens to join and report regularly on developments.

• The international Communist fronts sometimes flood a country with propaganda -- mailed booklets and pamphlets, publications issued by various fronts, wall posters, etc. Much of this material would be barred if distribution were attempted by a Soviet bloc diplomatic mission. Reciprocity can be the general rule here as in other dealings with the Soviet bloc. Distribution of such propaganda could be banned on grounds the Communist countries do not permit distribution of outside propaganda to their citizens.


• Authorities can keep an eye on visiting delegations representing the various front groups. They can be screened, for example, to make certain that they are not being used to infiltrate subversive elements. Their contacts with local citizens can be monitored as a clue to likely targets. Similarly, records can be kept of those local citizens who accept membership on local front committees.

• Not all local citizens who agree to work with international front groups are traitors to their country. The Communists make a practice of attempting to attract idealistic but naive local personages to serve on local committees, even to serve as local chairman, to provide a facade of respectability. Those who accept such offers might well be cautioned, however, concerning such standard operating practices by these front groups. Similarly, local labor leaders who may have been chosen to attend a trade union course or seminar or young people who agree to attend a work camp or recreational activity organized by a front group should not be branded as potentially subversive for this alone; they, too, can be cautioned about use of such lures by Communist front groups for ulterior purposes.

• Local publishers, editors and other media representatives who may be the targets of Soviet line propaganda issued by national affiliates of international front groups can be advised to acquaint themselves with the recent history of these fronts, specifically the undemocratic manner in which they are organized, their reliance on Soviet financing and Soviet control over selection of officers and propaganda themes. The various Communist fronts, it can be noted, invariably criticize human rights violations in non-Communist countries, but are blind to such violations in Soviet bloc countries.

VII BACKGROUND, STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITIES OF FRONT GROUPS

MAJOR COMMUNIST FRONT ORGANIZATIONS



THE WORLD PEACE COUNCIL (WPC)

Background

The World Peace Council (WPC) is the Soviet Union's single most important international front organization. It is usually the first of the various front groups to respond to new Moscow propaganda initiatives and it coordinates the activities of a number of other front groups. The WPC Presidential Committee includes the top leaders of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF), International Union of Students (IUS) and Christian Peace Conference (CPC).

Communist writers themselves have cited the peace movement as the most important joint action of the "anti-imperialist" forces. Peace has been a major Communist slogan since the Bolsheviks campaigned for power in the USSR 60 years ago under the banners of "land," "bread" and "peace." The 1950 Stockholm Peace Appeal, launched in 1950, was the first big WPC endeavor. It sought an absolute ban on the atomic bomb, at a time when the USSR had not yet developed its own nuclear capacity. The 1950 appeal was so successful that Moscow decided recently to do it again with a new "Stockholm Appeal," directed against "the arms race, the stockpile of weapons in the hands of the imperialists" The WPC claimed in 1977 that the new campaign had attracted more than 400 million signatures. The Picasso peace dove, also promoted by the WPC, advertised scores of international Communist gatherings.

The peace movement led by the WPC appeared to be taking an expanding role in Soviet agitprop operations in 1977, partly to counter the adverse propaganda effect of increasing shipments of Soviet military supplies to such countries as Angola, Libya and Ethiopia and Moscow's supporting role in such conflicts as the Ethiopian-Somali confrontation and the victory of the MPLA in Angola over two non-Marxist liberation groups.

Everybody is for peace, and Moscow has capitalized on this fact for years by coupling the idea of peace with any number of Soviet policy initiatives, attempting to encourage broad acceptance of Soviet formulas for resolving international conflicts, ranging from Angola to Cyprus, with the most emphasis on Moscow's solutions for problems of disarmament and detente. The WPC attempts to create an emotional atmosphere which obscures any critical examination of Soviet disarmament proposals, specifically their lack of any enforcement machinery for international inspection, to make sure that no one cheats.

The WPC had its origins in a Soviet-organized "World Congress of Intellectuals for Peace," held in Poland in 1948. This led to the "First World Peace Congress" in Paris the following year, which resulted in establishment of the "World Committee of Partisans of Peace," renamed the "World Peace Council" (WPC) in 1950. WPC was forced to move to Prague in 1951 after the French government ordered it out of Paris for subversive activities. Then in 1954 Moscow moved WPC offices to Vienna, until the Austrian government forced it to move once again in 1957 for "activities directed against the interest of the Austrian State." However, WPC continued its operations in Vienna under the name of "International Institute for Peace" (IIP), until it finally moved to Helsinki in 1968 where it is located today. IIP remains in Vienna.

Although publicly committed to peace as its raison d'etre, WPC activities invariably coincide with Soviet international policies and goals, particularly support for sweeping Soviet

proposals on disarmament without international controls or inspection. This pro-Soviet bias has been evident throughout the years. The WPC denounces Western "colonialism" and "imperialism" at every opportunity, but closes its eyes to what the Chinese call Soviet "hegemonism" and "social-imperialism." It describes Western military maneuvers as threats to world peace, but defends Soviet bloc maneuvers as peace-keeping exercises. It demands withdrawal of Western forces from advanced bases, but ignores the growing number of Soviet military footholds in Africa and Asia. Periodic Communist crises through the years -- for example, over Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the Sino-Soviet confrontation, the Cuban missile crisis, the ouster of Yugoslavia from the bloc -- have resulted in campaigns on Moscow's behalf and purges of front organization leaders who dared to question the Soviet position.

Structure

The WPC boasts an impressive organization chart, listing a president, 22 vice-presidents and about 120 additional members of a Presidential Committee chosen from affiliated peace organizations in more than 50 countries and from a number of other international front organizations. Romesh Chandra, a ranking member of the Indian Communist Party for many years, was named President at the 1977 WPC congress in Warsaw -- the first to hold this office since the death of F. Joliot-Curie in 1958. Chandra had been a faithful supporter of Soviet policies in his earlier post of WPC secretary-general since 1966. The Presidential Committee runs the WPC between Council meetings. There have been 11 major Congress sessions since 1949, the last one in Warsaw, convened with a good deal of advance promotion under the label, "World Assembly of Builders of Peace."

In addition to the Presidential Committee there is a WPC Bureau, responsible for implementing committee decisions, and a Secretariat, which serves as an executive body to carry out decisions of the Council, the Presidential Committee and the Bureau.

The WPC has established numerous subsidiary organizations, usually on an ad hoc basis, to carry on specific campaigns. Currently these include the International Campaign Committee for a Just Peace in the Middle East, the International Committee for Solidarity with Cyprus, the Commission on Mass Media and Information, the International Commission of Enquiry into the Crimes of the Chilean Junta, the Commission on Scientific Research for Peace, the Commission on Ending of the Arms Race and Disarmament, the Commission on Development and a New International Economic Order and the International Human Rights Commission. Moscow directed its WPC agents in 1977 to soft-pedal the human rights issue after embarrassing questions about Soviet violations were raised by non-Communists at earlier WPC-sponsored

meetings. A decision was made to confine WPC human rights activities only to regional gatherings, which could be confined to specific area violations with no danger of getting into Soviet bloc repression of its activists.

Ultimate control of the WPC lies with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which, with some assistance from other bloc countries, provides most WPC financing, and has a hand in selection of pro-Soviet Communists and other leftists for positions throughout the WPC administrative structure.

Chandra himself has a record of servile loyalty to the Soviet Union. He views Moscow as the foremost champion of peace, challenging imperialist proponents of the arms race, and says so publicly at the drop of a gavel. He is on the road almost constantly, speaking out at WPC-sponsored conferences, forums and protest gatherings all over the world; he makes frequent stopovers in Moscow on these travels, to consult on the party line.


Yet the Kremlin does not rely on Chandra alone to carry out its policies in the WPC. A representative of the International Department of the Soviet Communist Party has for years sat at Chandra's side, in a background WPC role, but holding ultimate control. This position was held for a number of years by Aleksandr Berkov, but the job was taken over in early 1977 by Igor Belyayev. Berkov, and later Belyayev, were listed only as one of a number of secretaries in the Secretariat, but they were recognized within the organization as the final authority, including the power of veto, as representative of the USSR. Berkov, for example, was known to have over-ruled Chandra on certain decisions involving meetings or other activities and relayed the party line concerning WPC causes and operations. Two other Russians playing key roles in the WPC are Vitaly Shaposhnikov, who is listed as a Soviet member of the WPC Presidential Committee, and Oleg Kharkhardin, who is executive of the Moscow-based Continuing Liaison Committee (CLC) of the World Council of Peace Forces and also vice-chairman of the WPC-affiliated Soviet Peace Committee. Both are officials of the International Department of the Soviet CP Central Committee. The International Department (ID) is responsible for major clandestine political activities abroad including the front organizations, foreign Communist parties and activities such as strikes and demonstrations designed to destabilize foreign governments. In terms of power in Moscow the ID stands firmly over the KGB for clandestine political activities. In these matters the KGB may act only on direction of the ID.

The WPC structure is honey-combed with hand-picked pro-Soviet Communists and other leftists. There are a certain number of prestigious non-Communist figures to provide a facade of independence and nonalignment. But most individuals affiliated with the WPC are active in Communist affairs in their home countries and many are active on national peace committees. New members of the WPC are selected from nominations submitted in advance by the various national peace committees. These national committees, in turn, have been set up as local Communist fronts, generally with the assistance of the

WPC. By maintaining control over key WPC officials, the USSR commands the content of the communiques, resolutions and statements which issue from WPC events, and directs the final decisions on WPC projects and activities.

Opposition to Soviet domination erupts on occasion, but trusted leaders are usually able to confine this to private meetings of commissions or sub-commissions. At several 1977 meetings, beginning with the World Forum of Peace Forces held in Moscow in January, non-Communist participants embarrassed Soviet representatives on several occasions by asking pointed questions about human rights violations in the USSR. Opposition views seldom find their way into the large-scale public gatherings, however. Dissenting views, if they exist, are ignored. The Soviet human rights activist, Andrei Sakharov, sent a message in 1976 to a WPC-sponsored forum on disarmament in York, Britain, for example. It was not read to delegates, as Sakharov requested, because, the organizers said, it was too long, too late and of a "different nature" than other messages. Two Soviet delegates threatened to walk out if it were read.

WPC headquarters are in Helsinki, Finland. The WPC has opened a new office in Geneva, in order to be in closer touch with United Nations agencies there. The WPC holds consultative status with a number of UN agencies and WPC spokesmen have addressed UN committees on disarmament, decolonization and other matters. The UN sends representatives to the larger WPC meetings. A WPC delegation presented Joliot-Curie gold medals to UN committees on apartheid and decolonization in 1975 -- an act which brought a Chinese attack on the WPC as a "hired tool" of the Soviet Union. In May 1977, a Chinese spokesman at the UN went a step further and referred to the WPC as "the highest tool of a certain super-power."



Vol. 8, No. 7 WPC Secretariat, Lönnrotinkatu 25 A, Helsinki 18, Finland October

**'International Fortnight of Actions against Horror-Bomb
WPC BUREAU CALLS: BAN NEUTRON BOMB**

The leader
Council
Septem-
ber

Activities

The WPC attempts to achieve its propaganda objectives mainly by organizing worldwide campaigns, coordinated regionally by national peace committees. These have often involved mass collection of signatures -- for example the two Stockholm Appeals. Massive protest campaigns are sometimes launched, supported by forums, conferences, public statements and a flow of pamphlets and booklets. The WPC spearheaded such an effort against the neutron "bomb" in 1977. Regional campaigns are co-sponsored by individual peace committees, and delegations of top-level WPC officials from Helsinki make visits, particularly to Third World countries, to lend prestige to the local peace front and to stimulate local support for WPC goals.

WPC propaganda activities reach a peak every three or four years at large-scale Congresses, designed to attract the attendance of some well-known non-Communist liberals, as well as the solid core of loyal party members who stage-manage these spectacles. The most recent one, called "The World Assembly of Builders of Peace," held in Warsaw in May 1977, attracted 1,500 delegates from 125 countries according to its sponsors. Moscow provides clandestine funding for these periodic extravaganzas, which usually include free travel, free hotel accommodations and some sort of souvenir for delegates, such as a gold-plated watch, properly inscribed to peace. The previous Congress was held in Moscow in 1973 (where the watches were handed out) at an estimated cost to the USSR of more than \$10 million. The 1977 event may have cost more. One of the principal propaganda achievements of the Warsaw meeting was passage of a resolution condemning "the imperialist and Zionist maneuvers" against the USSR and their attempts to capitalize on human rights issues in the Soviet bloc. Delegates also paid resounding homage to Leonid Brezhnev and the Soviet Union for Moscow's policy of peace and detente. Congress resolutions are always by acclamation, not by a vote. Delegates sometimes do not get a chance to read resolutions they have adopted until they are published later.

Other WPC-sponsored meetings in 1977 included a "World Forum of Peace Forces," held in Moscow in January, said to have drawn 500 participants from 115 countries, and "A World Conference of Religious Leaders for a Lasting Peace, Disarmament and Just Relations Between Peoples," also held in Moscow in June, with a claimed attendance of 700 from more than 100 countries. At the first meeting Chandra, then WPC secretary-general, praised the Soviet Union for its "peace initiatives" in recent years.

Other WPC gatherings propagated the Soviet line on a variety of international issues, including Angola, Timor, Indonesia, Cyprus and the Middle East. On Angola, for example, the WPC condemned attempts to implicate the Marxist government (and, in effect, the Cuban troops stationed in Angola) in any "so-called

invasion of Zaire." The Angola issue -- as do other issues periodically -- resulted in some dissent in WPC ranks. Ben Kumah, President of the Ghana Peace Council, a WPC affiliate, was removed from his post, accused among other things of issuing an unauthorized press release on Angola "putting him on the same side as the imperialists." He had also been a member of the WPC Presidential Committee.

The WPC issues a number of publications including a bi-monthly, *New Perspectives*, distributed in English and French, and a monthly, *Peace Courier*, published in English, French, Spanish and German. It also puts out a large number of bulletins and booklets on specific regional issues.

THE AFRO-ASIAN PEOPLE'S SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION (AAPSO)Background

The Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), established in Cairo in December 1957, was designed to fulfil two purposes: (1) to serve as an anti-colonial offshoot of the World Peace Council (WPC) and (2) to facilitate Soviet entry into the Afro-Asian bloc, from which the USSR had been excluded at the Bandung conference of 1955.

AAPSO was created with the ostensible aim of co-ordinating the efforts of African and Asian peoples against colonialism and promoting their political, economic and cultural development. But whereas the Bandung conference sought to bring together "non-committed" African and Asian nations in a campaign for independence, AAPSO from the outset has been a tool of the Communists.

The Soviet Union and China were among 18 countries whose delegates decided on the formation of an Asian Solidarity Committee at a conference in New Delhi two weeks before the Bandung conference. In December 1956, the Asian Solidarity Secretariat, meeting in New Delhi, decided to expand the organization to include African countries. The first Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference was held in Cairo in December 1957. An AAPSO constitution was adopted in 1960.



Yusuf As-Sebai of Egypt has been Secretary-General of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) since it began in 1957. He was also elected its President in 1974. He is a member of the Presidential Committee of the World Peace Council (WPC) and Secretary-General of the Afro-Asian Writers Permanent Bureau (AAWPB).

During its first years, AAPSO was jointly controlled by the Soviet Union, China and Egypt. The Sino-Soviet dispute led to disruption of AAPSO conferences at Moshi, Tanzania, in February 1963 and at Winneba, Ghana, in 1965, and to a walkout of the Chinese from the eighth AAPSO Council conference in Nicosia in February 1967. The Nicosia conference decided to make Algiers, instead of Peking, the meeting place for the fifth AAPSO plenary conference that year. Since 1967, Soviet domination of AAPSO appears to have been virtually unchallenged; and working control of the organization remained in the hands of men trusted by Moscow. The Russians said that the departure of China strengthened rather than weakened AAPSO. By 1975 it was no longer necessary even to hold Council meetings in African or Asian countries. That year the 12th AAPSO Council meeting was held in Moscow.

Structure

AAPSO/membership has comprised three main elements:

- (1) African and Asian political parties and national liberation movements which have attained power.
- (2) Afro-Asian national solidarity committees whose members have been drawn primarily from local Communist and pro-Communist political groupings and related front organizations.
- (3) Representatives of political parties and movements in opposition to established regimes in African and Asian countries.

Many of the African political organizations and movements in this third group which are (or have been) active in AAPSO -- for example, the Socialist Workers and Farmers Party of Nigeria -- are banned in their home countries. Other member organizations play insignificant political roles in their own countries, partly because their affiliates lack substantial membership and because they fail to represent majority views. But any political group unrecognized by its own government but represented in AAPSO may be assumed to be acceptable to Moscow sponsors of AAPSO as well as to key Communists in control of AAPSO.

There does not appear to be a comprehensive listing of AAPSO members and affiliates. But committees affiliated to AAPSO exist in most countries of Africa and Asia. Afro-Asian Solidarity Committees in the Soviet bloc countries are accepted as associate members. Countries which have hosted AAPSO and AAPSO-related conferences in recent years include Egypt, Libya, Syria, India, Iraq, South Yemen, Cyprus, Lebanon, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Benin, Greece and Angola. An Emergency International Conference of "Solidarity with the Struggle of the People of Angola," held in Luanda in February 1976, was attended by delegates from approximately 50 AAPSO member countries and 80 international organizations.

At the first AAPSO conference (Cairo, 1957) countries -- classed as "progressive" by the Cairo Preparatory Committee -- which were represented by delegates chosen by their own governments included the USSR, China, North Vietnam, Mongolia, Egypt, Ghana, Sudan, Syria and Indonesia. The 13th International Conference of AAPSO held in Mozambique in September 1975 was attended by AAPSO Council members from Egypt, Cyprus, Gambia, Kuwait, Laos, Mali, "Palestine", Upper Volta, and the Soviet Union. Also represented were members of the national liberation fronts of Algeria, Bahrain and the Comoro Islands, the UPRONA Party of Burundi, the National Revolutionary Councils of Dahomey and Ghana, the "organizations for solidarity and peace" of India and Iraq, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Morocco, Namibia (South West Africa), the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, the United People's Party of the Seychelles and delegates from Swaziland, South Yemen, Vietnam, Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), East Germany, Poland, Romania, the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), the World Peace Council (WPC), the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), the Organization for Solidarity with the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America (AALAPSO), the Soviet Association of Jurists, the Finnish Committee for Africa, the Committee of Anti-Imperialist Solidarity, the African Society, Angola's MPLA, the African party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC) and the Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe. The Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) was a joint organizer of the conference with AAPSO.

AAPSO headquarters remain in Cairo. Yusuf As-Sebai, who has occupied the key position of Secretary-General since AAPSO's inception, was elected AAPSO President in March 1974. As-Sebai, who has been Egypt's Minister of Culture, remains AAPSO Secretary-General as well as President (Chairman of the Presidium). But Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's renunciation in 1976 of the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship raised doubts about Egypt's future role in AAPSO.

Other leading AAPSO officers include five Deputy Secretaries-General -- Facimo Banguera (Guinea), Kamal Baha el-Din (Egypt), Mursi Saad el-Din (Egypt), Nuri Abdul Razzaq Hussein (Iraq) and O. P. Paliwal (India) -- and three Deputy Chairmen -- Vasco Cabral (Guinea-Bissau), Vassos Lyssarides (Cyprus) and Azis Sharif (Iraq). Bahia Karam of Egypt is head of the women's section. There are 17 Secretaries: five from Black Africa, five from the Arab States, five from Asia and two from the USSR; and 13 Presidium members from different Afro-Asian solidarity organizations.

The Secretariat has been the key organizational unit in AAPSO, and since 1974 appears to have shared primary responsibility for the direction and execution of policy with the Presidium.

Conferences held by AAPSO are stage-managed in such a way that Soviet direction of policy remains more or less constant. At open sessions of AAPSO's forums, a representative of the host country's national committee generally acts as chairman. The representative selected is one who can be depended upon to accept Soviet guidance and to push through resolutions emanating from either the AAPSO Permanent Secretariat or from a preparatory committee (which has also, presumably, been selected because of its reliability in Soviet eyes). AAPSO debates, whenever considered necessary, are packed with disciplined Communists to ensure decisions acceptable to Soviet interests. Voting is nearly always by voice. Soviet guidance is well hidden from uninitiated delegates and is provided to key organizers and leaders at preparatory meetings, discreetly outside the hall while meetings are underway, or between conference sessions.

Activities

AAPSO's activities have been closely linked with those of the WPC; Yusuf As-Sebai has represented AAPSO on the WPC Presidential Committee. AAPSO conferences have also been attended by such front organizations as the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF) and the International Union of Students (IUS) -- in addition to those fronts listed in attendance at the September 1975 international AAPSO conference.

As-Sebai is also Secretary-General of the pro-Soviet faction of the Afro-Asian Writers' Permanent Bureau (AAWPB), which broke away from the Chinese-controlled organization (AAWPB-Peking) in 1966. AAWPB-Cairo and AAPSO not only have an overlapping directorate but both focus on problems in the same geographical area. AAPSO, however, appears to be more active.

In association with the WPC, AAPSO has sponsored recent conferences in support of liberation movements in Southern Africa, gatherings in support of the Palestinian case against Israel, a conference of solidarity with Iraq, seminars on Middle East oil and a meeting on Indian Ocean bases.

AAPSO has involved itself in political controversies on behalf of North Korea, over Indochina, in defense of the MPLA in Angola and in support of liberation movements in Latin America. It has joined other fronts in denunciation of "imperialist subversion" against Cyprus. At a preparatory meeting in Nicosia in September 1977 for a year-end AAPSO conference in Baghdad, AAPSO announced support for an "independent, territorially indivisible, nonaligned, united and demilitarized Cyprus" and the withdrawal of all foreign troops.

But while taking up causes with which developing countries and anti-colonial movements are emotionally involved, AAPSO is invariably mindful of the interests of its Soviet sponsors.

A blatant example was the holding of the 12th AAPSO Council session in Moscow in September 1975. AAPSO Deputy Chairman Aziz Sharif said of the location: "Moscow has always been, and is, our dear city which attracts the eyes of all fighters against imperialism and colonialism."

An AAPSO Emergency International Conference for Solidarity with the People of South Africa, held in Addis Ababa in November 1976, was used as a forum to conduct frontal attacks against the West and particularly against United States initiatives in the Middle East.

The 5th International Session of the AAPSO Presidium, held at Cotonou, Benin, in March 1977, denounced U.S. "imperialist maneuvers" in the Spanish Sahara and accused Washington of "perpetrating a Two Koreas plot." The Presidium also issued a declaration of support for Soviet bloc policies in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Because Soviet representatives were among the founding members of AAPSO, Moscow has a special, controlling, relationship with the organization, over and above the usual front services the Soviets command. The Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee of the USSR is an appendage of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, which makes policy decisions and provides direction to international Communist front organizations. The existence of such a Solidarity Committee inside the USSR gives Moscow an excuse for open activity and propaganda in the Third World. At the WPC/AAPSO conference on Indian Ocean bases (held in New Delhi, November 1974), for example, Soviet delegate Victor Popov was able to defend Russia's "peaceful role" in the Indian Ocean.

The Soviet Committee summoned As-Sebai to Moscow to review the 12th AAPSO Council session held in September 1975. AAPSO delegates were called from various countries to Moscow, presumably to receive guidance, before the 1977 Presidium conference at Cotonou and travelled directly from Moscow to the conference.

The AAPSO Secretary-General's report to Council in 1975 acknowledged contributions to the organization from Solidarity Committees in the Soviet Union, Egypt and Iraq and considerable help in money and kind from "Socialist" countries.

Since 1960, the AAPSO Fund Committee, located in Conakry, Guinea, has been used to distribute Soviet and bloc funds to national liberation movements and to selected political opposition groups in African countries. AAPSO has also been used to

channel arms and arrange training for African organizations favored by Moscow.

AAPSO forums have been used as cover for secret, direct negotiations between Soviet and other bloc representatives and leaders of non-ruling Communist parties and of radical opposition political parties bent on seizing power.

WORLD FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS (WFTU)Background

The founding meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) in Paris in 1945 marked a renewal of the historical Marxist emphasis on the labor sector as perhaps the most important instrument in the conflict with capitalism. The meeting, originally an initiative of the British Trade Union Congress, was the first of many post World War II efforts by Moscow to foster controllable international instruments to support its policies. Befitting the significance accorded the proletariat in Marxist-Leninist theory, WFTU has been one of the most consistently active and largest of the fronts.

Like the other fronts, WFTU's initial mix of Communist and non-Communist affiliates and staff did not survive Moscow's efforts to consolidate its control, and by 1949 some of its non-Communist affiliates left to form the International Conference of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). In this early period, Moscow used WFTU to carry out a propaganda campaign, strikes and demonstrations in direct support of its opposition to Marshall Plan aid to West Europe. Its subsequent failure to support strikes in East Germany in 1953, or in Poland in 1956, and its endorsement of Soviet action against the worker-supported Hungarian revolution in 1956 further dramatized its role as a tool of Moscow's foreign policy.



Enrique Pastorino, President of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), is a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uruguay, living in exile in Prague. He became head of the WFTU when Renato Bitossi of Italy was ousted after the WFTU Secretariat criticized the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Pastorino, a Lenin peace prize winner in 1972, serves on the Presidential Committee of the World Peace Council.

WFTU was expelled from its headquarters in Paris in 1951 for subversive activities; it relocated temporarily in the Soviet zone of Vienna, only to have to move farther eastward to Prague in 1956, where it remains today, for "infringing" Austrian neutrality.

As of 1975, WFTU claimed affiliates in 70 countries representing about 170 million organized workers. Almost 90 percent of its membership comes from its affiliates in the bloc. The Communist controlled General Confederation of Labor (CGT) in France and the General Confederation of Italian Labor (CGIL) have been WFTU's most significant affiliates in the West, providing the bulk of its non-bloc European membership.

Structure

The organizational structure of WFTU closely follows the pattern of other fronts, with the highest authority residing in theory with a Congress of the Affiliates which meets every four years. The last five have been held in bloc countries; the 1978 session is scheduled for Prague. Observers from non-affiliated unions and other international organizations are invited, to help provide a facade of unity with other groups. The Congress "elects" a General Council which chooses an Executive Bureau to assist it in providing policy guidance between Congresses. Programs and decisions are actually carried out by a Secretariat headed by a Secretary-General, a post occupied since 1969 by Pierre Gen-sous, a long-time member of the French Communist Party. His only predecessor, Louis Saillant, also from France, is credited with the successful consolidation of Moscow's control, although he subsequently was displaced soon after criticizing the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Other senior officials include Enrique Pastorino from Uruguay as President, Shripur A. Dange of India, as one of the Vice-Presidents, and Boris Aver-yanov, former head of the International Department of the USSR trade union, as the most prominent of the five departmental secretaries.

Since the number of delegates to the Congress for each affiliate is determined by the number of affiliate members, the Soviet Union's All Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), combined with delegations from other bloc countries, completely dominates the assemblage. The AUCCTU also has a major role in WFTU's management through its direct ties into the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which formulates all national and international labor policy. The internal political role of Soviet trade unionism is well-established -- it claims 100 million members, and about 60 percent of the delegates to the AUCCTU Congresses are full or candidate members of the party. Its International Department maintains the largest overseas staff in

the international trade union field and is a known arm of Soviet intelligence.

Five departments under the Secretary General of WFTU oversee the implementation of programs. In addition to those concerned with geographic regions, there are specific departments for such activities as relations with UN agencies, propaganda, and the Trade Union Internationals (TUIs). The latter were established in part to counter the Trade Secretariats of the ICFTU and carry out programs among workers in similar or connected trades. Nominally independent, the TUIs are actually financed and controlled by WFTU and their affiliated unions are themselves usually parts of national unions which are WFTU members. They provide further opportunities for WFTU training and indoctrination and are heavily involved in recruiting individual unions for the unity campaign. Ten of the eleven TUIs have their headquarters in bloc countries. This TUI network is further supplemented by allied regional groups, such as the All-African Trade Union Federation (AATUF), the Permanent Committee for Trade Union Unity of Latin American Workers (CPUSTAL) and the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions (ICATU).

WFTU has worked more diligently than the other fronts, with the possible exception of the World Peace Council (WPC), to develop close working relations with intergovernmental organizations. Reflective of this was its creation in 1967 of a "Special Commission on United Nations Agencies." It now has Category A status with ECOSOC, UNESCO, the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and has permanent representatives at the UN headquarters and with ILO and the FAO. As expected, it also maintains close relations with other fronts such as the World Peace Council, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, and the Women's International Democratic Federation; these fronts receive program and information support, as well as financing for joint campaigns. WFTU has been particularly close to the WPC and its Secretary General is a member of the WPC Presidential Committee.

WFTU has an expensive publication program, including an illustrated monthly journal, "World Trade Union Movements," and a weekly bulletin called "Flashes." Pamphlets, brochures and special bulletins are also issued regarding specific events or campaigns. The monthly is circulated in about 75 countries in English, French, Spanish, German, Russian, Arabic, Japanese and other languages. "Flashes" appears in all the major European languages except Italian and there is also an Arabic edition. The TUIs have their own parallel publication programs which further proliferate the WFTU message. A new publication called "Opinion," which is devoted to African affairs, made its appearance in June 1977. The line and coverage of WFTU publications is generally traceable to "Trud," the organ of the Soviet affiliate.



The Communist international front groups spend millions annually for publication and distribution of a large number of front organs. The mastheads of some are pictured above. World Trade Union Movements, for example, is an illustrated monthly journal of 30 to 40 pages printed by the World Federation of Trade Unions in 10 languages and distributed in 75 countries. The journal, like other front publications, promotes the Soviet position on most major political events.

Like the other fronts, WFTU does not publish its budget figures, but claims that affiliation fees, publication sales and special donations cover its costs. Given the level of its activity, the latter category of income is probably substantial and includes subsidies in cash and kind from the bloc countries, for example, Czech support of the publication program and the underwriting of the WFTU training centers for Third World trade unionists by the East European affiliates where they are located. Some reports place the 1976 budget at about \$2.3 million (excluding the hidden subsidies) and indicate that it represents a 30 percent increase over the previous year, continuing an expansionary trend since 1974. Most of the increase is said to be for programs vis-a-vis other trade union organizations, representation at the UN agencies and the activities of the TUIs.

Even less information is available about an "International Solidarity Fund" which provides a supplementary budget for special -- usually sensitive -- activities such as strike support or special aid programs in countries struggling against "imperialism, colonialism, fascism, and the monopolies." Moscow has been known to use direct covert financing through both diplomatic channels and AUCCTU representatives to support local strikes and other political action programs.

Activities

WFTU's main task as described by Alexander Shelepin, the former chairman of USSR's labor confederation and prior to that head of the KGB, is "the comprehensive support and defense of the world socialist system." Its programs, whether linked with genuine problems of the worker or not, are designed primarily to support Soviet foreign policy. WFTU uses its bloc training centers and the educational programs of the TUIs to indoctrinate participants in a Marxist approach to labor activities.

A fairly typical agenda for one of its meetings was that of the Engineers Commission held in Prague in July 1977. It included "labor safety, a new economic order, multinational companies and preparation for the Ninth Congress of WFTU to be held in April 1978." Similarly, a WFTU-supported conference of the World Federation of Teachers, held in Moscow in 1977 to discuss "the school and the teacher in the world today," condemned the actions of "imperialist governments" and "reactionary forces" in South Africa, Chile, Uruguay and South Korea. A list of such meetings held around the world in the first six months of 1977 would include, among others, a meeting with the Cuban and Latin American members of the Wood and Building Materials Industries TUI in Warsaw, an Arab conference of metalworkers unions in Iraq, a "Workers Tourism" meeting in Paris and an Asian affiliate meeting in India. Appeals and messages of solidarity were issued with regard to Chilean prisoners, apartheid, ill treatment of Pales-

tinian political prisoners in Israel, implementation of the Helsinki Agreement, support of the MPLA in Angola, and condemnation of the "new escalation of the arms race by the United States."

In recent years WFTU has increasingly emphasized its campaign for unity of action among Communist and non-Communist labor unions, while simultaneously undercutting the influence of its main competitor, the ICFTU. The WFTU Congress in 1978 was to center on this theme. Representatives of the Socialist-oriented ICFTU and the Christian World Confederation of Labor were urged to participate and have been the object of a three year WFTU effort to arrange joint meetings or proclamations.

WFTU has also stepped up its participation with the agencies of the UN, particularly the International Labor Organization (ILO), to substantiate its bonafides in the unity campaign and presumably also to facilitate its effort since the early 1970s to relocate back to Paris or to Geneva. In 1974 it was able to catalyze the first of a series of ILO-sponsored meetings of Communist and non-Communist European unions on social welfare problems of workers. Its apparent new flexibility in permitting the Italian labor confederation to have "associative status" with WFTU, to allow it to meet the requirements of membership in the new European Trade Union Confederation with non-Communist unions of the European Community, is a measure of the significance WFTU's sponsors give to the unity campaign. The British TUC and the German DGB have been courted persistently by the Soviet Trade Union in its "bi-lateral" program of exchanges and joint seminars.

While WFTU support of Moscow on foreign policy issues is still obvious and often appears contrived, some WFTU leaders, such as Secretary Karel Hoffman, Chairman of the Czech Central Council of Trade Unions, have already criticized WFTU's propaganda for being too offensive and militant.

WORLD FEDERATION OF DEMOCRATIC YOUTH (WFDY) and
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS (IUS)



Aleksandr Sholepin of the Soviet Union has been a key figure in three Soviet front Organizations—the International Union of Students (IUS), the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) and the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). In between, he also headed the Committee for State Security (KGB) for three years and was a member of the Politburo. Sholepin began his career in the Komsomol, the Soviet youth organization. As a leader of Komsomol, he was elected a vice chairman of IUS in 1949 at the age of 31. He was a vice chairman of the WFDY from 1953 to 1958. He was closely associated with Moscow-sponsored World Youth Festivals from 1949 to 1958 and played a major role in the 1957 festival staged in Moscow at an estimated cost of nearly \$100 million. Sholepin moved from the youth front to the KGB post, then, in 1967, was named chairman of the All-Union Council of Soviet Trade Unions, the central trade union organization in the USSR. He became a vice president of the WFTU during this period. Once considered a possible successor to Brezhnev, Sholepin lost favor in April 1975 and was ousted from the Politburo and his union posts.

WORLD FEDERATION OF DEMOCRATIC YOUTH (WFDY) and
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS (IUS)

Background

The historical roots of Communist student and youth organizations trace back to the international Communist Youth Organization founded in the post-revolution days in Moscow. Its name alone was enough to scare off potential non-Communist collaborators, and it got nowhere.

Moscow tried again after World War II as part of an overall effort to create a series of Communist fronts without the Communist label. The World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) was founded in London in 1945 with Soviet participation and the International Union of Students (IUS) got its start similarly in Prague a year later. At the beginning, both organizations represented varying shades of political opinion. Moscow's usual organizational problem of control versus influence was, however, resolved by Stalin in favor of control. As a result, most of the non-Communists who initially accepted the new international organizations as non-partisan were soon disillusioned with the heavy-handed Soviet attempts to dominate them and all but the most gullible dropped out.

The WFDY, based in Budapest, claims a membership of 150 million in more than 100 countries today, but most of its members are from Communist bloc countries; affiliated groups from non-Communist countries generally are connected with local Communist parties. The IUS, headquartered in Prague, has a smaller membership, estimated at 10 million, the bulk of it also in Communist countries.

The two organizations have worked together over the last 30 years in promoting a series of 10 youth festivals, staged in Communist capitals for the most part in order to maintain tighter control. The last such festival was put on in East Berlin in 1973. Preparations have been underway since 1975 for the 11th such festival, scheduled in Havana, Cuba, beginning July 28, 1978.

Like others of the Moscow-controlled fronts, the WFDY and IUS have reflected the internal feuds of the Communist movement.

In August 1968, for example, WFDY President Rudolfo Mechini and Secretary-General Francois Le Gal, both Communists in good standing in the Italian and French Communist parties,

respectively, sharply condemned the Warsaw Pact invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia. Official action by the WFDY to protest the invasion was blocked, however, by Soviet bloc representatives on the Secretariat. Shortly thereafter both Mechini and Le Gal were removed from office and replaced by more disciplined comrades.

There were similar repercussions in the IUS, which had its headquarters in Prague and a Czechoslovak President, Zbynek Vokrouhlicky. He was subsequently replaced after sending protest letters to youth and student organizations in Warsaw Pact countries. The IUS never took up the Czech invasion at its meetings.

Another shakeup took place in the WFDY in early 1977 with the announced resignations of the federation's Italian President, Pietro Lapicciarella, and its French Secretary-General, Jean-Charles Negre. Both were said to be unhappy over Moscow's domination of the organization.

Since the mid-1960s, the Chinese Communists have been excluded from participation in the two groups. Discrimination has even extended to factions within individual Communist parties. Followers of the independent-minded leader of the Spanish Communist Party, Santiago Carrillo, have been removed from positions at both WFDY and IUS headquarters.

Jiri Pelikan, the Czechoslovak Communist who served as Secretary-General and President of the IUS for ten years (1953-63) summed up the Soviet position at IUS Headquarters in these words: "The Soviet Union was always trying to impose its tactical policy of the moment on the organization The Soviet members saw the IUS and similar organizations merely as unofficial instruments of Soviet foreign policy."

Organization

In theory the structures of the WFDY and the IUS are said to be democratic. There is a Congress of affiliated organizations every two or three years which elects an Executive Committee that is supposed to meet twice a year. The day-to-day work is carried out by a smaller Bureau and Secretariat, whose members are chosen by the Executive Committee. In practice, thanks to the magic of Soviet-style democratic centralism, the appointed executives decide what names will be listed on the election slates and thereby gain permanent control over all the key positions. The Soviets always hold a vice-presidential position in both the WFDY and IUS, and several other key positions are reserved for Communists responsive to Soviet direction.

The French affiliate of WFDY proposed in 1974 the creation of a separate West European Department at WFDY headquarters on the grounds that special conditions in the capitalist nations of Western Europe gave rise to special problems which were not shared by the Communist-governed states and, therefore, were not soluble on a pan-European basis. Presumably fearful that this seemingly innocuous change in the organization of its headquarters might serve as a carrier of the dread Eurocommunism virus, the East bloc leadership of WFDY opposed the French proposal. The proposal was subsequently withdrawn.

The WFDY publishes a monthly news bulletin, WFDY News, and a bi-monthly glossy magazine, World Youth, in English, French and Spanish. The IUS publishes a monthly World Student News and a fortnightly bulletin, News Service, in the same languages. Both organizations distribute booklets and pamphlets on topical and regional propaganda subjects. These publications, as do the statements and communiques issuing out of their meetings, consistently follow Soviet policy and are invariably directed against the West.

Both organizations are recognized by UNESCO and ECOSOC.

NEWS

N° 3.

Meeting of International for the

A consultant
Organizer
1971



News Service

international union of students

IN THIS ISSUE:

- The WFDY President meets Luis Corvalán
- Unemployment in capitalist countries
- Visits to headquarters
- International youth chronicle

SEE IT:

Task of our Generation

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(Continued on page 3)

Activities

The two youth and student fronts generally sponsor a half dozen or so meetings each year which are geared to current needs and opportunities for advancing Soviet foreign policy and denouncing western "imperialism."

Both organizations condemn discrimination and repressions directed against youth and students in such countries as South Africa and Chile and alleged violations in other non-Communist countries. But they have remained silent when student rights are violated in Communist countries -- for example, demonstrations by African students in Moscow and Sofia in 1963, imprisonment of Polish students in 1968, widespread arrests of students in East Germany in 1969 and crackdowns on student dissidents throughout Eastern Europe in recent years.

By far the most important activity of the WFDY and IUS, however, is their joint sponsorship of the World Youth Festivals. The festivals have attracted an average attendance over the years of 20,000 young and not-so-young persons. Communists seem to age slower than others, as many Soviet bloc youth and student officials are well into their thirties; Aleksandr Shelepin was closer to forty when he resigned as Vice President of WFDY in 1958 to take over as chief of the Soviet secret police organization, KGB. The purposes served by the Festival are manifold. Under such attractive slogans as "anti-imperialist solidarity, peace and friendship," the gatherings serve, perhaps most importantly, to attract non-Communist sympathizers. The KGB and other bloc intelligence services look on the Festivals as a happy hunting ground for fresh recruitment prospects.

Youth festivals are expensive undertakings, costing up to an estimated \$100 million in some years. Fidel Castro is said to be attempting to raise a purse of \$50 million for the 1978 extravaganza planned in Havana. Overt sources of financial support, such as national fund-raising drives, probably account for no more than 30 percent of actual costs. The balance is paid through covert means by the Soviets and, under pressure from Moscow, by the other Warsaw Pact states.

THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF JOURNALISTS (IOJ)

Background

The International Organization of Journalists (IOJ) was founded in June 1946 in Copenhagen. Two earlier groups, the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) and the International Federation of Journalists in Allied and Free Countries disbanded to merge with the IOJ in the belief that it would become a genuinely representative international organization. But Communists secured key positions in the new IOJ and, when it became clear in 1949 that the Communists had taken control, all non-Communist affiliated unions withdrew. The IOJ's first President, A. Kenyon of Great Britain, described the organization then as "a branch office of the Cominform."

The dissident unions revived the IFJ as a non-Communist federation in 1952 with headquarters in Brussels. IOJ headquarters had been moved in 1947 from London to Prague, where they remain. In an effort to heal the split with the IFJ, the IOJ in 1955 founded an International Committee for Cooperation of Journalists (ICCJ). But with most of its officers leading members of the parent IOJ, ICCJ was simply the Soviet-sponsored IOJ under another guise. The IFJ announced its rejection of IOJ overtures for reunification so long as the IOJ represented countries in which freedom of the press was denied. The IFJ remained unwilling for years to collaborate with the IOJ on even technical and general matters. The Helsinki Agreement of 1975, however, appears to have led to a limited rapprochement between the two organizations. Observers from the IOJ attended the 13th Congress of the IFJ in Vienna in May 1976, and the IFJ sent observers to the 8th Congress of the IOJ in Helsinki in September 1976.

In 1963 a rival organization, the Afro-Asian Journalists' Association, was established by pro-Chinese journalists in Djakarta. Its headquarters are now in Peking.

Structure

Claimed membership in the IOJ, open to national unions of journalists, national groups and individual members, is 150,000. The highest IOJ body, the Congress, elects the Presidium, consisting of the President, Vice-Presidents and the Secretary-General. Policy-making, however, is carried out by the Secre-

tariat in Prague on directives which emanate from the International Department of the CPSU, transmitted through the International Section of the Journalists' Union of the USSR.

Kaarle Nordenstreng, a Finnish Professor of Journalism and Communications, was elected President of the IOJ at the 1976 Helsinki meeting as a result of strong Soviet backing. Arrangements had been made for IOJ Congress delegates to stop in Moscow for two or three days for pre-Congress briefings by officials of the Union of Soviet Journalists. The Russians had decided that Nordenstreng, an open admirer of the Soviet Union, would serve their interests better as chairman than would a known Communist.

Jean Maurice Hermann of France, a former Socialist closely allied since World War II with the French Communist Party, had been IOJ President since 1950, despite his protest registered in 1968 against the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Russians, who suffered a temporary setback in influence in the IOJ after the invasion, waited until 1976 to push Hermann out of the president's office but approved his face-saving election as Honorary President.

Jiri Kubka, a Czechoslovak journalist who continues to hold the key post of Secretary-General, remains a favorite of Moscow. To show his loyalty to the Soviets, Kubka used the Presidium, at a 1969 IOJ conference in North Korea, to block any discussion of the Soviet invasion of his own country.

Presidium members are selected either because they represent important affiliated organizations or because they are specially useful as individuals in promoting Soviet/IOJ interests in target areas. Most of the 20 vice-presidents elected at the 1976 Congress were from Third World countries. One of the Vice-Presidents is Viktor G. Afanasiev, the Chairman of the Union of Journalists of the USSR and chief editor of Pravda.

The IOJ claims to be financed by affiliation fees and "cultural enterprises," such as lotteries and exhibitions. But funds from such sources are believed to cover only a fraction of the organization's total expenses. Affiliation fees of 50 cents per member bring in about \$75,000 a year. Between 1964 and 1974 an "International Solidarity Lottery" raised an average of just over \$500,000 a year. Although IOJ accounts are rarely published, a document submitted to the UN in 1968 claimed a budget of \$6.3 million. Most of the IOJ's funds are believed to come from "special contributions," but details of Soviet assistance are not available. The IOJ has a "Solidarity Fund" from which grants are made to support organizations, individuals and campaigns -- for example, a gift of nearly \$300,000 to Vietnam journalists in 1977.

The IOJ has close contact with other front organizations -- particularly the WPC, WFTU and WFDY. IOJ representatives in the

WPC include Secretary-General Kubka, IOJ Vice-President Ernesto Vera of Cuba (a key figure in the Communist bloc of journalists) and a Secretary from Poland.

The IOJ has collaborated with the Pan African Union of Journalists as a means of influencing African journalists and has set up a "Palestinian Center" in the Prague office.

Activities

The avowed aims of the IOJ include defense of "freedom of the press and journalists" and "defense of the right of every journalist to write according to his conscience and convictions." In practice the IOJ exploits, exaggerates or distorts cases of alleged persecution of journalists and of censorship in non-Communist countries -- with the exception of countries where Moscow is currying favor, for instance, India during its 1975-76 censorship. But the IOJ remains completely silent about the absence of a free press in Communist countries. It refrained from any activity to support Czechoslovak journalists who lost their jobs because they disagreed with the Soviet invasion in 1968. The organization did not even protest the arrest and expulsion of one of its own secretaries, Ferdinando Zidar, of Italy, from Czechoslovakia in 1972.

The IOJ has engaged itself in a systematic campaign to discredit independent international news agencies and non-Communist newspapers by repeated charges that these organizations and publications are tools of "imperialist monopolies." The organization supports all major Soviet propaganda statements on international issues. IOJ delegates took part in preparations for Lenin's centenary.

In support of a Soviet campaign to discourage the use of new, Western-developed technical equipment in the media, The Democratic Journalist, the IOJ monthly publication, recently described use of such equipment as "electronic imperialism -- imposing on the people of other countries a foreign ideology."

A major activity of the IOJ is the training of journalists, as part of a Soviet-directed campaign to influence journalists in the developing countries. Most of the training takes place in the IOJ's East European schools -- in Budapest, East Berlin and Prague. Another IOJ school has reportedly been completed in Sofia and further schools are planned in Havana, Algiers and Baghdad.

The IOJ, accredited to UNESCO, cooperates with that UN body in holding training courses and conferences for journalists. IOJ has participated in UNESCO discussions on the media and on mass communication. The IOJ and other Communist fronts have used

their influence with some UNESCO officials to conduct a relentless campaign behind the scenes in support of a Soviet-backed proposal for international arrangements by which governments may regulate or control the news flow within and between countries. The proposal has been opposed by Western nations because of the threat it presents to the fundamental principles of a free press.

The IOJ is heavily infiltrated by Czechoslovak and Cuban agents. It operates a world-wide news service, offered practically free to Third World news media. A review of this IOJ service in any given country faithfully reflects current Soviet propaganda themes.

THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PEACE (IIP)

Background

The International Institute for Peace (IIP) came into existence as a front for the World Peace Council (WPC) after it was expelled from France in 1951 for subversive activities. The WPC moved first to Prague, then, in 1954, to Vienna. When the WPC was expelled by the Austrian government in 1957 for "interference in the internal affairs of countries with which Austria has good and friendly relations," the IIP was set up in Vienna to provide a legal cover for the WPC secretariat. The WPC continued operations under the IIP's name until September 1968, when the WPC moved to its present headquarters in Helsinki. The IIP has continued to function at the original WPC address (Estate-Haus, Mollwaldplatz 5, Vienna).

A notable example of the IIP's usefulness to the parent front was provided a year after the World Peace Council was forced to move from Austria. After years of lobbying on behalf of its Soviet sponsors, the WPC succeeded in organizing a "Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe," which opened in Vienna in November 1969. Throughout the preparation for the conference the WPC, trying to keep behind the scenes, used the IIP as a surrogate. Maurice Lambilliotte, a member of the IIP executive committee, headed the preparatory committee.

Present Status

The IIP remains strongly under the influence of the larger Soviet-controlled WPC. The IIP has a presidium of seven members and an executive committee of 30. Although the executive body is ostensibly independent of the WPC, it is in fact elected by the WPC General Assembly.

Of the IIP presidium officials elected in December 1969, the president, James Endicott of Canada, and the two vice-presidents, J. Dobretsberger of Austria and Nikolai E. Polyanov of the USSR, were also members of the WPC. In the present presidential committee which runs the IIP, the WPC members include Dr. Eric Burhop of Britain (who is also president of the World Federation of Scientific Workers, WFSW), Goran von Bonsdorff of Finland (a WFSW corresponding member) and Dr. Marian

Dobrosielski of Poland. A former director of the IIP, Romesh Chandra, of India, a faithful follower of the Soviet line for a quarter century, has been secretary-general of the WPC since 1966. He was elected, at a Congress in Warsaw in 1977, to the presidency of the World Peace Council -- an office vacant since the death of F. Joliot-Curie in 1958. The present president of the IIP is Dr. Georg Fuchs of Austria, and the office in Vienna is under the control of the administrative director, Vladimir Bruskov of the USSR; Moscow, therefore, appears to have its own man in residence.

The IIP delegates to the World Congress to End the Arms Race, for Disarmament and Detente (organized by the Continuing Liaison Council of the World Congress of Peace Forces), held in Helsinki in December 1976, comprised two delegates from West Germany, one each from Britain and Austria, two from Finland, one from East Germany and one, Alexander Kaljadin, from the USSR.

Significantly, however, the IIP's affiliate organizations are mainly in Communist countries -- the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland and Hungary. The others are in Austria, West Germany and Finland.

Activities

The IIP claims to provide a forum where scientists from East and West can discuss peace problems. The establishment of an 18-member scientific council was announced in December 1969. In 1970 the late Josef Lukas of Czechoslovakia (then a member of the WPC presidential committee and director of the IIP) described the IIP as the "scientific-theoretical workshop of the WPC." After the IIP convened a "Scientific Conference on Questions of European Security" in February 1971 at Vienna, Georg Fuchs (then IIP vice-president) termed it "the first representative meeting of prominent scientists from the East and West at which the major political, economic and cultural problems in Europe were thoroughly discussed."

But while discussions of detente and disarmament serve as a screen, the organization concentrates on issues in support of Soviet policies. For example, the IIP was brought into the Sino-Soviet dispute on Moscow's side. When a Chinese peace committee accused WCP secretariat members of a "base trick" to prevent Chinese delegates from attending a 1966 meeting of the IIP in Vienna, the IIP's lawyer in that city accused the Chinese of "inaccurate and tendentious statements."

The IIP publishes "Peace and Sciences" in English and German. It has member organizations in Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East and West Germany, Finland, Poland, Hungary and the USSR.

THE CHRISTIAN PEACE CONFERENCE (CPC)Background

The Christian Peace Conference (CPC) came into being in 1958 and was formally constituted in 1961 at an All-Christian Peace Assembly which the CPC, at the invitation of the Ecumenical Council of Czechoslovakia, had helped to organize. The All-Christian Peace Assembly (ACPA), installed as the highest organ of the CPC, held further conferences in 1964, 1968 and 1971 and was scheduled to hold its fifth meeting -- in Prague, as always -- in 1978. Prague is the CPC headquarters.

The CPC set out from the start to attract religious-minded people from countries outside the Soviet bloc who believed in the CPC's avowed aims to promote international Christian unity and "to dedicate itself to the service of friendship, reconciliation and the peaceful co-operation of nations, united action for peace and to co-ordinate peace groups in the peaceful development of society."

For some West European members there was early disillusionment. Richard K. Ullmann, a former Vice-President of the CPC and one of those who attempted to counter Soviet influence, acknowledged as early as 1963: "We had better admit that our Eastern brothers are being used for Communist policy and that through them we are being used in the same way."

Officials of the CPC, along with those in a number of other front organizations, were replaced by Moscow in an effort to restore discipline following differences that arose over the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The invasion precipitated a crisis in the CPC and almost caused its collapse. The then CPC President, Joseph Hromadka, and Secretary-General, J. Ondra, both Czechoslovaks, were forced out of office after they had protested against the invasion. Several West European members resigned from the organization. But by February 1970 Russian control had been restored and the CPC has become increasingly subservient to Soviet policies since. Reporting on the Fourth General Assembly of the CPC, held in Prague in September 1971, *Le Figaro* (Paris) said that the CPC had become "an instrument of Soviet policy All who meet in Prague will have accepted beforehand the decisions taken for the CPC's future under the presidency of Metropolitan Nikodim (USSR) and with Junusz Makovski (Poland) as Secretary-General."

Nikodim has been President of the CPC since 1969. A Hungarian, Dr. Karoly Toth, has succeeded Makovski as Secretary-General. The CPC has seven vice-presidents -- one each from Madagascar, Cuba, Hungary, Switzerland, India, West Germany and Czechoslovakia.

A Committee for the Continuation of Work (CCW), consisting of some 98 members, carries on the CPC's work between meetings of the Assembly. There is a working committee of 23 members, including the president and secretary-general, and there is an international secretariat of 18 members.

The CPC claims to have members in 48 countries. Members of Christian associations, professors of theology and Christian laymen are eligible for membership. Regional organizations exist in Africa, Asia, Europe, North and South America and Australia.

The CPC operates as a surrogate of the World Peace Council, and is represented on the WPC's presidential committee and on its council.

Activities

According to its constitution, the CPC seeks "to be a forum at which Christians from all over the world will meet together and search for God's will concerning current political, social and economic problems." The CPC strives to maintain close co-operation with such bodies as the World Council of Churches, the Conference of European Churches, the All-African Church Conference, the Berlin Conference of Catholic Christians (East Germany) and Pax Christi International. The CPC has consultative status with UNESCO and is frequently represented at meetings of various UN special committees, including those on racialism, decolonization and disarmament. It issues a quarterly publication, Christian Peace Conference, in English and German and an information bulletin about three times monthly.

The CPC helped to set up a preparatory committee to organize a World Conference of Religious Leaders in Moscow in 1977. The CPC took part in discussions at Bremen in April 1976 on "Liberation and Detente -- young Christians participate, in the spirit of Jesus Christ, in efforts towards a better world."

Eighty participants from Europe, North America, Africa and Asia attended a seminar in West Berlin in January 1975 on "What is the meaning of the Word Christian in the Work for Peace?" CPC President Nikodim, at whose suggestion the seminar was held, sent a message noting that the gathering was the first opportunity in years for leading members of the CPC to enter into discussions with former members of the movement and with representatives of other Christian peace groups. The message express-

ed the hope that ways could be found to continue the "fellowship." At an international secretariat meeting at CPC Prague headquarters in January 1976, a resolution was approved to "support all constructive efforts towards international detente and the implementation of the resolutions of the Helsinki conference."

In spite of such facades, the record shows that the CPC's major effort is to promote Moscow-approved political policies. Some examples are listed below:

- The head of the Russian Orthodox Church delegation to a CPC Working Committee meeting at Limuru, Kenya, in April 1977 was cited by Tass as having "decisively rejected suggestions by Western propaganda concerning 'violations of human rights' in the USSR."
- The CPC in January 1976 publicly called for support of the MPLA in Angola.
- At an International Secretariat Working Committee meeting in Moscow in April 1976, at which 50 leading church representatives were present, Metropolitan Nikodim spoke of "the necessity of putting an end to Zionism's misuse of religious ideas for justifying Israel's aggressive policy."
- The Asian Christian Peace Conference (January 1975), attended by 100 representatives from 22 countries, adopted a resolution demanding "full reunification of Korea in accordance with the principles of the five-point proposal of the North Korean government."
- At the World Conference of Peace Forces held in Moscow in October 1973, J. Michelko, of Czechoslovakia, speaking for the CPC on the disbanding of military blocs in Europe, protested against broadcasts of Radio Free Europe.
- At the CPC's Fourth General Assembly in 1971, resolutions on Vietnam, the Middle East, East Pakistan and South Africa all reflected Soviet positions. At subsequent major CPC meetings statements issued on such international issues and others (for example, Angola, Spain, Chile, disarmament, Cyprus, Latin America and a new international economic order) have continued to follow the Soviet line.

Trends

The scope of the CPC's work appears to be increasing. In addition to regional conferences in Europe, a Christian Conference for Peace in Latin America was held in Chile in April 1972.

and venues for meetings of the CPC Working Committee have included Canada (September 1973), Madagascar (September 1974), the USA (April 1976) and Kenya (April 1977). A Conference on Disarmament and Hunger, first discussed in 1975, is still to be held. The CPC planned an All-African Christian Peace Assembly in Sierra Leone in December 1977 and an All-Christian Peace Assembly in Prague in June 1978.

Its Soviet sponsors have made efforts since 1968 to increase CPC influence in developing countries. The secretary-general reported to the CPC's Fourth Assembly in 1971 that representatives of the Third World now "constitute nearly 40 percent of the assembly."

WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FEDERATION (WIDF)

General

Like many other Communist fronts, the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF) began in Paris (1945) but subsequently (1951) was expelled by the French government and set up its headquarters in East Berlin. It now claims 120 national affiliated organizations in more than 100 countries and its ability to generate activities among leftist women's groups around the world suggests this claim is not overly exaggerated.

However, no non-Communist women's group of any importance has ever joined and WIDF has been run by the Communists since its founding by the French Communist-dominated Union of French Women.

The Union of French Women, which became a major WIDF affiliate, subsequently condemned the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 as a violation of state sovereignty and non-interference. At the subsequent WIDF Sixth Congress, no French delegate was elected to the post of either president or secretary-general; one or both of these posts had been filled by the French previously.

In the past WIDF has claimed a total membership of "over 200 million." Whatever the figure, most members are from



Freda Brown of Australia, the President of the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF), is also a member of the Presidential Committee of the World Peace Council (WPC). She has been a member of the Central Committee of the pro-Soviet wing of the Australian Communist Party since 1961. Her husband, Witton, is also one of Australia's top Communists.

Communist countries. WIDF claims that its budget is supported by affiliation fees and "special contributions," but no figures are made public. Prior to its World Congress of Women in East Berlin in 1975, however, one million marks (about \$400,000) was known to be transferred to its account.

WIDF publishes a glossy quarterly in French, English, German, Russian, Spanish and Arabic and issues bulletins and pamphlets on special topics. It maintains close relations with the World Peace Council (WPC) and other fronts. Its President, Freda Brown (Australia), and Secretary-General, Fanny Edelman (Argentina), are members of the WPC presidential committee. WIDF has status with both UNESCO and with ECOSOC, where it maintains permanent representatives. It also has special status with the International Labor Organization for matters dealing with the rights of women workers and child labor and maintains contact with the World Health Organization on a regular basis.

Activities

WIDF's avowed goals are "to unite women regardless of race, nationality, religion and political opinion, so that they may win and defend their rights as citizens, mothers, and workers, protect children and ensure peace, democracy and national independence; and to establish friendship and solidarity."

It has had no compunctions, however, about interpreting its charter solely in terms of support for propaganda campaigns of the Soviet Union and the other Communist fronts. Run by a bureau and a secretariat, the so-called "highest organ" of the Federation, The Congress, has met only every four or five years and has little say in policy matters.

In any case there has been a party consensus on most issues, although opposition among some of its members to its subservience to Moscow led to a withdrawal of the Italian affiliate as early as 1963. Since the Soviet-Chinese split, Peking and Albania have regularly attacked WIDF as "Moscow's puppet." Its own spokesmen, as well as its programs, repetitively articulate the premise that "only socialism (i.e. communism) leads to woman's complete liberation and offers the most favorable conditions for maximum use of her rights as mother, worker and citizen."

This theme was interwoven among all the topics discussed at WIDF's 1975 "World Conference of Women," held in East Berlin as part of United Nations "women's year" activities -- the latter itself being a WIDF initiative through its UN association. WIDF managed to get UNESCO support for a preparatory meeting for the East Berlin conference, sponsored in Havana by the Cuban Federation of Women. Participants from 140 countries

took part in the 1975 conference, and speakers included Hortensia Allende of Chile and Angela Davis, well-known U.S. Communist. Tightly controlled by the East German hosts and WIDF officials, the meeting aroused some controversy, but was generally successful in promoting East German and Soviet policies and a considerable amount of anti-Americanism.

As part of its Seventh Congress, held simultaneously, WIDF announced plans for a number of seminars and conferences supporting Soviet policies on peace and security in Asia and a world disarmament conference. The 1976-1980 program of action included a series of international meetings on women's role in the struggle against Zionism, apartheid and fascism as well as about their status in various professions. Regional meetings were planned on such topics as the struggle for peace and national independence in Asia, "the role of women and their organizations in defending their rights ... and opposing pillage by the multi-national companies" in Latin America, and "ideological penetration by imperialism with the aid of mass media" in Europe.

Centers offering courses in literacy, hygiene and nutrition were planned for Africa, Latin America and Asia as part of a facade of WIDF activities in seeming support of its charter and responsibilities under its UN status. Meanwhile, in June 1977, the president and secretary-general of WIDF took part in a Moscow conference on "Women and Socialism" as part of the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the October Revolution. Tass has reported WIDF's "profound concern" over American plans to develop a neutron bomb and the Federation consistently supported Moscow's propaganda on Angola and other African issues.

Methods

WIDF's programs have been a mix of openly avowed support for Soviet policies and "educational" projects regarding women's role and rights in society and how socialism can provide solutions to their problems. It is somewhat different from the other fronts in the completely Communist character of its membership. Although it maintains an International Liaison Bureau in Copenhagen for contact with other organizations in the West, it appears to make little effort to involve other leftist groups or persons in its own programs. This is atypical of the classic front and WIDF appears at times to exist mainly to provide Moscow with consistently quotable statements from a so-called international group for use with its own Soviet and bloc constituency. It also serves effectively vis-a-vis the Third World in offering Marxist solutions to social, educational and economic inequities, an effort significantly aided by its identification with various UN agencies. While its significance as a voice in

support of Soviet foreign policy is hard to demonstrate, its "social" work among women's groups in developing countries has considerable potential for the long-term advancement of Marxist doctrine.

Both for its own programs and its close support of other fronts, such as WFTU in the labor field and WFDY in the youth field, it appears to receive considerable financial support from its communist party backers as indicated by its very professional and costly propaganda publications. The heavy expenditure of foreign exchange by East Germany for the 1975 Congress attests to the importance with which WIDF is regarded in the bloc. Although it faces competition from programs supported by Western governments and non-communist women's international organizations, WIDF is by far the more aggressive in pressing the identification of ideology as the dominant factor in the determination of women's role in society.

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF DEMOCRATIC LAWYERS (IADL)

Background

Although restricted in membership by definition, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL) has been one of the most useful Communist front organizations at the service of the Soviet Communist Party. Founded at Paris in October 1946 on the occasion of an International Congress of Jurists, the organization made its debut with a leftist-French coloration, as it was initially sponsored by the Mouvement National Judiciaire. Lawyers from 25 countries attended the first convocation.

By 1949 it was obvious the IADL was a Communist instrument. Most non-Communist members by then had withdrawn their support. Expelled from France in 1950, the IADL set up headquarters in Brussels. Lawyers representing 64 countries registered at the Tenth Congress held in April 1975 in Algiers. A membership of 25,000 is claimed.

A Review of Contemporary Law is published by the IADL twice a year, and an Information Bulletin sporadically. Propaganda pamphlets occasionally are disseminated.

The latest statement of aims as enunciated at the 30th Anniversary Meeting held at the UNESCO Building in Paris was: "To put law at the service of men, democracy, freedom and the new international economic order."

However, the real and ideological interests of the IADL were covered by the agenda at the Algiers meeting which considered law to be a function in the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism and apartheid. Under the banner of anti-imperialism, the IADL's thrust at Algiers was to do battle with the large international companies as a way to gain adherents and backing in the developing world, and in the name of the rights of man to defend leftist groups and individuals bent on changing economic, social and political institutions. Mention of the defects of the Communist world was not in accord with the rules of the meeting. The IADL has sent observers to trials in such countries as Chile, Iran, Morocco, Spain and Turkey, but never to trials held in Communist countries.

Tactics, frequency of meetings and the intensity with which causes have been, and are, pursued vary with the temper of the times and traumatic events affecting the Communist movement.

The IADL in the past three decades has responded to such events as the cold war, the Stalin-Tito confrontation, repression in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Berlin crises, Allende's rise and fall and the USSR's policy of détente. It has over the years set up a number of subsidiary commissions and committees to support specific Soviet propaganda themes. IADL pamphlets and bulletins have also supported these causes.

The Sino-Soviet feud surfaced within the IADL at Conakry in October 1962. At Conakry the Chinese moved unsuccessfully to set up a rival IADL organization, excluding the USSR. At the Budapest Congress in 1964 the Chinese delegation charged that an illegal agenda had been foisted on the meeting by the USSR based on the erroneous "line" of the Soviet Union. At the IADL's 20th Anniversary Meeting in Paris, Chinese lawyers sent a telegram announcing they would not attend and denouncing the "conspiratorial activity of a handful of IADL leaders under the manipulation of Soviet revisionists." The Chinese probably did not make a blanket indictment that most IADL leaders were in the Soviet camp because they hoped to wean away some of them into the Chinese orbit. The Chinese may have been influenced by a striking event in 1966 -- a protest by the IADL French affiliate (the French Democratic Lawyers' Association) with regard to the trial of two Soviet writers, Andrei D. Sinyavsky and Yuli M. Daniel. The protest signed by Pierre Cot and Joe Nordmann, President and Secretary-General respectively of the IADL, was the first time a USSR action had been criticized.

Campaigns and Issues

In retrospect the lone protest against a Soviet dereliction in the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial looked suspiciously like an effort to improve IADL's credibility. Prior to that there had been one-sided, IADL inquiries into "war crimes" in Korea; in 1965 and again in 1967 IADL commissions went to North Vietnam, joining forces in the second instance with the Bertrand Russell Vietnam Tribunal.

There were other issues, such as support for "progressive" elements in Indonesia brought to trial following an unsuccessful Communist coup, the trial of Regis Debray in Bolivia and a commission report on arrests of leftists in Iraq in 1963. Invariably a blind eye was directed towards the USSR and Eastern Europe. As time went on the IADL spread its inquiries even further so regional affiliates in India, Africa and Latin America could draw attention and attract support. Two regional conferences took place in Latin America in 1952 and 1953 to help set the stage, one in Calcutta in 1955 and the one held in Conakry.

Activities in 1970s

From March 1964 to July 1970 no IADL Congresses were held. (The Eighth was at Budapest in 1964 and the Ninth at Helsinki in 1970.) With the embarrassing Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the IADL marked time and did what it could to extend its organizational scope.

The IADL Bureau met with 50 lawyers from 20 countries at Budapest in May 1971. There they set the tone and direction for the 1970s. Pierre Cot and Mihaly Korom, the IADL President and the Hungarian Justice Minister, as keynote speakers, laid down "principles" on Vietnam, the Middle East, the international petroleum situation, European security and cooperation and racial discrimination; proposed various meetings on oil rights (sovereignty of natural resources), human rights (i.e. defense of communists), the economic struggle in Latin America, a world conference on Indochina; and then passed the decisions of the Bureau meeting to a World Peace Assembly which had been conveniently scheduled by the World Peace Council, also at Budapest, a week later.

The Budapest Bureau meeting also was an occasion to kick off a propaganda barrage -- a "save Angela Davis campaign," charges the U.S. was escalating the Indo-China war and support for Hanoi's "peace proposals." IADL leaders then fanned out to meetings they helped promote, such as a Colloquium on the Rights of Oil-Producing Countries at Algiers in October 1972; a forum on Human Rights in Latin America, held at Montevideo in September 1971; and the Third International Conference of Lawyers on Indochina at Brussels in February 1973.

During the past two years, the IADL has made little effort to cloak its support for Soviet foreign policy and other Communist ties. Its main publicity vehicles for news releases invariably are L'Humanite of Paris and East Berlin's Neues Deutschland. On the occasion of IADL's 30th Anniversary Meeting in December 1976, held at the UNESCO Building in Paris, major congratulatory messages, according to L'Humanite, were from President Podgorny of the USSR, Pham Van Dong of Vietnam and President Boumediene of Algeria.

These were among the major subjects and "causes" pushed during the past two years:

- IADL protested Israel's Uganda raid as a "crime against international law."
- IADL pressed a campaign against Chile, and called on journalists to join in efforts to save the lives of imprisoned leftists in that country.

- "Imperialist intervention" in Zaire was protested. No adverse comment was offered about Cuban intervention in Angola.

- IADL organized an International Conference on Human rights in Namibia, which took place at Dakar in January 1976.

- IADL criticized U.S. failure to implement the Paris Vietnam agreement.

- IADL named delegates to attend Bonn Peace Week '77.

In the 31 years of IADL's existence, it has so consistently demonstrated its support of Moscow's foreign policy objectives and is so tied in with other front organizations and the Communist press that it is difficult for it to pretend that its judgments are fair or relevant to basic legal tenets. The IADL has not hesitated to work openly, even publicly, with other front organizations -- especially the World Peace Council. President Cot is a Peace Council member and was awarded the Lenin Peace Prize in 1953.

INTERNATIONAL RADIO AND TELEVISION ORGANIZATION (OIRT)Background

In its early days the International Radio and Television Organization (OIRT) seemed to fulfill the main requirement stipulated by Lenin (at the Third World Congress of the Comintern in 1921) for a "transmission belt": a front organization under Communist control but with a non-Communist majority of members. The organization was founded at a conference in Brussels in 1946 by 28 radio organizations of European and African countries under the name of the International Radio Organization (IRO).

From the beginning the eight votes of the Soviet Union and its satellites, used as a bloc, were sufficient to maintain control over the non-Communist members of IRO. But the manner in which the Communists sought to run the show provoked Algeria, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Morocco, Tunisia and the Vatican to secede in November 1949. The IRO facade of a democratic mix of disparate ideologies collapsed. In February 1950 the British Broadcasting Corporation struck a blow against the Communist-controlled IRO by organizing a rival non-Communist organization, The European Broadcasting Union (EBU), with headquarters in Geneva. In April 1951 IRO received another rebuff when Syria and Yugoslavia withdrew their membership. Most other leading non-Communist organizations have since left the Moscow-controlled front, mostly to join the EBU.

At a General Assembly in July 1959 the IRO's name was changed to International Radio and Television Organization or Organisation Internationale de Radiodiffusion et Television (OIRT). By 1963 the only non-Communist members of OIRT were radio and television organizations from Finland, Egypt, Iraq and Mali.

Structure

In contrast to other front organizations, full membership in OIRT is confined to national (broadcasting and television) organizations. There is provision for associate membership. While remaining outside the now almost totally Communist OIRT, the Yugoslavs have attended meetings as observers.

The OIRT's highest body is the General Assembly, which elects the Administrative Council. Within the Administrative Council is the Presidium, comprising the president, vice-presidents, secretary-general, director of the technical center and chief editor. In 1966-67 the president was from Poland, the secretary-general from Czechoslovakia, the two vice-presidents from Mali and Mongolia respectively, the director of the technical center from the USSR, the chief editor from Czechoslovakia, the chairman of the technical commission from Bulgaria and the vice-chairman from Cuba. Ordinary members of the Administrative Council came from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, the USSR, Cuba and China (although China had already for all practical purposes withdrawn from the organization).

In 1973 the OIRT President was Dr. Jan Zelenka of Czechoslovakia. Another Czechoslovak, Jaromir Hrebik, had the key post (in terms of liaison with the USSR) of secretary-general -- a position he had held for at least 10 years.

The OIRT headquarters are in Prague, where the main technical center is also situated. Before the Sino-Soviet split the OIRT had another technical center in Shanghai. The Intervention Council, set up by the OIRT in 1958, established a television network of OIRT members in 1960.

Activities

OIRT's overt activities are mainly concerned with technical matters. The organization has published a periodical review, mainly technical, Radio and Television, in English, Russian, French and German. The avowed aims of the organization are to link broadcasting and television services in various countries, to exchange information and to "uphold the interests of broadcasting and television by solving all questions by means of international co-operation." But OIRT has a basic political propaganda function on behalf of its Soviet sponsors, including attempts to influence the development of Third World radio and television organizations through training and other assistance programs.

OIRT is the tool for the co-ordination of radio and television propaganda of the Communist countries for ultimate targeting at non-Communist countries. Because the radio and television organizations of the Communist countries are state-controlled and subject to the ideological direction of the Communist Party, talks and other programs acquire the political slant desired by Moscow.

During the early years of the organization Communist broadcasts to Latin America, Africa and Asia increased no-

ticeably. At the 1965 General Assembly of OIRT, held in Warsaw, a resolution was adopted calling for "the fullest expansion of fruitful ties with the radio and television broadcasting organizations in Africa, Asia and Latin America."

While stepping up the export of radio and television propaganda to Third World countries in the years immediately following the Warsaw resolution, OIRT and its East European affiliates also attempted to build up relationships with West European broadcasting and television services. A number of agreements on co-operation between East and West European countries were concluded or renewed in 1967; and the Austrian and Yugoslav television services were represented at discussions on joint programs devoted to the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution and plans for covering the 1968 Olympic Games.

OIRT held what was described as its 51st Administrative Council Session in Bucharest in December 1976. As reported by the Romanian national news agency, Agerpres, the meeting was attended by representatives of the broadcasting and television organizations of European Communist countries and of Finland and Cuba. Program exchanges and other forms of co-operation were discussed, according to the report.

WORLD FEDERATION OF SCIENTIFIC WORKERS (WFSW)General

The World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW) was launched in London in 1946 at the initiative of the British Association of Scientific Workers. The WFSW has consultative status with UNESCO. Headquarters is in London and the secretary-general's office is located in Paris. Although individual scientists and scientific organizations in all parts of the world may join, the main membership, claimed at 300,000, is drawn from Communist countries which from the start have controlled programs and policies.

Of the eleven General Assemblies held since 1948 (the London meeting in July 1945 was a Constituent Conference), three were in non-Communist cities (London, Helsinki and Paris); one Assembly meeting was split between Paris and Prague; and seven others were held in Communist East Europe.

Although the General Assemblies are forums from which positions are presented in detail, planning and primary tasks are carried out more and more through the Executive Council. The Bureau, which convokes its own meetings, recommends strategy and initiatives and acts also on the recommendations of standing committees. Regional centers in Prague, Cairo and New Delhi tailor activities to their geographical areas.

Published material and guidance is conveyed through the quarterly, Scientific World, now printed in English, French, German, Russian and Esperanto. Two recent pamphlets, on Disarmament and Ecology, were produced jointly with the WFTU.

The current roster of officers illustrates where the core of the organization has its roots, and the dominance of the Communist countries in its affairs. In addition to British President Dr. E. H. S. Burhop (1971 Lenin Peace Prize winner and member of World Peace Council Presidential Committee), representatives from these countries are officials: USSR, Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, Poland, Yugoslavia, Mongolia, Vietnam, France, India, Egypt, Japan, West Germany and Holland.

Strong Eastern European representation not only assures policy and program control of the WFSW by the Communist countries, particularly the Soviet Union, but it provides a way

by which financial resources can be funneled into the apparatus by legitimate membership contributions and in other ways.

Ninety percent of WFSW's financial support is estimated to come from the Soviet Union and East Germany. President Burhop gave an indication of that assistance when on the occasion of a Symposium of Young Scientific Workers in 1971 at Enschede, Netherlands, he thanked the Soviet and East German affiliates for their generous donations to the travel fund.

Because of propaganda and "abuse-of-science" campaigns increasingly undertaken by the WFSW, the organization has coordinated more and more with other front groups, including the World Peace Council, World Federation of Trade Unions, World Federation of Teachers' Unions, International Union of Students and the International Radio and Television Organization (producing for many years the program Science in Service of Peace). WFSW has arranged a systematic input into UNESCO and the ILO.

Ties with the World Peace Council have been constant. Professor F. Joliot-Curie, the first WFSW President from its founding until 1957, was also President of the World Peace Council. Professor C. F. Powell, the second President, was a member of the WPC, as have been other officers of the WFSW. The WFSW was a major influence in organizing the first conference of the Pugwash Movement of Scientists for Peace. Professor Powell was chairman of the Pugwash Continuing Committee in 1967.

Disputes in the Communist world have echoed within the WFSW. Yugoslavia was expelled from the WFSW at the time of the Tito-Stalin controversy. The Sino-Soviet confrontation found expression at the Afro-Asian Scientists Symposium in New Delhi in 1965. The Chinese delegate accused the Soviets and Indians of collusion in attempting to undercut the influence of a previous scientific symposium held in Peking in 1964. The Chinese convened their own "Physics Summer Colloquy" at Peking three months later. The WFSW refused to condemn the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, as suggested by some affiliated organizations. Ivan Malek, head of WFSW's center in Prague, was fired after the invasion as a result of Soviet pressures.

Activities

The avowed aims of the WFSW, stated in the Constitution and Charter, meet the general criteria of most scientists: To employ science for the peace and welfare of mankind; to use it as a means to help solve the urgent problems of the times; to exchange scientific knowledge freely; to improve the status of

the scientific worker; to direct scientific endeavors for the advancement of society; and so on.

Actually, throughout its history, the WFSW has neglected the pursuit of scientific objectives and has concentrated on supporting the Soviet line regarding disarmament and world political issues. For example:

- During the 1962 Cuban crisis the WFSW protested U.S. defensive measures, but was silent about the Cuban-Soviet missile buildup.
- The WFSW Conference on ABC (atomic, biological and chemical) Weapons at East Berlin in November 1971 took up "abuse of science" themes upon which it had hammered since the Korean War (in those days a "germ warfare" campaign against the U.S. was conducted). At the East Berlin meeting a resolution was passed calling upon the U.S. to "cease chemical warfare in Vietnam." The Soviet proposal for convening a world disarmament conference also was a major agenda item, as it had been since the executive council's meeting at Varna in 1966.

Activities over the past two years clearly show what kind of organization WFSW has become and how it can be expected to act in the future.

President Burhop called a meeting of the Bureau and the special commissions at East Berlin in January 1976 to evaluate the results of a disarmament symposium in Moscow in 1975 and the implications of the Helsinki Conference on the WFSW. The 11th General Assembly at London in September 1976 worked under the umbrella theme, "The Interrelation of Current Economic and Social Developments with Science and Technology." A Bureau meeting in January 1977 at Morainvilliers, France, announced plans for an international symposium on multinational companies to be held in 1978. Earlier the Socio-Economic Committee at a Paris meeting planned coordination activities and information exchanges with the WFTU, ILO and UNESCO.

For his part, President Burhop was responsible for two "disarmament initiatives." He was one of a number of signers of a letter sent in December 1975 to the British Prime Minister in which the United Kingdom was asked to cooperate with the USSR in seeking a universal ban on nuclear weapons. In 1977 he issued a WFSW brochure denouncing the U.S. decision to produce the neutron "bomb" -- an issue which precipitated frenzied activity by a number of other front groups.

Organizationally, the WFSW today is more tightly controlled than ever by its largely Communist membership. It has succeeded in setting up liaison and lines of communication with United

Nations organs. As always, it works in tandem with other front organizations. It has enlarged the number of members and affiliates in the developing world.

Now and into the foreseeable future, the WFSW will support Moscow's disarmament proposals and the Kremlin's positions on security and cooperation in Europe. The U.S. (as in the case of the neutron issue) will continue to be attacked for "abuse of science." Efforts will be made to curry favor in the developing world, directing criticism at the multinational companies as monopolists charged with exploiting the scientific worker. In Europe, and West Germany in particular, charges of discrimination against scientific workers with leftist persuasions can be expected.

If anything, the WFSW will be more political and less scientific.

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF RESISTANCE FIGHTERS (FIR)

Origins

The International Federation of Resistance Fighters (FIR) was organized in 1951 in Vienna, where it has maintained its headquarters since.

Growing out of an association of former political prisoners, the new federation expanded the membership to include individuals or groups which had been victims of Nazism or fascism, including especially World War II partisans and resistance organizations. Descendants of those so involved are also eligible. At the time it was a major effort by the Communists to influence and make use of an elite veterans groups, many of whose members had moved into political or bureaucratic positions of significance in Western Europe. Its roots and the nature of its membership limited its organizational efforts essentially to East and West Europe, where it claims representation in every country. The only non-European affiliate is in Israel.

The FIR presently publishes a journal in French ("Resistance Unie") and in German ("Widerstandskampfer"). It maintains two press services in those languages, used to publicize activities and resolutions and occasionally issue special pamphlets.

Its current President is Italian (Arialdo Banfi); Alex Lhote of France is Secretary-General. The FIR is recognized by UNESCO and ECOSOC.

Activities

In addition to promoting the memory of the horrors of concentration camps and the ideals of the resistance, the FIR charter calls upon its members to unite to secure independence for their homelands and freedom and peace for mankind. Members are to fight against racial, political, ideological and religious discrimination and to work for peaceful relations between nations in accord with the United Nations Charter.

Nevertheless, like other Soviet fronts which are supported and controlled by a department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the FIR has been persistently selective in imple-

menting its charter only in support of Soviet foreign policy positions. Calling attention to neo-Nazism and fascism in such countries as Spain, Chili, Greece or West Germany has been a recurring theme in its meetings and publications over the years.

It has consistently followed the Russian lead on disarmament, human rights, the Portuguese elections and South Korea.

After Tito's break with Moscow the Yugoslav affiliate was expelled. Discrimination against Polish-Jewish survivors of concentration camps in the Polish affiliate was ignored, as were the purges of pro-Dubcek members of the Czech Association of Anti-fascist Fighters. A serious and vituperative split in the Congress over the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia was glossed over in reports of the session and different accounts distributed to Eastern and Western member groups.

The FIR Historical Commission has organized conferences on the History of the Resistance which extol the role of the Communist partisans and the Red Army, denigrating all other parties. Its responsiveness to Soviet interests is further documented by the alacrity with which it set aside its anti-United States program on Vietnam in 1974 to accommodate Moscow's initiatives on arranging a European Security Conference.

Although FIR since its founding has consisted mainly of Communist groups, with its acceptance by ECOSOC it has had more success in arranging joint efforts with Western veterans organizations, such as the Paris-based World Veterans Federation, with which it organized a European symposium of ex-servicemen for disarmament in 1975. In July 1977 it called for an end to the arms race in a message to other non-governmental organizations with consultative status in ECOSOC.

Current Status

Although the highest governing body of FIR is its Congress of representatives of member organizations, that body now meets only every four years and real power lies with the Bureau. Headed by the president, it controls the secretariat, supervises implementation of decisions by the Congress and is responsible for the budget. No budget figures are made public, but the federation claims to be financed by affiliation fees, gifts, legacies and "other subventions."

FIR sponsors such activities as annual memorials and rallies at monuments and at former concentration camps, medical conferences on the effects of imprisonment, and days or weeks of "solidarity with Former Political Prisoners and Fighters against Facism." All are used as a facade or occasion to enunciate positions on issues selected by the Bureau with Soviet guidance.

These annual pilgrimages or celebrations have become less frequent and the significance of World War II resistance and veteran groups has declined with the passage of time. The FIR, however, continues to add its voice to the chorus of other Soviet fronts. It maintains close liaison with the World Peace Council (WPC) and the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL) and has sponsored exhibitions and lectures at the world youth festivals sponsored by the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY). Although FIR strength may have eroded in recent years and the level of its activities declined, it continues to contribute to Moscow's worldwide propaganda program.

The non-Communist International Union of Resistance and Deportee Movements (UIRD) has denounced FIR as "an instrument of agitation and propaganda" serving the USSR and has consistently rejected FIR appeals for joint action.